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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines Thai foreign policy since the end of the Cold War as a focusing 
period. In its essence, it proposes that Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy can 
be viewed as more proactive than what the conventional wisdom holds. 
Considering the strong influence of nationalistic sentiment amongst Thai people, 
this thesis suggests to look closely at the role of how this factor plays part in 
constructing Thailand's self-perception. In other words, it examines to what extent 
the way in which Thai policy-makers see their country, influences Thai foreign 
policy-making process and the possibility of transforming Thai foreign policy 
behaviour from reactive to proactive one. 
This thesis traces back the origin of this self-perception. It argues that Thailand's 
self-perception is a product of social construction throughout its modern nation-
state building process. It has resulted in a consensus view that Thailand and its 
people are in a better quality than its neighbouring countries. Coupled with its 
strong geopolitical position in mainland Southeast Asia, Thai policy-makers have 
been convinced that Thailand is a natural leading state in this area. This thesis 
argues that this self-perception has remained in its essence. The Cold War 
environment in which Thailand became a frontline state against communism 
accentuated this view whilst its surrounding neighbours were viewed with an 
antagonistic attitude. 
The prevailing globalisation since the end of the Cold War did not alter this self-
perception in its core. However, this thesis further contends that since the nature of 
the Thai state has transformed into the competition state model in which economic 
competitiveness replaced national security as an ultimate national interest. State's 
strategy then revolved into promoting its competitiveness. One way to achieve this 
goal was to promote economic co-operation. Operating within this logic, Thai 
decision-makers therefore maintained the perception that Thailand was in a 
suitable position politically and economically and should be a leading actor to 
foster regional co-operation. 
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This thesis shows that Thailand's aspirations to play a leading role in Southeast 
Asia's development arguably reflect in its foreign policy throughout the post-Cold 
War period. Regional economic co-operation schemes preoccupied most of Thai 
governments' agenda since Chatichai Choonhavan until Thaksin Shinawatra. This 
thesis gives a detailed study of two major foreign policy cases in the Chuan 
government and the Thaksin government. They reveal that regional aspirations in 
both cases mattered in shaping foreign policy goals. Regardless of its success or 
failure to achieve these goals, this feature was a part of Thai foreign policy-making 
that shapes foreign policy direction and behaviour in the post-Cold War era. 
Therefore, this research finds that Thai foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has 
gradually become more proactive partly based on the self-perception and a re-
emergence of regional aspirations. Contrary to the conventional belief depicting 
Thai foreign policy as 'bamboo bending with the wind' -a policy of accommodating 
external forces in order to preserve its national security and status quo, this thesis 
demonstrates that Thailand has increasingly played a regional leading role. This 
leadership involved an active role in regional agenda setting and facilitating 
regional co-operation. This leading role is expected to illuminate Thailand's 
position in the region. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis evaluates the changing nature of Thailand's foreign policy in the post-Cold 
War period. It examines the ongoing debate over Thai foreign policy behaviour and 
offers a distinct explanation of how Thai foreign policy behaviour should be viewed. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that generally argues that Thai foreign policy is 
generally reactive, this thesis asserts that such a view has become somewhat 
problematic especially in explaining Thai foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. This 
thesis therefore proposes that Thai foreign policy behaviour in this period has become 
more proactive. In this connection, this thesis is interested in examining an ideational 
factor-self-perception-as one of many sources of foreign policy proaction as 
opposed to only situating national interests exclusively in materialistic terms. It traces 
the ideational basis of foreign policy-making in association with the formation of the 
modern Thai state and addresses the social consequences of how Thailand views itself 
in its relations with the outside world. It asserts, moreover, that this 'social 
construction' of self-perception has certain influences on Thai foreign policy-making, 
particularly in terms of identifying policy preferences or strategies to achieve goals. 
The main concern of this study is, then, how Thailand's self-perception of being a 
leading actor in Southeast Asia relates to its foreign policy preferences in line with its 
desire to see Thailand playing a leading role in regional affairs. It contends that this 
self-perception has played a role in forming Thailand's foreign policy preferences as it 
has attempted to influence the region on many occasions. It draws on the existing body 
of literature on Thailand's foreign policy behaviour. It also incorporates assessments 
on the historical development of Thailand's self-perception, selected theoretical 
concepts on the changing nature of the state, and detailed case studies of two major 
foreign policies in the post-Cold War initiated by different major Thai political parties 
in pre- and post-1997 Financial Crisis periods. 
This introductory chapter develops a case for studying Thailand's foreign policy in the 
context of the country's leadership aspirations especially for mainland Southeast Asia 
and for Southeast Asia in a broader sense. It shows how this thesis is significant in 
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expanding the body of knowledge about Thailand's foreign policy behaviour which 
incorporates both theoretical and policy relevancies. It also develops key research 
questions within the context of a broad theoretical frameworks and a methodology 
that lead to drawing inferences and to identifying pertinent data to answer the 
research questions. The chapter's conclusion outlines the structure of this thesis and 
the main focus of each chapter. 
1.1 The significance of the study of Thai foreign policy 
Providing a general overview is necessary for understanding the importance Thailand 
has within the history of Southeast Asia's regional politics. It is suggested here that 
despite its significance as a leading actor in the region, Thailand's foreign policy has 
recently failed to attract sufficient attention. Academic debate on this topic can thus be 
reinvigorated by offering a fresh focus on ideational factors that are usually not taken 
into account in previous studies of Thai foreign policy analysis. 
1.1.1 The role of Thailand in Southeast Asia 
Throughout the history of mainland Southeast Asia Thailand has been a leading actor. 
This historical experience has added a distinctive characteristic to the modern Thai 
nation. Ancient Thai kingdoms were embryonic predecessors of the modern Thai state, 
and 'Siam' (the former name of Thailand) was a regional power in Southeast Asia 
(Brocheux & Hemery 2009, p.10), particularly after the fall of the Khmer Empire and 
the rise of Ayutthaya Kingdom in the mid-fourteenth century until the early nineteenth 
century. Therefore, noting the role of Siam is integral to the study of mainland 
Southeast Asia's history. 
Siamese diplomacy played a very important role during the European colonial 
expansion into Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century. This was due to its political 
influence and occupation in major parts of mainland Southeast Asia and in certain 
Malay archipelagic states. According to Thai official history and mainstream historians, 
Siam had conquered the Khmer Empire, the Laotian kingdoms and most of the less 
powerful Malay sultanates to its south (Waruni 2001). Siamese influence thus 
encompassed most of mainland Southeast Asia even before the European colonial 
powers expanded into Southeast Asia. The exceptions were Vietnam and a large part of 
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the Kingdom of Burma. By the nineteenth century Siamese vassal states covered a 
significant area ranging from the south of China to the Malay Peninsula. This was 
recorded in 1857 by Sir John Bowring, the Governor of Hong Kong who was dispatched 
to negotiate a treaty with the court of Siam (1857, pp.1-55). Siam had exercised 
political influence over these auxiliary territories until they were ceded to European 
control, so as to preserve their 'genuine' Thai parts. A major chapter in mainland 
Southeast Asia's diplomatic history during this period was inevitably about how the 
European powers, especially Britain and France, interacted with and engaged with 
Siam in order to achieve their colonial objectives. In turn, Siam managed to be the only 
part of Southeast Asia that escaped direct colonisation and maintain its sovereignty 
throughout the nineteenth century. This historical background is a source of pride 
amongst the Thai people in contemporary times. 
During the Second World War, Thailand was also seen by Japan as a key strategic actor 
for its further expansion into inland Asia, especially Burma and Southern China. 
Thailand's decision to align with Japan in order to escape the Japanese occupation and 
to maintain its sovereignty underscored its highly developed sense of policy 
pragmatism. Despite its siding with Japan, Thailand was able to avoid being treated as 
a cobelligerent based on the recognition by the United States of its underground anti-
Japanese movement and was thereafter able to join the United Nations. Thailand's 
diplomatic skill therefore helped the country emerge from uncertainty after the war 
and resume its regional role during the Cold War under the American security alliance. 
During the Cold War, Thailand's regional role can be clearly understood in its relations 
with the United States' strategic posture and its anti-communist expansion in the 
region. Thailand together with South Vietnam and the Philippines anchored the United 
States' posturing strategic position in the region, notably its accommodation of the 
American military deployment during the Vietnam War. Thailand was also a founding 
member of ASEAN, the only enduring region-wide organisation, not to mention other 
regional groupings prior to ASEAN in which Thailand had actively participated. These 
included the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and the South East Asian Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO). Moreover, it was Thailand that mobilised ASEAN to apply 
pressure against Vietnam as a result of the latter's invasion of Cambodia in the late 
1970s. This resulted in the imposition of international sanctions on Vietnam and its 
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puppet government in Phnom Penh. It also entailed a long process of international 
peace negotiations on the Cambodian issue that dominated regional and international 
discussions about Southeast Asia throughout the 1980s. Chinese regional influence 
intensified as a result of such negotiations, and the Sino-Thai relationship became a 
major driving force in Southeast Asia's regional affairs during the same period. 
Therefore, it can be surmised again that Thailand's role was also a significant 
component of Southeast Asia's regional order during the Cold War. This role is perhaps 
best captured by Barry Buzan's argument about security complexes (1988; 2003). He 
contends that Southeast Asia during the Cold War comprised two sub-regional security 
complexes: the 'Indochina Security Complex' and the 'Malay Archipelago Complex'. 
Thailand and Vietnam played a key role in the former while Indonesia dominated the 
latter (Buzan 1988; 2003, pp.133-136; Emmer 2006; Ganesan 2001). However, 
Thailand's role during this period cannot be viewed in isolation from the Cold War 
politics of the major powers in the region. 
In the post-Cold War environment, the balance of power politics that played a major 
role during the preceding period was subordinated. This was, in large part, due to the 
absence of traditional secudty threats to the 'holy trinity' of the Thai nation, namely 
'nation', 'religion' and 'king'. Although the rise of China has drawn Beijing and 
Washington into a political and strategic competition in the region, Thai policy-makers 
understand that such tensions will probably not reach a critical breaking point where 
the two contending powers engage in direct military confrontation (Kusuma 2000, 
p.334). In this situation, Thailand prefers not have to 'choose sides' but rather to shape 
its foreign relations based more on self-determination. One of Thailand's main foreign 
policy strategies is to promote its active role in the region that will ultimately create a 
regional setting in which Thailand's national economic and strategic interests are best 
realised (Buszynski 1989, 1994; Kusuma 2000, pp.334-5). This general trend is well 
observed by Macintyre and Soesastro (2006), that the end of the Cold War and the 
impressive economic growth in East Asia gave a sense of 'national self-confidence and 
assertiveness' and a greater 'freedom of foreign policy movement' amongst policy-
makers across the region (p.266-7). 
A major shift in Thai foreign policy revealed this self-confidence during the final days of 
the Cold War under the Chatichai Choonhavan government (1988-1991). Thailand 
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reconstituted its policy towards a rapprochement with Indochinese countries and 
promoted economic development in mainland Southeast Asia under the slogan of 
'turning the battlefields into marketplaces'. However, some critics claimed that after 
the Chatichai government, Thailand's foreign policy had no significant regional impact, 
notably so during the Chuan Leekpai governments (Funston 1998d; Thitinan 2004b, 
p.3). Thai policy-makers had been increasingly concerned that their country had lost 
its ground as a leading actor in the region. This belief was enunciated by Prime 
Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh in 1997. He feared that his country's role in shaping 
regional policy was being overshadowed, contrary to past times when other countries 
would have consulted Thailand about regional affairs (Bangkok Post, 17 March 1997). 
1.1.2 The current stage of the study of Thai foreign policy 
Parallel to the concerns discussed in the previous section, the study of Thai foreign 
policy behaviour after the Cold War has also been somewhat in a state of inertia. This 
can be attributed to several reasons. First, it has been almost a given that Thai foreign 
policy behaviour is best characterised as 'reactive'. This is due mainly to Thailand's 
high degree of adaptability and policy accommodation to the external environment, 
especially with regard to regional great powers inherited from the Cold War period. 
This foreign policy behaviour has been characterised as 'bamboo bending with the 
wind' diplomacy. However, after the Cold War's demise and especially following the 
conclusion of the Cambodia peace agreement in 1991, the focus of Thai foreign policy 
shifted to other issues, especially those related to economic and human rights. The 
economic boom and the rise of democracy during the early 1990s, and the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997, accentuated this trend. Interestingly, however, the shift of 
focus has not changed the conventional view of security-oriented foreign policy 
amongst academia and observers, leaving the emerging significance of 'low-political 
issues' in a separate domain. Therefore, the general reference of Thai foreign policy 
behaviour has remained unaltered despite the changing nature of the Thai state and its 
other emerging foreign policy directions. 
Second and related to the above development, the study of Thai foreign policy 
behaviour has been virtually abandoned. Recent trends in Thai foreign policy studies 
direct attention to the immediate issues facing Thailand. The general trend in the 
major literature in the early 1990s focused on several major issues. These included 
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Thailand's policy towards regional conciliation in the aftermath of the withdrawal of 
Vietnam from Cambodia, its foreign economic policy towards ASEAN economic 
integration under AFTA, and the emerging human rights issues in its foreign policy. 
During the 1997 Financial Crisis and its aftermath, Thai foreign policy studies mainly 
focused on how Thailand negotiated with its foreign lenders to obtain economic relief. 
At the same time, the revival of separatism in the southern part of the country and the 
global anti-terrorism campaign led by the United States after 11 September 2001 
incident also shifted attention back to the security issue and Thailand's relationships 
with the major powers. However, no matter how Thailand has responded to these 
issues it remains an issue-based analysis. The Iongue duree study of Thai foreign policy 
behaviour in the post-Cold War has not yet produced significant debate. 
Third, foreign policy issues still command insufficient public attention in Thailand. The 
study of Thai foreign policy is still in a 'twilight zone' in which only a few groups of 
people are interested, notably government officials and academics in the field. The 
private sector and non-governmental organisations have increasingly paid attention to 
the issue. The general Thai public is, however, still largely ignorant and disinterested 
how the government conducts its foreign affairs and believes that such matters are far 
beyond their daily life (Thitinan 2004, p.3). Moreover, recent troubles in Thailand's 
southernmost provinces bordering Malaysia have also heightened Thai people's 
interest in domestic affairs and the issue of terrorism. For these reasons, the debate on 
the factors underlying the enduring Thai foreign policy has not been evident within the 
discussion of Thailand's foreign relations for some time. This situation not only 
undercuts efforts to make the study of Thai foreign policy more rigorous but also fails 
to capture a fundamental understanding of the dynamics in Thai foreign policy. As a 
result, Thai foreign policy behaviour is seen as static and only a product of continuity 
from the past. 
1.1.3 Re-invigorating the debate in Thai foreign policy behaviour: the key 
research questions 
The recent history of Thailand's lackadaisical foreign policy debate combined with 
current concerns amongst Thai policy-makers over losing Thailand's leading position 
has a 'puzzle'. If the view of traditional posture of Thai foreign policy as reactive 
behaviour holds true for Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy, we should expect a 
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situation in which Thailand would be satisfied with its position when international 
politics no longer poses a direct threat to its security and sovereignty, just as it did 
during the expansion of colonialism in the nineteenth century, and the Cold War. 
Indeed, the legacy of Thai 'reactiveness', the dearth of foreign policy study, and the 
general lack of public interest in foreign affairs would all point towards Thailand 
adhering to a status quo posture. 
However, the fact that Thailand has been involved in initiating regional policy 
throughout the post-Cold War period-notably regional schemes involving Indochina 
and sub-regional economic arrangements-may fit uncomfortably with this image. 
Therefore, the first set of key research questions arises: 
Considering the changing nature of the international environment after 
the Cold War, can Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy still be viewed 
through the conventional lens as 'bamboo bending with the wind', or a 
reactive foreign policy? If not, how can it be appropriately characterised, 
and why? 
This thesis questions the validity of 'conventional wisdom' about Thai foreign policy 
behaviour when applied in the post-Cold War era. This thesis makes the case that Thai 
foreign policy has been increasingly proactive inthe post-Cold War period. Instead of 
paying attention solely to material conditions as has been done in most previous 
studies, this thesis is interested in the role of ideational factors as a supplement to the 
whole picture in explaining Thailand's increasingly proactive foreign policy. However, 
by focusing on ideational variables it does not mean that the importance of material 
aspects in foreign policy-making is downgraded. However, certain ideas developed in 
history are distinctive to Thai society and still exist in the minds of the Thai people and 
their perception. These historical legacies may in turn still influence Thai foreign 
policy-making in many ways. 
As David Wurfel and Bruce Burton assert, most modern Southeast Asian states have 
inherited powerful pre-colonial legacies manifested in their self-images, their 
perceptions of external threats, institutions and culture, thus greatly affecting the 
decision-making styles of the political elite in the region (1990, p.2). Although Thailand 
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did not experience direct colonial rule, its historical record of regional affairs-mainly 
involving its interaction with the European powers during that time, including with the 
United States in the Cold War-would also impact similarly. The aforementioned 
comment by Chavalit (1996) on Thailand's fading leadership and his yearning for a 
greater Thai regional role signify this historical component of Thai policy-making. It 
demonstrates that Thai policy-makers' memories and certain ideas of how they view 
their country-self-perception-may play a role in foreign policy-making processes. 
This thesis asserts that in the case of Thailand the above observation of Chavalit's 
comment may closely relate to a concept of 'Suvarnabhumi' or the 'Golden Peninsula', 
demonstrating the Thai political elite's vision of the country as an epicentre of 
mainland Southeast Asia. This ideational factor, though mentioned in the existing 
literature on Thai foreign policy, seldom attracts in-depth analysis. To offer an analogy, 
the issues of self-perception and regional aspirations in Thai foreign policy are treated 
like questioning the existence of gods in the mind of devout adherents to a religious 
belief. They believe in their existence but never seek any empirical evidence of how 
much gods influence men's daily lives. 
Therefore, the second key question addressed by this study involves how ideational 
force has influenced the changing nature of Thai foreign policy behaviour in the post-
Cold War period. To be specific: 
Given Thailand's self-perception as a leading actor in Southeast Asia, to 
what extent and how does it play a role in Thailand's post-Cold War 
foreign policy? 
The answer to the second question is closely connected to and, in fact, further explains 
the first. It is set up in order to examine how such a self-perception influences Thai 
foreign policy-making. This thesis argues that Thailand's self-perception shapes or at 
least justifies a specific foreign policy preference that aims to advance Thailand's 
regional leading profile or so-called 'regional aspirations'. In other words, Thailand 
desires to exercise or project its leading role especially by promoting regional 
economic arrangements. Therefore, to show that Thai policy-makers in the post-Cold 
War period may select their policy options in accordance with that idea helps 
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underline the assumption of Thailand's increasing proactiveness stipulated in the first 
question. 
By seeking answer to these two key research questions, this thesis addresses 
Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy in three related layers. Firstly, it fundamentally 
questions the suitability of the widely accepted typology of Thai foreign policy 
behaviour as a 'reactive' foreign policy particularly in the post-Cold War era. Then, it 
considers Thai foreign policy in parallel with the changing nature of a modern state in 
the context of economic globalisation and the end of the global political contestation 
that marked the Cold War. In this context, Thailand's self-perception re-emerged and 
has been adjusted. This self-perception generates a view of Thai foreign policy as a tool 
to achieve not only material objectives but also, ultimately, ideational goals. Thirdly, 
the thesis argues that this ideational factor facilitates Thailand's attempt to exercise its 
leading role in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War environment, and certainly 
explains its active participation in the regional affairs. 
The conceptualisation of Thai foreign policy behaviour by incorporating ideational 
aspects of policy-making leads to several significant implications for students of 
Thailand's foreign relations and Southeast Asian affairs. First, it helps explain the 
adjustment of Thailand to the new international environment after the Cold War in 
which a smaller state in the international system has more room to exercise its own 
policy direction. Considering Thailand's relatively close ties with both potentially 
contending great powers-China and the United States-the study of Thai foreign 
policy behaviour is an appropriate case through which to observe how such a country 
adjusts its position during times of substantial change. Moreover, a clearer and more 
proper characterisation of Thai foreign policy behaviour will help in understanding the 
contemporary Southeast Asian political and economic development in light of its 
trends in regionalism. 
In the realm of policy-making, if these characterisations of self-perception and Thai 
regional aspirations are valid, we may expect Thailand to be at the forefront of 
Southeast Asian states in supporting the idea of regionalism. These characters suggest 
that the role played by Thailand will be indispensable to the success of the Southeast 
Asian regionalism process. Moreover, this implication can be extended to a broader 
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process in which Thailand's role could be of importance as a bridging agent between 
the advanced and less developed nations or between potential antagonists within the 
region. This role can be equated to the notions of entrepreneurial and intellectual 
leaderships developed by Oran Young (1991). He suggests that apart from structural 
leadership exercised mainly by great powers, these types of leadership are also 
essential in articulating the solutions that 'foster integrative bargaining and put 
together deals that would otherwise elude participants' (p.293). The author shares this 
view along with those of other analysts such as Thitinan (2004) and Ganesan (2001, pp. 
145-146) that evolving Thai foreign policy is important to the region in this context 
and thus deserves to be re-examined. 
1.2 The central argument: a foreign policy with regional aspiration 
The evidence presented in this thesis supports the view that Thai foreign policy since 
the end of the Cold War is not totally dominated by reactive behaviour. Thailand has 
been involved significantly and proactively in rearranging and directing regional 
political and economic development as seen in its rigorous support for regionalism at 
many different levels. This regionalist approach signifies a departure from a 
historically reactive foreign policy towards a more proactive one. It should be noted, 
however, that the reactive foreign policy behaviour as signified by accommodating 
posture in Thai foreign policy does not totally disappear, especially in relation to major 
countries with which power relations are often asymmetrical. Simply speaking, this 
thesis shows Thailand's changing foreign policy portfolio towards proaction through 
exercising regionalist policy. 
Considering the possible role self-perception plays in the proactive nature of Thai 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, Thailand's foreign policy proaction can be 
observed through its distinctive policy preference. Therefore, the central argument of 
this study is that: Thailand's foreign policy in the post-Cold War period prefers to support 
and promote regional co-operation initiatives which allow Thailand to play a leading role 
either as an initiator or co-ordinator regardless of its different domestic political settings 
and structural changes. 
Although the main focus of this thesis is Thai foreign policy, the analysis draws from 
wider relevant theoretical frameworks related to ideational factors in foreign policy 
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and international relations as a framework of analysis. This thesis specifically focuses 
on the need for directing greater attention towards ideational variables which has not 
been assigned much weight in traditional analysis of Thai foreign policy. Therefore, the 
author sees this study as a pioneer in opening up more sustained research on 
ideational factors in Thai foreign policy-making in the future, instead of as an absolute 
conclusion. 
Since this thesis refers to diverse aspects of the ideational approach in its analysis, it 
needs to contemplate how the ideational literature views the significance of ideas and 
their influences on foreign policy-making. This thesis focuses on a core merit of this 
type of scholarly literature in that ideational factors shape policy preferences. 
As asserted by Judith Goldstein and Robert 0. Keohane (1993) ideas can affect policy in 
three ways. First, ideas provide 'world views' in which possibilities for action are 
perceived. They also act as 'principled beliefs' defining certain criteria for judging what 
is right or wrong, and as 'causal beliefs' offering guidelines on how to achieve 
objectives. (pp. 8-11). Therefore, by focusing on beliefs, Goldstein and Keohane suggest 
that 'ideas serve as road maps' to particular preferences whilst other possible 
alternatives are excluded (pp.13-17). Third, ideas also help determine the levels of co-
operation and cohesion for particular groups or to 'serve as focal points'. Policy-
makers may resolve collective action problems and reach agreement based on 'shared 
culture' and other normative factors (pp.18-19). Over time, ideas become 
institutionalised whilst the levels of interest supporting certain initial ideas may fade 
or change (p.21). Therefore, according to Goldstein and Keohane, ideas certainly shape 
policy preferences. Moreover, certain shared ideas may dominate policy-making and 
generate certain types of policy options for a long period of time. 
Constructivism in international relations theory, political psychology, and other 
variants of cognitive-based approaches also attach great importance to the power of 
ideas by sharing their view of endogeneity of both interests and ideas despite their 
detailed differences (or by expressing it in other terms such as 'identities', 'self-
perception', 'self-image', and 'role'). Therefore, these approaches generate certain 
common research enquiries of how ideas are shaped, and how these ideas, in turn, 
influence preferences, choices, or even interests in the policy-making arena. In short, 
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they agree on the impact of historical and social processes, whether they be 
experiences, memories, or social context, in shaping individual and collective views or 
perceptions about themselves (further discussion of these approaches on the aspect of 
how certain ideas are shaped is elaborated in Chapter Three where the formation of 
Thailand's self-perception and its persistence is discussed in detail). Over time, this 
self-perception, identity, or image is used to ascertain reality more simply and inform 
what role actors should perform in response to it. To apply this process to policy-
making, it can be seen that self-perception or identity has a great impact on how 
policy-makers are interested in certain aspects ofreality, hence their policy responses. 
The perspectives of these ideational approaches on the relationship between 
ideational factors and policy preferences help shape the framework of this thesis' 
analysis. Thailand's self-perception as a leading actor especially in mainland Southeast 
Asia helps facilitate a certain policy preference. In other words, Thailand wishes to see 
itself as having an important role in the region. This preference plays out in the post-
Cold War period through its promotion of regional development schemes. The 
persistence of this foreign policy preference in the post-Cold War period, as will be 
shown by this thesis' case studies, supports the thesis' claim that Thailand's foreign 
policy in this period has increasingly developed into a proactive behaviour. 
However, by knowing that Thailand's foreign policy preference is mainly to advocate 
regional co-operation and the country's eminent role in this endeavour, one may 
enquire how this leadership is attained. In other words, this thesis further identifies 
how Thailand's foreign policy proaction is exercised. This study observes that 
Thailand's attempt to influence the region has some elements that can be viewed 
through the concept of international leadership, particularly in association with the 
'middle powers' concept of Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal (1993) and the non-structural 
aspects of leadership in the work of Oran Young's work (1991). These perspectives can 
facilitate our understanding of a smaller power can actively build international co-
operation. 
In brief, the middle powers concept, in particular, asserts that medium-sized countries 
such as Thailand may exercise their international leadership based largely on their will 
and capacity. Their foreign policy tends to be 'active' compared to that of minor 
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powers, but by no means without constraints especially from the great powers' 
influence if the latter decide to obstruct the move of the former (Higgott & Cooper 
1990; Cooper, et al.. 1993). Due to this constraint, middle powers tend to exhibit 
specific behaviours, particularly prioritising and focusing on certain issues as 'niches' 
(Ravenhill 1998, p.311; Cooper et al.. 1993; Higgott & Cooper 1990). Moreover, they 
also tend to 'pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, [and] ... to 
embrace compromise positions in international disputes' (Cooper, et al.. 1993, p.19). 
The literature on middle powers is also generally concerned with what Young (1991) 
suggests in his analysis of regime formation. He argues that not only does structural 
leadership matter in sustaining any regime, but also entrepreneurial and intellectual 
leadership. Co-operation without hegemonic support is still possible if a country (or 
even non-state actors) develops enough policy entrepreneurship. This entrepreneurial 
leadership is exercised by brokering deals or articulating solutions acceptable to 
parties engaged in international bargaining (Young 1991, p.293; 1999, p.806). 
Therefore, both middle power theory and the entrepreneurial leadership concept 
agree that non-hegemonic powers may become 'natural leaders' amongst those 
countries interested in pursuing common functional issues. They can facilitate 
initiatives to build a coalition of like-minded countries to co-operate in pursuing 
common interests. Middle power diplomacy is persuasive rather than coercive since it 
is unsupported by sufficient material power to sanction would-be defectors in any 
coalition formed. Therefore, these concepts are useful in analysing in detail Thailand's 
proactive policy behaviour in cultivating regional co-operation as spelled out in the 
two case studies. 
In short, this thesis argues that Thailand's self-perception plays a role in Thailand's 
post-Cold War foreign policy. It partly shapes Thailand's policy preference for 
exercising its leading role through promoting regional co-operative arrangements. This 
leading role is mainly built through acting as a mediator in setting up regional 
arrangements. 
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1.3 Research methodology 
This study is qualitative in nature due to its main focus being key policy-makers and 
their thinking. In order to provide a detailed examination, this thesis adopts two major 
strategies for examining self-perception and regional aspirations in Thai foreign policy. 
First, it investigates a 'horizontal picture' of self-perception and applies this to Thai 
policy-makers. It traces the possible connection between Thailand's political 
development and Thai people's construction of self-perception. It then examines 
whether the changing structural context of the political economy at the end of the Cold 
War altered previous Thai perceptions and how these regional aspirations took form 
amongst Thai policy-makers, including politicians and government officials. This 
approach offers a broad picture of the role of self-perception in shaping policy 
preference of building its leading role in the region. As will be explicated more 
comprehensively below, the author has relied upon archival materials and interviews 
with selected officials to support this analysis. 
Second, the study 'vertically' traces to what extent this self-perception influences 
policy-makers in their decision making and policy directions. To achieve this, the thesis 
employs a case-study analysis method to examine in detail two major initiatives in 
Thai foreign policy after the Cold War: the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
Initiative (1993), and the Forward Engagement Strategy (2001). By utilising the case 
study method, the thesis draws a link between self-perception, regional endeavour, 
and the foreign policy preferences. With such a bridging of these factors, a conclusion 
can be drawn about the relationship between Thailand's self-perception and its 
attempt to influence the region which can be part of the explanation of Thai foreign 
policy's proaction after the Cold War. 
As intimated above, accessible official documents are employed here to locate, test, and 
confirm the main argument in this thesis that self-perception and regional endeavour 
play a role in shaping Thai foreign policy direction and its proactive policy behaviour. 
By presenting evidence and drawing inference on the direction of Thai foreign policy, 
the thesis illuminates the potential applicability of self-perception as a factor in 
understanding Thai foreign policy. 
- 14 -
The focus of this thesis is 'state-centric' in the sense that the level of analysis is mainly 
state. However, foreign policy represents the 'subjective perspective of the actor' 
(Rosenau 1980, pp. 7-8); therefore, it is important to see how actors involved in 
foreign policy~making think and act. Process tracing can be employed and can be 
modified to suit a strategy that requires the compilation and investigation of different 
aspects of 'the intentional behaviour of individuals and organisations' (Bennett & 
George 1997, p.17). These aspects include the policy-making process, policy-makers' 
motives, and the implementation of the policy. Through modified process tracing, 
Thailand's self-perception and regional aspirations featured in Thai foreign policy can 
be revealed at different stages of development. Therefore, ideas or thoughts held by 
policy makers or government officials are seen as part of the state which formulates 
and implements foreign policy objectives. 
The motives in foreign policy-making traced in this thesis are observed by 
operationalising the idea that Thailand is a regional leading actor in Southeast Asia. 
The thesis investigates whether or not this idea exists in the minds of Thai foreign 
policy-makers as a common denominator, and to what extent it has shaped foreign 
policy direction, particularly in the post-Cold War era. To argue that this regionalist 
idea has played a role in foreign policy, the study shows that Thai foreign policy 
makers consistently make a reference to this regionalist idea in various ways 
throughout the post-Cold War period regardless of the changes of government and 
structural shocks that have affected Thailand. Ultimately, this ideational element helps 
explain part of the proactive nature of Thai foreign policy. Then, the research 
demonstrates that this regionalist characteristic also makes Thai foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War gradually depart from what the conventional wisdom about Thailand's · 
'bending with the wind' or reactive foreign policy implies. 
Although these concepts are admittedly abstract and may not be able to be measured 
with a great degree of precision, this thesis attempts to set applicable benchmarks to 
enable these concepts to be operationalised. The following terms are essential to the 
interpretation and argument throughout this thesis; hence need to be clarified for 
common understanding. 
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'Regional aspirations' relates to the idea of desiring to influence a region or to play a 
leading role in regional affairs. This leading role is closely corresponding to Orang 
Young's leadership concept that 'refers to the actions of individuals who endeavour to 
solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the efforts of parties 
seeking to realise joint gains in processes of institutional bargaining' (1991, p.285). 
Therefore, in this thesis the concept of 'regional aspirations' covers 'ideas' that are 
designed to place Thailand in a leading role in the Southeast Asian regional arena. It 
can be expressed in such ways as 'centre', 'bridge', 'central player', 'facilitator'. The 
major objective of this idea is to adjust, solve, or change the current regional 
environment, or even to create a new environment in which regional interaction can 
be possible. 
'Reactive' and 'proactive' foreign policies are employed here to illustrate a broad 
portfolio of policy objectives. The terms applied in this thesis are adjusted from Palmer 
and Morgan's 'Two Good Theory' of foreign policy (2006). This theory contends that 
foreign policy should not be viewed only as the state's apparatus to protect its security 
or the status quo. Instead, foreign policy consists of many policy objectives that help a 
state achieve its desired outcomes'. These objectives can be categorised into two major 
stances-[first], 'to change something in the world that it does not like ... [ and second] 
to reinforce an existing outcome' (Palmer & Morgan 2006, p.4). To state it more 
succinctly, the theory assumes that a state pursues two broad foreign policy 
objectives-change and maintenance (Morgan & Palmer 1998; Palmer & Morgan 2006, 
pp.1-42). Therefore, this thesis conforms to the 'Two Good Theory' by referring to a 
'reactive' foreign policy as a policy that aims at preserving or maintaining status quo; 
whilst a 'proactive' policy exhibits an intention to alter or adjust the external 
environment in order to elevate a state's position in the international order. 
'Proactive', therefore, corresponds to 'regional aspirations'. Both terms imply a similar 
notion. According to the above definition, the term 'proactive' represents an action 
performed by a state to change the existing nature of its external environment, 
whereas the term 'regional aspirations' implies an idea of a state trying to shape the 
regional environment in such a way as to further its own interests. Thus, the purpose 
of exercising a leading role is to increase the country's influence in its external affairs. 
This leads to the conclusion reached in this thesis that regional aspirations entail a 
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proactive policy to adjust, modify and change current situations that will facilitate or 
enhance a country's leadership. By doing so, a country will be able to pursue its foreign 
policy initiatives that will eventually make its external environment more suitable to 
realising this goal. 
While 'proactive foreign policy' may clearly involve active or assertive characteristics, 
'reactive foreign policy' according to the Two Good Theory is more complicated than 
merely being passive. Reactiveness in foreign policy applied in this thesis is 
determined by foreign policy objective or motive, not merely an observed action. This 
focus also corresponds to the cognitive approach to foreign policy that aims to reveal 
'mechanisms' or 'psychologic' attributes to political motives other than 'political 
thinking and action' (Wrever 1990, p.335). If a foreign policy aims at preserving status 
quo or maintaining an existing arrangement, it is thus regarded as reactive foreign 
policy. However, a reactive policy or maintenance seeking is not static; it can be 
pursued by either passive or active means. Palmer and Morgan (2006) give a good 
example of the United States and its allies' foreign policy in liberating Kuwait from Iraq 
in the early 1990s as maintenance seeking rather than proactive policy as generally 
interpreted. This policy is viewed as a 'reaction' towards the changing status quo in the 
Persian Gulf through 'assertive' actions of military intervention (p.24). 
To obtain relevant information linked to the above factors, selected criteria constitute 
a 'guide' to the study of cases and the collection of data. These criteria include: (a) 
policy-makers' perceptions, especially about the role Thailand is entitled to play in 
regional affairs; (b) regional implications of selected foreign policy, whether or not 
these policies aim merely to adjust Thailand's position according to external pressures, 
or to change the environment in the region, or the pattern of regional interaction; and 
( c) consistency of certain policy preferences pursued by different Thai governments. 
A comparison both within cases and between cases and the aforementioned horizontal 
picture are all useful to elucidate a number of generalisations about Thai foreign policy 
behaviour. They can collectively provide a link between the idea of regional aspirations 
of Thai policy-makers, the policy processes leading to the projection of such ideas into 
specific individual foreign policy, and policy outcomes in terms of a preferred policy 
direction to execute that particular policy. 
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Case selection 
For this thesis, two major case studies-Quadrangle Economic Co-operation and 
Forward Engagement-were selected to examine and illustrate its arguments about 
the influence of ideational factors in Thai foreign policy-making. The case selection is 
based on three main criteria. First, both cases are situated in the post-Cold War 
environment. Therefore, these selections share a similar international contextual 
background, especially one without pronounced ideological conflict across countries. 
Both cases indicate that Thailand intended to exercise regional leadership. However, it 
is not certain whether this intent found in both cases is a coincidence or is dependent 
upon the inclination of specific political leaders and policy-makers. 
Second, the two cases represent 'least-likely' and 'most-likely' episodes, considering 
the nature of the Thai government and its tendency to implement proactive foreign 
policy. This tendency is further influenced by the general public image a government 
cultivates in the process of initiating and implementing a particular policy. The Chuan 
administration, for example, was normally seen by the Thai public as inore 
accommodating and passive to external pressures, and hence more likely to implement 
reactive policy. The Thaksin government, however, appeared to public as being more 
confident and assertive in international affairs and its foreign policy was expected to 
be more proactive. Therefore, if this thesis demonstrates that Thailand's self-
perception and regional aspirations played a role in making both governments' foreign 
policy more proactive than generally expected, it confirms the study's main 
proposition about Thai foreign policy's proactivity 
Third, of the two cases one is pre-1997 Financial Crisis (Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation); the other is post-Crisis (Forward Engagement). This difference provides 
the opportunity for a comparative analysis of both domestic and international shocks 
on Thailand's foreign policy behaviour in the two timeframes. The two cases also 
reveal detailed differences on how regional aspirations were sustained in and used to 
advance foreign policy before and after the shocks. If the thesis can illustrate that 
structural shock did not have a major negative effect on the existing self-perception 
and regional aspirations across times and cases, self-perception and its derivative 
regional aspirations can be identified as significant elements in Thai foreign policy with 
a reasonably high level of confidence. 
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The selection of these two cases also relates to the concept of 'region' in Thai foreign 
policy-makers. The cases signify the regional priorities in Thai foreign policy-maker's 
view. Based on Cantori and Spiegel's argument (1970), the identity of region is 
dynamic and not confined only within geographical boundaries. Region can also be 
shaped due to other elements such as nature of communications, level of cohesion, 
power, and structure of relations (p.406). At the same time, a state can also construct 
multiple regional identities that may reinforce its own identity (Jayasuriya 1994, 
p.411-412). Therefore, both cases reveal several implications. Foremost, it signifies 
that Thailand's interest mainly focuses in mainland Southeast Asia. It is 
understandable regarding its geographical and historical backgrounds of dominating 
this area and its involvement in modern times. As it will be further elaborated in each 
case study chapter, mainland Southeast Asia still maintained its place in both policy 
initiatives. 
However, the second case study shows how the concept of 'region' is fluid and could be 
expanded beyond geographical proximity. In this case, other elements in Cantori and 
Spiegel's analysis-communication, power, and structure of relations-seem to also 
play a role in regional definition. Moreover, by expanding the operative region it allows 
Thailand more room to exercise its leading role in co-ordinating common interest 
amongst distant countries where a mediator was not existent. At the same time, it has 
an implication about leadership competition amongst major states in Southeast Asia. 
Although Indonesia is often seen as a natural leader of the region there is no official 
acceptance of this status. Several leaders from other countries always played a role in 
regional affairs such as notably Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia and Lee Kwan Yew of 
Singapore, regardless of the size of their countries. Therefore, Thailand's attempt to 
play its role beyond Southeast Asia can help lift its international profile effectively, if 
successful. 
As noted above, this thesis utilises a combination of data and information including 
primary official documents, interviews of policy-makers, and secondary data from 
academic writings and newspapers. Official documents relating to foreign policies 
between the Chatichai government (1988-1991) and the Thaksin government (2001-
2006 were collected and reviewed. These documents include declassified policy 
papers, meeting reports and minutes. Speeches of relevant dignitaries in various 
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circumstances such as policy statements to the Parliament, records of parliamentary 
debates, press releases, and newsletters issued by the relevant government agencies 
have also been incorporated. Such documents were obtained from archival collections, 
libraries, and direct enquiries to desk officers of selected government agencies, mainly 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Economic and Social Development Board, 
the Office of the National Security Council, the Office of the Cabinet, and the Parliament. 
Interviews were conducted with selected groups of current and former policy-makers, 
officials and individuals in relevant agencies, to ascertain whether the 
data/information found in archival documents corresponds to actual policy. The 
author was able to access a range of policy-makers including a former Deputy Prime 
Minister, various Foreign Ministers and deputies, retired and current senior officials, 
middle-ranking and desk officials in core agencies related to foreign policy-making 
including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Office of the National Security 
Council (NSC), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the Office of National Economic and 
Social and Development Board (NESDB). Some of the interviews uncovered 
undocumented information and enabled the author to search further for critical 
documents or key persons to cross-check this information. Interviews focused on how 
Thai policy-makers view Thailand's position and leadership in the region; they were 
asked what factors, in their opinion, appeared to be most important to achieving their 
foreign policy objectives. The interviews extracted their experiences of implementing 
the foreign policies under study to gain a general understanding of the opportunities 
and challenges that Thailand faced. These included the capability of relevant agencies 
implementing the policy, the roles of external powers and neighbouring countries. 
The thesis has also made use of secondary sources, such as media analyses and reports 
related to the policies concerned, as well as interviews with area experts and 
academics in the field to obtain opinions and different perspectives on the issues. 
These secondary sources point to some key factors and aspects in which the research 
may have initially and unintentionally overlooked. The collected data and information 
from both primary and secondary sources enabled the author to understand to what 
extent self-perception and regional aspirations were important in Thailand's foreign 
policy-making, and how the issues were handled and implemented. The data and 
information also shows the difficulties and challenges during the courses of policy 
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implementation. Moreover, they have yielded insights into how Thailand responded to 
other countries' reactions towards its policies, and how adept its diplomats and 
government officials were in advocating the policies in order to gain support both 
within and outside the country. The assessment of this data and information has not 
only helped reveal details specific to each individual case, but has also facilitated the 
author's ability to delineate commonalities and patterns amongst cases. 
1.4 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis develops its argument concerning Thai foreign policy behaviour by firstly 
demarcating the specific parameters of the debates in the literature. Therefore, 
Chapter Two provides a broad understanding of this debate in the existing literature 
on Thai foreign relations. It discusses three broad categories of how scholars view Thai 
foreign policy behaviour based on its key factors affecting Thailand's external relations 
with foreign countries-that is reactive foreign policy, the foreign policy based on 
universal principles, and the foreign policy with regional ambitions. 
The mainstream of Thai scholars views Thai foreign policy behaviour as reactive. In 
this view, Thai foreign policy exhibits a high degree of adaptability in the external 
environment, where Thailand's policy has been dubbed 'bamboo bending with the 
wind' diplomacy. This feature reflects its struggle for survival and security orientation, 
from the colonialism period up to the Cold War when external powers played an 
important role in regional politics. Notwithstanding the end of the Cold War, this 
conventional school of thought asserts that this behaviour continues. 
Other typologies of Thai foreign policy behaviour include additional variables-
notably the universal principle of democracy and human rights, and specific political 
leader's ambition-reflecting the political and economic developments in the early 
1990s. Despite introducing other new factors in Thai foreign policy analysis in the 
post-Cold War, these typologies still view the role of new factors fluctuating between 
different governments; hence they ultimately accept the primacy of the conventional 
view as a suitable generalisation of Thai foreign policy. This chapter therefore 
concludes that the current typologies of Thai foreign policy behaviour leave no room 
for viewing the increasingly proactive nature of Thai foreign policy after the end of the 
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Cold War. The chapter points to shortcomings in each explanation and seeks to 
describe this changing character based through ideational factors-self-perception-
that cut across actors and time in the post-Cold War period. 
Chapter Three traces the development of self-perception in Thai history focusing on 
Thailand's nation-building process. Based on a 'cognitive argument' drawn from 
pertinent literature as a loose framework of analysis, the intention is to establish a link 
between Thai modern state-building, nationalism, and the construction of self-
perception shared amongst the Thai people and their policy-makers as a collective idea. 
It shows that nationalism is a critical tool for the Thai state to consolidate its power 
over the modern territory and people especially through mass education. Nationalism 
not only successfully helped modern Thailand escape colonisation but also created the 
'self' and 'other' frame of reference. Based on this reference, the Thais conclude that 
their country and people are 'superior' to other nations in the region. 
Thailand's experiences during the Cold War also reinforced the country's sense of 
significance. Thailand's status as a close ally to major powers such as the United States, 
Britain, and later China, and its role in regional organisations strengthened the idea of 
being an 'important state'. Therefore, this chapter takes the view that this self-
perception was consolidated throughout modern Thai history. Due to the regional 
political environment Thailand could not fully express or translate this idea into policy 
action independently without the involvement of regional great powers. Thailand's 
foreign policy throughout the Cold War era mainly aimed at protecting its security and 
sovereignty by actively seeking or strengthening allies against national threats. The 
chapter further argues that the lingering self-perception gradually revealed itself at the 
end of the Cold War when it started to seek change in the regional environment. 
Chapter Four examines the interaction between idea and materials in the 
globalisation context as a critical juncture towards its post-Cold War foreign policy. 
This chapter examines whether and how the changing economic and political 
environment affects the core element of Thailand's self-perception. It initially draws a 
connection between economic globalisation and Thailand's economic and political 
transformation along with the 'competition state' model. It argues that these changes 
have a direct impact on the Thai state's foreign policy objective in which strengthening 
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its economic competitiveness became an important goal. It further shows that 
Thailand's self-perception continued with some adjustments in its peripheral elements. 
That is, its core perception still holds that Thailand is a leading state in the region and 
should remain its influence while its policy strategy needs to adjust for facilitating 
economic interdependence. This trend reveals in Thailand seeking to play a leading 
role for regional co-operation especially in mainland Southeast Asia. The chapter 
assesses this emerging trend in Thai foreign policy after the Cold War and shows its 
regional focus. This proposition is closely examined in detail in the succeeding chapters. 
Chapters Five and Six examine specifically foreign policy of two major Thai 
governments in the post-Cold War period, the Chuan government (1992-1995 and 
1997-2001) and the Thaksin government (2001- 2006). 
Chapter Five analyses Thailand's role in a particular sub-regional economic co-
operation in mainland Southeast Asia namely the 'Quadrangle Economic Co-operation' 
initiative under the two Chuan governments. This chapter points to some anomalies in 
Thailand's proactive role that are unsatisfactorily explained only by analyses based 
purely on rationalist approaches and material interest. This chapter therefore provides 
a supplement explanation by referring back to the influence of Thailand's self-
perception and its regional aspirations. Only by incorporating these ideational 
elements in Thai foreign policy analysis does the chapter clarify to what extent the 
exercise of regional leadership was important in this regional initiative. These key 
ideational elements arguably made Thailand's behaviour proactive notwithstanding a 
regional great power and other key e.xternal actors such as China, ADB, and ASEAN. 
This chapter offers the view that Thailand perceived its active involvement in regional 
institutionalism as a means to fulfil its ideational vision and to 'sell' it to its regional 
neighbours and other stakeholders. This chapter also reveals that these aspirations 
were broadly shared rather than specific to any certain elite despite the existence of a 
domestic 'push-pull' process at the implementation level. Although the Chuan 
government's general image recalls a reactive working style and policy routinisation in 
which general observers may not expect any significant regional leadership in its 
foreign policy, its management of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative 
paints a different picture. 
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Chapter Six examines the 'Forward Engagement Strategy', a Thai foreign policy 
strategy formulated by the Thaksin government. In general, this chapter addresses to 
what extent regional aspirations were a core element in Thailand's foreign policy 
strategy considering the domestic and regional settings at the time of Thaksin's rise to 
power. It is shown that the immediate mission of the Thaksin government was to 
restore the Thai economy from the consequences of the Financial Crisis in 1997 in 
which financial assistance from international institutions was a reasonable last resort. 
At the same time, a strong backlash domestic coalition against the Western countries 
also emerged as another constraint in public policy calculation. However, the Thaksin 
government's foreign policy neither reverted to accommodating Western great powers 
in return for their assistance nor totally dwelled the domestic outcry for inward 
orientation. Instead, Prime Minister Thaksin chose to cultivate regional co-operation as 
an essential way to economic recovery. In this contest, the domestic backlash and 
internationalist coalitions were manifested in the government's 'dual track' approach 
through its regional strategy. However, what made Thai foreign policy during this time 
interesting is that, instead of utilising and supporting various existing regional fora, 
Thailand again initiated its own version of regional co-operation. Thai foreign policy 
strategy was crafted to ensure that Thailand played a leading role in bridging various 
regional actors in Asia and promoted Asian regionalism centring around three major 
initiatives: the Asia Co-operation Dialogue (ACD); the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC); and the Ayeyawady-Chao 
Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation Strategy (ACMECS). Moreover, Thailand's 
interest in mainland Southeast Asia continued, and could be seen in its exercise of 
leadership in economic development projects and renewed financial assistance under 
the ACMECS scheme. Without the influence of Thailand's self-perception as a leading 
actor, these regional initiatives may not have materialised and been pursued. Thai 
foreign policy may have been much more reactive than it was amidst the thirst for a 
strong economic revival. 
The final chapter, Chapter Seven, summarises the thesis' findings and explores their 
significance and implications. The conclusion reiterates the main argument developed 
throughout the thesis, that Thailand's ideational factors-self-perception and its 
derivative regional aspirations-have a potential merit in explaining the development 
in Thailand's foreign policy behaviour especially in the post-Cold War era. Without 
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these ideational elements in Thai foreign policy-makers, Thailand's foreign policy 
preference may not have sustained its regional orientation. Also, domestic and 
structural changes would have changed the course of Thai foreign policy into different 
postures. The chapter also discusses the contributions of this study to the literature on 
Thai foreign relations, particularly its theoretical and policy implications. It finally 
proposes further possible research for understanding Thai foreign policy in the future. 
To reiterate, the ultimate intention of this thesis is to offer a supplementary view in 
explanation of Thai foreign policy behaviour particularly after the Cold War. It 
provides a room for incorporating ideational factors into Thai foreign policy analysis 
that could loosen the rigidity of the conventional analysis. By doing so, this thesis re-
invigorates the debate over Thai foreign policy behaviour in several respects. First, it 
argues that reactive foreign policy behaviour no longer dominates the general posture 
of Thailand's external relations, but that, on the contrary, Thai foreign policy after the 
Cold War can be viewed as increasingly proactive. Second, this study also establishes 
that how Thailand views itself, that is, in its self-perception can also influence its 
foreign policy behaviour. The emphasis on the role of ideational factors is novel and 
not unique in previous studies in Thai foreign policy. This thesis can thus be regarded 
as a significant step towards understanding Thailand's int~rnational relations as they 
contribute to Southeast Asia's overall political stability and economic progress. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE EXISTING DEBATE ON THE PATTERN OF 
THAI FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR 
The most important thing is when we know that great powers always 
compete for power we must fall into nobody's arms but maintain the 
policy of equidistance-not leaning too much towards anyone who 
will tie us so tight that we cannot breathe comfortably. This is the 
policy that I always followed when I was responsible for Thai foreign 
affairs (Thanat Khoman 1999, pp.186-187) 
The above statement by Thanat Khoman, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Thailand, neatly captures a general view of Thai foreign policy amongst observers 
and experts in the field. This view represents a legacy of Thailand's diplomatic 
successes in contemporary history. These achievements are partly owed to 
Thailand's adept diplomatic skills that have throughout history helped the country 
escape from major direct external threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
This legacy has resulted in the formation of the dominant view of Thai foreign policy 
behaviour amongst scholars of Thai foreign relations, which focuses on the country's 
flexible and accommodating attributes, dubbed as 'bamboo bending with the wind' 
diplomacy. This conventional wisdom also has an important implication, that 
Thailand's accommodating posture to external pressures is equivalent to 'reactive' 
foreign policy. The main policy objective is to preserve Thailand's security and 
maintain its stability. This view has prevailed as a core assumption about Thai 
foreign policy behaviour. 
The challenges or attempts to explain Thai foreign policy behaviour from other 
perspectives also emerged after the Cold War, mainly due to the change in global and 
domestic politics towards the end of the Cold War. These propositions also try to give 
a view of the general trend toward proactiveness in Thai foreign policy based on the 
expansion of universal principles of democracy and human rights, and the vision of 
certain political leaders. 
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The political development inevitably introduced other factors apart from security 
threats in Thai foreign policy-making. The economic transformation since the 1980s 
and the emerging role of non-state actors in international and domestic politics 
gained more attention in both academic and policy-making domains. These two new 
elements were symbiotic. The stronger economic condition gave rise to the business 
and middle classes, hence greater demands for democratisation in many parts of the 
world, particularly following the collapse of the communist bloc. Thailand was no 
exception to this global trend. With the help of modern information technology, the 
proliferation of universal norms and ideas underpinning democracy could make 
their way into Thai politics. This democratic value began to be seen in many aspects 
of political development in Thailand especially after the retreat of the military from 
direct involvement in politics in the early 1990s. The spirit of democratic values and 
principles could be felt notably in the 1997 constitution (Kuris 2003, p.10), as well as 
in Thai foreign policy of the time. 
The other emerging idea in the study of Thai foreign affairs attempts to analyse 
Thailand's role in the region in the post-Cold War era based on certain idiosyncratic 
factors of its political leaders. This third tenet focuses on the ambitions of some Thai 
politicians for Thailand to become a leading regional actor considering its economic 
success. However, this group of scholars sees this ambition mostly as a way which 
allows businessmen-cum-politicians to exploit their political powers for their 
economic and political advantages. Due to its particular focus on personality this line 
of idea does not sufficiently generate a common characteristic of Thai foreign policy 
behaviour. This explanation is limited to only certain political leaders who are 
thought to have conflicts of interest and use foreign policy rhetorically to boost their 
own domestic popularity. 
Against the background of world and domestic political development at the end of 
the Cold War, as briefly described above, Thai foreign policy analysis in the post-Cold 
War period has manifested itself and been portrayed in the existing literature and in 
debates on Thailand's foreign relations. This has resulted in a loose categorisation of 
the literature on Thai foreign policy into different ends of spectrum: 'reactive versus 
proactive' foreign policy based primarily on their different objectives and emphases 
on factors influencing foreign policy-making. At one end, the 'conventional wisdom' of 
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reactive foreign policy posits that Thai foreign policy aims at preserving an 
environment suitable for continuing or sustaining Thailand's sovereignty and 
security. At the other, the challenging explanations argue for emerging proactive 
foreign policy behaviour based on 'universal principles' and 'personal ambitions of 
political leaders'. 
However, this chapter demonstrates in detail that although the conventional wisdom 
is convincing in explaining the general posture of Thai foreign policy before the end 
of the Cold War, that conventionality is becoming increasingly unable to capture the 
post-Cold War era where dynamic changes took place at both systemic and domestic 
levels. At the same time, while giving credit to attempts to explain this changing 
nature in Thai foreign policy through the impetus of universal principles and 
personal ambitions, this thesis contends that these emphases are short-lived and 
unable to offer a sustainable explanation of Thailand's increasingly proactive nature. 
Such debates normally conclude in favour of the conventional school of thought that 
Thai foreign policy even in the post-Cold War period has been continuously reactive. 
This chapter is therefore structured to explore the essence of each existing general 
explanation of Thai foreign policy. Moreover, it examines and assesses the validity 
and weaknesses their explanation and the extent to which they can explain 
Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy behaviour. Showing the drawbacks of each 
school of thought will suggest the gap in the literature which this thesis is also trying 
to fill. 
2.1 Conventional wisdom: the reactive foreign policy for security maintenance 
The idea of Thai foreign policy exhibiting a reactive behaviour is well established in 
the study of Thailand's foreign relations. This conventional school of thought derives 
its strong argument based on Thai diplomatic history especially since the 
introduction of Western colonial powers in Southeast Asia in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. This section reviews how this reactiveness has strongly 
established within the study of Thai foreign policy especially through historical 
records of Thai diplomacy. Finally, it points out the weaknesses of this view in 
understanding Thai foreign policy in the dynamic of the post-Cold War era. 
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Before looking closely at the historical evidence it is useful to clarify some concepts 
that are normally found in association with the explanation of reactive foreign policy 
of Thailand-flexibility and pragmatism. Flexibility and pragmatism in the literature 
of Thailland's foreign relations resemble those described in American philosophers 
notably Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. The concept of American 
pragmatism describes the American worldview with regard to its international 
affairs that prefers following the middle path between preserving the status quo and 
preventing sudden and radical changes inspired by any political or ideological 
position (Crabb Jr 1989, 93). It accepts changes but only with 'gradual' and 
'incremental' pace that is based on the realistic development of a society, whereas 
revolution and radical changes are thought to lead to losses and insecure 
international peace and stability (Crabb Jr 1985, 1989). Moreover, based on this 
pragmatic notion a foreign policy tends to be ad hoc and serves as a solution for a 
particular arising problem (Kissinger 1969, pp.29-34). In this view, American anti-
communism policy during the peak of the Cold War can be discernable as a policy 
that tried to prevent such revolutionary upheavals. 
This description is, in many ways, closely linked with Palmer and Morgan's 'Two-
Good Theory' in explaining foreign policy portfolio of maintenance seeking objective 
as explained in Chapter One. To reiterate the operationalisation of concepts 
employed in this thesis based on 'Two-Good Theory', this thesis differentiates not 
only reactiveness and proactiveness but also proactiveness and mere activeness or 
assertiveness. In connection with the flexibility concept, it views reactive foreign 
policy behaviour as able to be pursued through active or assertive actions as long as 
the main policy objective is to preserve status quo. It can be pragmatic or flexible to 
make 'rapid changes ... [in] actions and statements, goals, aspiration, or abandoning 
bargaining positions, coercive strategies, or set patterns of activity' (Mitchell & 
Druckman 1995, p.213). 
Martin Stuart-Fox (2004) posits that the flexible nature in Thai foreign policy can be 
thought of as having emanated from the 'mandala', an ancient concept of inter-state 
relations in mainland Southeast Asia. This state· system was based on the tributary 
relations in. which smaller states recognised the superiority of the more powerful 
kingdoms. More importantly, loyalty was not exclusive to one but multiple powers as 
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long as they were perceived as potential threats and effective balancers to guarantee 
the autonomy of the less powerful kingdoms. Therefore, it resulted in the system in 
which there existed overlaying spheres of influence over small kingdoms. For 
example, the Khmer kingdom recognised both Siam and Vietnam as its patrons by 
sending 'golden and silver trees' as symbols of acceptance of their suzerainty over 
Cambodia. 
This system was difficult to comprehend for the European powers whose idea of 
states was the Westphalian system in which a single suzerain power or authority was 
recognised, with a clear and well defined demarcation of borders. Stuart-Fox relates 
this concept with Thailand's balancing strategy since the arrival of the European 
powers in the mid nineteenth century, and then concludes that 'the concept of the 
mandala underlines the flexibility of Thai foreign policy. The support of one power to 
balance that of another 'is always in the interest of Thailand' (2004, p.142). The 
tendency to accommodate external powers in order to protect its vital interests-
sovereignty and territorial integrity-is thus a core value in Thai foreign policy 
behaviour. It was external challenges to the Thai state that shaped Thai foreign 
policy to follow this direction. Consequently, the conventional argument perceives as 
an important aspect of Thai foreign policy, that it is mainly reactive and seeking to 
preserve the status quo. 
According to this typology, flexibility and pragmatism in Thai foreign policy in 
practice can be seen throughout history and can be conceptualised in several 
dimensions. Firstly, the flexibility allows Thailand to maintain its status quo in terms 
of sovereignty and security. Secondly, it tends to avoid conflict with major powers, 
but retains good relations with all. Despite its attempt to cultivate cordiality with 
most major powers, Thailand understands that it is relatively insignificant in the 
great power politics and may be abandoned at any time. Thus, Thailand expects only 
temporary arrangements and prefers diversifying its alignment with various external 
powers. Consequently, some scholars have concluded further that Thai foreign policy 
is opportunistic and free from firm principles. These characteristics of Thai foreign 
policy upheld in this conventional wisdom will be examined in detail in the 
succeeding sub-sections. 
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2.1.1 Realist view of security-oriented foreign policy 
~ 
Security is argued to be a primary goal of any state, according to the realist paradigm. 
Waltz argues that 'the first concern of states is ... to maintain their position in the 
system' (1979, p.126). The conventional wisdom on Thai foreign polidy analysis 
implicitly positions its argument about Thailand's reactive behaviour within the 
broad literature of 'small states' in the field of international relations. Thailand's 
foreign policy behaviour through this conventional lens then generally shows the 
characteristics of a 'small power'. As Thanat Kho man puts it, 'Thailand is not a big or 
even a medium power, but a small power ... therefore we have to be realistic and 
pursue a policy appropriate to timing and commensurate with our capability' (1999, 
p.186). 
The notion of small powers assumes that· a small state lacks power in quantitative 
terms (Neumann and Gstohl 2006, p.4) especially in its military and economic 
attributes. As elaborated by Keohane (1969) using a psychological dimension, in 
such a country, the leaders 'consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small 
group, make a significant impact on the system' (p.60). A small power thus often 
'feel[s] threatened, to some significant and immediate sense, by the play of Great 
Power politics' (Rothstein 1968, p.4). Therefore, it actually prefers neutrality and 
nonalignment, and finds the way in which its involvement in the great powers' 
conflict is minimal (p.30). However, ironically an optimal policy of nonalignment and 
neutrality is hard to achieve in reality due to the country's smallness. A small state, in 
Morgenthau's view, therefore can maintain their independence mostly through 
either the balancing or bandwagoning with great powers to guarantee its survival 
(1948, cited in Neumann and Gstohl 2006, p.18). If it chooses inappropriate policies 
it 'may end the possibility of free choice' (Rothstein 1968, p.5). 
This suggests that security and state survival are the primary concerns, thus a foreign 
policy has a significant function to protect this interest. Therefore, the flexibility to 
select an appropriate foreign policy to practically reflect the surrounding 
environment at a particular time is deemed necessary by its leaders. Considering its 
relative weakness in terms of power within the international hierarchy, a small state 
generally exhibits a reactive and passive posture rather than acting actively as an 
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agent of change (Hey 2003, p. 6). The maintenance of the status quo in the system is 
therefore an essential feature of a reactive foreign policy. 
The view of Thailand as a small state, according to this conventional school of Thai 
foreign policy, hence exhibiting a reactive foreign policy to maintain its security and 
survival constitutes the core theoretical background of this conventional wisdom. 
The general description of Thai foreign policy under this tenet, thus, reflects the 
assumption of the nature of small states that struggle for maintaining their autonomy 
at home by flexibly and pragmatically adjusting their external policy suitable for a 
particular international environment. Scholars of Thai foreign policy subscribing to 
this argue that Thailand's properties, of being small and marginalised in the 
international hierarchy, do not change, Thailand thus continues its traditional 
direction of flexibility, pragmatism and accommodation of external powers. This 
behaviour is analogous to the view of Thai foreign policy as 'bamboo bending with the 
wind', described vividly as 'always solidly rooted, but flexible enough to bend 
whichever way the wind blows in order to survive' (Kislenko 2002, p.3). This also 
characterises a foreign policy of conflict avoidance and conforming to the 
mainstream (Prapat 2000, p.4). This policy orientation is historically rooted in both 
a traditional inter-state system and Thailand's experience with external interactions 
especially with great powers. 
For Thailand, the national security concept is traditionally defined in relation to the 
national pillars, namely, 'nation', 'religion' (Buddhism), and 'king' (Neher 1990, p.201; 
Panitan 1998, p.420). The maintenance of Thai national security thus involves 
preserving the status quo and continuing the relevance of these three elements in 
Thai society. Likewise, Thai foreign policy is argued to exhibit this nature and aims to 
achieve a condition that stabilises its national 'holy trinity'. In other words, as Panitan 
asserts, Thai foreign policy needs to 'defend the nation's independence, sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and status in the international arena' (1998, p.433). Flexible and 
pragmatic foreign policy is thus regarded by Thai policy-makers as the proper way to 
achieve that goal. It is the way in which Thailand allows the key pillars to sustain and 
survive in the international system. This has been reflected in Thai foreign relations 
throughout its history. 
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According to this conventional wisdom Thai diplomatic history well justifies its claim 
on flexible foreign policy. Tha~land constantly adjusted its foreign policy and 
strategies to suit domestic and external environments in order to preserve its 
national security and status-quo. Thai foreign policy-makers have always tried to 
avoid dependence on any single external power. There seemed to be no difficulty for 
the Thai elite to suddenly change their foreign policy posture when the situation 
changed. Several notable examples with regard to Thailand's position during the 
major wars reflect this tendency. 
For example, in the First World War, Siam (the former name of Thailand) officially 
declared war on the Central Powers, led by Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy and the 
Ottoman Empire in 1917 (Prapat 2000, p.4) becoming the only Southeast Asian 
country in the European theatre. This was surprising to the public because relations 
between Siam and countries in the Central Powers up to that time had been very 
cordial and warm. Since the reign of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) German, Austrian 
and Italian nationals had maintained a good reputation in the country and played an 
important role in Siam's reformation and modernisation projects such as the 
construction of the transport system, Western styled palaces and buildings, and in 
modern military training (Rong 1977, p.153). Moreover, Germans were important to 
Siam's economy as they controlled most international shipping by which Siamese 
imports and exports were carried (Terwiel 1983, p.304). Germany, Austria and Italy 
were also parts of Siam's balancing strategy against other European powers, 
particularly France and Britain who had extensive great interest in mainland 
Southeast Asia. During that time, according to a major group of Thai policy-makers 
and the general public, Germany appeared to have a positive image that posed no 
threat to Siam's territorial integrity compared to the British and the French to which 
Siam had ceded many parts of its 'territories' (Neher 1974, p.311; Sanan 1975, p.294). 
However, partly with his careful observation and calculation of the situation in 
Europe, including his pro-British background, King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) was 
convinced that the Allied Powers were gaining the upper hand and to side with them 
would enable Siam to re-negotiate the course of the unequal treaties with the 
European nations (Wyatt 2003, pp.217-219). Consequently, Siam could resume its 
full sovereignty without major external interference. Thailand's independence was 
thus preserved. 
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The various positions taken by Thailand during the Second World War are commonly 
cited as a case of Thailand's attempt to secure its stability and the status quo. 
Thailand adjusted its position at least three times during the Pacific War from 
neutrality to taking sides with both the Axis and the Allied Powers, respectively. 
Thailand had remained neutral until December 1941 when Japanese forces landed 
on Thai soil. It then signed a military alliance treaty with Japan at the end of that 
month, and a month later declared war on Britain and the United States. However, 
· the victory of the Allied Powers did not result in Thailand being treated as an Axis 
country. This was due to the fact that the United States acknowledged the role and 
merit of the 'Seri Thai' movement-the underground grouping both within and 
outside the country against the Japanese and the co-belligerent Phibun 
government-and refused to recognise Thailand's declaration of war. Thailand's 
post-war leaders also swiftly renounced the country's war declaration and claimed 
that it was illegitimately enacted without unanimity in the Council of Regency. 
Moreover, they argued that Thailand was forced to join the Axis while the majority of 
Thai people disagreed with that decision as evidenced by the emergence of 'Seri Thai' 
(Wiwat 1999, pp.123-128; Wyatt 2003, pp.250-251). Thailand was thereafter treated 
as an enemy-occupied country. It only had to pay reparation in rice to the British and 
to relinquish its claim on adjacent territories gained during the War (Neher 197 4, 
pp.314-315; Sanan 1975, pp.302-303; Baker & Pasuk 2005, pp.135-137). 
Importantly, Thailand was the first nation amongst the former Axis countries to join 
the United Nations in December 1946. Thai sovereignty and independence were 
therefore preserved, unlike those of other Axis Powers, such as Germany and Japan, 
which were occupied by the Allies until the end of the 1940s and the early 1950s, 
respectively. 
Thai foreign policy doctrine after the Second World War was also grounded in its 
experience with the role of major powers in sustaining Thailand's international 
status and sovereignty (Chulacheeb 1998, 2004 ). International recognition of 
Thailand's independence became a top national interest amongst Thai policy-makers. 
At this juncture, the United States became 'the principle guarantor of [Thailand]'s 
independence against hostile regional powers' after World War II (Muscat 1990, 
p.18). Embracing external powers in this way to guarantee its sovereignty, as well as 
regional stability was not unfamiliar to Thailand. This characteristic was quite 
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different from some other Southeast Asian nations that were colonised by Western 
colonial powers and gained their independence after World War II. Indonesia, for 
example, was normally suspicious of external powers' intentions and involvement 
with regional affairs and tended to resist their roles especially during the Sukarno 
regime (Chulacheeb 2004, pp.190-193). For Thailand, this accommodating posture 
was the way to maintain its survival. 
However, the 'reactive foreign policy' argument asserts that Thai foreign policy still 
changed along with global and regional politics, not only adhering to pro-Western 
bloc as once generally understood. Neher's generalisation of the pattern in Thai 
foreign policy during this time gives a clear picture of Thailand's flexibility. He states: 
Thai foreign policy can be chronologically categorized as follows: 
1945 to early 1970s - the era of Pax Americana when Thailand chose 
an exclusive and all-encompassing relationship with the United States; 
from the early 1970s to the present - a period first called 
'equidistance' amongst the great world and regional powers, as 
Thailand sought a way to respond to the Communist victory in 
Vietnam and the decrease in American interest in the region and later 
termed 'omnidirectionality', a more independent foreign policy ... The 
patterns are clear (1990, p.189). 
Corrine's analysis (1998) also concurs with that of Neher about pattern in Thai 
foreign policy. She contends that Thailand's post-war foreign policy followed three 
major directions-siding with the Free· World against the communists, tilting 
towards the socialist bloc, and being neutral. She argues that Thailand tried to do all 
of them but finally returned to its traditional foreign policy position which was being 
friends with everybody, or a so-called 'omni-directional policy' (Corrine 1998, pp.9-
10). 
According to this argument, pragmatism was a suitable strategy for Thailand's 
survival especially during the Cold War period. During the peak of ideological conflict 
in the region and within Thailand during the 1950s and 1960s, Thailand saw the 
need for the American security guarantee to fight against the communist threat 
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perceived amongst the Thai elite (Neher 1975, p.1102; Chulacheeb 1999, p.94), or 
what Wiwat (1999) calls the 'security syndrome'. 
Reactive foreign policy in which Thailand accommodated the United States' strategic 
position in Southeast Asia was also important at the peak of the Cold War. The 
convergence of both the security and the economic interests of the United States and 
Thailand brought about a close relationship between the two countries. Thailand was 
thus a key actor in sustaining American hegemony in Asia during the 1950s-1960s 
by serving as a supplier of natural resources and a market for the reconstruction 
project of the post-war Japan, 'as well as in the American drive to keep communism 
at bay' (Kullada 2003, pp.48-49). In return, Thailand received a significant assistance 
package from the United States after the early 1950s including access to foreign 
capital through international financial institutions (Fineman 1993, pp.234-313; 
Chamber 2004, p.461; Kullada 2003, p.49). Embracing the American presence also 
shielded Thailand from a possible threat from a regional power, namely that of 
communist China during the first decade after World War II, and against communist 
Indochina led by Vietnam in the 1960s (Kullada 2003, pp.54-55, 60-62). Thai foreign 
policy throughout the 1960s continued to support the American military presence in 
the region with the latter's involvement in the Vietnam War to protect South Vietnam 
from falling into its Northern rival's hands. 
This fear of communism within its own backyard prompted Thailand to deepen the 
Thai-American security alliance. This resulted in the transformation of the Manila 
Pact from a multilateral to a de facto bilateral document of the Thanat-Rusk Joint 
Communique in 19621. This resulted in another significant increase in American 
military assistance to Thailand after the first wave of military assistance following 
1 Prior to the 1962 Thanat-Rusk Joint Communique, Thailand and the United States were both 
members of a multilateral security arrangement under the 1954 Manila Pact of the South eEast 
Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). However, Thailand viewed this security pact as insufficient 
to guarantee its security against the communists due to the weak commitment amongst the 
treaty members, unlike that in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This weakness of 
SEATO manifested in the Laos Crisis in 1960-1962 when the communist Prathet Lao supported 
by communist China and North Vietnam was likely to gain victory over the right wing 
nationalist group backed by Thailand and the United States. Thailand requested SEATO to 
intervene militarily but many of the organisation members disagreed. Instead, SEATO's decision 
came out in favour of calling for a cease-fire agreement, 'constructive negotiation' and an 
international conference on Laos. See also in US Department of State 1961; Chulacheeb 1999, 
pp.77-78. 
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the Korean War in the early 1950s. However, the United States military assistance 
did not involve any actual operations in Thailand but was mainly limited to technical 
and logistic assistance. The assistance programmes related to military or security 
affairs included personnel training, the procurement of military supplies, the 
construction of road networks to remote areas where communist movements were 
gaining ground, and airport construction in strategic locations for the American 
military operation in the Vietnam War (Marshall 1969, pp.192-196; Muscat 1990, 
341-343; Plotnick 1994, pp.123-127). This included U-Tapao airport that became a 
front-line facility of the United States Air Force (USAF) during the Vietnam War from 
1966through 1975. 
Thailand's vigorous role in the birth of ASEAN in the late 1960s might be seen as an 
assertive foreign policy in the middle of the Cold War; however, it was not proactive 
regarding its intent. Thanat Khoman's view on the need of a regional entity to 
supplement the weakening SEATO to secure the regional stability can reflect this 
security maintenance view. 
The factors for regional co-operation at that time were, one, to 
preserve Thailand's independence and freedom. So, ASEAN was a 
necessity for our country's survival. The other one was the weakness 
of SEATO gave us a lesson that an effective regional arrangement 
required the participation amongst countries with common interest 
(Thanat 1990, p.167) 
The security concern about communism amongst the Thai elite was carried through 
into the 1970s although the nature of the threats and foreign policy response 
changed. Suchit and Sukhumbhandh state that Thailand's foreign policy in the 1970s, 
at least until 1977, turned to seek peaceful co-existence and normalisation with its 
Indochinese neighbours. This reflected the reality that Thailand had to live with its 
neighbours regardless of their political differences (1999, p.277). This more 
accommodating posture reflects the prevailing Kissingerian realist idea prevailing 
amongst Thai policy-makers during that time that downplayed the internal nature of 
other regimes, similarly to Nixon's foreign policy (Roth 2006). This change arose due 
to several major international and regional political developments at the end of the 
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Vietnam War-the split in the communist camp between China and the Soviet Union, 
the rapprochement between China and the United States, and, importantly, the 
American failure in the Vietnam War and its withdrawal from Southeast Asia. 
In this new environment, therefore, Thailand adjusted its foreign policy posture to 
accept the new reality following the pull-out of the last Thai troops from Vietnam in 
May 1972. Thailand started to prepare for the resumption of its relations with the 
People's Republic of China in the early 1970s despite the major concern about 
Chinese support of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). However, confidence was 
gradually built and the plan had been carried out. The Thai Foreign Minister 
announced in 1971 that Thailand was willing to resume trade relations with China. 
After that, Thailand relaxed its regulation of official contacts with the Chinese 
officials leading to sending a ping-pong team to China in 1972. Discussions between 
Thai and Chinese officials about diplomatic normalisation and exchange of visits 
continued from 1972-197 4 and finally reached an agreement to normalise the 
diplomatic relations on 1July1975 (Anand 1999). 
Apart from the more distant communist states of Soviet Union and China, a greater 
concern amongst Thai policy-makers was actually their immediate neighbours and 
traditional buffer states-Laos and Cambodia-including its traditional regional rival, 
Vietnam. This concern gained wider recognition after the fall of Saigon, Phnom Penh 
and Vientiane in the same year, 1975. The regime change in these countries brought 
Thailand to the border of communist regimes for the first time. The fall of Thailand as 
the next communist state was then becoming more likely according to the domino 
theory. Therefore, to reflect this geopolitical reality Thailand initially attempted to be 
friends with Vietnam leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1976 
under the civilian government of Seni Pramoj. However, the Vietnamese threat still 
remained in the mind of many Thai policy-makers. The right-wing backlash against 
the policy of appeasement with the socialist countries including a growing leftist 
student movement, then forced Seni to resign and replaced him with an extremely 
right-wing leader, Tanin Kraivixien. This domestic change led to a break in the 
foreign policy of peaceful co-existence briefly during 1976-1977 (Plotnick 1994, 
pp.103-146; Chulacheeb 1999, pp.80-84; Wiwat 1999, pp.143-151). 
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This perception of threat from Vietnam reached its peak when the latter invaded 
Cambodia in 1978, resulting in the installation of a pro-Vietnam regime in Cambodia 
(Thongchai 2005, p.121). The Cambodia conflict occupied Thailand's foreign policy 
throughout the course of the 1980s and the early 1990s (Sarasin 1999, p.314). This 
event rose to significance due to the combination of both domestic and regional 
factors. It arose after the return of the right wing government following a short 
period of democracy during 1973-197 6, when Thailand faced a serious internal 
communist insurgency and economic downturn (Funston 1998c, p.53). Vietnam was 
viewed as a potential destabilising force against Thailand's national security 
considering its experience in the war with the United States and being a relatively 
stronger military power (Sarasin 1999, p.317). Vietnam's political and military 
influence in both Laos and Cambodia further accentuated this fear. Thailand 
suspected that the real intention of the Vietnamese hegemonic project did not stop 
only in these buffer states but was also aimed at inclusion of the north-eastern part of 
Thailand in its goal to recreate the Federation of Indochina (Sunai 1997, p.3). This 
belief was reconfirmed when Vietnamese troops, for the first time, intruded into Thai 
territory in Non Mak Mun village of Prachinburi Province in June 1980 (Sunai 1997, 
p.9), and 70,000-100,000 personnel were deployed very near to Thailand's eastern 
border in May 1981 (Khien 1999b, p.307). The repercussions of this threat were felt 
regionally and arguably crystallised ASEAN's co-operative direction against the 
Vietnamese invasion thereafter. 
During the Cambodia conflict Thailand pursued a multilevel strategy to seek for 
international support against the abrupt change in regional balance of power. Again, 
its active role in the entire episode of regional conflict resolution was grounded in its 
fear of the security threat and power imbalance in Indochina. The primary objective 
was to maintain security and status quo in mainland Southeast Asia which reflects 
the reactive nature of its policy. 
Thailand made use of the relaxing international environment by diversifying support 
from various major powers and supporters, but did not limited this to any particular 
ideological camp, including not only the United States and the free world but also 
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communist China and even the Soviet Union.2 While maintaining political support 
from the United States, Thailand also turned to China for political and military 
assistance. This resulted in Chinese involvement in the conflict by supplying weapons 
to both the Thai armed forces (Chulacheeb 1999, p.87) and Cambodian resistance 
groups through Thailand (Sarasin 1999, p.319; Suchit & Sukhumbhandh 1999, p.284; 
Theera 1999, p.348). 
At the regional level, ASEAN and China agreed to address the problem by placing 
pressure on Hanoi on both economic and political fronts. Politically, Thailand on 
behalf of ASEAN succeeded in convincing the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) to agree with Thailand and ASEAN's direction in conflict resolution. This 
resulted in the UNGA Resolutions No.34/22 and No.35/6 and subsequent 
international conferences to solve the conflict throughout the 1980s (Sunai 1997, 
pp.4-9; Funston 1998c; Surachai 1999). This led to the proposal of a 'comprehensive 
solution' to the Cambodia question especially the demand for a Vietnamese 
withdrawal from Cambodia, a call for a free general election in Cambodia and a 
guarantee of Cambodian neutrality (Soon 1982, pp.549-550). At the same time, 
Thailand and other supporters such as the United States, Japan, China and some 
ASEAN member states also levied economic sanctions against Vietnam (Soon 1982, 
p.559; Surachai 1999, pp.19-20). Although Thailand may be seen as playing an active 
role in the issue, it was rather a reaction to the change of the status quo in Southeast 
Asia as well as a defence of its national security and sovereignty. Therefore, 
according to this thesis' operational definition of reactiveness, Thailand's foreign 
policy during the Cambodia problem was basically a reaction to Vietnam's growing 
influence and Thailand's security threat. 
In spite of changing international political and economic environments, the 
conventional school of Thai foreign policy analysis still holds the view that Thai 
foreign policy continues to, and should, follow the flexible posture it adopted after 
the Cold War. Neher (1990) suggests that pragmatism is necessary for Thai foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War era to deal with more complexities in the interdependent 
world economy. Kislenko (2002) similarly argues that Thai foreign policy will still 
2 The then Prime Minister of Thailand, General Kriangsak Chomanand, made a state visit to 
Moscow in 1979 after his visit to the United States and China, becoming the first Thai Prime 
Minister to visit the Soviet Union. 
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hold firmly to 'a remarkable history of continuity' (p.561). She posits that 'Thailand 
will undoubtedly try to accommodate [all major powers]' (p.561) including other 
actors, such as its neighbouring countries and regional organisations in order to cope 
with emerging challenges in the post-Cold War environment, such as economic 
difficulties, lingering problems with neighbouring countries and international 
terrorism. 
However, this thesis contends that the above observation is misleading in its analysis. 
Certainly, it is irrefutable that any country needs to be pragmatic to tackle the issues 
thrown up by a complex world. The differences rest on its policy intention or 
objective. If pragmatism in Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy were aimed at 
preserving Thailand's traditional security, that is, 'sovereignty' and its 'status quo', 
then this conventional view may still be valid. 
However, traditional threats seem to have disappeared or no longer challenge Thai 
security, especially since the comprehensive withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from 
Cambodia in 1989 (Kusuma 1999, pp.47-48; Prachuab 1999, pp.184-185; Prasong 
1999, p.60). Other non-traditional security issues such as illicit drug trafficking, arms 
smuggling, illegal migration and economic crime have become more relevant to 
current security concerns especially during the 1990s (Prachuab 1999, 191-192). 
Moreover, the international recognition of Thai sovereignty remains relatively stable 
despite the renewed political upheavals and insurgency in the Muslim-dominated 
areas of the southernmost provinces bordering Malaysia since 2003. Thailand has 
managed to exclude external intervention in the issue. The Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) still officially supports peaceful conflict resolution between the 
Thai government and the insurgent groups while still not acknowledging the 
legitimacy of the separatist group (The Nation, 16 March 2005, p.1A; 9 June 2005, 
p.2A). At the same time, regardless of criticism about the Thai government's tough 
handling of the issue, Thailand's Muslim neighbours have been very careful about the 
question of legitimacy of the Thai authority. They have rather encouraged 
negotiation and non-violence solutions including providing intelligence support to 
assist in arresting suspects (Bangkok Post, 19 March 2005, p.3; The Nation 23 March 
2005, pp.4A, 6A; 11 June 2005, p.9A). In addition, although border disputes between 
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Thailand and its neighbouring countries are still unresolved in many parts, they do 
not act as a direct threat to the country's sovereignty, nor to its survival (Panitan 
1998, p.436). Therefore, despite the fact that pragmatism may still constitute an 
important part of Thai foreign policy since the Cold War as argued by the 
conventional wisdom, the core element of flexibility as security and the status quo 
maintenance during the post-Cold War period may face serious challenges. So, the 
question arises: is the flexible foreign policy still needed to protect Thailand's 
sovereignty? 
2.1.2 Conflict avoiding and opportunism 
Other prominent characteristics of Thailand's reactive foreign policy according to the 
conventional wisdom can be seen . in its 'conflict avoidance' and 'opportunistic 
tendency'. These elements are inseparably linked to the primary aspect of security 
and the status quo orientation mentioned in the last previous sub-section. This is 
because when Thailand sees external actors being more powerful and their policy 
direction as threatening its security, it will need to manoeuvre its relations with them 
in order not to succumb to the external environment. Therefore, the optimal choice 
for Thailand in such a situation is to avoid unnecessary conflicts with major powers 
but rather mainly accommodate their policies and befriend them. 
The existing literature analysing Thai foreign policy prior to the end of the Cold War 
also largely focuses on this aspect. Astri Suhrke (1971) points to this aspect and 
suggests that the accommodation of -external powers helped Thailand minimise the 
interference by the great powers in its domestic affairs. Suszynski (1982) argues that 
accommodating posture has become a norm in Thai foreign policy-making because 
Thailand realises that external powers normally stay in the region only temporarily. 
Consequently, the fear of being abandoned has convinced Thai foreign policy-makers 
that their foreign policy needs to seek engagement with all powers to hedge against 
any uncertainty (Suszynski 1982, pp. 1037-1039). Kislenko then asserts that 
Thailand prefers temporary arrangements with foreign counterparts (2002, p.537). 
Therefore, the ability to change its alignment is regarded as the important strategy to 
serve the country's national interest in response to the rise and fall of different 
foreign powers. It has helped Thailand avoid engaging in long-term conflict with 
external powers. 
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This line of argument gives a sense of 'normative' policy evaluation in that 
pragmatism is regarded as a preferred element in policy choice for a small country 
like Thailand. Thailand should avoid direct confrontation and choosing sides with 
any particular external power. Suhrke argues that Thailand's ability to adjust its 
policy towards external actors and environments can be attributed to a successful 
model of small nation diplomacy (1971, p.429). Neher also concludes that 'the 
pragmatic foreign policy of the Thai government has been remarkably successful in 
securing at least one goal, the sovereignty of the Kingdom' (1990, p.201). This norm 
seems not only to stabilise Thailand's domestic interest but also the regional . 
environment itself. To alter this norm may result in destabilising both domestic and 
regional fronts. 
According to the conventional view, the end of the Cold War seemed to allow 
Thailand to continue and easily consolidate its traditional posture of maintaining 
stability. Thailand's security tie with the United States has been loosened since the 
latter;s military withdrawal from the Vietnam War and Thailand in the 1970s, while 
dependence on China's security assurance against Vietnamese expansionary policy 
declined along the conclusion of Cambodia issue. The erosion of ideological 
contestation leaves more room for a small nation like Thailand to choose its own 
course of foreign policy. This pragmatic feature of Thai foreign policy was still argued 
to be relevant to the country's foreign security policy after the Cold War according to 
scholars who hold this conventional view. With regard to strategic competition 
between China and the United States in this period, Vatikiotis (2003) posits that 
'Thailand's traditional aversion to domination by any one power also offers a useful 
[understanding of] how that influence can be harnessed safelyto the best advantage' 
(p. 77). It means that Thailand would balance the influence of the great powers by 
maintaining and cultivating close relations with all of them at the same time (Prapat 
2002b; Panitan 2006). Murphy also argues similarly that Thai foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War era may generally neither balance nor bandwagon with the United 
States and China, but Thailand has tried to 'strengthen its relations with [everyone] 
without setting off a security spiral of threats with the others' (2006, p.44). This 
policy preference to avoid tensions with regional powers aims to ultimately stabilise 
the external environment for Thailand to secure its national interest. 
Supporters of the this conventional wisdom would argue that Thailand's shifting 
positions during the first few weeks after the September 11 terrorist incident 
ostensibly reflected conflict avoidance in its foreign policy. Thailand initially 
announced its neutral position despite its support of the international anti-terrorist 
campaign. However, the Thai government had to tone down its position after 
receiving strong criticism from many domestic parties, including the public, 
academics, the press, and the Senate with regard to the concern of other Muslim 
countries and its Muslim population which constitutes the second biggest religious 
group in the country. The Thaksin government declared its position, that Thailand 
still supported the American actions against terrorism but 'within the United Nations 
framework'. However, Thailand adjusted it position again after President GW Bush's 
criticism of some countries' covert and inactive support with the well-known quote: 
'you're either with us or against us in the fight against terror' (CNN, 6 November 
2001). Thailand, then, eagerly pledged its full support of the United States' anti-
terrorist policy with the possibility of utilising the Thai-American military alliance, 
including dispatching Thai troops to Afghanistan upon the US' official request. 
Although this vacillation may have confused or even upset the United States in terms 
of rhetorical support, in practice, it was found that Thailand's co-operation with the 
United States in general was not seriously affected (Supamit 2002; Chambers 2004). 
United States' aircraft have constantly stopped over at U-Tapao airport even after the 
Vietnam War ended. This airport is part of the Pentagon's forward-positioning 
strategy where American forces stored equipment and from which they come and go 
as needed. In the war against terrorists, Thailand has also provided constant support 
to the United States. During the military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, 
American warplanes from the US military base in the Pacific were always allowed to 
stop at U-Tapao before continuing to military base at Diego Garcia in the Indian 
Ocean (Sapamit 2002, p.167; Chambers 2004, p.466). Furthermore, U-Tapao has 
been used as a base for the annual joint military exercise between Thailand and the 
United States-Exercise Cobra Gold-for over a quarter of a century since 19823 to 
promote interoperability between their military components, not only in war-related 
3 In fact, the Thai-US joint military exercise can be dated back to the early period of the Cold War 
in 1956. The exercise involved the Royal Thai Navy and the United States' Navy and Marine 
Corps focusing on amphibious landing training. The exercise expanded to involve more 
operational activities and all branches of the armed forces in 1982. The new name, 'Exercise 
Cobra Gold' has been used since then. 
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activities but also in other purposes such as peace-keeping operations, humanitarian 
assistance, disaster relief, including anti-terrorism (TSCH 2007). This joint military 
exercise has expanded to include the other main participating countries in the region, 
that is, Indonesia, Japan, and Singapore, as well as other invited participants 
differently each year (TSCH 2007; PACOM 2008) making it the largest peacetime 
exercise in the Pacific. 
In addition, bilateral co-operation especially in intelligence sharing and training 
against terrorist network has been tightened, leading to the arrest of Hambali, a 
leading figure of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network in Southeast Asia 
(Chambers 2004, p.469). There were also reports of Thailand being used as a CIA site 
for interrogating terrorists connected to the September 11 incident and the al-Qaeda 
network since 2002, including a controversial secret prison (Bangkok Post n.d.; 
Priest 2005). 
With reference to this security policy, the conventional wisdom argues that Thailand 
still preferred to see its close ties with the United States continue while balancing its 
posture with other emerging forces, such as public opinion and criticism from other 
foreign countries through seeking support and justification based on international 
arrangements. It points to how Thai decision makers evaluated the cost and benefit 
of the degree to which its commitment should be presented to the public in that time. 
On the one hand, to stay very committed to the United States may have brought 
conflicts with other Muslim countries and certain domestic groups which could be 
potentially harmful to Thailand's security and the government's stability. The less 
verbal commitment, however, did not change the significance of Thailand's support 
of American operations in reality. This policy option, on the other hand, reduced 
conflict and pressure on the government and could hedge against any negative 
consequences, hence leaving more room for the government to manage the situation 
at hand. These changing positions in support of the war on terrorism reflect 
Thailand's traditional features of accommodating external powers and conflict 
avoidance so as to maintain its security interest. Thus, this posture is reactive in 
nature. 
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The above observation, in a way, is also relevant to a broader literature on the 
security and strategic posture of Southeast Asia focusing on enquiry into the region's 
strategic inclination towards major powers. It has become increasingly accepted by 
many scholars that Southeast Asia neither totally practises balancing nor 
bandwagoning in dealing with the regional security order. Rather, the regional states 
tend to combine several strategies, including 'soft-balancing', 'engagement' and 
'omni-enmeshment', to hedge against future instability and to nurture the ongoing 
co-operative atmosphere in the region (Tow 1999, 2001, 2004a, 2004b; Ganesan 
2000; Van Ness 2001, Higgot 2004; Goh 2005a, 2005b, 2007 /08; Roy 2005; Archaya 
& Tan 2006; Ba 2006; Frost 2006; Murphy 2006). This evolving regional order is also 
seen in Thailand's foreign policy goal of avoiding conflicts and maintaining friendship 
with all powers as advocated by the conventional wisdom. 
In line with the conventional belief, Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy in 
general tends to conform to the above observation. Although a close tie between 
Bangkok and Beijing is widely recognised by some scholars and government officials 
in both countries, especially in economic terms (Montesano 2003; Vatikiotis 2003; 
Murphy 2006), the military alliance between Thailand and the United States still 
continues. Kusuma (2001), Thitinan (2003) and Busakorn (2006) further argue that 
Thailand as one of the United States' allies is using its security tie with the US to 
balance the Chinese influence. The closer tie with the United States after the terrorist 
attack on 11th September 2001 especially following the designation of Thailand as a 
Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) offered economic benefits to Thailand as well as 
consolidating the government's power (the Thaksin government) over domestic 
contestation especially with regard to the Southern unrest. Moreover, some scholars 
suggest that alignment with China may also help Thailand deal strategically with 
other cross-border problems spilled over from its neighbours, particularly in relation 
to Myanmar in drug trafficking matter (Busakorn 2006; Murphy 2006; pp. 38-39; 
Siriluk 2004; Ganesan 2001). 
Not only does Thailand strengthen its ties with both contending powers, it also 
cultivates economic co-operation with other external powers, especially Japan, the 
European Union, and other new trading partners. Thailand is also at the forefront in 
support for China's constructive involvement in ASEAN affairs, leading to 
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institutionalisation under the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework (Chulacheeb 1998; 
Panitan 1998; Tow 1999, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Goh 200Sa, 200Sb; Shambaugh 
2005). This regional development corresponds to Gob's suggestion that Southeast 
Asia in fact exercises soft-balancing not only in the politico-security area but also in 
the economic arena (2005a, pp. 9-12), while omni-enmeshment and engagement are 
also at work to cultivate a complex web of interest and co-operation amongst 
regional stakeholders. As William Tow argues, the role of existing bilateral alliances 
in the Asia-Pacific is an assurance for continuity of the regional order while regional 
multilateralism is being developed to address emerging security challenges (1999; 
2001; 2004a; 2004b). 
In sum, scholars supporting the conventional interpretation of Thailand's foreign 
policy contend that the characteristic of conflict avoidance by flexibly changing its 
position whenever it suits the national interest still constitutes a major part of 
modern Thai foreign policy. To maintain neighbourliness and friendship with foreign 
countries has been in Thailand's interest. It is then easy to see this school of thought 
conclude that this type of foreign policy behaviour comfortably fits with the general 
practice of other Southeast Asian countries pursuing the combined security strategy 
as mentioned above. This position encompasses all practical approaches to regional 
stability that fit both medium and long-term goals towards regional security order. 
Hedging through soft-balancing and omni-enmeshment serve Thailand's preference 
of conflict avoidance and not taking sides. At the same time, engagement strategy will 
secure economic benefits from rising powers and gradually enhance regional 
institutionalisation in the longer term. These strategies can be viewed as smaller 
nations being assertive in managing their relations with bigger powers. However, its 
main objective is still to accommodate external power so that regional stability is 
maintained. Thus, it still can be regarded as a reactive behaviour according to the 
Two-Good Theory'. 
The conventional wisdom that sees Thai foreign policy as pragmatic and avoiding 
conflict with major powers also has another implication that this type of behaviour 
finally results in a lack of clear guiding principles. Temporary arrangements allow 
Thailand to change its direction deemed to serve its national interest. It allows the 
country to choose to align itself with any party that would offer greater benefits and 
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opportunities at any time. The examples of Thailand's positions during the First and 
Second World Wars including its close co-operation with China in security matters in 
the 1980s cited in the previous sections clearly support this generalisation. 
Prapat (2000) criticises this opportunistic tendency in Thai foreign policy that 
continues its way to the post-Cold War period, and sees it as a weakness. He states: 
A weakness in Thai foreign policy is derived from its strength in 
adhering to 'bamboo bending with the wind' policy. Sometimes 
Thailand adjusts or bends so quickly that its foreign policy seems to 
lack principle. This causes conflicts with countries in the region on 
many occasions (p.175). 
He also posits that although Thailand's reactive foreign policy with pragmatic 
characteristic helps Thailand maintain security and smooth relations with its foreign 
counterparts, on the other hand, it makes Thai foreign policy more receptive to 
changes. By avoiding direct confrontation and easily adjusting to the changing 
external environment, Prapat (2000) concludes that Thai foreign policy is very 
reactive in nature. He characterises it as highly vigilant, reserved, compromising, 
incremental, hence lacking in long-term vision (Prapat 2000, pp.175-7). These 
descriptions appropriately encapsulate the main feature of this conventional line of 
argument. 
A search for better opportunities to maintain its security and the status quo can be 
seen in both foreign security and economic policy. In dealing with power competition 
amongst great powers, it can be said that in general Thailand prefers not to choose 
sides, but rather cultivates friendship with all if their powers are perceived as equally 
distributed. However, in a situation where there is only a predominant power that is 
likely to preserve Thailand's sovereignty and national pillars, Thailand will adjust its 
policy towards alignment with it. This was evidenced during the peak of the Cold 
War when Thailand agreed to form an alliance with the United States; it was seen as 
a de facto position with China when Vietnam invaded Cambodia. In the foreign 
economic policy sphere, critics of Thailand's position particularly with regard to its 
neighbouring countries argue that that Thailand's lack of principle has some negative 
- 49 -
consequences (Kusuma 2001; Thitinan 2003, 2004a; Asda 2004; Surapong 2007). 
Considering the proliferation of democratic norms and principles worldwide, 
Thailand's relationship with Burma is a good example of how economic benefits in 
trading with the Burmese junta may be conflicting with international pressure 
against its violation of human rights and democracy. 
2.1.3 Drawbacks 
Although this conventional view offers a useful understanding of Thai foreign policy 
in the history, it cannot clearly explain Thai policy-makers' decisions and their 
proactive foreign policy, particularly during the Chatichai government between the 
end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, and notably during the Thaksin 
governments between 2001 and 2006. Thai foreign policy during these two 
governments in particular was not necessarily accommodating of external major 
powers, as the 'bamboo bending with the wind' analogy would suggest. These 
governments' foreign policies did not merely seek to preserve Thai national interests 
by pragmatically choosing appropriate policy options but opted for exercising the 
country's leadership, which sometimes came into conflict with major external 
powers and friends. For instance, Chatichai's initiative suddenly moved Thailand 
away from its previous position on the Cambodia issue and surprised supporters and 
stakeholders, especially China, the United States, and ASEAN countries (Murphy 
2006, p.21). Thaksin also utilised nationalistic sentiment against the West to buttress 
his assertive and aggressive foreign policy during his first term in office. 
Even during the Democrat Party-led government when most observers would have 
predicted the most accommodating foreign policy towards external pressures many 
unexpected decisions can still be observed. For example, the Chuan government 
refused American requests to pre-position.its supply ships in the Gulf of Thailand in 
1994 and 1996 despite the existing bilateral security agreements between Thailand 
and the United States (Chambers 2004, p.462). The Thaksin administration also 
made the same decision in 2002 (Chambers 2004, p466). This policy direction does 
not seem to fit the traditional description of Thai foreign policy of accommodating all 
foreign major powers and conflict avoidance. This may suggest that in the post-Cold 
War period accommodation with external regional power has not always been the 
only dominant policy choice for Thailand as it was during the Cold War. As in the case 
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of Thailand's compromising position in the war against terrorism mentioned earlier, 
other factors came into play in decision-making. This case shows that independent 
and active foreign policy regardless of any security alliance has also been pursued 
widely after the Cold War as well. 
To summarise, the rationale behind this flexibility argument is deeply grounded in 
the traditional international environment especially during the Cold War. This 
conventional school views Thai foreign policy as a reaction towards 'security' threats 
and external pressures. However, this thesis argues that the post-Cold War 
environment has transcended those traditional boundaries not only in the 
international and regional arenas, but also in the domestic one. Although the 
traditional elements and conventional thinking about what the threats are and how 
foreign policy should be implemented to deal with them have not totally disappeared, 
ideas of how foreign policy should serve the national interest have altered. 
Examining foreign policy within the post-Cold War environment is more complicated 
than judging decisively which factors are most influential to foreign policy outcomes. 
Certainly, the security factor in the post-Cold War environment still carries weight 
within foreign policy circles, but it is no longer a primary element in every situation. 
Economic, social and non-traditional challenges within the ongoing globalisation 
process have also infused foreign policy decision-making and have become even 
more significant in many cases. The author views that post-Cold War foreign policy 
analysis without this consideration is partial and may not show powerfully the 
general picture. This has led to the importance of some globalised norms and 
principles that have gained wider acceptance in the international community 
especially democracy and human rights. The next section therefore discusses the 
opinion posed by a group of scholars who suggest incorporating these international 
norms in Thai foreign policy analysis. This element, in their view, constitutes 
evidence of active behaviour in Thai foreign policy instead of a conventional flexible-
reactive foreign policy. 
2.2 The emergence ofproaction in Thai foreign policy 
The end of the Cold War offers an opportunity for Thai foreign policy analysis to 
incorporate factors that may influence its foreign policy-making. There are two 
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important focuses that are prevailing in the discussion in the literature of Thailand's 
post-Cold War foreign policy. One is the effect of democratisation to Thai foreign 
policy. The other is related to Thailand's economic success and its leaders' ambitions 
to raise Thailand's profile for economic benefit, mostly of the politicians and their 
cronies. 
2.2.1 Proactive through adhering to universal principles 
Along the line with the liberal approach to the effect of the rise of democracy in the 
1980s, a number of scholars viewed that in the post-Cold War period Thailand has 
embraced universal norms and principles, notably democracy and human rights; 
thus, its foreign policy has reflected this nature by actively promoting democratic 
norms both domestically and internationally. This position holds that this 
phenomenon occurred as a result of democratisation in Thailand since the late 1980s, 
especially after the May 1992 uprising against the attempt of the military to 
reconstitute its power in Thai politics. Consequently, the military role declined, 
while other social groups especially the urban middle class and the businesses 
gained greater opportunities to participate directly in the politics (Kusuma 1995, 
2001; Ganesan 2004, 2006; Lynch 2004; Chanlett-Avery 2006; Kasian 2006; Panitan 
1998, 2006). 
The spread of ideas associated with democracy and civil liberty across borders 
became more significant and relevant in the policy-making process after the end of 
the Cold War. Policy-makers and academics saw that Thailand was by no means able 
to avoid this global phenomenon. Therefore, not only did Thai foreign policy shift 
from a security orientation to an economic one, but it also accepted other universal 
principles particularly human rights and democracy. This foreign policy orientation 
towards universal norms was clearly and repeatedly pronounced in several 
governments and most actively during the Chuan administrations. For this reason, 
most literature that supports this tenet particularly focuses on his governments' 
foreign policy, and even set it as a benchmark for a preferred policy for Thailand. 
Panitan (1998) and Connor (2003b) contend that Thai security and foreign policy 
objectives also transformed from being narrowly defined to protect national 
sovereignty and integrity to a new concept that was more socially oriented. 
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Especially since the 1997 Financial Crisis, issues such as good governance, 
accountability, transparency and proper political practices have gained currency not 
only within private sector and economic reform discussions, but also in foreign and 
security policy circles as a panacea for the problems (Connor 2003b ). This type of 
foreign policy is, again, argued to be found apparently in the rise of the pro-
democracy movement, notably led by the Democrat Party, after the resignation of 
General Suchinda Kraprayoon as the Prime Minister in 1992. Since economic issues 
were still the main focus of foreign policy, Thailand then needed to restore public and 
foreign investors' confidence in its economy following the domestic political turmoil 
of the time. Therefore, the principles of democracy and human rights were obviously 
inserted as a policy objective for that purpose and appeared on many occasions. 
Chuan Leekpai delivered his inaugural policy statement to Parliament on 21 October 
1992, which stated that his government would be committed to international norms 
and standards with regard to democracy and human rights. In this connection, he 
particularly referred to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Chuan 1992b ). On another occasion at the Asian Regional Meeting on 
Human Rights in 1993 he also reflected his government's realisation of the 
significance of democracy and its relevance to Thailand's political and economic 
development. He stated: 
Thailand has been moving steadily towards greater democracy. 
Naturally, this process had to overcome whatever obstacles along the 
irreversible path of democratization ... By this, I am referring to the 
growing awareness in Thailand of an individual's rights and 
fundamental freedoms as well as of one's duties to society. Ordinary 
people are aware of how these concepts-abstract as they may be-
affect their everyday life. The inherent inter-relationship between 
human rights, democracy and development has become clearly visible. 
The need to keep a fair balance between those fundamental 
components becomes even more urgent. This is particularly so in the 
time of greater political and economic uncertainties in our world 
today (1993b, p.4). 
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Prasong Soonsiri, Chuan's Foreign Minster (1992-1995) also made his turn towards 
democracy, despite his well-known security hard line in previous governments and 
background in the National Security Council (NSC). He placed the promotion of 
democratic values as one of the Ministry's highest priorities. He pledged that not only 
would this ideological stance be advocated within the country but also throughout 
the region (Prasong 1993, p.7). 
Certainly, this reflected the Chuan government's political environment in which his 
dominant party operated after the fall of a military regime. Similarly, Corrine (1998) 
agrees with what Panitan (1998) and Connor (2003b) mention, that one of the 
immediate tasks of the Chuan government was to 'correct the country's image on the 
violation of democracy and human rights after the 1991 coup d'etat and the bloody 
military crackdown on the popular demonstration in May 1992' (p.8). Moreover, the 
international factor during his first term in office was also important. This was a 
period when the United Nations was active in peacekeeping operations based on the 
support from the great powers after the Cold War and the principle of human rights 
which was widely advocated under the 'New World Order' (p.7). 
Proponents of this argument contend that the adherence to democracy and human 
rights in Thai foreign policy achieved in the post-Cold War era had never appeared 
previously in other governments. Thailand stated to adopt these principles in line 
with the international community regardless of the negative consequences that may 
have followed (Corrine 1998; Kusuma 2001, 2000). In this connection, two examples 
are widely mentioned. One is the issuance of entry visas to a delegation of Nobel 
Peace Prize laureates in 1993 despite political pressure from China and Myanmar 
and the likelihood of the impact on Thai businessmen in those countries. The other is 
Thailand's proposal of 'Flexible Engagement' in 1998 within ASEAN that underlies 
the modification of the ASEAN's non-interference in members' internal affairs (this 
issue is discussed further below) (Kusuma 1995, 2000, 2001; Corrine 1998, pp. 34-
35). 
However, Chuan and his party may have also found that an attachment to the 
international principle of democracy and human rights was useful in positioning 
Thailand in the international system after the Cold War. This policy doctrine 
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appeared in both Chuan's terms in office and was further elaborated during his 
second one (1997-2001) notably through his Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan. Surin 
argued that a foreign policy was an extension of domestic policy, therefore, it was not 
peculiar that democratic values would be in Thailand's interest particularly against 
the background of the country's democratic consolidation since 1992 (Surin 1999b ). 
A month after he was appointed Foreign Minister, Surin tested the waters in the 
region during the Informal ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997. He 
claimed that he proposed the idea of promoting open societies in ASEAN as a way 
towards the creation of a caring community envisaged in ASEAN Vision 2020, 
cherishing the concept of democratic and human values (Surin 1999b, 2003). At least 
two places in ASEAN Vision 2020 echo this idea; it stated that ASEAN member 
countries: 
see vibrant and open ASEAN societies consistent with their respective 
national identities, where all people enjoy equitable access to 
opportunities for total human development regardless of gender, race, 
religion, language, or social and cultural background, [and] ... envision 
our nations being governed with the consent and greater participation 
of the people with its focus on the welfare and dignity of the human 
person and the good of the community (ASEAN Secretariat 1995). 
Surin saw this move as reflecting the success of Thailand's foreign policy in 
promoting universal principles in the region despite some compromises with state-
centric reservation. This may have lifted Surin's level of confidence to further 
elaborate his idea afterwards. 
Surin emphasised the significance of adhering to democratic values, and envisaged 
that in the globalised world Thailand could no longer afford to abandon this value, 
otherwise it would be unshielded against negative consequences. His stance was 
clearly pronounced in his speech at Thammasat University on 12 June 1998. He 
asserted that to survive in the globalised world with emerging trans-border 
challenges especially through invisible market forces a country needed to 'either 
reform [itself] to meet international standards, or [it] can resist and be overwhelmed 
in the end, with no control over the pace or direction of change' (Surin 1998a). 
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With respect to the realisation of interconnectedness revealed in the course of the 
1997 Financial Crisis, Surin was, again, not reluctant to extend his idea to Southeast 
Asia at large. At the Asia Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur on 1 June 1998, he 
started to call for ASEAN's attention to re-evaluate the group's weaknesses when it 
came to the matter of democracy and human rights. He urged that ASEAN countries 
should seriously amend their outdated policy especially with regard to democracy, 
human rights and transparency that undermined ASEAN's diplomatic bargaining 
power in the international community, including its shield against possible problems 
(Surin 1998c). Although his main objective was to criticise ASEAN members' inability 
to give each other a warning about the potential economic turmoil in 1997, the 
repercussion of his comments was greater than the economic issue. He criticised 
ASEAN's longstanding norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of member 
states, and proposed to adjust it. For instance, on the same occasion in Malaysia he 
said: 
I wish to pose the question to this academic forum whether the time 
has come for ASEAN to rethink its decades-old policy of non-
interference in the internal affairs of Member States .. .If events in one 
nation inevitably impact upon the affairs of another nation halfway 
around the globe ... This is to say that ASEAN members perhaps no 
longer can afford to adopt a non-committal stance and avoid passing 
judgement on events in a member country, simply on the grounds of 
'non-interference' (Surin 1998c ). 
Subsequently, Surin brought this issue up and tabled his new initiative of 'Flexible 
Engagement' at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in the Philippines later in 1998. This 
proposal, if approved, would have allowed ASEAN Member Countries to publically 
criticise and jointly seek solutions to members' domestic issues even when the 
adverse effects were likely to spill over to other member countries or had a regional 
implication (Haacke 2003, p.168). However, the Westphalian principle of sovereignty 
was still strongly upheld by most of ASEAN's member states, therefore, the proposal 
was rejected. 
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Haacke (1999) contends that Thailand's initiative 'should be understood in the 
context of the ASEAN Vision 2020, to which ASEAN governments had committed 
themselves in .December 1997' (p.586). This proposal mirrored Thailand's view of 
the value of democracy as an effective tool to help overcome emerging challenges in 
the interdependent world. On the other hand, it also revealed the country's 
confidence in its ability to advance this idea based on what the ASEAN Vision 2020. 
This regional master plan envisages the group achieving a concert of Southeast Asian 
Nations in which its members espouse the values of 'outward looking, living in peace, 
stability and prosperity, [and] ... a community of caring societies' (ASEAN Secretariat 
1995). 
However, adherence to universal principles, according to this tenet, seems to be able 
to explain only some specific foreign policies especially during the Democrat-led 
government, and cannot establish a solid generalisation of Thai foreign policy. 
Although advocates of this tenet rightly offer a thought to another element in Thai 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, ironically, they also accept that Thai foreign 
policy still lacks this element in general. Therefore, the literature in this group tends 
to focus on criticising reactive foreign policy and suggests Thai foreign policy-makers 
incorporate this principle into foreign policy as a 'preferred element'. The call for 
universal principles in Thai foreign policy in the existing literature, in turn, reflects 
the ephemeral nature of this universal value feature in Thai foreign policy-making. 
In addition, the management of some domestic issues also casts doubts on how 
these democratic and human rights principles are sustained or seriously pursued in 
foreign policy-making. Thai governments after Chuan do not have a strong record 
on promoting human rights and democracy. Thaksin's heavy-handed approach to 
narcotics, the local mafia, and the violence in the South (Ukrits 2006b) was an 
important point worth considering against his adherence of human rights. 
Furthermore, the resumption of a military role in Thai politics after the coup d'etat 
in September 2006 certainly points to the failure of military professionalism and its 
likely implications for foreign and security policy direction. The regime's approach 
towards some universal principles was criticised, particularly concerning the 
freedom of speech, which· directly challenged the notion of the country's adherence 
to democratic norms and human rights as advocated by this view. 
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The military back-up government after September 2006 coup also lacked 
legitimacy to fully claim to be democratic. For example, General Surayud Chulanont 
was reported having difficulty in strongly condemning the Burmese junta about the 
suppression of the civic demonstration in September 2007. He stated, 'my 
government did not come from a democratic process. If I pressure Burma too 
harshly and they retort from where my government came into power, how can I 
answer them? Therefore, we have to consider this point as well. If this government 
were an elected one, we would have been able to speak clearly with a stronger 
voice about democratic system' (Matichon Online, 13 October 2007). 
The newly elected government in early 2008 under Prime Minister Samak 
Sudaravej did not look any more impressive in terms of its human rights and 
democracy record. Samak was criticised for his involvement in the crackdown on 
student demonstrations in October 1976 resulting in the death of many protesters 
(Bancha 2008; Chaiwat 2008) and thereafter his support of the right-wing 
. governments and the role of the military throughout the 1980s. Samak's 
controversial statement was from an exclusive interview on 9 February 2008 with 
CNN International after the government under his premiership was newly formed. 
In the interview he denied any his involvement in the event and only accepted that 
just one 'unlucky' student died during the crackdown of the student riot. He stated, 
'Oh, I deny the whole thing. I have no concern on that business. And I have nothing 
to do, to deal with that at all ... For me, no deaths, one unlucky guy being beaten and 
being burned in Sanam Luang ... Only one guy by that day' (CNN, 19 February 2008). 
Moreover, many of his key ministers were also in the Thaksin administrations, 
while his party itself, People's Power Party (PPP), was also criticised as being a 
proxy of the former Thai Rak Thai Party which was abolished by the order of the 
Constitutional Tribunal after the September 2006 coup. 
Even more recently, the Abhisit government is also widely criticised by the 
opposition and many human rights organisation on its violation of numbers of 
issues, including its heavy-handed crackdown of the anti-government 
demonstration in April-May 2010, its suppression of freedom of speech under the 
emergency decree, and its uncompromising position towards the public outcry 
about undemocratic features of the government. These domestic policies and 
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events certainly affected the country's foreign policy position, confidence, and firm 
commitment to democracy and human rights issues. 
For this reason, while seeing the value of this development as an important element 
of Thailand's proactive foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, this thesis still 
considers this evolution incomplete for the time being and cannot represent the 
general feature of Thailand's proactivity. It has increasingly become an important 
element indeed but needs to be considered within a broader context. 
By looking from different perspectives, it may be possible to offer a more convincing 
explanation of what constitutes Thai foreign policy as we have seen it throughout the 
post-Cold War era. Interestingly, both views on Thai foreign policy mentioned earlier 
seem to say very little, or nothing, about a major force at the international level 
developing even before the end of the Cold War, that is, the increasing 
internationalisation of the Thai economy. The next section will therefore discuss 
another body of literature that takes this element into consideration in Thai foreign 
policy analysis by focusing on Thailand's attempt to exercise its leadership in the 
region within the new regional political economic context of post-Cold War. 
2.2.2 Proactive through political leaders' interests 
Even though the idea of Thailand being a leading actor in the region is not totally new 
in Thai foreign and security policy, there are relatively limited scholarly analyses 
devoting mainly to this issue. Most of the available materials refer to this point 
simply as a lingering historical background that helps explain cases after the Cold 
War in which the leaders' ambitions were extraordinarily pronounced, notably those 
of Chatichai Choonhavan, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and Thaksin Shinawatra. 
Buszynski's several publications on Thai foreign policy (1989, 1994) may be 
regarded as the flagship in the exploration of a regional leadership idea in Thai 
foreign policy after the Cold War. He argues that the Chatichai government wanted to 
promote and extend Thailand's economic benefits through creating a web of 
interdependence throughout mainland Southeast Asia. Chatichai saw Thailand's 
strong economic position as a vehicle for expediting this idea and then adopted the 
strategy of promoting Thailand as a regional gravity that would link countries in the 
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region into a new phase of interaction (1989, p. 1061; 1994, pp. 723-4 ). Buszynski 
also implies that this idea of leadership and regionalism is actually ingrained in Thai 
policy-makers and even in the general public. He states, 'it was Chatichai who with 
his grandiloquent turn of phrase formulated a regional vision for Thailand's foreign 
policy, which struck a deep chord amongst the Thais' (1994, p.723). However, he 
does not elaborate further on why this leadership idea suddenly became an issue in 
the post-Cold War period, or whether this idea became a genuine element in Thai 
foreign policy-making after Chatichai. 
Similar to Byszynski, Funston (1998d) also demonstrates that there existed regional 
aspirations amongst Thai leaders. He argues that despite the political and economic 
turmoil in the mid 1990s Thailand was still attempting to exercise its regional 
influence. He shows that different regional initiatives were proposed constantly by 
Thailand throughout the Cold War such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 
1992, Economic Growth Quadrangle in 1992, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral ·Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC) (1997), and Flexible 
Engagement (1998). He concludes that Thai foreign policy in the 1990s was an 
attempt to depart from being reactive and receptive but only failed to do so due to 
the need for foreign assistance to support its economic recovery after the 1997 
Financial Crisis. 
Funston's discussion is thus another important writing amongst the limited number 
representing this line of argument. It confirms that the idea of projecting Thailand's 
regional leading role exists in Thai foreign policy. However, his analysis covers the 
subject matter focusing particularly on the Chavalit administration until around the 
Financial Crisis in 1997-1998. He also gives more weight to domestic factors over 
external ones, especially the frequent changes of government and foreign ministers 
that affect the exercise of leadership. He does not situate Thai foreign policy in a 
broader context in relation to changes in the international and regional political 
economic development with the exception of the immediate consequences of the 
Financial Crisis for Thailand's regional leadership. 
Amongst recent analyses that focus on Thailand's international leadership, Thaksin's 
foreign policy is raised as an important issue for debate. Thitinan (2004b) argues 
- 60 -
that Thaksin's foreign policy resembled that of Chatichai, and that they shared 
similar characteristics. Foreign policy under both governments departed from the 
simple 'reactive and pragmatic' notion that had dominated Thai foreign policy-
making. They became assertive, unconventional and seeking to exercise Thailand's 
preponderance and sphere of influence particularly in Indochina, as well as to extend 
Thailand's role in regional and international affairs. It was Thaksin's conflicts of 
interest that brought strong criticism against his policy. 
Paul Chambers (2005) argues that Thailand became an economic hegemon especially 
in mainland Southeast Asia, benefiting from its superior economic and political 
conditions compared to its neighbours. Thailand's foreign policy especially in the 
economic domain then aimed to exploit its neighbours' rich resources and cheap 
labour for the profit of Thai businessmen through the promotion of export 
processing zones (EPZs) around Thailand and regional economic co-operation at the 
regional level. 
Both Thitinan and Chambers agree on one fact that Thailand during the Thaksin 
period actively engaged in regional affairs as the country's strategy in the post-Cold 
War era. They agree there is a connection between Thailand's economic position 
within the region and the personal interests of political leaders as major driving 
forces in Thai foreign policy during the Thaksin government. However, both authors 
do not further touch upon the possible interaction between Thailand's self-
perception as a leading nation and its economic interests within foreign policy-
making circles. Thitinan's main intention is simply to focus on the connection 
between Thaksin's foreign policy assertiveness and his personal benefits. Although 
Chambers touches upon the concept of 'Suvarnabhumi' or 'the Golden Land' as 
Buszynski does, it is only very briefly and is simply an a posteriori justification to 
support Thailand's regional interest. In other words, none of the aforementioned 
scholars views 'self-perception' as having a significant determining effect on current 
foreign policy-making. It is seen merely as an old-fashioned ideology which is 
obsolete and, if relevant, is picked up by politicians to raise nationalist rhetoric in 
support of their policy. In this way, 'economic interests' constitute or reinforce 'self-
perception', not the other way round. 
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Several foreign affairs critics also emerged during the Thaksin government, similarly 
criticising how Thaksin exploited his political position for the benefits of his crony's 
businesses (Surapong 2007, p.30, Asda 2004). For instance, the Thaksin 
government's endorsement of the offer of a multimillion-dollar loan to the Burmese 
government for improving its infrastructure was arguably benefiting his own 
family's telecom company, Shin Corp. (Taipei Times, 1 October 2006; Thitinan 2004, 
p.5). This line of criticism concludes that Thaksin finally demeaned Thailand's 
credibility in the international community, hence his failure to exercise effective 
leadership of the country. They see Thaksin's foreign policy as the extension of his 
government's populist domestic policy. Thaksin merely tried to impress the Thai 
constituents that their leader was active in the international arena but, in fact, there 
was no significant substantive value in this policy. Furthermore, it did not serve 
Thailand's national interest but that of Thaksin and his circles. Thaksin's foreign 
policy therefore compromised Thailand's commitment to democracy by his pursuit 
of his personal interests. Thus, the scholars and critics in this group eventually 
advocate Thailand's bringing back in a foreign policy with universal principles, many 
of which are found having a close link to the Democrat Party4. 
In sum, this regional leadership feature has not been established as a significant 
element in Thai foreign policy behaviour. It is still regarded as a sporadic 
phenomenon and mostly dependent on individual political leaders. Therefore, this 
group of scholars and observers implicitly concludes that regional ambition, though 
it exists, has not become an important input in foreign policy. Proaction is yet 
Thailand's foreign policy behaviour. The overall nature of Thai foreign policy is still 
flexible and reactive. Thus, this explanation falls into the same situation as the 
'foreign policy with universal principles' argument, as being partial and specific to 
certain individuals and political systems. To the best of my knowledge, apart from 
the number of writings mentioned above there is not a single scholarly study that 
straightforwardly tries to pursue this regional aspirations notion as a continual 
driving force in Thai foreign policy throughout the post-Cold War period. 
4 Prominent vocal critics of the Thaksin regime and his foreign policy include Surin Pitsuwan, 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra, Ambassador Kasit Bhiromya and Ambassador Surapong Jayanama. 
The first three are members of the Democrat Party, and the last one mentioned during the 
interview on 12 February 2008 that he was invited to join the Democrat Party. He refused to 
engage directly in the politics and preferred an advisory role to the party. 
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Although this thesis sees the merit of a 'personal ambitions' hypothesis for Thailand's 
emerging regional ambitions since the Chatichai government, it does not see this 
tendency as merely bounded specifically within the personal and business interests 
of politicians. The personal ambition factor, though it exists, is quite inadequate in 
providing a broad or general picture of Thai foreign policy behaviour and is therefore 
limited to only a certain number of political leaders. Therefore, it is this thesis's task 
to propose reconsidering Thai foreign policy from a different angle. It suggests that 
Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy behaviour is proactive. This proactive nature 
is examined through the influence of ideational factors in Thai policy-makers-self-
perception-within the context of the internationalisation of the Thai economy in the 
post-Cold War era. The interaction between these elements has become another 
important part in forming and strengthening the idea of regional leadership in Thai 
foreign policy circles after the Cold War and its proactive role in shaping regional 
order especially in mainland Southeast Asia. 
This thesis agrees with the approach of 'perceived' position of a state in the 
international system as contended by Rothstein (1968) and Keohane (1969). That is, 
a country shall be regarded as small or not, depending on how its people and 
institutions perceive themselves. If they do not see themselves as small, they shall 
not be so. For this reason, this thesis will explore Thailand's self-perception in detail 
to establish the proposition that this has also been a factor in directing Thai foreign 
policy behaviour especially after the demise of the Cold War. Amongst other things, 
this is another important feature that has shifted the nature of Thai foreign policy 
behaviour towards proaction as evidenced by its rigorous support and involve~ent 
in regionalisf schemes. The succeeding chapters thus discuss the emergence of 
Thailand's self-perception, its development and adjustment in the changing post-
Cold War environment, including its relevance in shaping Thailand's foreign policy 
direction. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THAILAND'S SELF-PERCEPTION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this dissertation agrees with the possibility of 
seeing Thailand's regional ambition to the extent that it opens up an analytical space 
for the role of 'idea of Thailand being a leading actor in Southeast Asia' in Thai foreign 
policy-making. However, this thesis disagrees with the main conclusion of this group of 
scholars, that the intention to utilise this concept is merely rhetorical and as a 
justification to extend the personal interests of some politicians, or only prevails 
amongst military. This study, instead, seeks to see how this idea has perpetuated in the 
Thai policy-makers' minds as a collective perception in general. This perception is 
formed, elaborated, maintained, and should be likely to influence the country's foreign 
policy choice in certain ways. 
Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to trace the origin of this idea so as to 
reveal its significance and inferences for the formation of Thailand's self-perception 
and its regional aspirations. Therefore, this chapter demonstrates the historical 
development of ideas associated with how the Thais view their country and their 
neighbours. It will form the foundation on which the succeeding chapters of this 
dissertation rest in order to empirically demonstrate the significance of self-perception 
and its regional aspirations in Thai foreign policy-making and implementation in the 
post-Cold War environment. This chapter, thus, strengthens the relatively new 
argument for Thailand's regional aspirations and will ultimately help elucidate its 
proactive role in regional affairs. 
Historical events involving the formation of the Thai state and its nationalism shaped a 
particular image amongst the Thai policy-making elite and the Thai public about their 
country within the region. This image or perception about their country has been 
developed through several phases in Thailand's modern history tracing it back as far as 
the period of colonialism. The shaping of self-perception did not take place in a vacuum 
but in the context of domestic politics and regional political economy. Therefore, this 
chapter aims to answer a basic inquiry, that is, 'how does Thailand perceive itself in the 
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region?'. How this self-perception evolved into regional aspirations after the Cold War 
is to be examined in the succeeding chapter. 
Prior to answering this question, the next section discusses the theoretical frameworks 
across disciplines deemed to be useful in elucidating the issues relevant to the main 
focus of this chapter-the construction of self-perception and its significance in policy-
making. Due to the fact that foreign policy analysis involves multiple levels of analysis, 
ranging from the micro level of individual decision making to state and international 
levels, this dissertation is unbound by particular theoretical schools. It sees the 
usefulness of an eclectic approach that will help improve our understanding of the 
complexity of the subject area. Different perspectives are thus viewed as 
complementary tools or building blocks towards a better understanding of the nature 
and pattern of foreign policy. 
This section is followed by a section on historical understanding of how Thailand's 
self-perception originated by tracing the introduction of the modern nation-state 
concept to the Siamese (Thai) elite. This concept gave birth to a 'new Siam' or Thailand 
as we see it today, within a clear boundary and the idea of nationhood or nationalism 
sanctioned, sponsored, and promoted by the Thai state. The last section touches upon 
the consolidation of these ideas especially through mass education in newly 
democratic Thailand. This will include the impact of Thailand's involvement in the Cold 
War on strengthening the self-perception. 
3.1 Analytical frameworks for understanding the construction and implications 
of self-perception in foreign policy-making 
The analysis of perception is relatively abundant in the psychology discipline from 
which Political Science including its sub-field of International Relations has borrowed, 
to build a useful analytical tool to understand human cognition in political behaviour. 
Therefore, this section draws on the notion of self-perception from various sources 
and uses concepts as analytical framework for foreign policy analysis, such as the 
concepts of perception, self-perception, image, role theory /national role conceptions, 
and identity. It should be noted here that, however, this section will not discuss in 
detail each pertinent concept but rather maps and points out the basic ideas that are 
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relevant to the focus of this dissertation as a heuristic tool ·of analysis to facilitate 
further discussion of Thai foreign policy. The main objective of this section is to 
derponstrate how pertinent theoretical approaches view: (1) the connection between 
historical and socialisation processes and the construction of self-perception, and (2) 
how certain self-perceptions may transcend individuals to form a collective self-
perception of a society, and (3) the implication of self-perception for policy-making 
focusing on how self-perception may i~fluence policy preference or policy choice. The 
succeeding sections then investigate how Thailand's self-perception has been 
constructed in history and how it is likely to shape the way in which Thailand's foreign 
policy focuses. 
3.1.1 Perception/ self-perception 
Within the International Relations discipline, scholars have for some time thought 
about the significance of belief and perception in foreign policy decision making. They 
agree that the way in which state leaders view each other can be a basic factor in 
international relations as, in fact, their decisions and actions generally emanate from 
this perception, not as a response to reality per se (Brecher et al. 1969, p.86; George 
1969, p.190). Therefore, a state's perception (or misperception) of others as either 
friends or threats, regardless of their real intention, informs which type of foreign 
policy response the former should pursue in the first place. The concept of perception 
was developed more comprehensively by Robert Jervis in his seminal work, 
'Perception and misperception in international politics' (1976). 
Jervis' argues that perception of decision makers is important in the international 
politics as it dictates the way in which a policy towards other actors in the 
international system is shaped and implemented. He criticises International Relations 
theories that normally assume decision makers make decisions rationally in response 
to external stimuli in policy formulation. Jervis does not deny that rational decision-
making model entirely but, instead, posits that perception, which consists of images, 
beliefs and intentions, intervenes in decision making as the fundamental motivation 
behind political decision (pp.3-31). By doing so, Jervis suggests that foreign policy 
decisions can be most comprehensively understood with greatest clarity. Perceptions 
are then one of the most important factors determining policy choices in foreign policy 
and can be useful independent variables (Herrmann 1986, p.869). However, it seems 
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that this model does not elaborate on the extent to which the perception of one's own 
self or self-perception is a significant determinant in foreign policy-making. This 
directs this dissertation to consult further with other fields of study related to a 
decision maker's cognitive aspect especially within the psychology discipline. 
In psychology the concept of self-perception seems to be more clearly analysed. A 
seminal work of Daryl J. Bern (1972) on 'self-perception theory', is widely mentioned, 
incorporated and extended in foreign policy analysis. 'Self-perception theory' offers a 
useful starting point here to see a causal link between individuals' historical 
background, context, the formation of attitude and belief, and their behaviour. Bern 
posits that: 
Individuals come to 'know' their own attitudes, emotions and other 
internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own 
overt behaviour and/ or the circumstances in which this behaviour occurs 
(1972, p.2) 
Self-perception theory is concerned with the condition under which individuals' 
principles, attitudes and beliefs are formed. This theory argues that human social 
behaviour is strongly influenced by their past history and the 'socialising community 
itself must necessarily train the individual's self-descriptive skills' upon the social 
context (Bern 1972, p.55). Therefore, self-perception theory offers several useful 
points here for the analysis in this dissertation. First, observers can infer individuals' 
inner attitudes and intentions from their behaviours. Second, in order to understand 
individuals' behaviour observers also need to take into account their surrounding 
environment and historical background. For these reasons, with relevance to policy-
making it is critical to understand policy-makers' attitudes inferred from their 
historical and external context in which their socialisation and decision making take 
place. 
Self-perception theory further argues that the attitude formed in the first place is 
generally stable with little substantive change occurring afterwards (Bern 1972, p.28). 
External contingencies of reinforcement have only a small effect on the individuals' 
attitude and behaviours that they believe they want to carry out or which reflect their 
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true opinion (Bern 1972, p.39). Although a change of perception or belief is possible, 
normally only peripheral perceptions are easily altered while the core perception is 
unaffected (Heradstveit 1979, p.21). As asserted in the theory of cognitive dissonance, 
'a decision-maker can infer several mechanisms, in order to reduce dissonance and 
achieve consonance, without changing the images or beliefs' (Deyer 1983, p.266). In 
other words, contradictory information is either ruled out, ignored, or used to 
reinforce the existing perception. 
This notion has significant implications for this thesis in drawing inference from the 
historical development of policy-makers' attitudes, at least as individuals or groups, 
about Thailand within the region that have continued until the post-Cold War period. It 
argues that the self-perception amongst the Thai elite about Thailand's glory and 
position as a leading nation has remained of important relevance to Thai foreign policy 
decision-making background. 
3.1.2 Image theory 
Image theory is closely associated with the 'perception model' discussed above as they 
both agree that ideas of other actors influence foreign policy responses. However, 
image theory differs from the 'perception model' in its definition of image. Image 
theory views an image as 'a cognitive structure that represents organised knowledge 
about a given concept or type of stimulus' (Herrmann 1986, p.843-844 ). It holds that in 
general people tend to simplify reality and interpret what they encounter to fit their 
generalised versions. Therefore, ideas towards other actors are organised in a 
systematic way into different types of images, also called stereotypes, or group 
schemas. Each image contains specific cognitions, views, beliefs, and characteristics of 
the other actors in it (Alexander et al. 2005, p.28). 
Originally, image theory mainly dealt with the enemy image between competing states 
as a result of the Cold War's international environment, but it restricted the theory to 
explain other behavioural variations especially after the Cold War (Herrmann & 
Fischerkeller 1995; Alexander et al. 2005, pp.28-29). Therefore, Herrmann & 
Fischerkeller (1995) extended the theory based on three basic compatibilities, that is, 
goal, relative power, and cultural status. These produce five different general images, 
which are enemy, ally, barbarian, imperialist, and dependent images (Herrmann & 
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Fischerkeller 1995, pp. 425-438). These images encompass both perceptions of other 
actors and one's own self, since decision makers need to evaluate their country's 
compatibility with their counterpart before reaching a conclusion on what kind of 
image would represent their relationship. 
Only one image, an ally image, is a result of all compatibilities in goal, power and 
culture and eventually produces co-operative responses. Other images are formed due 
to asymmetries in these basic three elements. The enemy image prevails when their 
status and power are relatively similar but they share different goals. The barbarian 
image dictates a relationship in which one country portrays the other as more 
powerful and exhibiting an aggressive goal but less civilised than itself. The former 
would therefore try to resolve this conflict by way of appeasement. When a country 
views that it is superior to the other in both power and cultural terms and sees an 
opportunity to exploit the latter's weaknesses to serve its objectives. The former thus 
takes the dependent (colony) image of the latter resulting in a policy of domination or 
helping inste?d of a harmful policy. At the same time, the weaker state also views the 
stronger state under the imperialist image and may resist domination passively or 
strongly depending on circumstances (Herrmann & Fischerkeller 1995, pp.428-438; 
Herrmann et al. 1997; Alexander et al. 2005, pp.29-32). 
Therefore, image theory is a useful guide in conceptualising self-perception as it also 
suggests a specific tendency of policy responses with regard to each image type. Image 
theory offer a meaningful analytical lens through which to see further which image 
represent Thailand's collective view of itself and of others. By doing so, it permits us to 
seek for a trend in which Thailand's foreign policy is formulated in cei:;tain ways. In 
other words, a certain image held by policy-makers may allow specific policy 
preference to influence policy outcomes. 
3.1.3 Role theory/ national role conceptions 
Role theory, being originally advanced in the disciplines of social psychology and 
sociology, offers great benefit as another way to understand an individual's 
psychological factors and how one perceives oneself vis-a-vis others in society. It 
provides a useful analytical tool for foreign policy analysis under the 'national role 
conceptions' which many scholars in international relations have successfully 
- 70 -
incorporated into their works notably those of K. J. Holsti (1970), Naomi B. Wish 
(1980), James N. Rosenau (1984), and Stephen G. Walker (1987). 
Role theory holds that individuals spend most of their time in groups in which they 
take different positions or roles, with a set of funct~ons that are formed by the · 
· expectation of others in the group. Therefore, it posits that 'social behaviour is in large 
part a function of the expectations attached to or associated with individuals on the 
basis of their locations or position (or status) in a social system' (Biddle and Thomas 
1966; Biddle 1979 cited in Grossman 2005, p.42). A society, then, can be viewed as the 
complex relationships and interactions amongst roles in which individuals hold 
particular positions. In this sense, roles and behaviours are analogous as once 
individuals 'perform' their roles it means they 'decide' to take certain 'actions', which 
are called behaviours (Holsti 1970, pp.237, 239). 
At the same time, roles are also influenced by both the internal factors and external 
factors of the individual or in Holsti's words, ego's role conceptions' and alter's role 
prescriptions. Internal factors include, for example, self-interest, goals, attitudes, values, 
and personality; whereas external factors involve norms, cultures, social institutions, 
and organisations of which individuals are members. (Holsti 1970, 239- 240). 
Holsti proposes the application of the co.ncepts of role theory to introduce 'national 
role conceptions' in foreign policy analysis as a powerful model in explaining foreign 
policy behaviours. Based on ·the assumptions that the foreign policy elite are the 
primary actors in the policy-making process, and the international system is a type of 
social system; national role conceptions thus views states interacting in the 
international system similarly to the way in which individuals in a stratified society 
perceive which roles they should perform (Grossman 2005, p.42). Therefore, 'role 
performance results from, or is consistent with, policy-makers' conceptions of their 
nation's orientations and tasks in the international system or in subordinate regional 
systems' (Holsti 1970, p.245). 
National role conceptions also assert that a national role arises from a complex 
combination of sources. Other factors rather than merely self-interest (or national 
interest) are also influential in shaping the behaviour or roles performed by actors, 
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including decision maker's attitudes, decisions, commitments, rules, and actions in 
accordance with the role they perceive how their nation should perform in the 
international society. This includes location, capabilities, socio-economic 
characteristics (Holsti 1970, pp.239, 245-246; Wish 1980, p.533; Rosenau 1984 in 
Walker 1987, p.49). Some scholars also find that role prescriptions, such as system 
structure, are also relevant in shaping the roles in many cases (Walker 1987, 
p.242-243; Wish 1987). 
Not only do national role conceptions suggest which roles a state would perform in the 
international system but also limit certain policy options that may be otherwise 
available since certain policies are seen as appropriate to certain roles and vice versa 
(Holsti 1970, p.247; Rosenau 1984 in Walker 1987, p.54; Grossman 2005, p.42). As 
Holsti argues: 
The more these national role conceptions become part of the political 
culture of a nation, the more likely they set limits on perceived, or 
politically feasible, policy alternatives, and the less likely that 
idiosyncratic variables would be crucial in decision-making' (1970, p.298) 
Thus, national resources, leadership, and other collective actions are mainly mobilised 
and directed towards policies that support, reinforce, or sustain the national roles 
(Hollis & Smith 1986, p.277). In other words, national role conceptions help redefine 
national interests and courses of actions to achieve it including foreign policy. 
The national role conceptions model also agrees with other psychological theories that 
see perception and image as difficult to change but 'likely to remain stable and 
consistent' (Wish 1980, p.533). Backman argues, changes of political elite 'seldom 
[have] the expected effect of changing national policies' (1970; p.311). Therefore, 
national role conceptions act as a set of guidelines or standards for foreign policy-
making on which decision makers rely to conduct their policy on a general basis (Holti 
1970, p.246; Wish 1980; Rosenau 1984 in Walker 1987, p.54-55; Aggestam 1999; 
Grossman 2005). As a result, national role conceptions can provide a useful 
explanation for general patterns of foreign policy behaviours. 
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Furthermore, the result of Holsti's study (1970) suggests that instead of several 
traditional typologies based on the balance of power theory such as bloc leader, 
balancer, and bloc follower, many different roles based on an active-passive continuum 
can be conceptualised. He found seventeen role conceptions to which states subscribe 
depending on different functions, issue areas, geographical regions, or sets of 
relationships. They can also be categorised into two major groups as active and passive 
national roles. The active national roles refer to a variety of policies that engage with 
the external environment-including bastion of revolution-liberator, regional leader, 
regional protector, active independent, liberation supporter, anti-imperialist agent, 
defender of the faith, mediator-integrator, regional-subsystem collaborator, developer, 
and bridge. In contrast, faithful ally, independent, example, internal development, 
isolate, protectee can be labelled as the passive national roles which focus more on 
domestic development and less on external involvement (Holsti 1970). 
A national role is argued to be useful either as a dependent variable or an independent 
variable depending on how the research question is posed (Holsti 1970, p.307; 
Grossman 2005, p.337). It is also valued as an intervening variable that helps bridge 
levels of analysis (Holsti 1970; Rosenau 1984, Adigbuo 2007) and modifies the 
prevailing Rational Actor and Bureaucratic Polity models (Hollis & Smith 1986). 
Therefore, a national role conceptions framework is relevant to this thesis as another 
analytical tool to help investigate Thailand's self-perception and the roles that Thailand 
views it should perform. Certain methodology employed in national role conceptions 
can be replicated to help reveal Thai foreign policy elite's perception about Thailand's 
roles in the region and through what type of policy preference they seek to realise 
those roles. 
3.1.4 Identity 
Within the field of international relations, the social constructivist school is at the 
forefront in advocating the analysis of identity and its effects on foreign policy and 
international politics at large. Constructivists share ontological ground with the post-
positivists in questioning an attempt to understanding political reality solely through 
materialistic and value-free perspectives. Constructivism proposes that 'accounts of 
the world are shaped by preferences - and often power - so that if truth is possible at 
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all it lies only in understanding how different versions of events have come to be 
produced and how they compete' (Hill 2003, p.28). So, social reality is not an object of 
nature or an entity pre-existing before human society, but is constructed and 'exists 
only as inter-subjective awareness among people' (Jackson & S0rensen 2003, p.253). 
This includes the international system that is thought to be anarchic but 'anarchy' itself 
is argued by Alexander Wendt (1992) to be 'what states make of it'. Therefore, a social 
system consists of values, ideas, norms, thoughts, and knowledge upheld by certain 
people and prevailing at a particular time and place. 
Constructivists contend that actors within a society engage in the social processes of 
sharing and distributing these ideas and knowledge. Through the process of 
socialisation, then, a society constitutes collective understanding and expectations of 
'self and 'other', thus identities are formed with roles attached to them (Wendt 1992, 
pp.397-398; Katzenstein 1996, p.1). Therefore, similar to role theory, constructivists 
view that a state as another type of social system attains its identities through the 
sharing of the same collective norms and values amongst its population in relationship 
with other states in world state society (Jepperson et al. 1996, p.10). In this way, the 
state gives notions to itself as an entity different to others in terms of historical 
background, religion, race, language, culture, ideology, political institutions, and so on; 
and hence national identities, nationalism, patriotism, and so on. At the same time, the 
state also defines the nature of its relationships with other states, whether they be 
friends or enemies, allies or rivals, and thereby constitute international relations. 
Furthermore, unlike neo-realists and neo-liberals who view identities and actions are 
conditional upon interest, constructivists repudiate that claim. They assert that 
interests and actions are shaped according to identities or how actors see themselves 
and their relations with· others. In other words, identities constitute interest and 
actions (Wendt 1992, pp.398-399; Reus-Smit 1996, pp.8-9). As Wendt puts it: 
Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a "portfolio" of 
interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, 
they define their interests in the process of defining 
situations ... Sometimes situations are unprecedented in our experience, 
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and in these cases we have to construct their meaning, and thus our 
interests, by analogy or invent them de novo (1992, p.398). 
Constructivists suggest that foreign policy is an important tool for a state because it 
reproduces the state's identities that ensure 'self and 'other' differentiation (Campbell 
1998, pp. 68-72), hence 'reinforces national and statist culture' (Hill 2003, p.9). For this 
reason, identity is worth studying as a significant variable explaining a state's 
international policies and actions. The primary objective of foreign policy analysis 
based on the constructivist perspective is therefore to discover how identities are 
formed and what forces, mainly at the domestic level, may play a part in this identity 
formation. 
Constructivists also view language as another means that constitutes political reality as 
it is a tool to convey ideas and values in society. Therefore, 'language, whether official 
or private, rhetorical or observational, has a lot to tell us about both mind-sets and 
actions, and it is a relatively untapped resource' (Hill 2003, p.9). This thesis can utilise 
certain constructivist research strategies that might help investigate the perceptions of 
Thai foreign policy-makers especially through analysing the language used in various 
policy statements. 
To reiterate, the main objective of mapping the above conceptual frameworks is to 
show that all concepts mentioned above agree on one common ground-that is, how 
states view themselves has significant implications for foreign policy behaviour. 
Moreover, it also offers some useful guidelines to elements that may influence the 
deve_lopment of collective self-perception. The agreement rests on the fact that 
perception is shaped within a social and historical process and remains relatively stable 
through time. To do so this thesis requires a historical method to infer the formation of 
self-perception from the environment in which Thai people and policy-makers are 
socialised and share their experiences and worldview. 
This chapter places heavy focus on the understanding of self-perception or identity as 
a discursive practice within Thailand's own history, socialisation and interpretation. It 
argues that this historical process of socialisation was imposed largely, if not totally, by 
the Thai state through phases of its nation building. Thus, subsequent sections will 
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firstly discuss Thailand's history with relevance to the shaping of the Thai people's 
self-perception. Attention will be paid to how the state formation process in Thailand 
since the late nineteenth century has contributed to creating a certain self-image or 
perception. Next, it investigates how self-perception was sustained, reinforced, and 
popularised in Thai society in post-war Thailand. The main objective is to show how 
the self-perception was formed and how it affected the way of thinking amongst the 
Thais and, inevitably policy-makers, especially towards Thailand's neighbouring 
countries. As Vertzberger (1986, 1990) argues, decision-makers 'act as a practical-
intuitive historian' whose decisions are often based on beliefs, values and stereotypes 
(1990, p.113) which is shaped by a mixture of historical experience, selective memory, 
national mythologies, writing, painting or artefacts (1986, p.224). In short, this chapter 
wants to show the part of socialisation process that gave birth to Thailand's self-
perception, and the effects of this self-perception on foreign policy-making will be 
discussed largely in the subsequent chapters. 
3.2 The origin of Thailand's self-perception 
This chapter maintains that self-perception amongst member of the Thai elite can be 
traced back to the process of modern nation-state building since the late nineteenth 
century. It is directly related to the creation of state's version of nationalism that 
brought individuals to share perception towards their country. This section highlights 
two significant factors that are deemed to be critical of the construction of Thailand's 
self-perception. that is, the physical and ideational formation of modern Thailand. This 
is done especially through the adoption of modern state boundaries particularly in the 
early development of the nation-state and education as a means to inculcate the very 
concept of 'Thai-ness'. Therefore, nationalistic sentiment is an outcome from modern 
state formation and thereafter shaped the Thai people's worldview and perception. 
Moreover, this self-perception also spread vastly when the national education system 
was implemented nationwide. The perception amongst the elite and the populace 
became uniform with regard to the view of their own country and the comparisons 
made with its neighbours. 
However, the task of this section and the subsequent one is by no means to discover 
the origin and development of nationalism in Thai politics. A great number of studies 
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have already successfully added to the rich literature on this issue. The main concern 
in this chapter is rather to establish a link between state formation, nationalism, and 
self-perception in the context of Thai history that was influential in foreign policy-
making in the succeeding periods. This linkage has been overlooked or, at least, 
recognised only superficially in most Thai foreign policy analysis as previously 
discussed in Chapter Two. Therefore, not every aspect of Thai nationalism will be 
discussed in detail; only the scope relevant to the shaping of self-perception is included. 
3.2.1 The birth of Thai modern state and definition ofThai-ness 
The formation of the modern state began for Thailand during the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) as a novel political project of the Bangkok elite in 
response to the expansion of colonialism in Southeast Asia. The centralisation of 
Bangkok's political power as a sole legitimate political entity involved the imposition of 
Bangkok's power over other traditional polities arguably by way of adopting a modern 
geographical concept, hence sovereignty, over its tributary states. Thereafter, the 
success of the royal court in Bangkok was attributable to its modernisation and 
reformation in state apparatus such as the fiscal system, modern army, bureaucracy, 
and, importantly, the education system within a new bounded territory. Through the 
modern education system nationalism was achieved by instilling the nationalistic idea 
amongst its citizens. As Baker & Pasuk (2005) well summarise: 
The idea of nation, unified nation-state, nationality, national identity, and 
centralised nation-governing bureaucracy were imposed from above. 
They were adapted from European models, and adopted in part to parry 
the threat of colonial takeover. But they were taken up also to replace old 
systems of rule and social control ... (2005, p.47) 
The political actors are selective in manoeuvring historical narratives that 
mobilise their nation-building; hence constructing shared memories and 
knowledge of society amongst peoples. Nationalism has been utilised as a tool by 
the Thai political elite in Bangkok throughout contemporary Thai history to 
consolidate their power and, significantly, to form the new modern state's shared 
identity or 'imagined community' in Benedict Anderson's term (1983). 
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As mentioned briefly in the preceding chapter, mainland Southeast Asia's interstate 
system was traditionally marked by constellations of power or mandalas. Within each 
constellation there existed a hierarchy of power and recognition. Direct controls from a 
centre were exercised only within its military and administrative capabilities. Beyond 
these areas were tributary states that recognised the superiority of and bestowed their 
loyalty and symbolic tribute to the stronger entities. Apart from the recognition of this 
hierarchy, unlike colonies, tributary states still maintained their autonomy in 
managing their manpower, resources, and even external relations with other states. 
Moreover, this loyalty was not exclusive to any particular power but could be granted 
concomitantly to several ones. As a result, multiple recognition of the influence of 
powerful kingdoms as the overlords was a general practice by these tributaries as a 
means to hedge against any threat to their survival. (Thongchai 1996; Stuart-Fox 2003, 
pp.26- 36; Baker & Pasuk 2005, p.58; Thanet 2006, pp.13-33). At the same time, the 
influential kingdoms also needed recognition from their smaller tributaries for 
maintaining their superior hierarchy within the system. The loss of recognition also 
meant the shrinking of their sphere of political influence and profile. This recognition 
of power also played an important part later in modern border demarcation between 
Siam and Western colonial powers. Siam could not control parts of Cambodia and Laos 
partly owing to the fact the latter also had recognised Vietnam as their suzerainty 
concomitantly, hence creating a legal claim by France after its occupation of Vietnam. 
Thongchai's seminal work on an early stage of mapping Siam in modern history as 
another way of explaining the construction of the modern Thai state is a useful starting 
point for this analysis. As argued by Thongchai (1994, 1996), boundaries in 
pre-modern mainland Southeast Asia were obscure, imprecise, and flexible. Territories 
were normally limited to an area where towns or cities could oversee with their 
manpower. Therefore, borders between towns and cities were not necessarily 
interfaced leaving some areas ungoverned by any authority (1996, p. 73). These 
overlapping and ambiguous boundaries created confusion, misunderstandings and 
conflict between the Europeans and local people when territories were important to 
the farmer's colonial expansion. The demarcation of state boundaries in a modern 
political geographical sense was first introduced when the British requested Siam to 
indicate its border with the colonised Burma in 1826. The Siamese court, instead, saw 
it as an unimportant and irritating issue in the first place but gradually agreed to settle 
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the issue just to prevent any conflict and mainly because they had to play the new 
game to ensure their survival (1994, pp.62-72). However, from the time of King 
Chulalongkorn the new generation of Siamese elite who mostly received Western-style 
education also wanted to modernise the country in the Western way and started to 
share the same rationale for demarcation. They also saw the embrace of modern 
cartographical concepts as a device to buttress their new modern nation-state building 
project (1996, p.80). 
The adoption of modern mapping techniques helped the Siamese rulers to form their 
idea of how their nation should look. The increasing pressure from the Europeans 
around Siam alarmed the Siamese court enough to define its border as a defensive 
mechanism. Siam, for the first time, in 1880 hired a British surveyor James McCarthy to 
map the territories, a work which was completed in 1887 (Baker & Phasuk 2005, 
p.58-59). The McCarthy map demonstrates the Siamese elite's aspirations to claim 
sovereignty over all Siamese traditional tributaries by automatically transferring the 
old concept of tributary relationship into a new Westphalian idea of state (Thongchai 
1996, p.80). At this time, Siam viewed its tributaries using the Western concept of 
colonies, thus, they should have been incorporated into a new Siamese map as part of a 
modern Siamese state. The new map was, in Thongchai's word, 'the encoding of desire' 
(1994, p.125) covering southern China's Sipsongpanna (now officially called 
Xishuangbanna), Sipsongchuthai (the northwestern part of Vietnam), Laos, northern 
Cambodia, and the northern Malay states (Thongchai 1994, p.125; Wyatt 2003, 
p.189-190; Baker & Phasuk 2005, p.59-60). Thus the perception amongst the Thai elite 
as revealed in this mapping of a new Siam indicates that they saw Siam as an empire 
influencing and controlling a vast area of mainland Southeast Asia. 
These aspirations became internalised in the Thai elite's perception that it created 'self 
and the sense of belonging within these boundaries. This can be seen from the 
historical narrative of Thai history that King Chulalongkorn felt so humiliated and so 
sad after Siam lost the territory east of the Mekong River to the French in 1893. The 
area nowadays covers most of present-day Laos. As Terwiel (1983) describes: 
[King Chulalongkorn] collapsed and left the country's daily affairs in the 
hand of his cabinet. He took the matters so to heart that he refused to eat 
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and to meet people, and it was widely expected that he would die, his 
spirit broken (p.260) 
It is very interesting to see how this sense of belonging of a new bounded state was 
built in quite a short period of time. It can be argued to a certain degree that, at this 
stage, the Siamese elite had already attached themselves to the new concept of state 
sovereignty. Thongchai (1996) does not really explain this in detail. He states that 'two 
decades later [around the mid 1820-the early 1840], the British were still urging that 
the boundary be demarcated. Siam finally agreed, for unknown reasons' (p.78). 
However, he implies that the new generation of Siamese elite may have been strongly 
influenced by their modern education (1996, p.80). 
Prior to the accession to the throne of King Chulalongkorn in 1868 many young princes 
and noblemen were either educated abroad or by foreign teachers. Young Prince 
Chulalongkorn had also been trained by a group of English teachers including Anna 
Leonowens (Wyatt 2003, p.175), a famous character in the Broadway musical 'The 
King and I'. This group of elite, the so-called Young Siam, later become a driving force 
in modernising the country (Kullada 2004). Leaving aside those educated abroad, it 
can be easily imagined that part of the curriculum taught by these English teachers 
would have been Western history and geography in which modern maps of the world 
and the British Empire were illustrated. As a result, by the time Prince Chulalongkorn 
become the king, the concept of modern nation-state with clear boundaries was at 
least understood amongst the potential ruling class. 
Therefore, Thongchai's treatment of the demarcation of Siamese territory as an 
independent variable in explaining the emergence of nationhood, thence nationalism, 
might be somewhat problematical in inferring the formation of elite's self-image and 
perception. Perhaps, the western elements of education prior to the mapping 
processes in Siam had actually formed such a perception. Maps, though influential, 
were merely an outcome of cognitive structuring that was crystallised and revealed at 
a particular time when political environment was allowed. That is, although the 
concept of nation-state was recognised by a certain modernised elite during King 
Mongut's reign (father of King Chulalongkorn), this group had still been unable to push 
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forward the change until they could consolidate their political power vis-a-vis other 
groups later during the reign of King Chulalongkorn. 
Kullada's seminal work (2004) discusses in detail how King Chulalongkorn 
successfully consolidated his political power and achieved the ultimate goal of creating 
a modern absolutist state during his reign. She argues that King Chulalongkorn's idea 
of building the nation-state owed much to Napoleonic France in which the French 
emperor maintained his absolute power above all. This absolutist state idea was 
reflected, and in some sections paraphrased, in an unpublished constitution that King 
Chulalongkorn ordered to be drafted (pp.193-194 ). It was a response to the traditional 
political power held in the hands of both the noble class and the great families, so that 
he could gradually mobilise political support and power from new resources to create 
an absolutist state. 
King Chulalongkorn's state formation project was more than an introduction of a 
modern system that comprised the institutions of taxation, military, and bureaucracy. 
More importantly, the ultimate objective behind these initiatives was his attempt to 
enforce the modern concept of citizenship within a territory. The creation of this 
notion is arguably attributable to the strengthening of self-perception, not only 
amongst the Thai elite but also the common people. 
The abolition of slavery, later on including corvee, was King Chulalongkorn's important 
tool to redirect loyalty from his new 'subjects', which brought several impacts to Siam. 
Firstly, it increased an independent workforce within the Siamese economy and 
allowed Siam to enjoy benefits from the expansion of production and trade with the 
Europeans. Secondly, it allowed Siam to expand its taxation base on which a new 
modern bureaucracy relied. Thirdly, this initiative also coincided with the interest of 
the Bunnags-a great noble family that controlled trade and tax collection. This 
convergence of interest between King Chulalongkorn and the Bunnags, in turn, had a 
positive effect on the former's political position vis-a-vis other hard-line groups 
(Kullada 2004, pp.45-51). Most importantly, the release of labour forces from the 
traditional system and the conversion of them into a modern conscription helped the 
new modern state to acquire its own army with less reliance on other traditional lords 
who would usually supply manpower. This helped Bangkok to deal effectively by force 
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with revolts and internal resistance within its new boundary, and finally brought all 
people under the Siamese King. In Baker & Pasuk's word, 'all men were now the king's 
men. Almost everyone now stood in the same relationship to the state tax and military 
service. In parallel, they were also reinvented as members of the same race' (2005, 
p.62). 
Challenged by the European definition of 'nation' as a political expression of race, King 
Chulalongkorn stepped forward to identify 'Thai-ness' based on language and new 
boundaries. Therefore, the Thai, the Lao, and the Shan were regarded as the same race, 
as their languages are in the Tai family. Other groups such as Malay, Mon, Khmer, 
though speaking different languages, were also Siamese as long as they resided in Siam. 
King Chulalongkorn adopted a term similar to that of the British Queen and her empire, 
representing himself as 'King of Siam and Sovereign of Laos and Malay'. Siam was 
many times instead referred to as 'Ratcha anachak Thai' which is literally translated as 
'the Kingdom of the Thais' (Baker & Pasuk 2004, p.62-67). 
3.2.2 Instilling Thai-ness 
Apart from King Chulalongkorn's attempt to re-mobilise loyalty in favour of his 
position under the new concept of who was Thai as described above, education was 
another significant tool for him to inculcate this new concept and strengthen 
nationalistic idea. King Chulalongkorn did this on both fronts, amongst the bureaucrats 
and the general public. His primary purpose was to create a loyalty centred on the 
monarch (Kullada 2004, p.66; Wyatt 2004, p.181). Modern education training was 
meant to become the new entry to career advancement. Promotion was now based on 
merit in contrast to paternalism, which prevailed in the in traditional system. Although 
King Chulalongkorn's primary targets were princes and noblemen, commoners also 
infiltrated the new system, treating it as a social ladder, hence the expansion of 
education outside the ruling class. Once the new bureaucracy grew, new recruits were 
needed hence mass education was expanded to provide modern knowledge to a wider 
population. Later, professional schools such as law and public administration were 
created to fulfil the need for specialised skills. The new bureaucratic class was formed 
and enlarged through time. However, the new class started to develop their own 
distinct interests and values attached to the new bureaucratic institutions and later 
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'the nation', whose definition started to gradually depart from the throne as initially 
intended by King Chulalongkorn (Kullada 2004, p.85). 
Popular education may be the key to understanding how the concept of 'nation' 
successfully entered into people's lexicon and later into their views on other nations. 
The concept of nation was taught through a standard textbook called 'Thammachariya' 
which conveyed the idea of moral education and new values for a civilised person 
(Kullada 2004, pp.85-87). This textbook rationalised an individual's love, responsibility, 
pride and loyalty to the nation. It emphasised a nation as a cultural community in 
which individuals share similar history, culture and other characteristics including 
language, Buddhist ethics, and family and interpersonal values based on seniority 
(Kullada 2004, pp.88-92). 
Thai history, at the same time, also started to be narrated in a linear line of continuity 
that explained how the Thai state had been formed, expanded and became Siam. King 
Chulalongkorn's half-brother and son-Prince Damrong and Prince Vajiravudh, 
respectively-were amongst the leading, and most rigorous sponsors, of the study of 
Thai history as a subject in the curriculum similar to that in other 'civilised Western 
nations'. They put forward that Sukhothai (1238-1438 AD) was the first capital of an 
established Thai kingdom and 'the beginning of an unbroken sequence down ... to 
Bangkok' (Baker & Pasuk 2004, p. 72). Prince Damrong also dedicated his time and 
efforts to writing Thai historical texts in which heroic Thai kings were portrayed as 
courageous and dedicated to protecting the country. In this context, Burma was 
depicted as Thailand's perpetual enemy which had twice destroyed the old Thai capital, 
Ayutthaya, forcing the Thai people to move southward to resurrect their kingdom in 
Bangkok. He put forward that Thai people basically loved peace and freedom. In one of 
his works, 'Laksana kan pokkhrong Sayam tae boran' (Governments in Siam since the 
ancient time), he concludes: 
It is common to think that because of their [past kings1 might the Thai 
people have become a dominant group in Siam. However, more 
importantly, the ability to rule Siam for over 700 years also needs other 
morale that is integrated in Thai people's character. As far as I have 
noticed in my historical studies, Thai people have three important 
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characteristics, that is, their "love of national independence", "tolerance", 
and "power of assimilation" (Prince Damrong cited in Chatchai 1991, 
p.354). 
This historical narrative came to the conclusion that it was King Mongkut and 
especially King Chulalongkorn who modernised Siam and protected their people and 
territories from colonial threats. This is similar to the way by which previous kings 
throughout history had protected Siam from its enemies. Therefore, according to the 
new morale, Siamese citizens owed gratitude to their king and should repay this debt 
in form of loyalty to the throne and, similarly, the nation. 
This nationalistic version of Thai (royal) history or 'Rachaphongsawadan' and the 
moral education of 'Thammachariya' were incorporated into national curriculum for 
commoners in 1884 and 1902, respectively. Attachak (1995) finds that a viva voce 
examination on knowledge of Thai history and the kings' contributions to the country 
was a general requirement for passing school levels until after 1932 when the absolute 
monarchy was officially abolished (p.184). However, this conventional version of Thai 
history has also been reproduced, and repeated, and still dominates the mainstream 
belief until the present day. 
During the reign of King Vajiravudh (1910-1925) the concept of nationalism was 
contested, redefined and elaborated. Similar to his father, King Vajiravudh saw 
nationalism as an important tool to defend himself against political instability upon his 
accession to the throne. However, King Vajiravudh did not possess great charisma on 
the same level as his father. Thus, he found himself not respected especially by the 
powerful· and experienced princes and bureaucrats. At the same time, the new 
educated social class concentrated in the modern bureaucracy that his father had built, 
in turn, became a stumbling block for the monarchy. The monarchy was increasingly 
losing its relevance as bureaucracy could perform state's modern functions and 
developed its own ideology of the nation which became gradually detached from the 
throne. As a result, many scholars argue, King Vajiravudh's nationalism was an attempt 
to strengthen the king's centrality and analogous to royalism (Wyatt 2003, 
pp.210-2218; Kullada 2004, pp.126-153; Baker & Phasuk 2005, pp.106-107). 
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King Vajiravudh's official nationalism rested on the creation of the national holy 
trinity-nation, religion and king. His emphasis was to rationalise loyalty directed to 
the throne. He created the metaphor of the king as captain who gained authority and 
respect from his subordinates so that he could control the vessel effectively and bring 
everyone to shore safely. Likewise, a nation needed a leader who acted for the national 
interest, and the people should obey the leader's authority if they wanted to see the 
nation survive and progress. Therefore, in King Vajiravudh's view the nation and the 
king were inseparable, while religion was needed to sustain people's moral principles 
to behave for the collective welfare, not for individualistic interest (Wyatt 2003, 
pp.216-217; Kullada 2004, pp. 126-153). 
King Vajiravudh's various nationalist campaigns aimed at promoting the core concept 
of unity, sacrifice, and duty as a guideline for his people to achieve collective action. 
The Wild Tiger Corps-a paramilitary unit-was an outstanding example of this 
attempt to institutionalise nationalism. It is arguable that the Wild Tiger Corps was 
established as his balance-of-power tool against the old establishment in the 
bureaucracy (Achara 1980; Yupha 1984 cited in Attachak 1995). However, its training 
and ideology suggest that, at least, it was an instrument for him to instil his nationalist 
ideas in government officials and population. It was an effort to melt down the 
individualistic mentality and to implant social utilitarian ideas in his subjects (Attachak 
1995, p.195). His speeches and writings to the Wild Tiger Corps emphasised the theme 
of the good citizen embracing the concepts of nation-loving and self-restraint for the 
public interest as their guiding principles. As the group expanded to the provinces his 
idea was popularised. As Terwiel (1983) notes, '[King Vajiravudh] established a truly 
nationalistic organisation which made people feel that they were part of the Siamese 
nation and bonded to the monarch himself (p.294 ). 
· Apart from the Wild Tiger Corps, other regular audiences of his nationalistic addresses 
on various occasions included the younger generation of low to middle-ranked officials, 
military officers, court officials and students of schools under royal patronage, such as 
the Royal Pages College, the Chiangmai Royal Pages College, the King's College, and the 
Pran Luang School (Ratana 2004, p.91). These young generations of the Thai elite, 
therefore, had absorbed these nationalistic principles which still influenced them when 
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they became political leaders in a new democratic Siam, as we shall see later in the 
succeeding section. 
However, the new modern state's mechanism-bureaucracy-that helped King 
Chulalongkorn and King Vajiravudh consolidated their absolute power started to 
change. Ironically, it also became destructive to the monarchy itself. Instead of 
consolidating the centrality of the monarch, the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie started 
to develop its own version of nationalism in which 'the nation' was departing from 'the 
monarch' (However, the issue of the fall of the absolute monarchy in Thailand is less 
relevant to the focus of this thesis, so this will not be pursued here). 
The new socio-economic reality that took hold in Siam after the country had 
experienced close contacts with Europeans in political, economic and social arenas, 
especially since King Mongkut, opened up new space and time. The previous section 
demonstrated how a new space was created once a modern nation-state was formed 
within new boundaries. This new spatial dimension influenced how people residing in 
Siam thought about themselves as a nation. This view arose first within the elite and 
was transmitted to other social classes. Simultaneously, the notion of time was 
redefined in association with a new space. Cosmological timing based on Buddhist 
theology that emphasised human reincarnation within samsara was gradually 
replaced by a more scientific reasoning. Humans have one life but the nation continues. 
Thus, the modern concept of citizenship evolved to rationalise humans' responsibility 
for safeguarding the nation, its continuity, historical pride, progress and glory, hence 
reinforcing nationalism. At the same time, the individualistic mentality developed so 
that it became another working rationale for other classes to see themselves as part of 
the country's progress, not only that of the king. 
The transmission of these concepts from the elite class to commoners was more 
conducive when the boundaries were defined. Education became an important 
instrument to proliferate these ideas into the wider population especially with the help 
of printing technology and modern communication. These new technologies gave a 
clearer picture in comparison to what one was and what others were. A self-evaluation 
of Siam within a new international community created a threshold for what its elite 
and people would aim for and avoid. The European model was then preferred to that 
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of the more backward neighbouring countries that had succumbed to colonial rule. The 
ability of Siam to avoid the fate of its neighbours also helped raise the morale and 
confidence amongst its elite and people. The early process of modern state formation 
and nationalism were therefore crucial to the further development of self-perception 
or the view of Thailand with reference to other countries, especially its neighbouring 
countries. 
3.3 The consolidation of self-perception 
The transformation of political governance from the absolute monarchy to democracy 
in 1932 did not lessen the importance of nationalistic sentiment in the political arena. 
Instead, as suggested in its name, the democratic regime needed popular support 
especially when the political change was driven from above by the military clique, and 
was not a social revolution. Nationalism was therefore an important means to direct 
the citizen's loyalty away from traditional palace to a new civilian government, and to 
consolidate its democratic nation-state building. 
3.3.1 Nationalism enforced and disseminated 
Thai nationalism in the new era reached its peak during the Phibun governments (16 
December 1938-1 August 1944; 8 April 1948-16 September 1957). According to 
Marshal Phibun, his state building policy meant to aggrandise and civilise Thailand 
through state mandates. His state policy was based on three broad aspects. First, it was 
fascist authoritarian as he encouraged and even forced people to only listen, believe, 
and follow him. He also positioned himself as the centre of national unity to push 
forward progress. Second, Phibun emphasised chauvinistic propaganda to raise public 
morale about Thailand especially in relation to its pride and prestige. He convinced the 
Thai people that they had been great since ancient times and this greatness should 
continue to be so. One of his famous mottoes that shows this idea is 'If we don't want to 
be enslaved, we must be a great power' (Manit 1997, p,96) Therefore, his nationalism 
was preoccupied with a sense of revolution in which certain aspects of Thai culture 
should be redefined, adjusted, and created, while other aspects should be annulled, 
according to the state's view (Piyanat 2007, p.174). All of this propaganda was 
intended to make Thailand civilised on a par with the West and to 'create in Thai 
citizens a sense that their country had entered a new epoch' (Reynolds 2002a, p.6). 
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Phil's nation-building policy was indoctrinated through the enforcement of twelve 
issuances of state's mandate or 'Rattaniyom'. These mandates were edicts that 
prescribed 'civilised culture' guidelines for Thai citizens to practise. They ranged from 
all personal and inter-personal levels such as how and what to eat, dress, speak, and 
act, to the social level including the reform of the Thai alphabet, the promotion of the 
role of women, the adoption of a universal New Year's Day, directives regarding Thai 
national characteristics, and the change of the country's name from Siam to Thailand. 
Affirmative actions were implemented, including economic nationalism in which an 
import substitution industrialisation policy was pursued. Foreign enterprises were 
nationalised while native Thai were encouraged to participate in economic activities 
and were privileged in accessing financial resources (Piyanat 2007, pp.174-183). 
In the political arena, the Phibun government stimulated nationalistic sentiment 
amongst the citizenry, most importantly through education. Education, once again, 
became imperative to instilling nationalism in the same way the leaders in the absolute 
monarchy had done. Thus, this thesis posits that nationalism in this period was a 
turning point at which Thailand's self-perception was crystallised and consolidated. 
This nationalism has had a great impact on how Thai people see themselves and their 
neighbouring countries, and is also seen in Thai foreign policy. 
Phil's nationalist pedagogy was to raise awareness that everybody in Thailand was 
Thai. The supremacy of the Thai race and Thai-ness were emphasised over other races. 
This project was manufactured by Phil's intellectual right-hand man and prominent 
Thai historian in the post-absolutist era, Luang Wichit Wathakan. Having overseas 
experience and modern education during his early life and a career in the Ministries of 
Education and Foreign Affairs, Luang Wichit was able to make sense of the different 
sources of materials to construct a new way of explaining Thai civilisation and history, 
including other literary writings. He departed from the previous focus of Thai history 
on individual chronology (mainly focused on the past kings) to involving a more 
interdisciplinary approach including geography, economics, archaeology, literature, 
sociology, linguistics, amongst others. By so doing, he was able to '[present] the history 
of Siam in relation to that of other countries ... [and] indicate the importance of the 
country in global terms and thereby instil a sense of pride in his readers' (Barme 1993, 
p.49). This new technique of history telling has been adopted and prevailed in Thai 
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textbooks. Srisak Walliphodom, a prominent Thai historian, asserts that the most 
influential narrative is 'Prawattisat ton trakun thai' [History of the Thai origin] 
authored by Luang Wichit Wathakan. It was adapted into nationalistic songs and plays 
during the Phibun regime and became part of textbook that Thai students needed to 
memorise (Thai Post 19 August 2001, p.1). 
Textbooks on Thai history and Social Studies which set out the knowledge of Thailand 
and its neighbouring countries for Thai students reflect how the Thai state inculcated 
the nationalistic ideology amongst its people. Although there were contending versions 
of Thai history in the beginning of the Phibun government including a liberal one 
which was more compromising and accepting the reality of ethnic diversity in Thailand, 
the nationalist version in line with Phil's policy of the great Thai-ness prevailed and 
was sponsored by the state. This historical discourse has dominated Thai education 
with insignificant changes until today. 
Warunee's study of the nationalist agenda in textbooks (2001) elucidates our 
understanding of the impacts of teaching Thai history and presenting information 
about neighbouring countries on the shaping of the idea of its relations with 
neighbours. She argues that Phil's nationalist version that emphasised the superiority 
of the Thai in mainland Southeast Asia due to the country's longstanding independence 
had a great influence on Thai education, especially at the peak of the Cold War. This 
nationalistic approach also reinforced an expansionary idea amongst Thai military 
circles that seeks to exercise Thailand's dominant position in mainland Southeast Asia, 
or the concept of 'Suvarnabhumi'. 
During 1960-1973 Phil's successor, Marshal Sarit Thanarat, continued the nationalist 
ideology, emphasising security as another justification. Thak (2007) argues that Sarit 
was influenced greatly by Luang Wichit's idea of promoting nationalism and received 
Luang Wichit's support in many occasions (pp. 115-119). Sarit saw that Thailand was 
in danger due to the communist threat encircling Thailand; therefore, the Thai state 
needed to raise the security mindset of its people. One way to achieve this was through 
following the central authority's directives as a guide to strengthen, develop, and 
modernise the nation. Any ideology that seemed to undermine the sacred pillars of 
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nation, religion and monarchy needed to be suppressed, including socialism and 
communism (Warunee 2001, pp. 21-32). 
Within the context of regional politico-ideological contestation, other neighbouring 
countries especially in Indochina were viewed with suspicion as threats to national 
security and portrayed as having inferior characters. Thailand's neighbours started to 
appear negatively in Thai people's eyes. Similar to King Vajiravudh and Phibun, Sarit's 
nationalism repeated the story of how the Thai people had struggled against brutal 
regimes since their migration from China to the Golden Peninsula of mainland 
Southeast Asia, frequently referred to as 'Suvarnabhumi'. 
School textbooks used in history and social studies illustrated that the Khmer Empire, 
which is associated with modern Cambodia, as being repressive towards the Thai. The 
victory over the Khmer and the successful establishment of the Thai kingdoms were 
interpreted as a reward for the Thais' love of freedom and independence, the 
characteristic special to the Thai. Burma was also portrayed an aggressive nation who 
had always invaded Siam. The stories of the Burmese sacking the old capital twice, 
forcing the Thai people to move to Bangkok, were reproduced in both textbooks and in 
fiction. The Vietnamese were also shown as an aggressive and· perfidious neighbour 
who betrayed Thailand's trust and always tried to take control over Thailand's sphere 
of political influence-Laos and Cambodia. Although the Laos and the Malay were not 
pictured as aggressive, they were portrayed as inferior because they were under 
Siamese suzerainty before. At the same time, Cambodia, Laos and Malaysia were also 
not trustworthy as Thai history interprets their rulers as being disloyal to Siam when 
they secretly agreed to be under the protection of the British and the French Empires 
(Warunee 2001, pp.38-67). 
Furthermore, the loss of control over Laos, Cambodia and northern Malay states since 
King Chulalongkorn were understood as Thai territory being attenuated based on the 
modern concept of state sovereignty. This became a political and diplomatic issue 
several times in the contemporary period. During the Phibun government, Japan 
helped return some parts of the 'lost territories' back to Thailand as a result of 
Thailand's co-operation in World War II and, partly, the popular support for the 
campaign of regaining Thailand's 'lost territories'. These included the northern 
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Cambodian provinces in 1941 (Battamban and Siem Reap), Lao territories on the west 
bank of the Mekong River in 1941, four northern Malay states in 1943 (Kelantan, 
Trengganu, Perlis, and Kedah), and the Shan States in 1943 (Wyatt 2003, pp.247-248; 
Baker & Pasuk 2005, pp.135-137; Piyanat 2007, pp.184-187). Moreover, the handover 
of ancient Khmer ruin of Preah Vihear on Thai-Cambodian border in 1962 to Cambodia 
according to a decision of the International Court of Justice also reinforced the 
perception of an untrustworthy neighbour. This dispute reared up again during 
2007-2008 when the Cambodian government proposed to register the ruin and its 
adjacent area as a UNESCO World Heritage site to which the Thai strongly objected and 
provoked a public outcry as the initial proposal included a wider area that may have 
encroached on Thai territory (Pathan 2008; Matichon, 18 June 2008, p.11). These 
incidents indicate that the sense of belonging and imperialistic perception amongst the 
Thai over mainland Southeast Asia is tangible. 
Images of other countries especially those within the communist camp deteriorated 
again after the backlash of the rightwing and conservative elite against the student 
movement in 1976. The perception against the leftwing also needs to be considered 
within the context of the collapse of Indochina in 1975 and the flood of refugees into 
Thailand. Textbooks during this time also show contents relating to threats against 
national security in a chapter on 'foreigners in Thailand'. This writing implies that the 
Thai state was aware of security threats that may have been disguised in these 
Indochinese refugees and advised Thai people to be cautious of their intentions 
(Warunee 2001, pp.81-82). 
A survey conducted in 1985 amongst local leaders about the nationalist attitudes, 
which catches the essence of the perception formed throughout history. The result of 
the survey is cited in Thongchai (1994 ), it shows that, 
unsurprisingly, the strong view that Thailand is a wonderful nation in 
which respondents would love to be reborn. As for the nations they hate 
most, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos scored the highest. People of these 
nations ... were the most untrustworthy .. .If one asks why these peoples 
are classified as enemies there will be no clear rationale (p.168). 
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This also is reflected in the general public's mind. A survey by the Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research (1987) reveals that Thai perception towards Indochinese 
countries was very negative. Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were ranked at four 
bottommost amongst 16 selected countries with which Thailand should strengthen co-
operation in both security and economic areas. 'Self and 'other' have been repeated in 
the minds of the Thais in such a way that the former is seen as better quality than the 
latter, corresponding to good and bad, civilised and uncivilised, peaceful and 
aggressive, friendly and hostile dichotomies. 
The formation of this perception amongst Thai public through education can also be 
inferred to political leaders who were also socialised and educated within the same 
context. Warunee finds that textbooks on Thai history after 1975 including 1977, 1978, 
1981, 1988, 1990, and 1998 showed no significant change in the core concept of 
nationalism, national security and its threats (2001, p.85). Knowledge of neighbouring 
countries in Southeast Asia was still limited and some parts were anachronistic. An 
anti-communism sentiment still exists in a textbook in 'Southeast Asia in a modern 
world' that has been used since 1993 by downplaying Thailand's neighbours' 
successes but focusing on their poverty, lesser development, and illiteracy (p.96}. A 
part on Vietnam still reveals a sense of competition in both political and economic 
terms over Laos and Cambodia (p.98). 
This relationship between education and the creation of self-perception can be well 
reflected in the opinion of Srisak Walliphodom about the study of Thai history. He 
asserts: 
[Thai education] is selective in studying. Therefore, Thai people are 
narrow in knowledge ... living in a wider world but with a narrow 
mind ... This is because of our education ... Simply, we do not understand 
our neighbours and always create problems [with them]. This is also 
because we study history to fantasise to ourselves that Thailand is greater 
than anybody else (Thai Post 9 August 2001, p.1). 
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In short, this section has shown the effects of Thailand's socialisation process through 
the enforcement of nationalism as part of nation-state building on the formation of 
Thailand's self-perception. This self-perception was formed within an idea of Thailand 
being a great nation first. The Cold War context helped add elements of comparison 
vis-a-vis its neighbours due to their different political development from Thailand. The 
fear of security threat augmented the negative view and image of its neighbours as 
seen in school textbooks, which also helped reflect and construct Thailand's self-image 
in return. 
3.3.2 External reinforcement of self-perception 
However, Thailand's self-perception as a great country in both physical and moral 
terms is also reinforced by the regional context of the Cold War. It also put in and 
brought back the sense of its significance. This can be seen in relation to the notion of 
the Security Complex in Southeast Asia that conceptualises political competition in 
Indochina in which Thailand and Vietnam played a key role during the Cold War 
(Buzan 1998, 2003, pp.133-136; Ganesan 2001; Emmer 2004). 
The co-operation with the Free World in the Cold War, at the same time, rriay have 
helped shape and deepen Thailand's self-perception as an important actor in the 
region as well. Besides the Indochina Security Complex view, briefly mentioned above, 
which shows that political dynamics in mainland Southeast Asia during that time were 
driven to a great extent by Thailand's security concerns, an ally status with great 
powers also became an indispensable element. Apart from its function as a security 
assurance against the communist threat, being an ally with the United States also 
symbolised being at the centre of attention and activities. Thai policy-makers seemed 
to be accustomed to the presence of the United States. Sukhumbandh Paribatra, a 
former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned that, 'Thai elite from the past 
including myself is used to having the Americans around', so 'it is a psychological 
factor' that helped lessen security concerns (interview, 29 February 2008). This 
perception was reflected in a survey of 1,352 Thai respondents conducted in 1987 
with regard to their attitude towards Thai-US relations. Around 75.5 per cent had a 
positive view on the US and more than 77 per cent thought the relationship was also 
good (Roper Center 1987). 
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The perception of Thailand being a centre of Southeast Asia was not only held by the 
Thais but also reflected by Thailand's major security patron, the United States. Edwin 
Stanton, a former US Ambassador expressed the United States' concern on Thailand's 
security threat in the aftermath of the Geneva Conference of 1954. He stated that 
'Because of her geographical and strategic location, Thailand is the heart and citadel of 
the region' (1954, p.72), thus should be kept free from being overtaken by the 
communist countries. He further proposed the US government should provide 
assistance in order to maintain Thailand in the free world and base its defensive 
system for Southeast Asia in Thailand (pp.83-84). He says, 'If Thailand's freedom and 
independence can be preserved, the heart and much of the body of Southeast Asia 
will have been saved' (p.85). Therefore, it can be seen that US military assistance 
during the Cold War and its political support were partly due to its perception that 
Thailand was an important fortress for the free world in this region. 
The creation of ASEAN can also be seen in the light of US involvement and 
Thailand's role in the region. Kullada (2007) questions the original idea of ASEAN 
as to whether it was proposed locally or influenced by the US foreign policy at that 
time. Her research on US archives reveals some possibility that ASEAN might have 
been a US idea but the US did not want to be seen being involved in it. Therefore, 
the US a.ssigned this leading role to Thailand. Kullada quotes a memoir of Dean 
Rusk to President Johnson on 13 May 1967 stating 'US Objectives: ... Growth of Asian 
Regional cooperation, with Thailand playing a leading role' (Kullada 2007, 151). If 
so, we can see how external power perceived Thailand's potential role in the 
regional order. Importantly, it also reiterates the passive and accommodating 
posture of Thai foreign policy. 
However, despite the continuity of Thai-US security alliance in the post-Cold War 
period, its value in Thai policy-makers' perception is mixed and still debatable. On the 
one hand, it has entered a new phase in which a strategic partnership between the two 
countries has replaced the old patron-client relationship of the Cold War resulting in 
the expansion of bilateral security co-operation to other related areas especially 
non-traditional security (Pranee & Nongnuth 2007, pp.17-18). On the other hand, 
some policy-makers viewed this relationship as something having started to be 
irrelevant in the modern time. When asked for his opinion on the issue of the relevance 
of the ally status with the United States, Kachadpai Burusapatana, a former 
Secretary-General of Thailand's National Security Council (NSC), stated: 
the conventional military alliance with the American is not significant 
anymore, its relevance is vague. Even with the Major Non-NATO Ally 
status, Thailand has not benefited that much from it. It is merely symbolic 
of friendship and historical co-operation (interview, 27 February 2008). 
If, in fact, these security ties are now not as important as before, their persistence can 
be seen as a reminder of Thailand's significant status in the region. This may be 
.relevant today as a psychological support on which Thailand's active role can be 
further rationalised. 
Thailand's assertive role in Southeast Asian regional co-operation from the beginning 
has also accentuated a sense of its centrality in regional affairs into generations of Thai 
elite. Thanat Khoman (1999), the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and a founding 
father of ASEAN, recalled Thailand's role in regional reconciliation at the beginning of 
post-war Southeast Asia. He stated that Thailand helped ameliorate the situation by 
being a mediator for over a year to prevent the escalation of conflict amongst Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines, which was finally settled in a meeting in Bangkok (1999, 
pp.170-171). Then, he claimed that the ASEAN initiative was informally tabled by him 
during that time. He noted: 
After the meeting they [Malaysian, Indonesian and the Philippines 
delegates] held a banquet and invited Thailand in order to show their 
appreciation for the host country that helped facilitate the meeting. On 
this occasion, I told Adam Malik who was Indonesia's Vice President and 
Foreign Minister that I wanted to restore regional co-operation and 
would like Indonesia to join. He agreed but asked for some time until the 
Malaysian-Indonesia diplomatic relations were normalised (1999, p.171). 
The fact that eventually ASEAN was officially conceived in Bangkok signifies the 
importance of Bangkok's role in this endeavour. Surin Pitsuwan, the former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and the current ASEAN Secretary-General, addressed Thailand's 
- 95 -
National Defence College on 25 December 2007 with a similar sense of significance. He 
stated that 'this organisation is important to Thailand; it was born here and is a pride 
of our nation'. 
Towards the end of the Cold War, although the alliance with the United States was 
reduced in significance after its withdrawal from Vietnam, Thailand was still able to 
maintain its central position of regional politics because of the Cambodian issue. The 
special relationship between Bangkok and Beijing cultivated during this regional 
episode also anchored another regional power's perception of Thailand's important 
role in pressuring Vietnam's withdrawal (Likhit 1999, p.367). The regional momentum 
towards Bangkok's leadership was evident as discussions and efforts to resolve the 
issue occupied ASEAN for over a decade until the early 1990s. 
In perceiving that Thailand has been an important driving force of ASEAN since the 
beginning of its establishment, Thai policy-makers seemed to refute the notion of 
Indonesia as ASEAN's natural leader. They felt that Thailand was equally eligible to be 
a leader as well. Thanat Khoman's view illustrates this perception. He asserts (1999), 
Recently, there was a country that thought it should be the regional 
leader due to its size. That really irritated my ears when I heard but didn't 
want to say anything much ... Of course, a country with a sheer size of 
territory and population including economic potential may gain more 
weights to attract audiences than a smaller country. Yet, a true leadership 
is rather dependent upon ability and wisdom. Although Thailand is not a 
very big country in term of size, many of our initiatives, in fact, have been 
reasonable and, thus, gained ·enormous support from all parties (1999, 
p.172). 
Therefore, it can be said that the experience of Thailand during the Cold War also help 
raise its policy-makers' confidence in the country's policy direction. Its co-operation 
with the free world led by the United States and its allies until the collapse of the 
communist bloc created a self-image of Thailand as a leading actor in Southeast Asia, 
especially compared to its socialist neighbours. Strategic relations with China in the 
- 96 -
latter half of the Cold War also demonstrated Thailand's relatively important position 
in regional politics. 
However, this thesis does not conclude at this point that Thailand's self-perception as 
being a leading actor in Southeast Asia primarily drove its foreign policy to a great 
extent. It is this thesis's assumption that the Cold War politics and security concern of 
communist threats around Thailand overshadowed a deliberate exercise of this 
perception. Thai foreign policy during this period was still reactive as it sought to 
maintain security, stability and status quo. Within these concerns Thai policy-makers 
allowed its policy to flexibly adjust to carry out those objectives. In most part, it 
searched for alignment with regional powers that could protect its sovereignty, and for 
collective action with regional states and friends to supplement it. In short, the effect of 
Thailand's self-perception during this time was subordinated to security consideration 
and played a minimal role in shaping policy direction. 
In turn, it is the Cold War and great powers' policy that helped consolidate the ongoing 
formation of Thailand's self-perception through highlighting Thailand's role in 
different episodes. Thanat Khoman's view also indicates that as a policy-making elite 
he did not see Thailand a regional leader. Thailand's leading role was only as a small 
power attempting to seek security protection. He states, 
Thailand as a small country in the middle of two big states like China and 
India and in Southeast Asia where great powers struggled for political 
interest,. .. such as China, US, and Soviet Union .. Our main interest is to 
survive (Thanat 1990 cited in 1999, p.174) 
However, this self-confidence and perception would start to reveal its greater effect 
towards the end of the Cold War. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The main objective in this chapter has been to show how self-perception originated, 
developed, and consolidated amongst the Thais and their elite throughout the modern 
state-building history. Situated within the framework of cognitive approaches to 
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perception mentioned early in this chapter, the historical development of ideas and 
socialisation in Thailand and its interaction with outsiders has helped shape 
self-perception, self-image, or identity amongst members of the society. 
In short, this chapter has introduced the advent of the Thai nation-state formation 
since King Chulalongkorn and its impact on instilling self-perception amongst the 
Thais. Although initially as an attempt to consolidate the King's power against other 
contending groups and to counter the external colonial threats from the West, the 
King's policies greatly affected the people's perception about themselves and their 
nation. The identification of the Thai people within a new nation-state created and 
strengthened loyalty to their community at large. Nationalism was developed and 
utilised by the Thai political elite to cultivate their subjects' allegiance, hence 
strengthening their power throughout contemporary Thailand from King 
Chulalongkorn to the governments of post-monarchical Thailand. 
In ways similar to the use of force, education was monopolised by the Thai state. It was 
even more effective in its controlling effect especially when a national historical 
writing, uniform school curriculum, and textbooks were determined by the central 
authority. Although private authors and publishing companies could later on write and 
produce their own textbooks, they all had to be inspected and amended thoroughly by 
officials in the Ministry of Education before the latter granted approval for them to be 
used in schools. However, the official textbooks produced by the Ministry of Education 
in general still gained more trust amongst schools and teachers, and were selected as 
the main teaching materials (Supannee 2001, pp.140-150). Therefore, a state 
nationalist ideology being passed on through education can persist in people's mind 
through time. It has produced the perception amongst the Thais that their country is 
great and able to sustain difficulties through history. This success is inevitably 
compared with its neighbours that fell into foreign hands and remain 'less developed'. 
The Cold War context also raised suspicion against these neighbours due to the 
differences in regime type. 
At the same time, the involvement of Thailand during the Cold War also reinforced the 
sense of its significance not only within a small circle in mainland Southeast Asia but 
also in external power's eyes. Close ties with the United States and Thailand's active 
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role in regional co-operation helped elevate a greater confidence in Thailand's policy 
actions. Therefore, it can be seen that Thailand's self-perception or identity is 
grounded deeply in its history. The consolidation of the Thai nation-state took place 
both at the domestic level and through the interaction with external actors. These 
processes certainly shaped the knowledge of Thailand's self and of 'other', which 
affected not only popular belief but was also within Thai policy-making circle. 
The next chapter will demonstrate how the self-perception formed throughout history 
started to crystallise at the end the Cold War; and how this self-perception eventually 
played some role in Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy. It will introduce how self-
perception has interacted with material changes within the context of economic 
internationalisation. This will demonstrate the fact that self-perception is not static. 
Some part is reinforced by, and some adjusts to a new environment. The 
self-perception of Thailand as a better nation has been reinforced by its economic 
success since the late 1980s. With its renewed economic interest in mainland 
Southeast Asia, Thailand re-created the sense of a sphere of influence on which it 
leading role rests, especially in mainland Southeast Asia development. Its regionalist 
policy throughout the post-Cold War period reveals this self-perception. Ultimately, 
Thailand's attempt to exercise its role in the region by rearranging regional order 
signifies its true embracing of proactive foreign policy behaviour. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EMERGENCE OF THAILAND'S REGIONAL ASPIRATIONS 
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: 
SELF-PERCEPTION READJUSTED IN A GLOBALISED ECONOMY 
This chapter explores the juxtaposition between material and ideational factors which 
converge to generate Thailand's regional aspirations in the post Cold War period. It 
intends to demonstrate how the self-perception that was formed over time as discussed 
in Chapter Three, relates to and interacts with Thailand's economic interest since the end 
of the Cold War. It contends that the internationalisation of the Thai economy since the 
late 1980s has had a significant impact on the nature the Thai state. It has gradually 
transformed the state's main priority from maintaining security-the basis of policy 
reactiveness-towards improving economic competitiveness. However, this change was 
not insulated from the pre-existing mindset but has been reconciled with it so that the 
core self-perception was sustained. 
This chapter asserts that self-perception and changing material interest converged and 
reinforced one another so that self-perception has become a working idea for Thailand 
to support regional development initiatives apart from its political and economic interest 
The existing self-perception operating in the changing context was therefore adjusted to 
not only fulfil a material objective of reaping benefits from economic globalisation but 
also to reinforce Thailand's self-perception in a new fashion. That is, Thailand's self-
perception in the post-Cold War era has been expressed in relation to its regional 
economic co-operative policy. Thailand has also attempted to propose its own version of 
co-operation on many occasions. These regional aspirations allow Thailand to play a 
leading and proactive role in regional politico-economic transformation. Foreign policy 
analysis in this policy tendency is therefore a good means to see how a state's ideologies 
and interests are intertwined. 
To describe this interaction, therefore, this chapter is guided by two key sub-questions: 
'how did the existing self-perception interact with the new international environment of the 
post-Cold War, and what was the outcome?', and 'how did the outcome of this interaction 
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influence Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy?' These questions coupled with the one 
posted in Chapter Three-addressing the construction of Thailand's identity and its 
possible implications for the cognitive aspects of Thai policy-makers-will ultimately 
address the main research enquiry of this thesis that seeks another supplementary 
explanation of the ongoing development of proactive behaviour of Thai foreign policy in 
the post-Cold War era. 
To reiterate, this thesis advances the argument that Thailand's post-Cold War foreign 
policy is not always as reactive as conventional wisdom maintains. In contrast, it has 
gradually departed from its reactive nature and become more proactive in the post-Cold 
War era. One way to observe this proactive nature is through Thailand's attempt to 
exercise a leading role in its own version of regional economic development especially in 
mainland Southeast Asia. Throughout this thesis this idea and policy preferences to 
achieve this role are collectively called 'regional aspirations'. They give rise to a 
discernable pattern in Thai foreign policy behaviour that has a strong attachment to a 
regional focus especially in mainland Southeast Asia. The previous chapter showed that 
the formation of this self-perception played a part in the cognitive mindset of the Thais 
as well as the policy-makers. This chapter subsequently demonstrates further how this 
self-perception persisted, evolved, and was expressed in a post-Cold War environment 
through its foreign policy and, particularly, through its efforts to innovate policy within 
an increasing globalised economy. 
This chapter first develops an understanding of the impacts from participating in the 
process of internationalisation of production on the Thai state. It revisits briefly how the 
Thai economy transformed in the current globalisation process. Then, it discusses the 
effects of this economic transformation on the nature of the Thai state in terms of its 
incentives, preferences and capabilities. Next, it examines how this changing nature of 
the Thai state interwove the existing self-perception and material interests. It suggests 
that this interaction helped generate Thailand's aspirations to play a leading role with 
certain characteristics. Finally, the chapter conceptualises these core characteristics of 
these aspirations that can arguably be found in Thai foreign policy throughout the post-
Cold War period. This nature and the pattern generalised in this chapter will be 
examined empirically through case studies in the succeeding chapters. 
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4.1 The economic globalisation and the Thai economy 
In addressing the first question posed earlier in this chapter on the outcome of the 
interaction between self-perception and material interest in the globalised world, it is 
necessary to discuss how the global political economic environment in the post-Cold 
War affected the nature of the Thai state. This chapter argues that the globalisation of 
production-especially since the 1980s-not only affected the economic activities of 
private firms but also increasingly shaped the state's political structure in many ways, 
hence is reflected in its foreign policy. 
It is therefore necessary to revisit the significance of globalisation briefly in this section 
to see how changes at the global level precipitated changes in Thai economy. In its 
essence, the recent globalisation has been highlighted by the flexibility in global 
production and its geographical dispersion as a way for private firms to reduce 
production costs and increase their efficiency. This change has pressured states to adjust 
their behaviour and policy to be more open to foreign firms and their investment This 
impacted on not only its economic but also political affairs. The raison d'etre operating in 
this new structure re-oriented most states towards a similar direction, that is, states 
became more concerned about and even overwhelmed with its competitiveness and 
their position in the world economy. 
4.1.1 Global and regional changes 
The current process of globalisation owes much to the internationalisation of production 
especially since the Plaza Accord in 1985. This agreement reflected the ongoing crisis of 
the Fordist mode of production and regulation extended to the post-war order under the 
Bretton Woods system. Under the previous system, liberalisation, stability and domestic 
welfare were compromised. This period saw the promotion of trade liberalisation that 
well served the mass production of the American industries for economic reconstruction 
in the free world, while the exchange rate remained stable (Cox 2006, p.40). At the same 
time, the role of the state as an interventionist to maintain domestic stability and 
economic growth was deemed important. The welfare state system and Keynesian 
policies were implemented to achieve this goal including the nationalisation and 
subsidisation of key public goods, financial markets, and strategic industries in 
industrialised countries (Palan et al. 1996, p.4). The rising inflation and the oil crisis in 
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the 1970s finally affected the profits of firms located in the industrialised economies 
(Bernard & Ravenhill 1992, p.1). This economic crisis subsequently generated a global 
structural change in production. 
This change resulted in firms gradually specialising in high value-added production in 
which they have comparative advantages and moving other low-profit and labour-
intensive chains to low-wage locations. International subcontracting of parts and 
components to foreign firms emerged as an important strategy. With the aid of advances 
in technology and transportation, geographical barriers were broken down, resulting in 
the achievement of firms to create a network of production across different locations 
(Brooks 2005, pp.21-24). 
With specific reference to East Asia, this change in the economies of production also 
creates tension between the United States and Japan, as well as other newly 
industrialising economies (NIEs-South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore). 
However, this change also needs to be put in the context of the changing world and the 
regional security environment. The political detente between China and the United 
States in the 1970s and the economic reform in China after Deng Xiaoping came into 
power in 1978 essentially transformed the Cold War logic. The maintenance of the post-
war regional order in which the United States allowed East Asian democracies to 'free 
ride' until they had accelerated their industrialisation was no longer applicable (Mack & 
Ravenhill 1994, pp.3-4 ). Therefore, the relative decline of the economic power of the 
United States and relaxing political environment reinforced the tension amongst 
industrialised economies, resulting in the United States forcing currency realignment in 
the mid 1980s. In effect, this move devalued the American dollar leading to the 
appreciation of the Japanese yen, thus increasing the cost of production at home for 
Japanese firms. 
The 1985 currency realignment marked a significant turning point in which the 
globalisation of production was deepened in the region mainly through foreign direct 
investment starting from Japan. Coupled with increasing demands from Washington to 
further reduce the Japanese trade surplus through various measures including voluntary 
export restraints, non-tariff barriers, and pressures for opening the Japanese market to 
American imports, one of Japan's prominent strategies was to increase its investments 
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abroad (Bernard & Ravenhill 1992, pp.2-3). The same adjustment also occurred in South 
Korea and Taiwan in the later 1980s which motivated their firms to relocate their 
manufacturing abroad to maintain their international competiveness. Since the Plaza 
Agreement foreign direct investments from the three countries rose significantly, 
particularly in Southeast Asia and mainland China (Bernard & Ravenhill 1992, pp.2-3; 
Ravenhill 1994, p.4; Lee 1995, p.70-71; Dent 2002, pp.215). Apart from economic 
motives of low wages, abundant labour, and geographical proximity, cultural affinity, 
historical contacts, and the large number of overseas Chinese also determined the 
geographical focus of Northeast Asian investment in Southeast Asia (Bernard & 
Ravenhill 1995, p.179). Although foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia was not 
unprecedented, the new wave of investment in the 1980s led by Japan shifted its focuses 
from natural resources, raw materials, and import substitution industries, to mainly 
export-oriented industries of low-end and low value-added electronic industries, textile 
industries and other consumer products (Pasuk 1990; pp.29-33; Naya & Imada 1990, 
p.37; Bernard & Ravenhill 1992, pp.8-9; Fukushima & Kwan 1995, p.17). 
The picture of economic regionalisation during this period is not complete without 
mentioning the pull factor of economic policy in many Southeast Asian countries. A plan 
for transforming an economy from import substitution industrialisation to export 
orientation took place amongst Southeast Asian countries in the 1970s with the 
exception of Singapore that had abandoned its import substitution policy during the 
early 1960s (Narula 2002, p.12). Although Malaysia's 1968 Investment Incentives Act 
and the 1970 New Economic Policy (NEP) marked its gradual turn away from the import 
substitution industrialisation strategy (Athukorala & Menon 1996), its export-led 
strategy was not seriously put into action until the mid 1970s (Kuruvilla 1996, p.643). 
Similarly, Indonesia's import substitution policy was implemented until the devaluation 
of the rupiah in 1986 when deregulation towards a more open market helped Indonesia 
to reap the benefit of its abundant natural resources and low-cost labour for the export 
sector (Lecraw 1993). The Philippines had a long-standing import substitution policy 
strongly influenced by American business interests and the local capitalist elite. The IMF 
alleviation package for correcting balance of payment crisis forced the country to 
deregulate and adopt the export-oriented strategy in the mid-1970s (Kuruvilla 1996, 
pp.646-64 7). However, due to strong resistance from traditional socio-economic 
pressure, serious implementation was not achieved until the early 1990s (Chan & Clark 
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1995, pp. 171-172; Clark & Chan 1995, pp. 89-90). It can be said that since the mid-
1970s countries in Southeast Asia had started to embrace a more open market 
orientation. The shift of economic development strategy coupled with the push factor 
from Japan and NIEs enabled the process of East Asian regionalisation and its integration 
into the world economy. Thailand was no exception to this transformation. 
4.1.2 Changes in the Thai economy 
In the case of Thailand, technocrats had started to outline strategies for promoting 
manufactured products during the mid 1970s but the plan was not well received as the 
protected domestic industries and agricultural export sector were still shown to be able 
to generate growth. Not until the second oil crisis in early 1980s when exports of 
agricultural products slumped and traditional domestic manufacturers faced increasing 
costs of production did full export-oriented industrialisation became possible (Pasuk 
2005, pp.202-203). After that, the Thai economy gradually departed from relying on the 
agricultural sector and import substitution industries based on natural resources to a 
focus on manufacturing industries. 
The change in production structure is illustrated by Table 4.1, seen in the decline of 
agricultural product share in Thailand's domestic product (GDP) compared to the 
considerable rise of GDP due to the manufacturing sector. During this period GDP in the 
apparel industry alone for the first time in 1990 overtook that in paddy rice 
production-the country's traditional major agricultural export (Figure 4.1). In addition, 
within the manufacturing sector itself GDP in machinery and electrical supplies 
increased sharply since the late 1980s. In 1996, it surpassed traditional manufacturing 
products in both textiles and apparels that constituted the country's industrialisation in 
the early stage (Figure 4.1). This signifies that the Thai economy had fully graduated to 
another stage that required more skilled labour and technology. As a result, Thailand 
experienced a rapid economic growth similar to that experienced by other Southeast 
Asian countries during this time. The growth of the manufacturing sector can be 
attributed to foreign investment since 1988 especially from Japan and East Asian NIEs 
who escaped their rising local currencies (Baker & Pasuk 2006, p.204). 
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Table 4.1: Comparison of Thailand's production in agricultural and industrial sectors in 
selected years; at 1988 price, unit: million baht (Source: NESDB 2006) 
Years 
1980 
1985 
1995 
2000 
2005 
140,000 
,.., 
..... 
120,000 
~ 100,000 
c:l 
i:: 
.s 
·5 80,000 
~ 
r.tl 
Cll (,I 
·;:: 
Q, 
~ 60,000 
()'. 
,..; 
..... 
0: 
Cll 
;:r 40,000 ~ 
20,000 
0 
GDP from agriculture 
184,576 
227,324 
263,607 
315,572 
309,948 
347,830 
I 
I 
I 
--- -- _, 
,,, 
,,, 
. I 
., 
:, 
./ 
. I 
--- -·-----·--------, ----·---
_,..,..-;.,;,:.::.:..-_·_,~ 
, 
, 
GDP from Manufacturing 
211,031 
268,133 
540,932 
909,316 
1,096,168 
1,500,657 
..... I . 
I 
I -
I 
Electrical Machinery and 
Supplies 
- - - ·Machinery 
--Textiles 
--WearingApparel Except 
Footwear 
-Paddy 
Figure 4.1: GDP in selected sectors, 1980-2001 (Source: NESDB 2006) 
To sum up, the results of political and economic changes-at both the regional and 
domestic levels-led to Thailand jumping into competition for foreign investment. In 
this context, the role of the state became an essential factor to ensure economic 
prosperity. In contrast to the hyper-globalisation thesis that predicts the decline and 
increasing irrelevancy of the state, the new phase of a globalised world economy 
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requires the state to be even more active. As Cerny puts it, 'states play a crucial role as 
stabilisers and enforcers of the rules and practices of global society, ... [and] are probably 
the most important single category of agent in the globalisation process (Cerny 1997, 
pp.257-258). 
The next section, therefore, discusses the evolving nature of the state in this changing 
economic structure in general, and directly relates to the Thai state in particular. It 
maintains that states became preoccupied by the competition for economic 
advancement within neo-liberal economic guidelines. This suggests that Thailand has 
inevitably transformed towards a neo-liberal 'competition state' as well. This 
transformation is represented by the structural changes which have taken place in the 
nature of actors, incentives, and capabilities of the Thai state. The changing nature of the 
state will be elaborated and connected to the notion of self-perception in the final part of 
this chapter. 
4.2 The Thai state as 'the competition state' 
As discussed above, the importance of the changes in the world economy in the 
1970s and especially since the 1980s in East Asia gave rise to a flexible and 
fragmented production system and the geographical dispersion of capital. The 
previous economic and production crises also brought to the end of welfare state 
and started the era of 'the competition state'. This section begins with a discussion 
of how the improvement of competitiveness became the state's priority. This 
conceptual guideline is then used to examine the nature of the Thai state. It shows 
how the Thai state transformed into 'the competition state' indicated by changes in 
three aspects-the nature of actors, incentives, and capabilities. This thesis 
contends that this changing nature of the Thai state towards 'the competition state' 
was a critical juncture in which the existing self-perception was modified and 
expressed in a new fashion in the globalised world. 
4.2.1 The competition state 
'The competition state' is a concept that tries to explain a type of state that has an 
embedded idea of promoting its international competitiveness by way of attracting 
economic transactions and activities within its territory which ultimately advances its 
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national wealth (Cerny 1997, p.259; Fougner 2006, 165). The reduction of the political 
and strategic tensions of the Cold War since the 1970s also facilitated the emergence of 
this type of state as states' priority shifted to market orientation. 
Palan et al. (1996) argues that 'the ~ompetition state' operates within four common 
denominators. First, the major concern of a government is economic growth, hence the 
standard of living of people. Second, traditional protectionist policies are increasingly 
inefficient and unproductive; thus, a hybrid of economic policies of free market and state 
intervention is implemented. As a consequence of modern telecommunication 
technologies that help private firms to become more mobile, states are also pressured to 
be more active in securing firms' investment decisions within their territories. Therefore, 
states exercise their authority in economic management policy, in order for their 
economies to become more competitively advantageous than others (pp.37-38). Third, 
states therefore shift their modus operandi within these new rationales. States' objectives 
and functions move away from maximising welfare and redistribution towards creating 
a 'competitive advantage' in the international market Therefore, in terms of policy, 
states tend to engage more at the microeconomic level to furnish themselves with 
suitable environments for competition, through policies such as deregulation, industrial 
policy, and the control of inflation. At the same time, they also engage in 'the promotion 
of enterprise, innovation, and profitability in both private and public sectors' (Cerny 
1997, p.260). In this sense, states are acting more like market players whose policies and 
strategies are aimed to 'promote, control, and maximise returns from market forces in an 
international setting' (Fougner 2006, p.167). 
This competitive nature in a globalisation context forces states worldwide to 
increasingly adopt and institutionalise a neo-liberal economic agenda into states' policies 
(1997, p.265). As Ravenhill (1994) puts it, 'the ideas of neo-classical economics have 
achieved an unprecedented hegemony' (p.9). This tendency has resulted in the advocacy 
of economic liberalisation by international economic institutions around the world 
which has infiltrated states' agendas (1994, pp.9-10). This prevailing free-market 
orientation can be attributed to the influence of the United States in these institutions. As 
mentioned earlier, although the liberal economic agenda had appeared within a post-
war economic order, it had to compromise with Keynesian welfare states partly for 
security purposes. After the decline of Cold War political tension, Washington was less 
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willing to bear the cost of maintaining such an economic order and shifted its economic 
policy back to an original ideology of free trade and economic liberalisation (Ravenhill 
1994, p.8; Rupert 2000, pp.42-54). In East Asia, the push for opening the markets of 
Japan and other East Asian NIEs by the United States since the 1980s reflects this 
situation. 
In the Asia-Pacific region, another factor that deepened and sustained a neo-liberal 
economic agenda was the increasing international co-ordination amongst officials of 
different countries and intergovernmental organisations, especially since the Plaza 
Accord of September 1985 (Furlong 1989). Ravenhill (1994) found that policy co-
ordination through several international organisations in the Asia-PaCific, particularly 
the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), the Pacific Basin Economic 
Council (PBEC), and the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC), had long been 
linking academics, business people, and government officials, also including providing 
ideas and networking even before the 1980s. These organisations and networks 
provided what Oran Young (1991) refers to as an 'intellectual leadership'. It created an 
epistemic community-as neo-Gramscians would say, an emergence of a 'constellation 
of dominant social forces' (Rupert 2000, p.50)-'to which the idea [of economic 
liberalisation] propounded by these organisations has been wholeheartedly adopted by 
the governments of the region' both as states' ideology and policy approach (Ravenhill 
1994, pp. 9-10). 
As shown above, competitiveness can no longer be taken for granted as a natural 
behaviour of the state. For neo-realists, competition is a natural way for states to obtain 
relative power (Hobson 2000, pp.17-63), but this chapter offers a different approach. 
Competitiveness is rather seen here as an outcome of the changing nature of the 
international economic order. This is because of states integrating into the world 
economy and transforming within this context; the issue of competitiveness thus 
becomes a governmental problem which public policy objectives aim to resolve. 
As Fougner reviews in his article (2006), the concept of international competitiveness 
was popularised and spread from the United States around the end of the 1960s initially 
in the business management field. Parallel with the decline of the welfare state and the 
Fordist mode of production, governments were conceived of being inefficient and their 
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roles should be limited only to deliyering the proper conditions for improving the 
competitive environment for national enterprises. The pressure on states to be able to 
react to a changing economic and business nature modified governmental mentality to 
embrace this concept. That is, states are more concerned with not only how to make 
their national firms competitive, but aiso how to make foreign firms competitive if they 
invest in their territories. In this environment, the 'competition state' theory suggests 
that states have fewer alternatives but need to compete amongst each other. They are 
increasingly commodified as competitive entities in a global market. States develop, 
promote, and market themselves including learning best practices while creating 
distinctive characters at the same time. The main objective is to become an attractive site 
for foreign investment (Fougner 2006, pp.179-183). In short, the change in the global 
economy has been instrumental in bringing about homogeneity in the competition state. 
However, as neo-liberal strategies were increasingly prevailing other policy options are 
less plausible. Therefore, it can be seen that economic liberalisation, deregulation, and 
the 'political and legal institutional framework in and through which a market is 
constituted (property rights, contract rights, and so on) and policed on a continuous 
basis (competition policy)' (Fougner 2006, p.176) emerged as a dominant prescription 
for governments. 
Thailand has also been incorporated into this process of embedding the notion of 
competition in the logic of the state. Its promotion of inward foreign direct investment 
and the implementation of its export-oriented strategy during the 1980s can be seen as 
an important step towards consolidating the nature of 'the competition state'. The effects 
of this transformation can be observed in three aspects-actors, incentives, and 
capabilities-as shown in the following sub-sections. These changing characteristics of 
the Thai state point to the fact that the Thai state is primarily concerned with its position 
and competitiveness in the world economy. 
4.2.2 Changes in the nature of actors in the Thai state 
As framed by the declining Cold War tensions and the emerging trend in the 
globalisation of production, economic issues previously described as 'low politics' 
increasingly became a priority of the state over traditional security (Hobson 2000, 
p.2). At the same time, as pressured by the changing nature of international 
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production and the state's failure of promoting its own national enterprises, as 
described earlier, the Thai state started to give way and allow private firms to 
participate in this decision-making process more directly during the 1980s, not 
only in its economic policy, but also in its foreign policy. 
Anek (1988, 1991) and Macintyre (1990) concur that this transition stemmed 
mainly from the growth of the private sector itself, the decrease in the ethnic bias 
against Chinese Thai businessmen by the traditional elite, and the political 
openness that emerged following the right-wing government of Thanin Kraivixian. 
Anek's analysis of the influence of business associations in Thailand on the 
formation of public-private sector dialogue in 1981-the Joint Public-Private 
Consultative Committee (JPPCC)-points to the departure of the Thai state from 
the bureaucratic polity towards the liberal corporatist model in which both sectors 
were now on an equal footing. Therefore, in the 1980s businessmen were able to 
enter politics and assert their power 'to encroach on bureaucratic prerogative' 
(Connor 2003, p.96). This transition reached its zenith when General Prem 
unsuccessfully tried to return to power and a retired general-turned-businessman 
Chatichai Choonhavan formed the first civilian government after twelve years of 
military rule in which a major faction in his cabinet had a business background. 
Although a coup d'etat against Chatichai took place three years afterwards, the 
military was unable to sustain its power for long after the blood-shedding 
suppression of the civic demonstrations in May 1992. Since then, as Connor puts it, 
'the military and bureaucracy were facing a steady decline in political influence and 
a threat to [the] corporate position and illegitimate commercial interests' (2003, 
p97). 
Although existing studies do not elaborate specifically on the power of 
international factors that may have contributed to the growth of the business 
sector in Thailand, earlier discussion in this chapter about the internationalisation 
of production in the advanced capitalist countries may offer an important 
connection. The external pressure from foreign capital coupled with the growing 
interest amongst domestic capitals keen to tap into this opportunity was likely to 
affect the dynamics of the business sector in Thailand, and thus the nature of the 
Thai state. With regard to the interest of foreign capital from the mid-1980s 
- 112 -
onward, Anek (1998) notes the role of several American agencies, notably the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the US Chamber of Commerce, and 
the Asia Foundation. These organisations made this public-private dialogue in the 
JPPCC possible through funding projects related to how to facilitate the business 
sector in both legal and policy areas, and training programmes for business and 
managerial upgrading (pp.460-461). These activities suggest that American capital 
also sought to penetrate the Thai market in close collaboration with the American 
state during that time. Therefore, the United States' influence on the business legal 
framework and policies towards deregulation and liberal economic practices is 
undeniable. 
It was during the Chatichai government when the convergence of Thai and 
international capital interest started to clearly constitute the core policy of the 
government. In his policy address to the Parliament on 25 August 1988, Chatichai 
stated that the main objective of his economic policy was to strengthen the Thai 
economy in which 'the private sector will become competitive in the world 
market ... [by] support[ing] [them] to play a major role in economic development 
under the liberal economic system' {1998, p.5). He repeated this economic policy 
orientation in his policy statement to the Parliament in 1991. He stated: 
The government aims to expand the country's production sector and 
trade through opening the economy to [the] global economy, so that 
Thailand will become an economic front line of the region, whether it 
be the regional centres for international production, processing, 
exports, financial business, and transport ... to achieve these goals 
Thailand needs to relax its economic policy ... [and] increase the role of 
the private sector (Chatichai 1991, p.25) 
Chatichai's foreign policy statements also reflected the emphasis on the expansion 
of economic activities and the role of the private sector. He noted his government 
would 'use foreign affairs to support Thailand's economic growth by encouraging 
close co-ordination between public and private sectors, so as to improve efficiency 
and unity in foreign policy implementation' (Chatichai 1988). It can be said that 
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during this time the Thai state apparently echoed the rationale of the neo-liberal 
'competition state' emphasising 'competitiveness' and the role of private business. 
Another crucial juncture at which the international and domestic capital interests 
converged was during the interim governments of Anand Panyarachun between 
1991 and 1992. Anand was a former diplomat, who went into business in 1979 and 
became a Vice-Chairman of Saha Union Group and a Chairman of the Board of 
Directors in 1991. He was also elected Vice-Chairman of the Federation of Thai 
Industries between 1982 and 1990 and became the Chairman in 1990. At the same 
time, he also held several positions in other companies (Tasker 1991, p.15; UNICEF 
n.d.; UN News Centre n.d.). He also actively engaged in ASEAN business groups, 
serving as President of the ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1982-
1984 ), President of the ASEAN Task Force responsible for ASEAN co-operation in 
its Track II (1988-1989), as well as President of the ASEAN Committee in the 
ASEAN-US Council (1986-1990). Despite the Anand government being appointed 
by the military, business interests were not severely dampened considering 
Anand's background in the private sector. Instead, they continued and even 
extended by the Thai state as suggested by Anek (1991, p.178) and Connor (2003, 
p.97). Anand ensured a free market economy continued (Anand 1992, p.260) and 
later passed many laws in line with the liberal economic prescription which further 
liberalised the Thai economy (Connor 2003, p.97). 
As leader of the interim government in 1992 Anand did not elaborate his economic 
and foreign policy in detail for his second term but directly referred to his intention 
to follow the Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-1996). 
According to the Seventh Plan, Thailand would develop a sophisticated financial 
market and liberalise it, so that it could achieve its goal of becoming a regional 
financial centre. Actually, this goal had been in place since the Chatichai 
government and was included in the previous Plan as well. Therefore, the Bangkok 
International Banking Facility (BIBF) which laid out the deregulation of Thailand's 
financial transactions was approved during the second Anand administration 
though fully implemented later in early 1993 with support from the IMF (MOF 
1992; Warr 1999, p.634). Not only financial liberalisation but similar liberalisation 
schemes can also be seen in other sectors during this time, for example, the 
abandonment of import bans and a reduction in the tax on cars (Sakkarin 2008), 
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the liberalisation of hypermarket outlets (Veerayooth 2008) and beer brewing 
industry (Nualnoi 2008). Moreover, despite his short tenure of the second term in 
office, Anand's most acclaimed achievement in foreign policy was ASEAN's 
adoption of his proposal to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) at the 
Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992. The scheme aimed for 
reduction and elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers within ASEAN, which 
thereby encouraging intra-ASEAN trade as a building block for global trade 
liberalisation. This included other economic co-operation such as investment in 
both the industrial and financial sectors (ASEAN Secretariat 1992). Once achieved, 
it was hoped that AFTA would make the region more competitive and attractive to 
foreign investment with a market size of nearly 600 million people. 
In sum, it can be said that the major actors in the Thai state had already 
transformed following its further engagement with the world economy. The private 
sector not only replaced the state as the driver of both economic and foreign policy 
decisions but had also played an increasingly important role in Thai politics since 
the 1980s. More importantly, parallel with this development the Thai state also 
embraced the neo-liberal competition state model in which economic liberalisation 
and competitiveness were embedded into its raison d'etat. 
4.2.2 Changing incentives/preferences of the Thai state 
If the changing nature of the key actors in the Thai state moved the centre of 
gravity towards industrialists/internationalists as an influential coalition, the 
incentive of the Thai state also shifted towards furthering this coalition's interests. 
Co-operation rather than conflict was therefore a preferred policy direction. This 
changing incentive also corresponded with liberal theory that saw economic 
transaction as a less costly means of accumulating wealth than coercive means. 
Moravcsik argues that 'economic development tends to increase the material stake 
of social actors in existing investments, thereby reducing their willingness to 
assume the cost and risk of coercion through war or sanction' (1997, p.530) 
Strengthening economic gains became a priority of the Thai state since the 1980s. 
The transition of the decision making structure of the Thai state from purely 
bureaucratic polity to liberal corporatism as discussed in the previous sub-section 
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was another critical juncture at which the concept of competitiveness was 
implanted into the Thai state. Competition in the world market, on the one hand, 
prompted the Thai state to mobilise its support to increase its attractiveness as a 
good location for investment and exporting. On the other hand, co-operation was 
also possible as a means to reduce structural costs of building up market 
infrastructure, to maximise the economies of scale, and to obtain raw materials for 
expanding domestic industries. Therefore, the strengthening of competitiveness 
and promotion of co-operation in the economic arena co-existed. 
To develop competitiveness, foreign direct investment became very significant to 
the Thai state. FOi gradually contributed to a major proportion of the country's 
productivity (GDP), from nearly 10 per cent in 1990 to more than 30 per cent in 
2005, measured by FOi stock as a percentage of GDP (UNCTAD 2007a). The Thai 
state started to implement policies that were generally aimed at improving its 
competitiveness to attract foreign capital and boosting exports as a core objective. 
For example, according to an UNCTAD report (1999) Thailand set up different 
types of special economic zones including three investment zones, five economic 
processing zones and several other specialised zones. It also offered a three-year 
tax holiday, duty-free imports and export privileges to investors. The main target 
industry was electrical appliances as a source of industrial upgrading from basic 
labour-intensive industries. The majority of firms interested in investing in this 
sector were Japanese, European, and American (p.454). 
Figure 4.2 shows the trend of net FOi flows to selected major industries of Thailand 
of which electrical appliances and machinery sectors are two major recipient 
sectors. The concentration of foreign investment in these two sectors also 
corresponded to the overall increase in the domestic products in the same 
industries as depicted in Figure 4.1 (section 4.1). In addition, when considering 
Thailand's major exports it is seen that the export structure also shifted towards 
manufacturing products with over 70 per cent of total exports since 1993 (Ministry 
of Commerce 2008). It also suggests that the production in these two sectors are 
more internationalised than others, corresponding to the overall nature of the 
production network especially in East Asia as previously discussed. 
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Figure 4.2: Thailand's net flow of FDI classified by sector, 1985-2007 (Source: 
data from BOT (2008) 
In addition, it was not only FDI that was so significant to Thailand's modern 
industrial sector and its real economy; foreign investment in equity form also 
became more attractive. Thailand at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s further 
deregulated its financial market through the establishment of BIBF. This made it 
much easier for foreign capital with lower interest to invest in the Thai stock 
market to finance domestic investment and consumption when domestic interest 
was relatively high with a fixed foreign exchange rate. The result was a rise in the 
amount of short-term foreign capital, even surpassing long-term foreign 
investment after BIBF was fully implemented in 1993 until the Financial Crisis 
interceded in 1997. 
This situation suggests that the Thai state was preoccupied with strengthening its 
competitive position in the world economy with a focus on attracting foreign 
capital, firstly with direct investment in the production sector and later extended to 
financial market. As Warr (1999) notes, one of the incentives to liberalise the Thai 
the financial market was the hope that Bangkok would 'replace Hong Kong as a 
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regional financial centre following the restoration of Chinese sovereignty in Hong 
Kong in 1997' (p.634 ). The competition for foreign capital can therefore be 
attributed to the Thai competition state in the post-Cold War period. 
The changing incentive of the state also began to blur the boundary between 
domestic and foreign affairs. Thai foreign policy, traditionally concerned with core 
political and security issues, also altered its focus to improving the country's 
economic position in the world economy. Thailand's priority had shifted since the 
end of the Cold War to attach more importance to economic development, while 
conflicts were either put aside or brought to an end. Peace, co-operation, 
interdependence, and mutual economic prosperity became buzzwords for Thai 
policy-makers even before the Chatichai government. Although in the 1980s 
Thailand was still preoccupied with the Cambodian issue in the area of security, it is 
undeniable that the Thai state was more active in promoting economic co-
operation and calling for an end to the conflicts, especially with its neighbours, for 
possible mutual economic prosperity. 
For example, Siddhi Savetsila, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking about 
Thailand's foreign policy in 1985, stated that in the 1980s economic 
interdependence was unquestionable, but this encompassed both benefits and risks. 
He noted that foreign policy had a role in harvesting this opportunity so that 
national economic well-being was improved. He asserted that 'now it is the time to 
concentrate on economic areas' and suggested that ASEAN should be geared 
towards removing its obstacles to create an economic community for mutual 
prosperity. He also called for the end of conflict in Cambodia and mentioned that to 
achieve regional progress and prosperity, 'Vietnam can and, certainly, should play a 
role' (Siddhi 1999). This can be seen as a seed for realising Thailand's eagerness to 
end the Cold War in mainland Southeast Asia in the Chatichai administration. 
As Thailand at the end of the 1980s enjoyed its high growth, Chatichai's policies in 
both economic and foreign affairs reflected the Thai state's preference for 
international and intra-regional co-operation. Chatichai argued that the most 
important force in the international political system was economic dynamics, not 
political or military contestation. As every country wanted to improve its citizens' 
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well-being, mutual economic prosperity would be the best way to secure peace 
(Phairot 1994, p.91). It can be said that in Chatichai's mind political competition no 
longer served the national interest. Only through economic relations would peace 
be sustained and benefit all nations. This was a new rationale for his foreign policy 
towards Indochina aimed at ending the political stalemate and opening up 
opportunities for trade and investment in these countries. This Indochina policy 
reflects the changing nature of incentive in which traditional security rationales no 
longer gained domestic consensus to maintain conventional foreign policy 
practices. Foreign policy needed to serve the interest of a new domestic coalition 
that saw economic opportunities abroad. This policy logic can be observed in 
Chatichai's words: 
External security is an important condition for improving domestic 
security. We cannot achieve our goal domestically without considering 
the external environment. Therefore, if possible, we must try to make 
what happens outside the country consistent and facilitate what we 
are doing in our country as well (Chatichai 1989 in Phairot 1994, p.49). 
This statement constituted an important message for Thailand's post-Cold War 
foreign policy. First, it indicated a shift in Thai foreign policy behaviour from 
reactive to proactive as it aimed to change the surrounding environment to serve 
the nation's best interest. Second, it signified Thailand's sphere of interest for its 
active foreign policy. It signified that Thailand wanted to improve its economic 
competitiveness through consolidating its economic and political position in 
mainland Southeast Asia, so that Thailand would become more attractive and 
prominent in the international community. This was a point from which later 
proactive foreign policy was sustained by successive Thai governments throughout 
the post-Cold War era. 
The changing nature of the Thai state towards 'the competition state' is not only 
seen in the changes of its key actors and preferences but also in terms of its 
capacities. A change in capacities can be seen through how the Thai state allocated 
its national resources, which reflected the shift of the Thai state's focus from 
security towards the economic arena. Many resources were mobilised to enhance 
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the country's economic position in the competitive world economy. The state's 
capabilities traditionally expressed in its military might changed and were replaced 
by the notion of economic strength and its ability to improve its wealth. The 
allocation of resources between these two objectives reflects this changing nature. 
4.2.3 Changing capabilities of the Thai state 
As economic competition gained currency over traditional security issues, it in turn 
affected the national resources allocated for state expenditure. State capacities in 
this new environment were defined more broadly, not exclusively as military 
strength, to show how the state could maintain and improve the economic well-
being of the nation. 
With reference to the previous discussion on the 'Two Good Theory' of foreign 
policy in Chapter Two, a country is considered to be endowed with limited 
resources. It needs to allocate these resources to either maintaining status quo or 
generating changes (Palmer & Morgan 2006). We can apply this model to the issue 
of changes in capabilities. Assuming a country has to distribute its resources to two 
broad national interests, that is, maintaining security and improving the country's 
economic position, when a country's preference or incentive changes towards the 
latter it is assumed that more resources will be allocated away from military to 
economic activities. Figure 4.3 illustrates the hypothetical change in national 
resource allocation in Thailand after the late 1980s. This figure assumes that when 
a country experiences economic growth its resources for both security and 
economy will increase, represented by a shift of production frontier from P1 to P2. 
However, due to changes in incentive and preference of actors favouring economic 
activities, depicted by the change of indifference curve ii or iz to be steeper towards 
X-axis, resources for military are unchanged (M) or reduced (M2) as a result. 
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Figure 4.3: The hypothetical picture of the shift in resource allocation and state's 
policy 
This trend can be observed in the change in the Thai state's military capability in 
terms of defence expenditure. Government expenditure on defence-related issues 
in general had declined since the Chatichai government. The drop in military 
expenditure occurs both as a percentage of total expenditure in each fiscal year 
(from around 30 per cent in 1988 to 10 per cent in 2006) and as a percentage of 
GDP (from 2.8 per cent in 1988 to 1.1 per cent in 2006). This is illustrated in 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5. 
# 
~ 
~ 
3.5 
3 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
1 
0.5 
Defence spending as a 
percentage of GDP 
-Percentage of GDP 
-- Linear (Percentage 
of GDP) 
0 --,---,,-·------,·-~·-·r~---, 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Year 
Figure 4.4: Thailand's defence spending as a percentage of GDP, 1988-2006 
(Source: SIPRI 2008a) 
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This trend does not directly indicate that the effectiveness of the Thai armed forces 
had declined since effectiveness is affected not only by budget allocation but also by 
other factors such as quality of weaponry, techniques of military training, and 
technological improvement. However, it is likely that without careful planning to 
improve its personnel and equipment the shrink in budget would also affect a 
country's overall military capabilities. Moreover, it may be reasonable to assume 
that the 1997 Financial Crisis had a negative impact on military expenditure. The 
record suggests this, as defence spending dropped from 2.1 to 1.9 per cent of GDP 
in 1997 and 1998, respectively (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5). Yet, this trend was not 
unprecedented as Thailand's military expenditure had gradually declined since the 
late 1980s with insignificant sporadic rises in only a few years within two decades. 
This thesis contends that a decline in military capabilities was substituted by other 
state strategies to improve the country's national security. In the context of 
declining traditional politico-military confrontation in the post-Cold War period, a 
co-operative strategy was thus likely to be a preferable option. 
In sum, this sub-section has attempted to demonstrate that the current the 
internationalisation of Thai economy changed the nature of the Thai state. The 
changes in its key actors, preferences, and capabilities reflected the general trend 
- 122 -
towards 'the competition state' in which the priority of the state was to improve its 
competitiveness in the world economy. The problem at this point is how this 
changing nature of the Thai state and its existing self-perception interplayed. In 
other words, how was self-perceptio,n in this globalised world expressed especially 
in Thai foreign policy? 
The next section addresses this question and points to the fact that Thailand's self-
perception has become an operative idea in which material interest is pursued. In 
this connection, self-perception was adjusted to incorporate features of 'the 
competition state'. Although its modification embraced a co-operative element, the 
existing self-perception still maintained its core feature of viewing Thailand as a 
leading actor in its essence. This created Thailand's regional aspirations in which a 
co-operative policy became an important strategy to enhance Thailand's leading 
position in the international and regional systems. 
4.3 Translating self-perception into regional aspirations in foreign policy 
Although Thailand's self-perception or identity has recently received attention in 
academia, the literature on this issue pays greater attention to how national 
identity is formed with relation to the consolidation of political institutions, such as 
the monarchy, the nation, or specific regimes. The emphasis on national identity is 
regarded as a political tool of the powerful elite to mobilise political support against 
their opposition in different contexts. Nationalism created the 'otherness' which is 
defined as a threat to the nation. These threats are thought to have been working 
against the Thai-ness such as the colonial powers and progressive political groups 
during the absolute monarchy or the communists during the Cold War. To the best 
of my knowledge, there is no specific study on the relationship between Thailand's 
self-perception and its foreign policy especially in the post-Cold War era. The 
farthest most scholars of Thai foreign policy have gone is the address of 
'Suvarnabhumi' concept (discussed in Chapters Two and Three). However, this 
feature is not further elaborated in detail. This thesis takes this issue seriously and 
assesses more extensively how self-perception or identity influences Thai foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War era. 
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After having discussed the external pressures on the Thai state from a current 
internationalisation of the Thai economy, and its effects on the political economic 
structure of Thailand, the problem addressed now is how self-perception of the 
Thai state, mentioned in Chapter Three, interacted with this changing nature of the 
Thai state. To put it slightly differently, what is the connection between these 
structural and cognitive factors that influenced Thailand's post-Cold War foreign 
policy? 
The answer to this question rests on the interaction between the nature of the 
'competition state' and the existing self-perception. Therefore, this section argues 
that the transformation of the Thai state into the competition state model helped 
facilitate or reframe the existing cognition amongst Thai decision makers. That is, it 
offers a new working space in which a co-operative strategy has become very 
relevant in promoting competitiveness. However, only changes in the economic 
system and domestic coalition did not automatically produce a specific type of 
foreign policy that aimed to promote Thailand's own version of economic co-
operation. Considering the fact that the decline of the Cold War context also offered 
more independence for Thailand to pursue its own foreign policy with less pressure 
from regional politics and great powers, other co-operative strategies could have 
been emphasised. Therefore, in such a case an fdeational dimension is germane to 
the analysis. 
In its essence, Thailand saw, at least, mainland Southeast Asia as a foundation of the 
country's leverage to project its leadership further in the regional system. The next 
sub-section, then, shows how this self-perception was expressed in major Thai 
foreign policy initiatives from the end of the Cold War roughly until the Thaksin 
administration. The main intention is to show a broad picture of Thailand's major 
foreign policy initiatives that exhibit regional aspirations. However, comprehensive 
evaluation of policy effectiveness is thus well beyond this study's analytical scope. 
4.3.1 A new expression of Thai's self-perception: emerging regional aspirations 
As intimated in section 4.2, the issue of competitiveness was relevant in the policy-
making of the Thai state. The competitive mentality was embedded within the 
decision makers' idea and behaviour in post-Cold War Thailand. A senior official in 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated this point to his audience from. the Thai 
Navy on a special lecture. He stated: 
We cannot ignore the economic aspect of foreign policy. This is 
because a prosperous country cannot only have political security but 
also needs economic well-being of its people. So, economic aspect is 
another effective threshold to. prove a country's prosperity. Therefore, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has focused on trade diplomacy by 
strengthening good relations with other partners (MFA 1989a, p.5). 
The significance of economic aspect has been especially elaborated in every 
government since the Chatichai administration. Since competition involves 
comparing and contrasting oneself to others, self-perception thus intervened in the 
cognitive mechanism of comparison. It was the self-perception of the Thai state to 
be understood as a capable country that achieved political stability and economic 
prosperity, particularly when compared to less-developed Indochinese neighbours. 
This cognitive notion helped policy-makers position Thailand within the region and 
shaped its foreign policy behaviour, resulting in its eagerness in exercising a 
leading role to help bring development into this area. As General Chatichai put it 
with regard to the situation in Indochina and his policy, 'Vietnam seems to be 
sincere to accept the reality and reach out its old foes for assistance so that it can 
get out of the quagmire in Cambodia and to improve its own economic condition' 
(1988 cited in 1999b, p.9). He further elaborated on another occasion that 
'(Thailand] needs to offer opportunities to Indochina and Burma to join the world's 
economic development process' (1989 cited in 1999a, p.4 ). 
A survey conducted in 1989 amongst 501 Bangkokians on their attitude towards 
neighbouring countries still reveals a somewhat negative view towards 
neighbouring countries but at the same time indicates the development of a co-
operative mentality. A percentage of 75.25 and 78.44 viewed Cambodia and 
Vietnam, respectively, with a negative attitude. An interesting trend emerged in this 
survey which suggests that despite their negative attitudes, the majority of the 
respondents thought, however, that maintaining good relations with them was 
important (71 and 63 per cent towards Cambodia and Vietnam, respectively). In 
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this connection, when specifically asked about Vietnam 57.4 per cent thought it 
would become an important trading partner with Thailand in the next 5 years. 
(Roper Center 1989). 
Given the tendency of the Thais to perceive their immediate neighbours as 
somewhat subordinate, the question arises: what, precisely, do the Thais think of 
their neighbours in the post-Cold War period? Perhaps the justification for this 
perception can be gauged through Thongchai's argument (2005). He asserts that 
Thailand's perception of Southeast Asia is based on its 'imperial knowledge' that 
assumes the centrality of the court in Bangkok and later the nationalist 
governments. It is therefore generally an inward-looking and nationalistic 
perception. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War and the integration of Thailand into 
the globalised world economy also shaped the context in which antagonism may be 
outmoded and co-operation preferred. The outcome shaped by this context was the 
transformation of the existing perception into a new variety that included a 
sympathetic view towards its neighbouring countries. While this perception was 
operationalised on the basis of co-operation and assistance rather than antagonism 
and defence, the core perception remained attached to the centrality and 
superiority of Thailand. 
The perception in the post-Cold War period was therefore still seen as being shaped 
within a hierarchical concept of power. Great powers and more advanced 
economies had a higher status, while Thailand was on par with newly 
industrialising economies characterised by co-operative and competitive natures. 
However, this self-perception viewed Thailand being of higher status in both 
political and economic terms vis-a-vis neighbouring countries on the mainland. The 
role attached to this perception was likely to be Thailand's responsibility for 
helping these countries out of backwardness and underdevelopment. Thailand 
therefore nominated itself as a leader, helper, or saviour. This notion was prevailing 
from the Chatichai government onward as shown earlier by the language of General 
Chatichai in his speeches. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also set a budget of THB 
200 million a year for technical assistance to Indochinese countries, and put 
forwards that Thailand 'will be proactive in helping them as much as possible in 
any area to nurture long-term relations as an ultimate goal' (MF A 1991 b, p.1 ). The 
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Foreign Ministry also set a foreign policy objective towards Indochina and Burma 
by 'supporting, advising and assisting economic development in these countries' 
(MFA 1989b, p.15), and also planned to 'push Thailand to be the co-ordinating 
centre of international assistance to rehabilitate Thailand's neighbours such as Laos 
and Cambodia' (MFA 1989c, p.2). 
Confident over its economic progress since the 1980s, Thailand's self-perception 
became associated more with successful economies, especially those in NIEs and 
other ASEAN neighbours. Indochinese countries were likely to be placed outside 
the same league, according to the Thais. An interesting study by Chulanee & 
Thompson (2007) revealed this possibility even on younger Thai generation. Their 
survey was conducted amongst Thai university students, and asked for their view 
of their country's position and its association with neighbouring countries. It was 
predicted to represent the fact that Thai people thought their country was very 
distinctive from other neighbouring nations. It finds that students positioned 
Thailand in the mid of Southeast Asia. However, they grouped Thailand in a 
category different from its mainland neighbours but in the same group as Malaysia 
and Singapore (Chulanee & Thompson 2007, p.47-49). Despite the geographical 
proximity and cultural affinity between Thailand and its immediate neighbours its 
ability to maintain independence and the level of economic development were 
major sources of pride to the Thais. 
By thinking and acting in the way that Thailand is superior and responsible for help, 
the emerging regional aspirations served both the ideational and material logics of 
the Thai state in the globalised world. This idea was well expressed not only by 
Chatichai in his 'turning the battlefields into marketplaces' policy but also within 
the military circle. Chavalit clearly envisioned Thailand's leading role in mainland 
Southeast Asia since he was the Supreme Commander of the Thai Armed Forces in 
1989. On the Thai Armed Forces Day, 25 January 1989, he stated, 
The Thai armed forces will strive to create a durable peace in order to 
make it possible for the development of economic co-operation, 
solidarity and prosperity in this Suwannaphume-with Thailand at its 
centre (Paisal 1989, p.11). 
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Ideationally, this perception still positioned Thailand as a centre of regional affairs, 
hence maintaining its pride and centrality. At the same time, it provided economic 
and political justifications for Thailand to assert its prowess in exploiting 
Indochina's abundant natural and cheap labour resources. The outcome of this 
structure was still hierarchical as it aimed to improve Thailand's economic 
competitiveness in the world market by upgrading its industries into a higher 
production whilst transferring labour and resource-intensive industries to its less 
developed neighbours. For these reasons, mainland Southeast Asia became vital to 
Thailand's international political and economic position in which Thai foreign 
policy needed to be carried out. 
This logic can be seen from the idea behind Thailand's interest in sub-regional 
economic co-operation expressed by a former Deputy Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Noranit Singhaseni, that 
The justification behind Thailand's foreign policy with regard to sub-
regional co-operation is not only a way to expand Thailand's market 
and trade opportunity ... but also aims at narrowing the economic gap 
in the region. This is because Thailand is successful in economic 
development especially in mainland Southeast Asia. In addition this 
policy also follows what HM the King mentioned. He said we cannot 
develop alone or be rich alone. We need to give help to our neighbours 
by bringing development to them and help them develop. This is not 
merely a charitable act but also a prevention of any problem that may 
affect us (Paisit & Uraiwan 2007, pp.10-11). 
As the boundary between domestic and external affairs was eroded in the post-Cold 
War period, it was less likely to express Thai foreign policy in an exclusive manner 
from other areas. Foreign policy was one of the tools used to help strengthen 
Thailand's competitiveness and facilitate its penetration into its areas of interest, 
both in mainland Southeast Asia and beyond. 
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(a) Pre-Asian Financial Crisis 
It is evident that in the post-Cold War era Thai foreign policy was more likely to be 
occupied with this regional agenda since the Chatichai administration. This sub-
section outlines major foreign poli~y initiatives under different government and 
their regional implications. 
Under the Chatichai government (1988-1991), Thailand initiated the transformation 
of Indochina from 'battlefields into marketplaces'. This foreign policy was partly 
intended to stimulate economic activities by bridging economic opportunities of 
both parties initially through border trade. This strategy was later supported by the 
expansion of transport infrastructure that linked inner regions to seaports on the 
East Coast of Thailand (Chuan 1992a). This significantly impacted not only on 
economic development but also on security and politics in Southeast Asia. Thailand 
was playing a leading role in paving the way towards peace and development in the 
region with historical foes becoming friends. The swift rapprochement with Hanoi 
may have been an impossible achievement under by previous governments because 
Vietnam was regarded as a foremost threat to Thailand's security. 
This can be seen from a conflict between Chatichai and his Foreign Minister, Sithi 
Savetsila. Sithi Savetsila was the Foreign Minister throughout the Prem government 
(1980-1988) and the first Chatichai's Foreign Minister (1988-1990). Although Sithi 
agreed with adjusting Thai-Vietnamese relations, he still strongly insisted Vietnam 
follow ASEAN's comprehensive withdrawal from Cambodia and was reluctant to 
turn around Thai foreign policy according to Chatichai's vision. This policy change 
was controversial because it was initially against the will of Thailand's supporting 
allies especially China and other ASEAN countries. As Sithi argued, 'Thai foreign 
policy towards the Cambodian issue has been consistent for more than 8 years and 
has had positive results. These benefits may be affected by a swift change' (MFA 
1988, p.4). He further asserted that these negative consequences can be Thailand 
losing its credibility amongst allies and increasing Vietnam's potential before the 
right time (MFA 1988, p.4). Thus, if Sithi's position had won support in the 
government, the change in Indochina may have been delayed further. This policy 
also left its legacy in ASEAN's widely-accepted practice of 'constructive 
engagement' with non-democratic neighbouring countries, particularly Burma. 
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Moreover, the focus on advocating regional co-operation in Thai foreign policy was 
consistent regardless of political changes or regime type. Thailand's case seems to 
be inconsistent to the prediction of the democratic peace theory that sees less co-
operative external behaviour from non-democratic regimes. It suggests that non-
democratic governments are constructed around nationalist and traditional elite 
coalitions, therefore, their grand strategy is generally opposing liberalisation. In 
other words, foreign policy under non-democratic regimes is likely to be inward-
looking and not constructive to international co-operation (Solingen 1996, 1998). 
In contrary, more internationalist and outward-looking features in economic and 
foreign policy can also be found in Thailand's post-Cold War period under the 
undemocratic governments. 
For instance, the interim government under Anand (1991-1992) appointed under 
the successful coup d'etat against Chatichai in 1991 continued further liberalisation 
and promoted regional integration, notably through AFT A. Surayud Chulanont, 
appointed under the 2006 military junta, also pursued a liberalisation agenda such 
as further elimination of agricultural subsidies imposed during the Thaksin 
government (The Nation, 10 November 2006), and relying heavily on exports while 
abandoning stimulating domestic consumption (Bangkok Post, 30 April 2007). In 
addition, he was reported to be more co-operative with Malaysia in addressing the 
Southern unrest as opposed to the suspicious approach during the Thaksin 
government (The Nation, 1 July 2007, p.3A). 
During the Anand interim government (1991-1992), the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) initiative in 1992 also reflected Thailand's regional ambition to push 
forward a free trade regime in the region as a whole. Anand was keen to table this 
proposal among ASEAN member countries despite his government's ad hoc nature 
as an interim government after the overthrow of Chatichai by the 1991 coup d'etat. 
AFTA aimed to lay out a comprehensive programme of regional tariff reduction and 
ultimately hoped to establish a common market in Southeast Asia (Chuan 1993a, 
p.9) as the European Community had done. It cannot be denied that AFTA was a 
significant turning point in ASEAN development and regionalism. Moreover, while 
Chatichai in practice laid the foundation of the general rationale for constructive 
engagement, it was Anand who formalised and advocated this principle as a major 
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guideline for Thailand's policy towards its neighbours, with a particular focus on 
Burma (Pavin 2005, p.128). This policy also had regional repercussions as it 
became a common regional practice with a broad reference to a general principle of 
non-interference in ASEAN members' internal affairs. 
During the Chuan government (1992-1995), the promotion of sub-regional economic 
co-operation was one of its major foreign policies. The 'Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation' was proposed to co-ordinate development projects-mainly with 
respect to transport links-among Thailand, China, Myanmar, and Laos. The 
transport links for the new East-West corridor not only stimulated economic 
development in this sub-region by strengthening the connection to the growing 
Chinese economy, but also placed Thailand at the centre of the project (Chapman 
and Hinton 1993; Kusuma 2001, pp. 194-195). The success of this project required 
effective international co-ordination. Thailand played an indispensable role in 
aligning interests amongst these countries. Thailand was committed to research 
and development in transport projects that would link the four countries together 
into a network. It also acted as a facilitator in brainstorming and mobilising support 
from within the member countries and external donors such as ADB, Australia, and 
Japan (MFA 1994c). Moreover, it also offered technical assistance to Indochinese 
countries to survey and design many road construction projects including partially 
financing their construction (OC 1994). This project was incorporated into the 
Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) project supported by the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) which further expanded to incorporate Cambodia and Vietnam. 
The Chava/it government (1996-1997) attempted to shape Thailand's regional 
aspirations to become an epicentre of mainland Southeast Asia through its 
'Indochina Policy'. This policy was put in place when Thai policy-makers felt that 
their country was becoming less active in regional affairs especially during the 
preceding Chuan government. Chavalit declared that his government was going 'to 
restore Thailand's former international influence which rested mainly on 
improving relations with neighbouring countries' (!SEAS 1998a). With his special 
relationship with the military regimes in Indochina established during his service in 
the Thai military, Chavalit relied heavily on his personal contacts. Importantly, his 
highlighting of foreign policy revolved around the exercise of Thailand's influence 
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over ASEAN's admission of Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos, including ASEAN's 
economic programmes aimed at creating transport links between countries in 
Indochina and the other ASEAN countries for which Thailand was a major hub 
(Funston 1998b). 
Moreover, Chavalit also wanted to link South and Southeast Asia under his 'Look 
West' policy. Chavalit initiated a regional co-operation institution in which both 
sub-regions could be formally linked, namely the Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand Economic Co-operation (BIST-EC). The forum later included Burma, Nepal 
and Bhutan and the name of the forum changed to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for 
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC) (BIMSTEC 2008). 
Through this forum linking two sub-regions, it was apparent that Chavalit 
positioned Thailand as an important piece in the jigsaw to fill the whole picture of 
potential economic prosperity with a market size of 1.3 billion people. Thailand 
envisioned itself as acting as a bridging actor, hence it deemed its leadership to be 
necessary. 
It can be concluded that Thai foreign policy during the years from Chatichai and 
before the 1997 Financial Crisis has attempted to nominate Thailand as a centre of 
regional dynamics. Thailand envisioned its leadership to be recognised, therefore, 
invested extensively in its regional policy throughout this time. Kasit Piromya, the 
current Minister of Foreign Affairs, also reflected this vision amongst Thai leaders. 
He said 'Thai leaders from Prem, Chatichai, and Anand on shared a similar vision 
which constituted continuity in Thailand's attempt to exercise its regional leading 
role in the early post-Cold War period' (interview on 19 December 2007). The 
attempt to project its leadership was curtailed by the Financial Crisis mainly due to 
its economic difficulties. However, the crisis did not cause Thailand's regional 
aspirations to vanish. 
(b) Asian Financial Crisis and its aftermath 
The Asian Financial Crisis that hit Thailand in mid 1997 and later spread 
throughout the region was a sign of Thailand losing its competitiveness, hence 
seriously affecting its confidence to continue its leading role. Although the exercise 
of leadership was temporarily dampened, its regional aspirations did not disappear. 
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Foreign policy was not totally overshadowed but re-adjusted to serve as an 
important state apparatus to overcome the crisis and bring back economic stability, 
thus restoring confidence amongst foreign investors over the Thai economy. During 
the course of the crisis and in its aftermath, the Thai leadership was gradually 
revived. 
It can be noticed that during the second Chuan government (1997-2001) Thai foreign 
policy turned back to its conventional focus on accommodating external powers. 
This was due to the fact that the United States, the European Union, and Japan were 
the important sources of assistance for economic recovery, and had their voices in 
international institutions such as IMF, World Bank, and ADB (Prapat 1999; Somchai 
2007). Therefore, Thai foreign policy during this time was mainly framed within its 
relations with external powers. However, the endeavour for regional leadership or 
regional aspirations in Thai foreign policy did not totally end. Thailand's proposal 
of 'Flexible Engagement' reflects this lingering idea amongst Thai foreign policy-
makers. 
The 'Flexible Engagement' initiative was proposed amidst the crisis and put the 
spotlight back on Thailand's leadership in regional affairs. This policy was proposed 
to radically adjust ASEAN's traditional non-interference in each other's domestic 
affairs. Thai foreign policy-makers understood clearly that ASEAN countries' 
inability to warn each other of foreseeable dangers that might spill over boundaries 
was partly responsible for the contagion of the 1997 economic crisis. This 
weakened and reduced ASEAN's credibility within the international community. 
Despite the fact that 'flexible engagement' was a timely, creative, and effective 
improvement in the conduct of ASEAN diplomacy, an important focus was also to 
address problems from Burma rooted in its authoritarian regime. It was therefore a 
break-away from Thailand's longstanding policy towards Burma that emphasises 
tolerance and expectation of gradual change in the regime. 
Also, this foreign policy initiative was arguably an effort to restore Thailand's 
credibility through emphasising its available soft power. The principle of 
democracy and human rights, thus, became an ideological guideline in Thailand's 
foreign policy. The proposal of Flexible Engagement did not only demonstrate that 
- 133 -
Thailand was committed to democratic norms similar to its Western counterparts 
but also distinguished Thailand from other ASEAN countries that opposed the 
proposal. ·As a senior official in the MFA put it in his facsimile to the Ministry 
assessing the position within ASEAN regarding the Flexible Engagement: 
The rejection of Thailand's Flexible Engagement by seven ASEAN 
countries, in fact, was positive to Thailand's image, reputation, and 
credibility. It undoubtedly made Thailand more outstanding, respected, 
and accepted in the international community in which civilised nations 
are governed by democratic rules (MFA 1998b) 
This strategy can be interpreted as Thailand manoeuvring its foreign policy in a 
proactive way that would preserve its material interest as well as self-perception. 
This proposal was explained by Surin (interview, 9 January 2008) and his 
supporters such as the current Minister of Foreign Affairs Kasit Bhiromya 
(interview, 19 December 2007) and the former ambassador Surapong Jayanama 
(interview, 12 January 2008) as a way by which to re-boost foreign investors' 
confidence and reassure donor countries of the country's accountability and 
transparency in exchange for access to economic assistance during the crisis. At the 
same time, this proposal obviously illuminated Thailand's leading role in the 
Association despite the likelihood that Thai · foreign policy-makers may have 
already anticipated a strong rejection beforehand. This can be captured by 
Surapong's words, 
Thailand proposed Flexible Engagement because we wanted to play a 
leading role in Southeast Asia. We had the potential to do so. It was a 
politics of identity and we needed to show clearly that we could lead in 
democracy and human rights issues (interview on 12 January 2008). 
Therefore, it can be said that although foreign policy under the Chuan government 
was largely concerned with attracting the attention of the major powers, it still 
sought to project its regional leadership within this context. Thailand's regional 
aspirations or its self-perception as a leading actor and its leadership once again 
loomed large in the succeeding government under Thaksin. 
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The foreign policy of the succeeding Thaksin government (2001-2006) likewise 
clearly demonstrated that he was attempting to illuminate Thailand's role in the 
region and the world. Thaksin's Forward Engagement initiative was bold, assertive, 
unconventional, controversial, and departing from business-as-usual. He clearly 
intended to pursue an active foreign policy especially through fostering 'a variety of 
regional institutions in recent years' (Goh 2005a, p.4). According to Thaksin and his 
Foreign Affairs Minister, this foreign policy sought to utilise Thailand's geopolitical 
leverage to strengthen existing international co-operation while further engaging 
new partners on an equal basis (Thaksin 2003a; Surakiart 2004b). This foreign 
policy platform revolved around new multilateral initiatives complemented by 
bilateral economic co-operation (Thitinan 2004a, 2004b). 
The major evidence of the leadership in multilateral platforms was Thaksin's 
enthusiastic campaign for his newly-created regional fora on the one hand-the 
Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation Strategy (ACMECS), and 
Asia Co-operation Dialogue (ACD), and the promotion of complex bilateral free 
trade agreements with many countries, on the other. Thaksin also renewed his 
interest in BIMSTEC and pushed forward several other sub-regional co-operations 
specialising in certain areas. For example, the Emerald Triangle Co-operation 
Framework was mainly intended to boost socio-economic development through 
promoting the tourism industry amongst the culturally and historically rich 
resources of Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand (MFA 2008b). Thus, the regional 
repercussions of his policy were widely recognised, albeit credited with varying 
degrees of success. This proactive foreign policy expanded the scope of co-
operation, affording Thailand an enhanced ability to play a leading role. 
At this point, it can be seen clearly that throughout the post-Cold War period up to 
the Thaksin administration, Thailand's regional aspirations were sustained despite 
the changes of government. Thailand's self-perception and its integration in the 
internationalisation of production created a precondition in which new regional 
aspirations were crystallised as an important element in Thailand's post-Cold War 
foreign policy. The next section, therefore, conceptualises the key features in 
Thailand's regional aspirations in detail. 
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4.4 Key features of Thailand's regional aspirations 
The interplay between self-perception and the material aspects of globalised 
economy exhibited in the 'competition state' has created quite distinctive elements 
in Thai foreign policy orientation and behaviour. The previous sections discussed 
the sources of the transformation of Thailand's self-perception into its foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War context. Thailand's self-perception was used as the 
cognitive basis on which the logic of 'the competition state' operated. The result 
was clearly shown in Thai foreign policy behaviour that sought to exercise its 
regional leading role or influence. This section then takes a further step to 
conceptualise in detail the essential features of Thailand's regional aspirations. This 
conceptualisation is further examined through the case studies in the subsequent 
chapters. 
From the general observations presented in the previous section about the trend in 
Thai foreign policy, it can be conceptualised that Thai regional aspirations exhibit 
three important characteristics: (1) it aims for improving Thailand's 
competitiveness; (2) it attempts to push for Thailand's leading role especially in 
mainland Southeast Asia; (3) it seeks multilateral approaches to regional co-
operation. 
4.4.1 Emphasising economic competitiveness 
Thai policy-makers envisioned Thailand as being able to be competitive in the 
world economy if proper measures were put in place. Therefore, its strategy was to 
enhance this opportunity. Since the Chatichai government Thai policy-makers 
viewed the liberal economic system as essential to the country's prosperity; 
therefore, it was the government's role to provide the necessary support to the 
market mechanism, and 'facilitate the adaption of the Thai economy into the 
changing world economy, so that it is strong and sound' (Chatichai 1988). 
Competitiveness was therefore important to continue a high level of economic 
growth, which would enhance Thailand's economic strength. in the region 
(Suchinda 1992). 
Therefore, it is also imperative to secure confidence amongst both domestic and 
foreign investors in the Thai economy by repeating its attachment to free market 
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system, deregulation, and transparency. Chatichai's foreign policy master plan 
clearly stated an objective to 'increase Thailand's role in the world economy by 
supporting free trade and lift up the country's international economic 
competitiveness (MFA 1991). The same line was reiterated in subsequent 
governments that they would 'continue a free market policy' (Anand 1992), or 'to 
implement liberal economic policy ... to strengthen the country's competitiveness' 
(Chuan 1992a). In addition, international economic institutions were seen as 
important fora from which Thailand would benefit (Banharn 1995). The Banharn 
government not only paid attention to the material aspects of competitiveness, but 
also to the promotion of the Thai image as complementary to the country's 
competitiveness. He mentioned in his policy address to the Parliament that his 
government was to 'promote the real and proper Thai image as a country in which 
its people are skilful, diligent, and responsible' (Banharn 1995). 
However, as the Thai economy stepped into a higher level of development the 
government realised the limit of the country's capability. The structural problem 
was identified as Thailand could not upgrade its industries quickly enough to 
escape entrapment in a low-value chain of production (NESDB 2002b, p.10). This 
problem alarmed the government enough to adjust its competitive position 
especially after the 1997 Financial Crisis. There was a series of attempts to do so, 
especially setting up the Committee for Restructuring and Improving 
Competitiveness (CRIC) in 1998, and the National Competitiveness Committee 
(NCC) in 2002. 
The issue of economic development appeared to be significant, not only in domestic 
and economic policy but also in the traditional areas of security and foreign policy. 
The scope of security issues was redefined in connection to the economic 
development theme. Security was now involved in socio-economic stability and 
people's well-being instead of the ability of the state to maintain defence 
capabilities against traditional security and political threats. For example, Chavalit's 
security policy states that the government would mobilise military strength to 
'facilitate other public and private sectors' activities in development, [including] 
training labour forces, [and] lifting national athletic competence' (Chavalit 1996). 
Moreover, foreign policy orientation towards economic focus can also be seen in 
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the government's attempt to include the Foreign Ministry under an 'economic 
agency' cluster (NESDB 2002b). 
Foreign policy in this context therefore becomes a tool to 'to actively project 
Thailand's leadership in the regional fora and promote Thailand as a link between 
advanced and less developed countries' (NESDB 2002b, p.13). Although the most 
recent strategy was formulated in 2002, similar expressions can be traced back to 
as early as the Chatichai government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' operation 
plan stated that the government 'attempts to search for the way in which Thailand 
can play a role in bridging economic co-operation between Indochina and Burma 
and the rest of Southeast Asian countries' (MFA 1991b). Viewed from the 
competition state's perspective, Thai foreign policy had now become a part of an 
overall national 'grand strategy' for improving the country's competitiveness. Not 
only was foreign policy expected to maintain a co-operative environment abroad 
but also to actively enhance Thailand's ability to step up on the international 
development ladder. 
The rapid economic growth of Thailand especially between the late 1980s and early 
1990s manifested this economic success and raised confidence amongst the Thais 
over their performance. This confidence certainly contributed to Thailand's attempt 
to project its leadership. As stated by the MF A's Permanent Secretary in a Ministry's 
senior official seminar in 1994, the MFA viewed that 'Thailand [was] much stronger 
both in international political and economic positions, therefore, it need[ ed] to take 
this advantage to boost its own role internationally' (PPD 1994, p.3). In order to do 
so, this thesis asserts that Thailand's foreign policy in the post-Cold War period 
favoured performing the role of a central link in various regional political and 
economic developments. 
4.4.2 Advancing Thailand's leading role 
According to the Thai policy-makers, in order for Thailand to hold and improve its 
competitiveness it needs to be able to exercise leadership beyond its boundaries. 
To perform a leading role, Thai policy-makers leaned towards the idea of placing 
their country as a centre of regional geo-politics and economic development in 
mainland Southeast Asia. 
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In Thai policy-makers' perception, and from a geographical point of view, Thailand 
was situated in a significant geo-strategic location. Historically, Bangkok and the 
central plain of Thailand had enjoyed the status of important entrepot on a trade 
route between Asia and Europe. Ayutthaya, the former capital of Siam, was 
reported by foreign traders as one of the flourishing metropolises in Asia (Baker 
2003, p.48; Kullada 2004, p.11) with population over one million people, greater 
than that of London in the seventeen century (Beek et al.. 1999, p.140). Although 
Singapore and Hong Kong increasingly became trading centres in Asia due to the 
British influence in the nineteenth century, Bangkok still enjoyed its commercial 
significance due to the overseas Chinese network in the region (Dick 2005, p.264). 
In the modern day, Bangkok has also been an important international aviation hub 
and a gateway to the region competing with Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Singapore 
(Chin & Tongzon 1998, p.95; Duenden 2001, pp.14, 18). 
Politically, as also discussed in the previous chapter, Bangkok has played a central 
role in regional affairs. Its continuity of maintaining independence from foreign rule, 
whether it be British, French, Japanese, or Communists, was viewed as Thailand's 
ability to manoeuvre the balance of power between contending forces (PPD 1994, 
p.3). As cited by many Thai foreign policy-makers, Thailand has an important role 
in regional fora and institutions (e.g. ASEAN, ASEM, ARF, AFTA) and also houses 
regional and international headquarters (e.g. SEATO, UN regional headquarters-
ESCAP). These elements also significantly indicate the centrality of Bangkok as a 
regional political centre (PPD 1989). 
These politico-economic elements undeniably influenced the cognition of Thai 
policy-makers that the promotion of Thailand as a regional leading centre was not 
an option but an essential strategy in Thai foreign affairs. The significance of this 
idea can be seen in foreign and economic policy of every government. Every 
government since Chatichai has elaborated on how to maintain, improve, and 
elevate Thailand's leadership and centrality in the international affairs. The focus 
on Bangkok's centrality and leadership was in both economic and political arenas, 
and generally expressed in the language of being 'a centre of (or base, hub, gateway) 
such as a regional centre of the financial market, transportation, aviation, etc. In 
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addition, other associated roles-as a bridge, a link, a door, a facilitator, or a 
broker-were also emphasised in a more consistent manner. 
In addition, Thai foreign policy in the post-Cold War era exhibited a preference for a 
facilitating role. Emphasis was placed on the role of co-ordinating economic 
development and co-operation in the region from which Thailand also benefited. 
However, Thai policy-makers realised that external powers still had strategic and 
economic interests in the region, and that their contribution to the region could 
improve economic development and stabilise regional peace. Thailand therefore 
used its strategic location, in the centre of mainland Southeast Asia, to extract this 
advantage in terms of inviting more foreign direct investment to Thailand and using 
Thailand as a gateway to other countries. 
Thailand therefore mobilised its possible resources to play a leading role in co-
ordinating regional development. It can be argued that no other foreign policy was 
more sophisticated and complex than the policy towards mainland Southeast Asia 
in the post-Cold War period. The Indochina policy was related to Thailand's 
domestic policy, and involved all possible aspects and levels of Thailand's 
diplomacy, whether it be political, security, economic, and socio-cultural. In 
addition, all ranges of actors in Thailand also took part in it-from the royal family, 
the government, the military, the private sector at both the national and local levels, 
to the general public. 
Thus, it can be said that since the beginning of Chatichai's Indochina policy Thai 
foreign policy objectives in this sub-region have remained unchanged. The main 
objectives include: (1) reviving and expanding economic relations, (2) enhancing 
Thailand's export and investment opportunities in this area, and (3) gaining access 
to necessary natural resources (PPD 1989). This idea was crystallised and explicitly 
expressed as Thailand's main goal. As a then Deputy Foreign Minister put it, this 
was to 'promote Thailand as a leader in mainland Southeast Asia ... which is 
attainable' (PPD 1994). A senior official expressed his support of this goal and 
suggested possible ways in which Thailand could materialise this idea including 
becoming a democratic role model, promoting its economic capability, and 
supporting regional co-operation (PPD 1994). 
- 140 -
For Thailand to effectively exercise its leadership and influence in mainland 
Southeast Asia, political rivalry emanating from the Cold War had to be put to an 
end. As a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prachuab Chaiyasan, reiterates: 
The end of the Cold War had a liberating effect on foreign policy 
making ... we should be writing the rules for the borderless future now 
practically upon us ... foreign policy must be firmly rooted in the 
national agenda ... focus[ing] on our country's economic interest and 
the role of the people .. .ln practical terms, the primary focus of our 
foreign policy remains our immediate neighbours ... the task of building 
shared prosperity in the region (Prachuab 1997). 
The main target was Vietnam. This was because compared to Vietnam's weaker 
economic and international status Thailand was emerging in the late 1980s as a 
newly industrialising country. It was believed that by opening up to Vietnam and 
allowing its economic reform policy, Doi Mai, to benefit from the world economy, 
Thailand would be able to remain significant as an economic role model, and, 
perhaps, also in political aspects if Vietnamese leaders were willing to democratise 
their country. This perception was undeniably playing a role in Chatichai's 'turning 
the battlefields into marketplaces' policy. Chatichai swiftly seized this opportunity 
to promote peaceful reconciliation so that Thailand's political centrality in the 
region was secured. 
Thailand, therefore, not only moved unilaterally to end the political stalemate, it 
also supported and facilitated any possible move to that end. Apart from its own 
role in ASEAN to push for Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, Thailand was 
also supportive of any possible move by other countries. Surakiat Satirathai, as a 
member of Chatichai's advisory team and later the Foreign Ministry, explained 
Thailand's facilitating role in support of Japan's action this issue in an interview on 
13 February 2008. He recalled that the Japanese actually wanted to end the 
Cambodia conflict and played a role but was not comfortable to explicitly express 
this will due to political sensitivity about Japan's political role in East Asia. 
Therefore, it once covertly requested Thailand to support Japanese involvement in 
a peace negotiation. Thailand accepted and proposed during an ASEAN meeting the 
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idea of holding a peace negotiation in Tokyo. Once ASEAN seconded Thailand's 
proposal, Thailand officially tabled this idea at a joint meeting of ASEAN and Japan. 
In response to this proposal Japanese officials acted as if they had not been 
informed beforehand, and seemed to be surprised. Therefore, a peace negotiation 
could be held in Tokyo in June 1990. Takeda (1998) explains why this event was so 
important to Tokyo. He asserts, 'the Cambodian conflict was the first testing ground 
where Japan could try to play a positive role in the international arena' (p.554). 
Thailand's role as a facilitator in this negotiation was therefore indispensable. 
Furthermore, as the biggest investor in Thailand, Japan also played an important 
part in Thailand's strategy to promote its active facilitating role in mainland 
Southeast Asia's trade and development. Korn Dabarangsi, a Minister attached to 
the Office of Prime Minister in the Chatichai government, reported on his Japan 
road-show trip to promote Thailand's investment potential that by investing in 
Thailand, Japanese firms also 'have an opportunity to sell their products in Laos, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Burma as Thailand has the advantage over other ASEAN 
countries of being so close to these countries' (SC 1988). 
In fact, Thailand and Japan discussed their economic relations within the six-year 
framework of the 'White paper on restructuring Thai-Japanese economic relations' 
since 1985. The First White Paper (1985-1990) mainly focused on the way in which 
both countries could reduce trade deficit and increase Japanese investment in and 
technical assistance to Thailand (Prasert 1999). The Second White Paper (1991-
1996) outlined further trade barrier reduction and indicated potential industries 
for Japanese investment, including the distribution of investment in other regions 
within Thailand. 
In a discussion of Second White Paper in 1992, both countries started to harmonise 
their policy towards Indochina. As a country that pioneered the end of the conflict, 
Thailand aimed at being a centre for international aid and technical assistance in 
Indochina after the political settlement process was complete. The MFA reported 
that co-operation between Thailand and Japan was significant in promoting 
development in Indochina. In this connection, Japan played an important role as a 
main aid provider while Thailand facilitated the arrangement of technical co-
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operation with its neighbouring countries (MFA 1992, pp.3-4, MFA 1993f). This 
Second White Paper for the first time designated a facilitating role for Thailand in 
restructuring mainland Southeast Asia (SORTJER 1996, pp.3-9). 
The Third White Paper (1997-2002) further institutionalised this role through a 
tripartite approach to co-operation that encouraged the involvement of recipient 
countries in the project planning and implementation. The tripartite approach to 
foreign development assistance became a prtnciple feature of Thailand's aid 
strategy. This is also an interesting point to note, that while foreign aid from 
external donor countries could be easily and directly granted to recipient countries, 
Thailand still attempted to justify its involvement. The Deputy Director of Thailand 
International Development Co-operation Agency (TICA) explained: 
Thailand was equipped with skill, experience, and necessary know-
how to train human resources in areas of development. Therefore, it 
was beneficial to every party to have technical training conducted in 
Thailand. It was cheaper to do it in Thailand than sending regional 
participants to train in donor countries, while the participants were 
more comfortable adjusting themselves and gaining more relevant 
experience from Thailand. At the same time, Thailand also benefited 
from the money spent in Thailand as well (Interview, 5 February 
2008). 
Therefore, it is likely that apart from small economic benefit of this assistance 
approach, the maintenance of Thailand's role and relevancy in regional affairs and 
development was likely to be of primary interest. 
It is clear that apart from sustaining self-perception of being a leading actor in 
mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand also related this role to a clear economic 
foundation. Indochina is abundant in natural resources that Thailand could exploit 
for its economic development. Thailand also saw an investment opportunity in 
utilising Indochina's cheap labour for its labour-intensive industries so that Thai 
firms remained competitive. In the early 1990s Thailand engaged in negotiations 
with these countries to reduce trade and investment barriers especially along its 
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borders. Agreements on the promotion and protection of investment were 
proposed by Thailand to Vietnam, Laos, and Burma in 1990 (MFA 1990, 1991; OC 
1990), and to Cambodia in 1994 (OC 1995). 
Moreover, transport linkage has been an important element in Thailand's Indochina 
policy. Bangkok tried to mobilise international support for numerous construction 
projects including roads, river ports, bridges, railways, including airports. The main 
contributor to this strategy has been the Asia Development Bank (ADB) especially 
for the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) project since 1992. Thailand has greatly 
benefited from these projects as they stimulated economic growth in its North-
eastern hinterland and in poor areas by providing transport links and outlets to 
Indochina. (Next chapter will discuss in further detail about transport link in case of 
the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative). 
Moreover, another important strategy of Thailand's Indochina Policy was to make 
use of existing socio-cultural affinity as the leverage. Although positive factors were 
well grounded as a basis of friendship and close co-operation, it appeared that 
Indochinese countries were still suspicious of Thailand's motives as to only exploit 
their resources, due to a long history of Thailand's political hegemony. Therefore, a 
socio-cultural aspect of foreign policy became an important tool to ease this 
difficulty. Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand share similar tradition and cultural 
practices through Theravada Buddhism. Laos and Thailand, in particular, even 
share ethnic and linguistic roots. The promotion of cultural diplomacy was 
therefore proposed to soften unintended consequences from political and economic 
diplomacy (PPD 1994). The promotion of socio-cultural co-operation, academic 
contact, tourism, and sports was believed would build a strong foundation and help 
facilitate other relations in the long term (NSC 1993). Coupled with aid and 
technical assistance, Thailand seemed to hope that the acceptance of its regional 
leading status could be secured. 
Thailand's attempt to exercise its leading role can also be seen expanding beyond 
mainland Southeast Asia at a later stage such as co-operation with South Asia and 
Asia as a hole in the Thaksin government. However, Thailand still tried to make 
them relevant to mainland Southeast Asia. Its leading role is clearly expressed as a 
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function of bridging and co-ordinating so it can remain central to these co-operative 
schemes. 
4.4.3 Multilateral orientation 
In connection to the aforementioned features of Thailand's regional aspirations, 
this thesis asserts further that Thai foreign policy in the post-Cold War era was 
reliant on a multilateral approach. This by no means suggests that bilateralism was 
unimportant or totally abandoned. Bilateral relationship still took immediate 
foreign policy attention and was equally important, especially with regard to 
relations with major powers. However, multilateralism and regional policy in 
particular have increasingly become an indispensable platform for Thailand to 
enhance its competitiveness, maintain its centrality, and exercise its leading role. 
This multilateral and regionalist orientation was well captured in a comment by 
Asa Sarasin, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Anand government, that 
'Thailand should pay special attention to multilateral co-operation in which the 
Thai image as a leading regional actor would be promoted and gained acceptance 
from the international community' (PPD 1994). 
Since the first half of the 1990s, multilateral strategy has been an integral strategy 
to Thai foreign policy. With reference to its 'Indochina Policy' Thailand did not see 
any alternative better than acting through a multilateral approach. In this 
connection, the National Security Council (NSC) in 1993 issued a policy and 
strategic guidelines for building regional co-operation. It aimed to promote a 
regional network including transport, communication, and shipping as a tool to link 
and support economic potential in the region by which Thailand played an 
important role in initiating and bridging these economic networks. The NSC 
assessed that Thailand was economically sustainable and geographically 
advantageous; therefore, it should retain a leading position to directly benefit from 
the regional co-operation. A significant strategy that the NSC also stipulated was to 
develop regional economic zones by pulling support, resources, and know-how 
from within ASEAN and other countries (NSC 1993). At the same time, the MFA also 
followed suit and agreed that Thailand should act as a bridge between Indochina 
and ASEAN, and Thailand should be promoted as a centre of political and economic 
activities related to this area. The MFA then concluded that sub-regional growth 
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areas and AFTA were therefore vital to achieve this goal on the economic front, 
while Thailand's support of the Indochinese countries' admission into ASEAN was 
its political strategy (PPD 1994 ). This adjustment in foreign policy also signifies a 
re-orientation of policy focus from security oriented to economic and co-operative 
approach taking place even within security agencies. 
The multilateral orientation was also pursued in response to emerging new 
challenges in globalisation. Apart from multilateral trade negotiation, this approach 
was sketched out to assert Thailand's role in other issue areas such as human rights, 
environmental protection, peace keeping, narcotic prevention, and so on. 
Democratisation in Thailand in the early 1990s, especially after the May 1992 
demonstrations, also facilitated the use of democracy as another front in foreign 
policy. Starting from Chuan these issues were incorporated as guidelines in foreign 
policy. Chuan said that the government was pledged to comply with the 
international treaties to which Thailand was a party including the UN Charter and 
the International Convention on Human Rights (Chuan 1992a). Banharn went 
further, saying that his government aimed to strengthen Thailand's leadership in 
foreign relations especially in Southeast Asia by focusing on its constructive role in 
promoting democracy, righteousness, human rights, and ecological balance and 
protection' (Banharn 1995). A similar tone of promoting these principles also 
appeared in Chavalit's policy. 
In practice, it can be seen that in the policy-makers' minds the multilateral 
orientation was a good strategy that sustains Thailand's economic benefits and 
leading role. Several examples demonstrate this belief. With regard to Thailand's 
becoming a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in October 1993 during 
the Chuan administration, Prasong Soonsiri, the then Foreign Minister, justified this 
application as an alternative multilateral forum in which Thailand can increase its 
political and economic roles. It is also a 'new platform for Thailand to expand its 
South-South co-operation including expanding its bilateral relations with other 
developing countries' (PPD 1993). Moreover, the official approval afforded by the 
Dalai Lama's visit to join the peace mission to press for the release of Aung San Suu 
Kyi in Thailand was also justified by referring to the global principle of democracy. 
Prasong argues, 'it is the right decision because Thailand is an open society. The 
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laureates are here for democracy and human rights' (The Nation, 20 February 1993, 
p.A2). Moreover, with regard to the peace process and reconstruction of Cambodia, 
Thailand pledged its total support to the UN process and refused to intervene in the 
issue before the election, a proposal proposed by the United States, France, and 
Japan to have Thailand arrange an informal quadripartite meeting. Prasong stated 
that Thailand should not intervene in the Paris peace agreement process and 
contact with any of the Khmer faction should be done through the Supreme 
National Council of Cambodia (SNC), a body composed of representatives of all 
gr·oups (Corrine 1999, p.86). It is clear that in these cases Thailand chose to justify 
its policy position with reference to multilateral forums and ideas. 
In fact, Thailand's multilateral strategy started to develop in the Cold War period 
especially with regard to world trading system. It, perhaps, developed from 
Thailand's disappointment in South-South co-operation in multilateral trade 
negotiations especially in GATT in the 1980s. Policy documents during this period 
emphasised the difficulties in multilateral negotiations in which developing 
countries did not fully benefit from the world trading system due to the lack of good 
co-ordination. Therefore, Thai foreign economic policy was aiming to increase 
policy co-ordination amongst them, such as through G-77 and UN CT AD, to advocate 
for special treatment for the developing world (PPD 1989). Promoting regional co-
operation was one of Thailand's proactive strategies to increase its bargaining 
power vis-a-vis bigger economic actors by lifting Thailand's leading role. 
However, with the unsuccessful Uruguay Round and increasing importance of the 
Asia-Pacific region since 1990s, Thailand had concluded that its leadership and 
interest should focus on Asia. Chatichai's Indochina policy may have had a narrow-
down effect on Thailand's policy on foreign co-operation. Geographical proximity 
became a criterion in which regional grouping was constructed, in which Thailand 
was as a leading actor. Sometimes, this element even overshadowed other regional 
co-operations in which many active actors existed, such as ASEAN and APEC 
(especially during the Thaksin government). 
Thailand's preference for its multilateral strategy focused on Southeast Asia as its 
primary concern. Different regional arrangements were an expression of such an 
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orientation. In the post-Cold War period, it can be said that Thailand was 
preoccupied with promoting sub-regional co-operations as previously exemplified, 
from Chatichai to Thaksin (See Table 4.2). Throughout this time Thai policy-makers 
had no reservations in promoting its role in this area. Pitsanu Suwannachot, Deputy 
Director-General of the East Asian Affairs, MFA, also expressed this rationale during 
an interview on 20 December 2007. In his words, 
Thailand has been always proactive since the end of the Cold War. Our 
attempt to assert a regional leading role has never changed. The only 
change is how to approach this goal. 
Table 4.2: Major regional policy initiatives of the Thai governments from 
Chatichai-Thaksin administrations 
Governments Regional policy initiative(s) 
Anand/ Suchinda (1991-92) Constructive Engagement, AFT A 
Banharn (1995·96) ASEM 
Chuan (1997-01) Flexible Engagement 
Certainly, ASEAN still constituted an important area in Thai foreign policy due to its 
experience during the Cold War. Thailand's MFA viewed that Thailand's role and 
involvement in ASEAN remained high after the Financial Crisis in 1997, despite the 
economic difficulties. It summarised that Thailand's various initiatives in ASEAN 
not only strengthened ASEAN itself but also lifted Thailand's leadership in the 
international community. These initiatives included ASEAN Troika, enhanced 
interaction, social safety net development, co-operation on science and technology, 
Mekong development co-operation, and human resource development, including 
Obuchi's Plan (MFA 1998b). 
Apart from ASEAN, the promotion of other regional co-operation beyond Southeast 
Asia also gained momentum mainly in response to the rise of trading blocs and the 
1997 Financial Crisis. The significance of regions can be seen in the restructuring of 
the Foreign Ministry in the early 1990s. The MFA document suggests that 
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previously, the MFA's internal structure was organised based on a functional 
approach. However, with the increasing significance of regions in the post-Cold War 
international environment as evidenced by the rise of regional trade blocs. such as 
EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, AFT A, a proposal to restructure its organisation on a 
regional basis in 1994 was welcomed. MFA senior officials rationalised that the 
'setting up of four initial regional departments within the Ministry reflected its 
adaptability to the significance of economic development at the regional level' (PPD 
1994). 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the interplay between the internationalisation of the 
Thai economy and its own self-perception. It concludes that the economic 
transformation impacted on the nature of the Thai state in which competitiveness 
issues became the state's core priority. It probed how this changing nature of the 
Thai state facilitates the continuity of its self-perception. At the same tirne, it also 
demonstrated how the material interest influenced change in self-perception. The 
critical point this chapter has emphasised is that 'the competition state' also 
requires a co-operative strategy to improve economic competitiveness. At the same 
time, this material objective was sustained by readjusting certain cognitive aspects 
in how Thailand interacted with outsiders. Thailand still saw itself in a better 
position than its neighbours. However, this better position was not to be 
antagonistic but moved towards compromising and co-operative approaches. The 
result of the combination of these two cognitive elements influenced certain 
aspects of its foreign policy on co-operation. That is, Thailand's foreign policy 
during the post-Cold War era attempted to promote regional arrangement by 
seeking to play a leading role or so-called 'regional aspirations' in this thesis. 
In other words, the change in the international environment that led to domestic 
adjustment towards openness and the free-market system harmonised a general 
'goal' of the Thai state, allowing co-operation to be possible with its former enemies. 
However, Thailand's self-perception, that it was superior to neighbouring countries, 
continued and was re-emphasised as Thailand's relative power especially in 
economic terms grew stronger. Therefore, the role that Thailand assumed in this 
environment was no longer that of a frontline state to contain the spread of 
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communism, but a forefront advocate for regional economic development. Thus, 
Thailand's eagerness to exercise its role in various regional schemes could be 
observed throughout the post-Cold War period. In this circumstance, Thailand's 
foreign policy has become more proactive in re-arranging regional settings in which 
Thailand could gain benefit from co-operation more independently from the dictate 
of the great powers. 
This chapter has further shown that the regional aspirations were relevant to the 
making and conduct of Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy at a broad level. By 
tracing the origins of Thailand's regional aspirations in the previous chapter and 
their evolution in a new global context in this chapter, this thesis shows 'how' 
preference was formed rather than assuming its existence a priori. It has been 
shown that regional aspirations were not merely a justification used by Thai policy-
makers for their proactive regional policy, especially in mainland Southeast Asia. 
They acted as a cognitive filter through which material interest was operationalised. 
This chapter has concluded with an attempt to conceptualise the essential 
characteristics of Thailand's emerging regional aspiration. It has proposed that they 
consist of three core elements. That is, Thailand's foreign policy aims to promote its 
own economic well-being and improve its competitiveness reflecting the nature of 
'the competition state'. Second, this economic strength is the basis on which 
Thailand seeks to exercise its central influence and role in mainland Southeast Asia. 
Third, in most cases, Thailand views multilateral approaches as suitable to promote 
its leading position in regional co-operation. Its proactive role in mainland 
Southeast Asia is generally pursued. This role can be expressed in many terms as 
facilitator, strategic hub or prime mover. 
The succeeding two chapters will therefore examine these features in Thailand's 
regional aspirations by focusing on major regional initiatives before and after the 
1997 Financial Crisis. The main objective is not only to examine whether or not the 
generalisation of regional aspirations in Thai foreign policy is justified by the 
empirical evidence. It is also to understand the differences in the way in which 
regional aspirations in Thai foreign policy are translated into action between the 
two periods separated by a structural shock-the 1997 Financial Crisis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE QUADRANGLE ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION: 
THE CASE OF THAILAND'S REGIONAL ASP IRA TIO NS 
IN THE EARLY POST-COLD WAR PERIOD 
Sub-regional co-operation entered into Thailand's interests since the beginning of the 
1990s resulting in its support and engagement in various initiatives, notably the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region project (GMS) in 1992, the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (QEC) 
in 1993, and the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) in 1993. With 
regard to this tendency in the early post-Cold War period, this chapter thus aims to 
examine Thailand's attempt to exercise its leading role in mainland Southeast Asia 
through the promotion of sub-regional economic co-operation. 
The chapter focuses on the case of Thailand's initiative, that is, the Quadrangle Economic 
Co-operation. It considers specifically how Thailand's regional aspirations were 
expressed in the implementation of this particular sub-regional initiative. The analysis 
here tests the validity of the previous chapter's conceptualisation of the characteristics of 
Thailand's regional aspirations-exhibiting preferences to improve Thailand's 
competitiveness, enhance its leading role especially in mainland Southeast Asia, and 
pursue a multilateral approach to co-operation. 
The Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative is particularly interesting and 
significant in its own right for several reasons. Firstly, this initiative can be seen as 
Thailand's earliest endeavour after the Cold War to re-arrange regional setting in 
mainland Southeast Asia based on a multilateral approach. Prior to this initiative, 
Thailand's move to befriend former Indochinese foes was primarily based on 
normalising bilateral relations with each of them inherited from Chat chai's Indochina 
policy of 'turning the battlefields into market places'. If Chatichai's foreign policy is seen 
as significant in re-arranging regional politics and security in the post-Cold War era, the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative can be equally seen as having a great 
impact on regional politico-economic development. It was Thailand's attempt to enfold 
the socialist countries in the region into a market-led system as well as a preparatory 
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forum for some Indochinese countries to engage in other regional institutions at a later 
stage. Secondly and important to this thesis's main argument, this initiative did not offer 
a self-evident picture of costs and benefits for Thailand in material terms relative to the 
potential costs in the economic, political or security sectors. The fact that Thailand 
initiated this initiative and persistently pushed for policies to sustain it regardless of the 
ambiguous success, relates to the central theme of this thesis: the role of ideational 
elements in Thai foreign policy-making. Thirdly, this initiative was also one of the earliest 
multilateral forums with mainland Southeast Asia that China participated after the Cold 
War. It can offer another lens to understand Beijing's policy intention in Southeast Asia 
in a new political and economic environment Fourthly, the initiative somewhat 
overlapped, complemented, and, to a certain extent, competed with the Asian 
Development Bank's (ADB) GMS project in many ways. As a result, studying this 
initiative may allow observers to see the dynamics of the interplay between a key 
regional institution, the Thai state, and other external foreign stakeholders in this 
particular episode of regional politics. 
The above. rationales of this case study therefore frame the key issues of concern to this 
chapter. That is, why did Thailand unrelentingly support the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation? Apart from economic benefits potentially accruing from promoting this 
initiative, how did the regional aspirations play a role in this policy-making? 
The chapter is presented in three main parts. First, the background of the Quadrangle 
Economic Co-operation initiative is explained to offer a general overview of the co-
operation including its initial establishment, implementation, and progress. It also shows 
factors affecting the progress of this initiative, mainly in terms of the participating 
countries' :commitment and capacity. This is followed by a discussion of how this 
initiative ·was rationalised so that Thailand was :actively engaged in promoting the 
project The overall discussion suggests that. the negative potentials arid consequences 
from this initiative may have affected Thailand in many ways, and in the long run, may 
not be offset by mere short-term benefits. Regardless of the negative impacts of opening 
up its borders to neighbouring countries, this chapter shows that an ideational factor 
may have played a role in Thailand's decision to continue supporting this initiative. 
Subsequently, the chapter discusses the actual dynamics of the initiative. It examines the 
ideas and roles of key stakeholders involved in this initiative including decision-making 
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elites, government officials and local businessmen. Towards the end of the chapter it also 
demonstrates the constraints of Thailand's regional aspirations or attempts to play a 
leading role. The continuity of political. support and differences of ideas amongst major 
policy-making agencies on how the initiative should be managed were amongst key 
explanations. Based on archival research (mainly speeches and policy documents from 
the Thai government) and interviews with a number of Thai policy-makers, this chapter 
reveals how ideational and material interests intermingle, resulting in a 'push-pull' 
process driving the implementation of the initiative. 
Most importantly, this chapter underlines the general proposition of the thesis that we 
can observe the emerging role of ideational factor in Thailand's post-Cold War foreign 
policy. The attempt of Thailand to play a leading role resulted in its proactive foreign 
policy behaviour to be developed. The Quadrangle Economic Co-operation can then be 
seen as another step for Thailand to exercise this regional role which is part of an 
unbroken vision since Chatichai. 
5.1 Background of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
The idea of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation can be traced back to the Chatichai 
government's policy of 'transforming the battlefields into market places' in the late 
1980s. This policy had significant repercussions for many actors in Thailand not only for 
the central government but also for local administrations and Thai business to 
reconstitute their approach towards Thailand's neighbouring countries. 
With particular reference to the birth of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation, it was 
initially associated closely with the proposal for expanding its trade to adjacent areas by 
local businessmen in Thailand's northern region, especially in the northernmost Chiang 
Rai Province (Siriphet 1997, p.18). This proposal was vigorously supported by the 
provincial administration since it was viewed as comprising part of Thailand's newly 
proactive foreign policy. In 1991 the Governor of Chiang Rai made a series of visits to 
local governments in Yunnan Province, Myanmar, and Laos in support of his campaign 
for intensifying trade and economic relations with the Northern Thai region. This project 
was later called the 'Five "Chiang" Strategy' encompassing Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, Chiang 
Tung (a former Tai language name for Kengtung in Shan State), Chiang Rung (a former 
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Tai language name of Jinghong, the capital ofXishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, 
Yunnan province), and Chiang Thong (the former name of Luang Prabang in Laos) (Arun 
2001). 
There was a simultaneous move by the central government to promote a similar agenda. 
A series of bilateral discussions was conducted between the Thai government and its 
neighbouring countries especially Laos and Myanmar for connecting their road network 
In December 1992, Thailand's deputy Foreign Minister and the Ambassador of Laos to 
Thailand agreed to link several roads between Thailand and Laos, especially between 
Chiang Rai Province and Luang Prabang, and Ubon Rachthani Province (in Thailand's 
north-eastern region) and Pakxe (Laos South). At the same time, the Myanmar 
government also requested assistance from Thailand to improve Road No.4 from 
Tachilek Town (opposite Thailand's Chiang Rai Province) to Kengtung in Shan State. The 
United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) also supported 
Myanmar's request for Thai assistance in improving road conditions to facilitate the 
shipment of agricultural products under the UNDCP's substitutional crops projects in 
Myanmar to the world market through Thailand (DERC 1993a). These decisions mainly 
reflected a determination to open up opportunities for trade and tourism expansion 
between Thailand and adjacent locales in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
The push to link transport routes also came from China as part of the 'Go West' strategy 
for the economic development of its western inland regions. Southeast Asia became 
significant in China's domestic development strategy as an alternative route to the sea 
for its exports. This policy was expected to boost the economy of China's land-locked 
regions of Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Tibet by shortening transport routes from 
these regions to sea ports in Southeast Asia, thereby stimulating trade, investment and 
tourism in the areas (DERC 1993b, p.5; Dosch 2008, p.171 ). The two important gateways 
under this strategy were through Myanmar's sea port in the Indian Ocean (Shee 2002, · 
p.36), and through Thailand's eastern seaboard which also links to Singapore in the far 
south (Tian 2004, p.623). An early initiative of the Go West programme was to offer 
assistance to Myanmar to improve its road connecting Yunnan Province to Kengtung 
(DERC 1993a). 
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At the same time, there were also emerging sub-regional projects around Southeast Asia 
. at the end of the 1980s. The growth triangle amongst Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore 
(IMS-GT, or the Southern Growth Triangle) as a duty-free and investment zone 
benefiting from the economic complementarities of the three countries was established 
in 1989. The IMS-GT's success in inducing private sector-led economic development 
(Tambipillai 1998, p.256) was so attractive that it was replicated in other areas. In 1992, 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) thus sponsored sub-regional economic co-operation 
under the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) project covering six countries, namely 
Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. The main objective of GMS 
project was 'to enhance economic relations amongst the countries ... [mainly through] the 
development of infrastructure to enable the economic development and sharing of the 
resource base, and promote the freer flow of goods and people in the sub-region' (ADB 
2008a). The first ADB study conducted for the GMS was published in 1993 and identified 
potential areas of co-operation including transportation, energy, telecommunications, 
tourism, trade and investment, human resource development, environment, agriculture 
and multi-sector industries (NESDB 1996; ADB 2008). Roughly around the same time 
Malaysia also started to express the idea of a growth triangle similar to the IMS-GT with 
Indonesia and Thailand. This resulted in the three countries agreeing in mid-1993 to set 
up IMT-GT or the Northern Growth Triangle. 
Against this backdrop, sub-regional co-operation was becoming popular and inevitably 
entered into Thailand's policy-making circle. Although Thailand participated in the ADB 
project, the primary focus of the GMS was initially on the lower Mekong Basis, and paid 
relatively little attention to the upper stream. Thailand's initiative to foster co-operation 
amongst the Upper Mekong countries, therefore, can be seen as an attempt to fill the gap 
in Mekong development and Southeast Asia's overall economic development. Close co-
ordination and overlapping areas of co-operation between the GMS project and the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative resulted in the latter sometimes being 
viewed as merely a sub-component under the GMS. Despite the final merging of the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative into the GMS, Thailand's attempt to 
maintain the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative's separate identity is 
interesting and worthy of attention in the context of this study's overall concerns. 
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5.1.1 Realising the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
' 
Against the above background, Thailand's Foreign Ministry subsequently convened an 
inter-agency meeting to discuss the impacts of opening Thailand's borders in this fashion. 
The meeting agreed to set up a working group to identify potential transport 
connections with Thailand's neighbours. The working group generated a proposal for 
creating eleven routes, including two that would link Thailand-Myanmar-Laos and 
Southern China. However, after a field survey of the two routes connecting Thailand's 
North to Myanmar and Laos the Director-General of the Department of International 
Economic Affairs raised the concern that Thailand was unlikely to be able to finance 
these projects unilaterally (DERC 1993d). During the Thai Foreign Minister's official visit 
to China (27 February-4 March 1993), Thailand invited China to support its proposal for 
a meeting amongst the countries concerned to discuss transport links more extensively, 
particularly in regard to seeking financial support from donor countries and institutions. 
Consequently, the Quadripartite Meeting on Sub-regional Transportation Linkages was 
held in Bangkok between 27 and 28 May 1993. ADB, UNDP, and ESCAP observers were 
also present. The meeting discussed three main issues, namely land transportation, 
water transportation, and tourism. The meeting concurred that the transport linkages 
amongst the participating countries as a means to promote contacts at all levels were the 
key to socio-economic development in the sub-region. As the Thai Foreign Minister 
Prasong Soonsiri put it, transport links were believed to 'facilitate the flow of 
commodities and services, ... [and] accommodate the movement of peoples across 
borders, thus contributing to greater economic activity in the sub-region' (MFA 1993a). 
The outcomes of the first meeting can be seen in two core areas of co-operation, 
transport and tourism. The meeting reached a common position concerning transport 
issues, in support of the construction of the two roads linking the four countries, 
including the potential extension of rail links. Thailand proposed to approach 
international institutions for funding both a detailed feasibility study and the actual 
projects, The meeting also supported the Chinese proposal of developing water 
transport along the Lancang-Mekong River and agreed to convene a technical-level 
meeting for further discussion. However, strong concerns of environmental and security 
impacts from developing the Mekong River as a transport alternative also existed 
especially between Laos and Thailand (this issue will be discussed later in the 
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succeeding section). Importantly, the participating countries agreed to co-ordinate their 
common position in the ADB meeting in the end of August 1993 to lobby for the two 
roads and water transport to be included in ADB priority projects. 
After that meeting, there was some progress towards realising this sub-regional initiative. 
Significantly, the four countries convinced other participating countries and the ADB to 
include the two road projects in AD B's priorities for developing transport networks in the 
Mekong sub-region during the second ADB meeting on the GMS project in Manila, the 
Philippines, 30-31 August 1993. ADB accepted responsibility for conducting a feasibility 
study of the projects including mobilising support for the projects. The two routes together 
were called R3 Route project as illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
5.1.2 Implementation, progress, and limitation of the co-operation 
As the project had started, the participating countries in the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation including the ADB, felt that the major obstacle to expanding economic co-
operation in this sub-region was an inadeq.uate regional infrastructure, especially in Laos 
and Myanmar. Therefore, the project attached considerable importance to infrastructure 
development linking the four countries. However, the road projects only moved forward 
slowly mainly due to the differences in the levels of economic development amongst four 
countries involved in project funding. Although road conditions and networks in 
Thailand were already of an international standard, many improvements especially in 
Laos and Myanmar, and to a certain extent in Yunnan Province; were needed in order to 
realise success in this regional endeavour. Moreover, the priorities of domestic 
development and the commitment to implement the plans by individual countries vied 
for attention. 
The discrepancy in financial capacity of each participating country made tangible 
progress dependent on the intensity of each country's policy commitment. First of all, 
there were stark differences in domestic systems amongst the participating countries 
particularly political structure, economic orientation, and level of development. 
Therefore, a significan_t effort to harmonise and to work through different expectations 
was necessary. This can be seen through a comment on the president of Thailand's 
northern region business association. He observed that the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation progressed slowly compared to its southern IMT-GT counterpart due mainly 
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to differences in the political systems. The similarities in the political systems of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand helped facilitate more effective co-ordination whereas 
these backgrounds did not exist in the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (Prachachat 
Thurakit, 27 May 1996). 
As China was another key actor in the co-operation, its commitment to fulfil the 
initiative's goal was also critical to the progress. However, the initiative was mainly in the 
interest of the Yunnan Province, not that of Beijing. A Thai official reported that Beijing 
seemed to focus more on expanding trade with major trading partners especially the 
United States, the European Union, and Japan (The Manager, 21 September 1998, p.8). 
Moreover, the route through Thailand was not the only option for China to reach the sea 
but routes through Myanmar and Vietnam would serve the same purpose. Therefore, the 
projects in the initiative sometimes lacked the strong support of the Chinese central 
government Other alternative policy options were given more urgent attention instead. 
For instance, China's determination to develop a Western road to Myanmar resulted in 
the R3 Route under the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation, becoming its second 
priority. It was reported that by 2002 China had improved and constructed most of its 
roads stretching from Kunming to the Western part of Yunnan Province, to Bhamo in 
Kachin State in the north-western part of Myanmar. However, a road improvement 
project as part of R3a route from Jinghong to Mohan bordering Laos' Boten did not 
commence until 2005 (MFA 2002g; ADB 2008). It was finally completed in late 2007 and 
opened in 2008 (Shilu 2007, p.15; MOFCOM 2008; UNESCAP n.d.). (See Figure 5.1 for 
comparison) 
The slow progress of these projects could also be attributed to factors in Laos and 
Myanmar. Laos and Myanmar felt that the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative 
mainly benefited China and Thailand leaving them only as relatively minor conduits 
between the bigger counterparts without any significant contributions or gains from the 
projects for themselves (Manager 21September1998, p.8; MFA 1998d). At the same 
time, they were not in a position to finance the proposed projects unilaterally; therefore, 
most of the funding and progress were driven by other actors. For instance, it was 
reported that the completion of 247km of R3 Route in Laos (R3a) could not be 
completed without the financial assistance of the ADB, China, and Thailand. China and 
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Figure 5.1:- R3 Route (Thailand-Kunming via Laos (R3a)and Myanmar (R3b)) 
•••••• Kuming-Bhamo Route 
Thailand offered to connect their roads into Laos by building 80 km each, while ADB 
gave a soft loan to the Laos government to construct the remaining 70 km (MFA 2002g). 
Human rights problems in Myanmar also prevented that country from receiving funding 
directly from other possible donors. China and Thailand were thus required to help 
finance some of the projects directly. Thailand approved a loan of THB300 million to 
Myanmar in 1996 to improve a 164km road from Tachilek to Kengtung. However, 
Rangoon was reported to initially intend to divert this loan to finance other roads 
outside the initiative especially in the central region around Taunggyi city instead. This 
resulted in Thailand temporarily suspending the withdrawal of the money for some time, 
as late as 1998, when the Myanmar representative resolved this issue with the Thai 
authority (The Manager, 21 September 1998). Later the project could be continued by 
the Myanmar government extending concessions to private companies to carry out the 
road construction. Tachilek's Governor recalled that a concession was given to a private 
company to repair a road from Tachilek to Kengtung (R3b) in 2001 which was expected 
to be completed within a few years (Chiang Rai Province 2001). 
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Myanmar was also viewed by observers as being reluctant to see progress moving 
quickly. Academics and some officials in China and Thailand observed that Myanmar 
also feared opening its border and that development projects would increase the 
influence of external powers, especially China and Thailand, as well as the United States 
in the area. At the same time, more development also meant increasing revenue and 
leverage of its ethnic minorities vis-a-vis the central regime, particular the Wa Army in 
the eastern Shan State (Krungthep Thurakit, 16May1997, p.5; 20May1997, p.4). 
Moreover, Chinese-sponsored water transport had also been proposed to develop 
navigability along the Mekong River from Yunnan Province to Thailand during the first 
meeting in 1993. For that reason, progress on water transport was mainly attributable to 
the Chinese eagerness to use the Lancang-Mekong River as its shipping route to the 
South. China hosted the first water transport meeting during 18-21 January 1994 in 
Kunming, Yunnan. The meeting reached a general agreement to develop the upper 
Mekong River as a transport route. A quadripartite committee was proposed to consider 
related legal and regulatory issues (MF A 1994c, p.5). However, this proposal was not 
met with significant enthusiasm by the 'lower-stream countries' but rather with security 
and environmental concerns- especially by Laos and Thailand (DERC 1993f; MFA 
1993d). Vientiane expressed its concern about environmental and other impacts, and 
proposed a detailed technical study before any further implementation could proceed. 
Thailand's position was similar to that of Laos. It had also suggested earlier that because 
it was an international river, any proposal that changed the status quo in utilising the 
Mekong River should be discussed and agreed upon amongst the riparian states. In that 
case, Thailand proposed China consider discussing the issue in detail with the existing 
Mekong Committee (MC) (later on re-formed as the Mekong River Commission-MRC) of 
which Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam were members (NESDB 1993b, p.1). 
However, as China was not a party to the 1995 Agreement on the Co-operation for the 
Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin it mostly continued pursuing its 
plans for the Lancang-Mekong River in its territory, unilaterally building dams and 
removing rapids and shoals in river areas. 
However, China still tried to push for a series of negotiations amongst the four countries 
regarding this issue. The co-operation over water transport was then successfully 
concluded in the Lancang-Upper Mekong River Commercial Navigation Agreement 
- 160 -
signed in April 2001. The agreement aimed to facilitate trade and tourism by improving 
the navigability of the upper Mekong River (Apichai 2005, p.4). The first phase of 
removing shoals under this agreement was completed in 2003 (MFA 2002h) allowing 
convenient passage of 100-150 ton ships all year round (Goh 2006, p.29). Subsequent 
discussions on further development for heavier vessels were conducted within the GMS, 
ASEAN, and the MRC frameworks (Buntaine 2007, p.12) as many parties were 
concerned about environmental impacts and changes of boundaries (Bangkok Post, 9 
June 2003, p.4). 
Tourism was viewed as having much potential for co-operation and as being more 
convenient to implement. The meeting in 1993 therefore agreed to facilitate this activity 
by exploring ways to simplify travel formalities such as visa and customs procedures, 
promotion of investment in service sectors and facilities, and expansion and 
improvement of air transport services (MFA 1993a; 1994a, p.4 ). In this connection, 
Thailand hosted a meeting on 9-10 August 1993 in Chiang Rai on tourism co-operation 
amongst the four countries. Later in that year, a friendship caravan trip travelling from 
Thailand to Myanmar and Yunnan during 3-10 December 1993 was sponsored by the 
Tourism Authority of Thailand and the Chiang Mai Tourism Business Association. The 
tour involved representatives of leading Thai travel agencies and aimed to promote 
potential tourist sites and routes between Thailand and Myanmar and Yunnan Province 
(DERC 1994). 
Air transport links also constituted an important part of the tourism venture. There were 
discussions about improving potential airports in the sub-region to facilitate an increase 
of flights and tourists. In August 1993, Myanmar allowed Bangkok Airways to fly from 
Chiang Mai to Mandalay. In addition, Thailand also requested China to allow more flights 
between Bangkok and Kunming, an increase from five times a week to one every day 
(DERC 1993c). Thailand also proposed to help Laos improve its regional airport in Luang 
Prabang. The first phase of this project was completed in January 1997 but the second 
phase was postponed due to Thailand's economic slowdown during the 1997 Financial 
Crisis (MF A 1998c). 
Discussions were also held on other areas of co-operation. Expanding trade and 
investment opportunities within the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation countries were 
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aimed to be achieved by proper adjustments in trade and investment regulations. 
Thailand addressed the need for better currency-clearing arrangements and a reduction 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Moreover, other issues related to strengthening legal 
frameworks to facilitate the movement of people were also raised especially in customs, 
immigration, and travel procedures. Notwithstanding the initiatives in other areas of co-
operation, the primary concern of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative still 
focused on developing transport networks. Discussions about road improvement and 
construction dominated the agenda of the co-operation especially from the Thai side, 
while China paid close attention to water transport. 
It is noteworthy here that the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation was not an initiative of 
the ADB per se but of the Thai government. The ADB was viewed by the Thai 
government as an external supporter, though very important as a project funding 
campaigner. Thailand, in fact, criticised the ADB for not giving much attention and 
priority to the initiative. The Director of Thailand's Export-Import Bank stated that four 
years after the first ADB meeting in 1992, there was no single donor country or financial 
institution that expressed interest in support of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
projects. External assistance with relevance to the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
initiative was limited to the bridge construction projects over the Mekong River, mainly 
from Japan and Australia. Even within the GMS framework itself, there was only one pilot 
road project between Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh City to which the ADB rendered 
technical support from 1991 to 1996 (valued at US$ 3 million). Even at the turn of the 
new century, it was also reported that ABD still had difficulty in funding and seeking 
private sector's support for the whole Mekong projects (Bangkok Post, 4 June 2003, p.4; 
9 June 2003, p.5). The limited participation of the external parties concerned therefore 
also greatly affected progress under this sub-regional co-operative framework. 
In short, the projects under the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative were 
viewed overall as offering potential economic benefits to all participating countries 
associated with the expanding network of transport. For Myanmar and Laos, the roads 
linking their countries to China and Thailand would benefit the development of their 
economies as it could bring about trade and tourism. Employment was expected to 
increase particularly due to potential investment in primary production and agriculture. 
Moreover, the Myanmar and Laos governments could also benefit from extending 
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concessions to road construction and collecting passage fees. These roads were also 
hoped to facilitate the movement of people and goods within Southeast Asia and 
between ASEAN and China. At the same time, China would benefit from having 
alternative routes to sea ports for its land-locked regions. These transport developments 
would ultimately enhance China's economic growth by facilitating the export of its 
products to Southeast Asia. For Thailand, the dominant belief was that the Quadrangle 
Economic Co-operation initiative would be a channel for Thailand to acquire raw 
materials from China, Myanmar and Laos where natural resources and cheap labour 
were still abundant. Moreover, the tourism industry in Thailand would also benefit from 
linking northern Thailand to many natural and culturally pristine locations in the other 
three countries. Despite slow progress, the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative 
was sustained for almost a decade from 1993 before slowly and fully merging into the 
GMS framework during the end of the second Chuan government in the early 2000s. 
The conventional belief thus seemed to put more weight on the economic gains 
stemming from this initiative. However, it is unclear whether Thailand perceived any 
negative effects that may have emerged from promoting this type of sub-regional co-
operation. Considering Thailand's active role in this episode, the question arises whether 
economic and other benefits were so great as to attract Thailand to play a leading and 
active role in sustaining the co-operation. The next section briefly develops a 
dichotomous view of the benefits and costs from the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
initiative. It suggests that the rationale of economic gains may have been weaker than 
was generally believed, while the negative impacts may have been greater. At the erid of 
this section, it is now important to show to how ideational factors played such an 
important role in Thailand's active participation in the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation. 
5.2 Thailand's justifications for the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative 
The justification promoted by the Thai state for sub-regional co-operation mainly 
stemmed from the economic assumption that 'growth areas are designed to exploit the 
existing natural cross-border economies and socio-political links, with the intention of 
extending the range and scope of activities' (Thambipillai 1998, p.251 ). The strategic 
thinking of the Thai policy-makers in proposing the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
was therefore to utilise Thailand's comparative advantages and complementarities vis-a-
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vis its neighbours as stated in an MFA policy document (MFA 1993b). Thailand believed 
that its attributes such as skilled labour, entrepreneurs, infrastructure, regulatory 
settings and its strategic location in the heart of mainland Southeast Asia could help 
Thailand reap substantial economic gains. Thailand's disadvantages were mostly 
thought of in terms of its shortage of natural res-ources and more expensive labour base 
which could be overcome by reaching out to its rich well-resourced neighbours via the 
initiative's evolving pathways. 
5.2.1Rationalising the benefits of Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative 
Analyses produced by Thailand's Office of National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB) and by its Foreign Ministry (MFA) seemed to support the above 
rationales. They reported that Thailand was considered most developed economy in the 
Upper Mekong Basin due to its rapid economic growth and per capita income. Therefore, 
Bangkok viewed the economic potential of the sub-regional co-operation as a 
complement to Thailand's economic development as well as contributing to those of its 
neighbours (MFA 1995a). 
In terms of its human resources, the Thai labour force was thought by most Thai 
stakeholders to be more competitive, qualified, adjustable, and educated. This was 
predicted on the basis of a literacy rate of 94 per cent and a longer duration of formal 
education received by average Thais relative to other countries in the initiative. 
Moreover, the NESDB also commented that Thailand was the only country in mainland 
Southeast Asia that had experience navigating through the market economy. Its labour 
force was thus expected to be more flexible to new skill training and production 
technology. At the same time, the Thai business sector was also familiar with market 
mechanisms and more experienced in management and diversifying their businesses. 
This could be seen in the country's expansion of its export sector since the 1980s and the 
increasing volume of Thai foreign investment abroad. Moreover, Thailand's well 
developed infrastructure was also seen as having an advantage over other countries in 
the sub-region. Its network of roads, railways, airports, deep-water seaports, and the 
telecommunications system was considered to be more efficient and penetrating. Such 
connections made Thailand one of the regional hubs for transport and shipping (MFA 
1995a; NESDB 1995, pp.4-2-4-8). 
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Not only were the physical aspects of the Thai economy thought to be conducive to 
Thailand's advancing its co-operation in the sub-region, but regulatory regime governing 
various national economic activities was also relatively more advanced and 
internationally compatible. Thailand had embarked on national economic planning 
during the 1960s and gradually promoted the role of the country's private sector in this 
process. Thailand's industrial policy, investment promotion policy, and tax system were 
more favourable to investment and commercial activities with limited restrictions 
against foreigners. The development of related legal frameworks in economic activities 
was also based on the free market which was seen as positive for foreign investors who 
wanted to use Thailand as a gateway to the sub-region. Furthermore, Thai policy-makers 
also viewed their country as being reasonably politically stable, operating under a 
democratic system compared to its socialist neighbours. The economy recorded steady 
growth since the 1980s and was not significantly affected by the occasional political 
disturbances, which were eventually resolved and resulted in further democratic 
consolidation (NESDB 1995, pp.4-9-4-12). 
Thai policy-makers also considered Thailand's disadvantages primarily in terms of its 
shortages in primary resources, that is, cheap natural resources, unskilled labour, and 
environmental degradation. The NESDB report (1995) reflected these concerns by 
stating that Thailand's thirty years of economic development had depleted its natural 
resources to the point that it increasingly faced resource shortages and environmental 
problems. Deforestation had reduced the forest area to around 20 per cent of the total 
land area which, in turn, affected rainfall and the fertility of the land. The economic 
consequences were apparent: Thailand could no longer produce timber, paper, and 
wood products to satisfy its domestic demand. A similar picture appeared in other 
sectors such as minerals for industrial production, sea products, and energy. Thus, 
related production costs especially in wages and land prices, rose (NESDB 1995, pp.4-
13-4-17). To secure necessary supplies, intensifying co-operation with its neighbours 
was seen as essential as the latter were still viewed as being underdeveloped. Increased 
co-operation with them was therefore logical as compensation for Thailand's shortages 
of resources, and as a means to stimulate economic growth and demand for Thai 
products. 
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For these reasons, Thai policy-makers expected to enhance Thailand's economic 
competitiveness in the international market by acting as a link between resource-rich 
Indochina, populous China, and the rest of the world. The result was expected to be a 
'win-win' situation which would, as Arkhom Termpittayapaisith, the Deputy Secretary-
General of the NESDB put it, 'eventually [help] narrow economic gaps between Thailand 
and its neighbouring countries, and generate jobs and incomes for people around the 
border areas and major cities of Thailand's neighbours' (Interview, 28 December 2007). 
5.2.2 Manageable or insurmountable negative factors? 
Although the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation promised to ~enefit the Thai economy 
substantially, it did not proceed without concerns from both government officials and 
independent observers. A study by Somkiat Osotsapa in 1993, for example, revealed that 
although the economic gains were feasible from expanding trade and transport links 
with the sub-region as generally believed, there were still significant limitations. 
Negative effects could largely neutralise expected benefits. 
Road network expansion within the sub-region was expected to increase trade 
opportunities for Thai exporters especially in the Chinese market. However, Somkiat 
argued that the Chinese market was fragmented and infrastructure in Yunnan Province 
was not fully developed, resulting in the likelihood of increasing price per unit in 
shipping. Moreover, Yunnan province was one of the poorest regions in China with GDP 
per capita less than $US 1,000 in 2004 (Kwan 2005); thus, its purchasing power may not 
be able to absorb exported goods as expected in the short run (Somkiat 1993, p.9). 
Although this problem was expected to be resolved when the Chinese economy become 
more developed and income distribution policy took effect in the future, it was the long 
term forecast and full of uncertainties. 
Even so, developing more convenient transport routes linking China, Laos, Myanmar, 
and Thailand may have offset the concerns about the lack of infrastructure for business 
to fully gain from accessing the bigger market in China. However, the removal of natural 
trade barriers conversely allowed cheaper Chinese products to penetrate markets for 
consumer goods, not only in Thailand but also in Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia which 
had been dominated by Thai products (MFA 1993e). This trend was evident in the mid 
1990s in the trade statistics for Myanmar and its counterparts. In this instance, Thailand 
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was replaced by China as the most significant trading partner especially in the consumer 
goods area (Shee 2002, p.47). At the same time, cheap agricultural products from China, 
Myanmar and Laos such as onions, garlic, soybean, corn, rice, vegetables, and livestock 
also competed with the Thai farming sector in the country's north which earned income 
through producing similar products. This situation was further exacerbated if Vietnam 
.was brought into the picture within a broader GMS project (NESDB 1995, pp.5-8-5-11; 
Somkiat 1993, pp.10-11). 
More convenient water transport along the Mekong River was expected to benefit trade 
and movement of people along the river, hence stimulating economic growth in border 
areas. Chiang Rai Province could gain most in this as a centre of border trade in the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation area (Somkiat 1993, p.25). However, a similar 
negative result in terms of the influx of cheap Chinese products to southern neighbours 
through shipment along the river was feasible. Moreover, since the costs of river 
transport were quite expensive, Chinese tourists could not easily afford to travel south to 
Southeast Asia. Tourism was thus likely to be a one-way movement mostly bringing 
tourists from Thailand to China, not the other way round. At the same time, the Chinese 
were able to control navigation on the Mekong River as they had been active in 
surveying and developing river navigation knowledge for quite some time. It was 
reported recently that most of the vessels and crews in the river are dominated by 
Chinese (Goh 2006, p.30). Moreover, overall Sino-Thai trade trends revealed that 
Thailand suffered an overall trade deficit with China. This remained unchanged even 
after the implementation of the Sino-Thai free trade agreement in 2001 (Bencha et al.. 
2004). 
Other social and security problems were also of concern to some Thai authorities. Adisak 
Tanyakul, Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council also expressed 
Thailand's concerns on the transport link in the sub-region. He said: 
The transport linkages bring a lot of security challenges including 
transnational issues, power expansion of China and its competition with 
other regional powers, changes in life style of people in the Mekong Basin, 
the opening connection between possible terrorist groups in China and in 
Southeast Asia (interview on 20 January 2008). 
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Apparently, convenient transport not only meant increasing flows of goods but also 
those of people. It was projected that there would be a huge flow of labour-both legal 
and illegal-from the sub-region to Thailand. Although, in general, cheap labour 
benefited certain production sectors in Thailand, it also brought other socio-security 
problems, such as increased drug smuggling, prostitution, and trans-border diseases. 
Costs accrued from the labour movement to Thailand were thus incurred in areas of law 
enforcement and health services (Somkiat 1993, p.12). It was reported that the 
estimated number of foreign workers emigrating mostly from Indochinese countries in 
Thailand in 1993 was approximately 1,000,000 people (Somkiat 1993, p.12). By 2005, 
that total number rose to over 2,000,000, of which around 1,200,000 people either 
overstayed or entered the country illegally (Banyat 2005; Sawai 2005). 
The expansion of trade and economic development in the region was likely to affect 
environmental and human security especially in the lower Mekong countries as well. 
This concern was mainly aroused due to China's hydropower plan for the river as well as 
other projects in the downstream states. These projects would not only require large 
areas of rainforest to be cut for the construction of dams but would also affect the food 
chain of 85 per cent of inhabitants living on the lower basin. This population was poor 
and made its living through small trade, subsistence farming, and fishing. The expected 
lower level of water flowing downstream could therefore affect fish supplies, 
biodiversity, soil fertility, and generate toxic waste in the lower basin. This would result 
in a weakened irrigation system and lowered agricultural production as well as 
exacerbated poverty and nutrition quality of over 60 million people (Somkiat 1993, p.26; 
Jacobs 2002, p.356; Goh 2006, pp.42-50; Grinter 2006, p.461-462). In the longer term, 
this resource management problem may even lead to a regional security conflict. In 
contrast, the Chinese authority continuously claimed that the impact of its dams was 
often exaggerated. An engineer at the Chinese Academy of Engineering was reported to 
comment that 'we concluded that the project will have limited impacts .. .instead, the 
dam projects will help with irrigation and navigation in the lower reaches [of the 
river]' (Liang 2003). 
Furthermore, the building of dams and removing rapids in the Mekong River by China 
could lead to changing patterns of river flow and to water diversion. This, in fact, could 
affect natural border demarcation especially between Laos and Thailand, a concern 
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expressed by the Thai military (Goh 2006, p.29). The Mekong River forms the Thai-Laos 
border for roughly 1,000 kilometres (of total 1,810 km border line) and most of the 
demarcation has been unsettled and still under bilateral negotiation (Lerdsak 2008). 
Therefore, future border disputes could erupt between the two neighbours should the 
river change its course, endure bank erosion, or incur blurring thalweg5. 
The· development of transport and increasing economic activities could also result in 
increasing political competition amongst the great powers, especially between China and 
the United States. Chinese influence in the sub-region had already raised security 
concerns in smaller countries. The road linkage between Thailand and China through 
Myanmar, though providing the benefits of the economic development in Myanmar, 
could also strengthen the economic position of the ethnic minority resistant. This issue 
was also mentioned by U Aye, Director-General of Political Affairs of Myanmar's Foreign 
Ministry, that his country needed to be careful of the development of transport networks 
due to its sensitivity about ethnic minority conflict (MFA 1994c, p.18). However, 
development patterns in the 1990s suggested that the Myanmar government was able to 
reach a number of cease-fire agreements with ethnic minority insurgents, partly due to 
the Chinese pressure over some of the insurgents, especially in Kachin and Shan States 
bordering China. Beijing's extension of military assistance to Rangoon also strengthened 
the latter's military capability vis-a-vis these insurgents (IISS 2000; Shee 2002, p.44; The 
Irrawaddy 22 August 2003; Keyuan 2003, p.65; Yawnghwe 2007). At the same time, it 
was also reported that the Myanmar government also worried about an increasing 
American political interference in its vulnerable region due to opened borders and 
foreign investment. Therefore, it did not want to see rapid progress of the initiative 
(Krungthep Thurakit, 16May1997, p.5). 
Consequently, these situations inevitably intensified some security concerns amongst 
Thai policy-makers. Thailand, for the first time, had to directly confront Myanmar's 
central authority on its border as well as indirectly face the Chinese influence in adjacent 
areas without obvious buffer zones. This alarming perception of Chinese influence 
appeared in a highly confidential policy document (declassified for public access in 
5The line in the bottom of a valley in which the slopes of the two sides meet, and which forms a 
natural watercourse; also the line following the deepest part of the bed or channel of a river or 
lake 
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December 2007) circulating in 1992 within the Thai Foreign Ministry-a year before the 
initiation of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation. 
The paper (DPA 1992) viewed China in a more pessimistic context than was publicly 
known. It argued that China's intention in Southeast Asia was to secure its own economic 
interests and to build a Chinese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia so as to prevent 
other major powers' intervention in the region. For this reason, China's strategy was to 
expand its economic relations with Indochina and Southeast Asian countries which may 
have, in turn, decreased the significance of Thailand's role in mainland Southeast Asia. It 
concluded that although Sino-Thai relations were at the time in an 'extraordinary 
amicable condition', in the long run this positive relationship was likely to change. 
Competition, especially in economic areas, may· undermine the relationship and evolve 
into conflict 
The paper also further expressed concerns that China was likely to be a security threat to 
Thailand as it could manipulate Thai policy-makers and business in favour of its interests. 
This was especially due to the fact that Chinese diplomats and officials had established 
close and unbroken contacts with high-ranking Thai officials and overseas Chinese 
associations, resulting in a sympathetic attitude toward China amongst the Thais. 
Increasing local government contacts between Thai provinces and Chinese counterparts 
were also viewed as a means by which China could expand its political and economic 
influence including in relation to the socio-economic problems in Thailand's regions. 
This document therefore recommended that though Thailand should inevitably maintain 
close ties with Beijing, it should use this relationship to also limit the negative 
ramifications (DPA 1992). 
For the·above reasons, although the economic benefits expected from the Quadrpngle 
Economic Co-operation initiative were clear, enhancing co-operation in the sub-region 
under this initiative also gave rise to a number of concerns. Some of these were seen as 
not being easily resolved in the short or medium terms. Against the background of 
Thailand's active role in promoting and encouraging co-operation under the Quadrangle 
Economic Co-operation initiative, ensuing developments in sub-regional co-operation 
raise an interesting analytical challenge whether purely material interest was a sole 
justification for Thailand's role. The next section thus discusses some drawbacks of using 
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the conventional perspectives to understand the dynamics of the Quadrangle Economic 
Co-operation initiative. The section presents empirical evidence to show that ideational 
factors-Thailand's regional aspirations-may have played a certain part in sustaining 
Bangkok's support for this project than has generally been understood. 
5.3 The role of regional aspirations in the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
initiative 
The conventional way of assessing regional economic co-operation examines how 
material factors drive inter-state co-operation, in terms of whether they relate to 
economic or politico-security interests. Although· increasing numbers of theoretical 
studies go beyond these material elements of inter-state co-operation, empirical research 
in this area is still limited in examining possible ideational factors that may play a role in 
which actors rationalise co-operation, particularly in the case of Thai foreign policy. This 
thesis does not refute the material significance of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation. 
It only wants to focus on how an ideational factor may play its role in policy planning. 
That is, it investigates how and to what extent Thailand's regional aspirations influenced 
Bangkok's foreign policy in sub-regional economic development, employing the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative as a 'case study'. 
5.3.1 Domestic and regional environments 
Prior to discussing the empirical evidence of the role of regional aspirations in the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation, this sub-section will evaluate domestic and regional 
environments during the course of this initiative. This is to highlight the fact that this 
rationalist-materialist approach to understanding this regional scheme may leave an 
unexplained gap for the ideational factor to fit in. 
(a) Routinisation of foreign policy 
In contrast to the Chatichai government in which the Prime Minister and his advisory 
team played an active role in policy formulation (Khien 1999a, p.38), Chuan Leekpai 
himself is well known for his reliance on the bureaucracy in foreign affairs. He did not 
have a specific foreign policy advisory team and his character is not outspoken. 
Therefore, his role in foreign policy was less highlighted or apparent. 
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Foreign policy formulation during the Chuan government was thus handed over to 
relevant ministries and agencies. During the initiation and implementation especially 
under the Chuan government, the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative was 
primarily implemented by technocrats in the government agencies, mainly involved the 
National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Office of 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). Due to this tendency to rely 
on technocrats, Thai foreign policy was routinised as a business as usual 
This can be seen from the negative image of the Chuan governments from a survey in 
2001. Around 70 per cent of respondents thought the Chuan government did not have 
any clear policy and implemented its policy slowly (Suan Dusit Poll 2001). This nature of 
foreign policy implementation therefore suggests some obstacles to the pursuit of 
regional aspirations, if existed. The implementation of this sub-regional scheme revealed 
a conflict amongst implementing agencies. At the same time, Thai private sectors were 
not fully ready to project such a leading role in this regional co-operation. The last 
section in this thesis section will show in further detail for constraints in realising 
Thailand's regional aspirations. 
Moreover, scholars and observers in Thai foreign policy also hold the view that 
Thailand's regional aspirations are specially expressed by the military and very old elite, 
a civilian government like the Chuan administration did not have such a tendency. In the 
interviews with Surin Pitsuwan (on 9 January 2008) and Sukhumbhand Paribatra (on 14 
February 2008) concurs noted that this regional aspirations were never be a conscious 
justification in Chuan's foreign policy. 
Regarding the above mentioned nature of foreign policy setting, one would expect 
foreign policy during the Chuan government to be totally unimportant and not so much 
active. However, Thailand's position in the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation suggests 
a different picture. Thailand was attempting to assert its leading role in setting up a sub~ 
regional co-operation and in many circumstances as equally as a regional power like 
China. Therefore, regardless of a mundane style of foreign policy formulation, an 
aspiration to play a leading role in Thai foreign policy can still be observed. 
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(b) Regional consideration 
Thailand's initial support of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative can also be 
seen from the regional political environment. Thai concern about China was also a major 
reason behind Thailand's cultivation of sub-regional co-operation. Strong security 
concerns about China's expansion to the South were reflected in the MFA policy 
document mentioned in the previous section (DPA 1992). Therefore, the regional 
balance of power behaviour played an important role in Thai policy formulation and 
would have generated several policy options. 
Furthermore, co-operation in a regional agreement was a viable option for Thailand to 
pursue with regard to the ongoing economic globalisation. Sub-regional co-operation is a 
way in which participating countries jointly shape their arrangements and will 
compromise in order to achieve economic progress. A peaceful international 
environment can be achieved by increasing contacts not only amongst states but also 
amongst the individuals and groups managing them. This multi-level interaction would 
bring about a complex web of interdependence in which armed conflicts become more 
costly (Rosenau 1990). Co-operative relations will ultimately result in an increasing 
sense of community that will resolute conflicts without resorting to large-scale physical 
force-a situation termed 'a security community' by Karl Deutch (1968). Therefore, 
building an institution or a set of rules, or a regime, will increase the sustainability for co-
operation as it increases levels of certainty and trust Qackson & S0rensen 2003, p.119-
120). 
According to this reason, it is likely that the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative 
acted as a loose form of institution or regime building that brought about norms and 
rules guiding how participants would expect to interact and compromise their interests 
as well as resolve obstacles so that they would enjoy mutual benefits from such co-
operation. In fact, the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative successfully co-
ordinated countries in the sub-region to achieve its plan of expanding the transport 
networks and increasing contacts at various levels. 
However, there are several questions that these explanations may not fully give 
satisfying answers. First, Thailand may have chosen to limit co-operate with China by 
which the latter would gain relative economic and political advantages. The increasingly 
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direct influence of China in mainland Southeast Asia definitely challenged the sub-
region's traditional power structure which was dominated by Thailand and Vietnam. 
This security awareness would result in a less co-operative environment. However, the 
opposite policy option was chosen. Instead, Thailand tried to engage China into this co-
operation. 
Second, if co-operation with China could be a possible option (and in fact was) as a 
means to maximise economic benefits from a big market, the co-operation would have 
lasted until Thailand thought that Chinese gain had exceeded an acceptable level. Such a 
break-off situation could result from China's construction of dams while ignoring the 
concerns of the lower Mekong countries about water supply, environmental impacts, 
and boundaries. Such an action would directly threaten Thailand's economic and border 
security, hence impeding further co-operation. However, the slow progress of the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation was not derived from political tension between 
China and Thailand but from other technical problems as mentioned in the first section 
of this chapter. 
Moreover, the Chinese position in its dam construction projects was the opposite of that 
held by the small riparian states from which Thailand needed to gain support for 
strengthening its sphere of influence in the sub-region. Thailand would have supported 
the downstream nations against China's actions. In fact, Thailand's differing position 
from the Chinese did not aggravate tensions between the two countries. In contrast, 
Thailand tried to persuade China to further co-operate within the Mekong River 
Commission. Failure to exercise soft-power effectively or to bring China into compliance 
with the Mekong Agreement would have brought about conflict between China and 
downstream countries. However, such a serious conflict did not arise. 
Thailand was finally able to convince China to reach a multilateral agreement amongst 
four countries over river navigation. The agreement started to be negotiated in 1997. 
China was initially reluctant to accept Thailand's proposal to include a provision 
regarding co-operation in maintaininR water flow in the river. China claimed that this 
provision would affect its ability to manage water in the dams, especially in dry seasons. 
During this time of unsuccessful negotiation, China instigated a bilateral approach to 
conclude a tripartite agreement with Myanmar and Laos, so that its vessels could 
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navigate the Mekong into Thailand. However, Thailand insisted on its inclusion in the 
quadripartite agreement and refused Beijing's proposal to sign similar bilateral 
agreements on this issue. Finally in a meeting in November 1997 China agreed to include 
co-operation in sustaining the water level but the difference remained (Week(y Manager, 
29 March 1999, p.12). Thailand wanted to ensure that there was 'adequate flow' 
especially for navigation {normally not less than 1-1.20 metres), whereas China only 
wanted it to use a more flexible term such as a 'possible extent' (The Manager, 25 March 
1999, p.8). In March 2000 Thailand's Foreign Ministry reported that it should not have 
any problem accepting China's preference in this regard and the agreement should be 
signed in Myanmar in April that year (SC 2000). Thus it can be seen that although 
Thailand and China were taking different positions on this issue, Thailand could 
persuade China to agree to the great extent The divergence was instead mediated 
resulting in the 'Agreement on Commercial Navigation on Lancang-Mekong River' being 
signed in April 2000. 
Third, on realising the Chinese threat, Thailand could have pursued a balancing strategy 
by seeking closer co-operation with external powers at the same time. However, it is not 
clear that any other players were playing an active role enough in the project to balance 
China's influence. The ADB and, perhaps, Japan (including other regional institutions 
such as MRC, ASEAN, or other individual Southeast Asian players) may be seen as 
constraining forces to China's ultimate objectives. Yet, they never really challenged China 
to the point where China needed to reconsider its position on its Lancang-Mekong 
development projects. In contrast, the fact that China was finally able to secure approval 
from ADB without the Japanese blocking such support may diminish the dominant 
explanatory power of the geopolitical logics. 
Regarding the creation of regional institution to possibly promote economic 
interdependence, there is an uncertainty if the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation could 
develop to play such role. This sub-regional scheme was comprised of a series of 
meetings and had no real guidelines for participating countries, it is difficult to conclude 
that institutionalisation of this co-operation was a primary objective of the member 
countries. Therefore, this case may not fully explain that 'institutions have an 
independent impact on strategies and outcomes' (Koehane 2002, p.157) as the main 
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actors and actions in the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative were still state-
centric in context, and an institutional effect was not so evident 
Moreover, the issue of cost-sharing to sustain the co-operation was also uncertain. The 
question arises to why Thailand was actively and persistently playing a key role in this 
co-operation. Institutionalists only explain that a state turns to collective action only 'to 
compensate for imperfection' or when it cannot pursue policy objectives unilaterally or 
bilaterally. Yet, collective action should not eventually impose greater cost on states, 
otherwise; the arrangement should cease (Ruggie 1998, p.55-56). 
Considering this point, desp.ite Thailand's higher level of economic development 
compared to the rest of the initiative's participants, it would still incur a financial burden 
by fulfilling the requests from neighbouring countries for assistance. Parallel with the 
liberal institutionalists' prediction, this was the clearest rationale for Thailand to initially 
seek sub-regional co-ordination that included of China. As a regional power China would 
have been expected to play an active role and be willing to bear the cost of the co-
operation considering its foreign policy of maintaining good neighbourliness with the 
surrounding states in Southeast Asia. However, Thailand did not financially contribute 
less than China in this case. 
Even though this can be seen as an attempt by Thailand in trying to play a role in 
bringing about a coalition of like-minded countries (including external donors and 
financial institutions) to promote a co-operation, it is still not clear why Thailand would 
also extend its economic assistance to a great extent China would have presumably 
played a greater role in this case. Yet, Thailand and China offered roughly equal financial 
assistance to Laos for building roads and bridges to complete the R3 route. Thailand also 
extended unilateral assistance to Myanmar to complete the project considering the 
latter's difficulty in acquiring financial support from the international community 
regarding its human rights problem. 
With regard to security considerations, sub-regional co-operation in the Mekong Basin in 
general has facilitated the modification of Cold War antagonisms and familiarised sub-
regional states with co-operation in a substantive manner. Yet, particular concerns about 
a possible Chinese threat have not waned in Southeast Asia. The Quadrangle Economic 
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Co-operation may be a means Thailand and other small states employed constraints and 
engaged with China, cultivating economic interconnectedness, regional norms, and 
institutionalisation (Goh 2006, p.13). However, the basic question: 'why only Thailand?' 
is still not clearly understood. Thailand should have realised its weaker power position 
vis-a-vis China. A more rational option would have seen Thailand seek to recruit more 
members into this co-operation, especially from ASEAN and external donors, or give way 
to the ADB's GMS project On the contrary, the attempt by Thailand to promote the co-
operation within only limited membership in mainland Southeast Asia, instead of within 
the GMS project, still leaves some room for questions. 
For· the above reasons, considering merely political setting and regional environments 
during the Chuan government may not fully explain why Thailand assumed a certain 
role in this sub-regional scheme. Moreover, it might not be able to predict why this role 
was also persistent when material and strategic interests may have been waned or 
lessened. As cognitive approaches discussed in Chapter Three contend, self-image, self-
perception, or identity of an actor may also influence on how it sees its role in 
international arena, hence policy options and preferences. Therefore, this chapter 
therefore brings Thailand's self-perception as being a leading actor in Southeast Asia into 
its analysis to fill this gap. 
This chapter incorporates an ideational factor into the analysis and looks at the black box 
of decision-making process. Thus, it is important to examine especially how relevant 
actors in Thailand involved in the scheme think and view themselves and their role in 
this sub-regional co-operation. Examining Thailand's regional aspirations amongst Thai 
policy-makers with regard to its role in mainland Southeast Asia may add further 
understanding in this case. 
5.3.2 Empirical evidence ofregional aspirations at play 
In order to understand Thailand's regional aspirations in the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation initiative, Thailand's overall national economic development strategy framed 
within the five-year Economic and Social Development Plan needs to be reviewed. This 
blueprint started in the early 1960s not only had domestic dimensions but also 
international implications which were largely relevant to the course of Thai foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War period. 
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The successful economic restructuring resulting from the so-called 'Fifth Plan' (1982-
1986) paved the way for successive phases of development to occur based on an export-
oriented industrialisation strategy. This yielded successful results evidenced by 
economic growth and stability and increasing level of income per capita. The 
international effect of the Plan can be seen in its increasing focus on enhancing 
Thailand's competitiveness in the world market which was constructed on the idea of 
Bangkok's increasing role in the regional political economy. Thailand's foreign policy 
direction in the post-Cold War can therefore be viewed as another facet of Thailand's 
ambition to fulfil this grand vision. 
The opening up of Indochina since the Chatichai government presented a significant 
opportunity for Thailand to lead and to make changes, especially in mainland Southeast 
Asia. The Seventh Plan (1992-1996) during which the Quadrangle Economic Co-
1 
operation initiative commenced, projected the goal of not only maintaining Thailand's 
economic growth and dynamics but also internationalising the Thai economy through 
becoming a centre of economic activities in the region (NESDB 1992). It even projected 
the Thai economy to expand to become the world's eighth largest by 2020 (The Manager, 
21 September 1998, p.8). As the Plan puts it: 
Trade and investment opportunities in our neighbouring countries are 
positive due to the constructive development in Indochina including our 
foreign policy to expand trade and investment relations with Indochinese 
countries and Myanmar. This will definitely enhance Thailand's 
opportunity to remain in the forefront of this region ... [ and] to become a 
regional financial centre (NESDB 1992, p.7). 
To achieve this goal the Plan endorsed ·the idea of developing 'regional centres' in 
different areas of Thailand. These 'regional centres' were the means of diversifying and 
distributing various economic activities throughout different areas of the country so as 
to increase employment and income in rural areas, hence discouraging urban migration 
into the over-crowded Bangkok area. Importantly, these 'regional centres' were also 
assigned to be gateways for engaging directly with neighbouring countries. These local 
centres were expected to promote overall economic dynamics in Thailand's regions, and 
ultimately enhance Thailand's political and economic centrality (NESDB 1992). Against 
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this background, Thailand's policy towards mainland Southeast Asia, including the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative, can be seen as the way in which Thailand 
continuously promoted its economic prowess by linking nodes in the periphery. 
This development strategy and foreign policy behaviour can be said to reflect a 
symbiotic relationship between ideational and material interests. Thailand's aspiring to 
assert its influence in mainland Southeast Asia thus coincided with Thailand's actual 
economic achievement As role theory and constructivism both claim, a state's self-
perception or national identity determines how it develops its international role and 
translates this into policy (Adigbuo 2007, p.89). While the idea of being a significant 
regional state was always part of Thai policy-makers' image for the future of the country, 
its recent economic growth revived and consolidated this self-perception amongst them 
and intensified their aspirations for regional leading role. Such aspirations influenced the 
way in which Thai policy-makers thought of how to sustain their country's economic 
competitiveness which, in turn, would strengthen its economic and political influence in 
the region. A glance at Thailand's foreign policy rhetoric that promoted Thailand's 
version of regional co-operation compared to that held by other Southeast Asian nations 
demonstrates this point. A statement made by Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh 
(1996-1997) reconfirmed these regional aspirations: 
Thailand must lead and be a centre of this region. Although we do not want 
to do so, our geographic location in the heartland of the region is an 
inevitable reality .... We are like a regional gateway to the prosperity. Our 
duty is to build a peaceful environment especially in neighbouring 
Indochina (MFA 1996c). 
With regard to the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative, these regional 
aspirations can be seen through the same idea expressed by different actors involved in 
the project, from the political elite and government officials to local provincial 
businessmen. 
(a) Political elite 
Although the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation was initiated by the Chuan 
government, it cannot be analysed separately from the initiative of his predecessors and 
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successors. Thai politics was not conventionally polarised by policy position divergence 
but rather by the balance of power amongst groups. Thai politics especially in the 1990s 
were controlled by a few groups of politicians who had established close connections 
amongst themselves. The main political cliques were around the Democrat Party based 
in Bangkok and comprising urban middle class voters, and the other parties were based 
on the rural majority. Therefore, it can be seen that politicians moving around these 
political parties or rival parties joining the same coalitions was common practice. In this 
context, certain ideas, visions, and policies were inevitably transferred, spread and 
shared amongst the Thai political elite through the loose, amorphous nature of domestic 
politics. 
To illustrate this complexity and interrelation between politicians, some examples of key 
politicians taking important positions in different governments since Chatichai are given. 
In the Chatichai government, Chuan was appointed Public Health Minister, Deputy Prime 
Minister, and Agriculture Minister. Banharn served as Industry Minister. Chavalit once 
replaced Chatichai as Defence Minister and also served as Deputy Prime Minister. 
Chavalit was also in Chuan's cabinet as Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, and 
in the Banharn government as Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Thaksin 
also replaced Prasong Soonsiri as Chuan's Foreign Minister, and became Deputy Prime 
Minister in the Banharn and Chavalit governments. Amnuay Wirawan also served as 
Deputy Prime Minister in the Chuan, Banharn, and Chavalit administrations. Moreover, 
Chatichai himself also became Chavalit's foreign and economic advisers during the 
latter's premiership. 
It is also interesting to trace the movement of some of Chatichai's foreign and economic 
affairs advisers. Pansak Winyarat, a chief policy adviser also served as the chief adviser 
to Thaksin. Sukhumbhandh Paribatra, a foreign affairs adviser, later won a 
parliamentary seat in Bangkok under the Democrat Party in 1996, and became Deputy 
Foreign Minister in 1997. Chatichai's economic adviser, Surakiart Sathirathai, served as 
Finance Minister in the Banharn government in 1995, Vice-Chairman of the Advisory 
Council on Economic and Foreign Affairs under Chavalit in 1997, and became 
Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in the Thaksin government. Therefore, 
certain continuity amongst Thai political elite especially in their vision and idea is 
highly possible. 
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Moreover, Thai foreign policy especially towards mainland Southeast Asia has long been 
dominated by security agencies such as the military and the National Security Council 
rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thai politics was also under the influence of 
the military for decades. In the post-Cold War period, although Thailand has been ruled 
mainly by civilian government, many political leaders are retired military, notably 
Chatichai Choonhavan and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh or even Thaksin Shinawatra as a 
former police. It is understandable that some vision or idea as the concept of 
Suvarnabhumi may have passed through generation of political leader as well. 
From the Thai decision-making elite's point of view, the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation was therefore part of the unfulfilled vision of 'Suvarnabhumi' (the Golden 
Peninsula) reintroduced during the Chatichai government The idea envisions that 
'continental Southeast Asia should be under Thai leadership' (Nischalke 2002, p.94) 
resulting in the creation of the Thai sphere of influence in the region in the 1940s 
(Suszynski 1994, pp.727-8; Nischalke 2002, p.94). Indochina has thus continuously been 
a priority in Thai foreign policy as an important part of this vision. 
The first Chuan government (1993-1996) held fast to this conventional perspective. 
Chuan's foreign policy statement to the Parliament well captured this idea. In order for 
Thailand to enhance its role and opportunities to be a regional economic, financial and 
transport centre, Chuan strongly advocated Thailand's increasing role in assisting and 
supporting economic development in neighbouring countries (Chuan 1992a, pp.24-25, 
28, 33-35). On another occasion, he intimated that that he 'strongly [felt] that [Thailand 
was] in a natural position to extend and channel greater co-operation with Indochinese 
countries and Myanmar' (Chuan 1993c). Chuan's Foreign Minster, Prasong Soonsiri then 
echoed this view by stipulate that Indochina was important to Thailand's interest and 
said that '[he] placed Indochina high on [his] agenda' (1993a ). Prasong therefore pledged 
to take serious steps to strengthen Thailand's co-operation with countries in the Mekong 
Basin. Prasong's deputy Surin Pitsuwan then put forward that the Quadrangle area 
should be promoted strongly as it was within Thailand's capability to pursue it based on 
closer cultural affinities in the sub-region and existing contacts at local and informal 
levels (Surin 1993). 
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To deepen political and economic relations throughout this sub-region, developing the 
transport system across borders was a very tangible objective which successive Thai 
leaders emphasised. This importance of the transport linkage arguably dates back to the 
Cold War era. Within Thailand the expanding road network was seen as an important 
tool for the central government to stretch its power and authority to control Thailand's 
peripheral areas. This was crucial when the threat of communism was at its peak during 
the 1950s-1960s, during which time the plan for completing 1,000km regional highways 
was extensively outlined in the first Economic Development Plan (1961-1966). This 
project accounted for the highest amount of government spending compared to other 
sectors, or roughly THB1.6 million at the end of the first phase (NESDB 1961, 1964). The 
northeast region's highway plan revealed this strategic thinking as it contained to build a 
loop that linked the American military bases in Nakhon Ratchasima, Ubon Ratchathani, 
Khon Khaen, Udon Thani, and Nongkhai (Thak 2007, pp.239-240). 
Likewise, the transport network was also viewed by Thailand as an important factor in 
the post-Cold War era, not only on its own soil but also in the wider areas outside 
Thailand. Economically, the network would facilitate trade and investment in the region 
and further enhance Thailand's economic development. Politically, it helped Bangkok to 
continue its leading role in integrating Indochinese countries into mainstream Southeast 
Asia after the Cold War, hence increasing Thailand's political influence in the region. 
The Thai intention to lead mainland Southeast Asia is captured in a statement by 
Amnuay Veerawan, Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister in the Chuan and Chavalit 
governments. Amnuay insisted that 'Thailand must be the leader of the Quadrangle 
Economic Co-operation as it was more qualified in every aspect than the other members' 
(Manager, 15-21November1993). In a discussion with a Chinese head of delegation at a 
GMS meeting in 1996 in Kunming, Amnuay expressed to the Chinese counterpart that 
both China and Thailand were important to the Mekong's development because while 
China led the upper basin Thailand was a key player in the lower one (MFA 1996a). 
Amnuay's statement can be seen as an expression of the Thai elite's belief in Thailand's 
eligibility to exercise its leadership in its traditional zone of influence. This perception 
complied with the Thai elite's cognitive predisposition to reaffirm Thailand's centrality 
by weaving peripheries further beyond Thai borders into Bangkok's sphere of economic 
and political influence. 
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The Quadrangle Growth project can also be seen as a way in which Thailand's regional 
aspirations in mainland Southeast Asia were rearranged in a more organised manner. 
The initiative can be seen as an early attempt of Thailand to build a sub-regional order 
on a multilateral approach. This strategy enabled Thailand not only to co-ordinate its 
own policy towards neighbouring countries in a more harmonious manner but also to 
identify its niche in actualising its ambition. Clearly, the transport issue was a logical 
choice for this as it was also a major interest of its neighbours. Thai policy-makers 
realised that the absence of proper infrastructure among its neighbours was a major 
obstacle for Thailand in consolidating its influence in the region. The first attempt by the 
Chatichai government to expand Thailand's economic strength into these neighbours 
based on the private sector failed to secure business interest in the area and resulted in 
its retreat (Thansettakij, 2 April 1997, p.24). The Thai state's active role in promoting 
infrastructure development in the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative was 
thus to fill this gap. Importantly, the focus on the transport issue by the Thai government 
through the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative was also a tangible link to 
complete its ideational vision of 'all roads lead to Bangkok'. 
(b) Policy-making agencies 
Clear written evidence of regional aspirations amongst the Thai policy-making elite may 
be relatively scarce because policy statements are normally written with a concern for 
political sensitivity. This sensitivity at the political level is very significant in Thailand's 
formal relations with its neighbouring governments as oppose to general view of 
historical animosities and cultural ignorance amongst the Thai public. However, this lack 
can be offset by examining ideas amongst government officials as they normally either 
initiate the idea with their ministers in the first place or adopt political views from them 
and translate these ideas into policy and action. At the same time, delving into how the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative was translated into policy action by 
government officials can verify that statements made by the policy-making elite were not 
merely rhetorical. 
Several central government agencies were involved in the implementation of the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative, but three important national agencies can 
be singled out: the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 
the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). The role of 
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the NSC was to give, approve, and monitor overall policy strategy. The MF A mainly 
pursued a negotiating role with foreign counterparts while NESDB's main responsibility 
was to study how the initiative should be directed and to propose policy 
recommendations to materialise the scheme. The inter-workings of these key agencies 
reflected the fact that, firstly, economic issues were incorporated into the state's security 
concerns, and secondly, foreign and domestic affairs were intertwined in Thailand's 
post-Cold War decision making. 
The National Security Council (NSC) 
Although the role of the NSC in sub-regional co-operation and the Quadrangle Economic 
Co-operation initiative in particular is not normally enunciated, its role as the national 
top policy-making body headed by the Prime Minister and having important ministers as 
members cannot be disregarded. The NSC's concern about sub-regional co-operation 
was parallel to the changing nature of the politico-economic environment Economic 
issues as embedded in the 'competition state', at this time, previously discussed in 
Chapter Four became associated closely with security policy. 
With regard to the view of economic competitiveness in the post-Cold War era as an 
integral part of security concern, the adjustment in organisational structure within the 
NSC took place. Prakit Prachonpachanuk, the former NSC Secretary-General, mentioned 
that during the mid 1990s, it revamped its structure and set up the Economic Division to 
be the NSC's policy formulating and co-ordinating unit with other concerned agencies. Its 
direct concerns were related to economic security issues with Thailand's neighbouring 
countries, such as maritime borders, border trade, and most importantly sub-regional 
economic development (interview on 20 February 2008). 
Relevant to this initiative, by March 1993 the NSC followed and evaluated regional 
P.olitical development closely, and making policy recommendations on sub-regional co-
operation. This re-orientation in the NSC's work could be traced back to the swift 
adjustment in Thailand's foreign policy towards Indochina since Chatichai. The March 
1993 recommendation therefore was not totally unprecedented but continued 
Thailand's general posture since the end of the Cold War and particularly in response to 
the ADB's GMS project that commenced in 1992. However, the policy recommendation 
was applied broadly. 
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During the time of the first meeting of Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative in 
May 1993, the National Security Council (NSC) presided over by the Prime Minister 
agreed on a master plan in which Thailand would streamline its strategy to actualise 
sub-regional economic development objectives. Reflected in a confidential report6 (NSC 
1993), the NSC rationalised that: 
Thailand would promote regional co-operation in which Thailand plays an 
initiating and leading role as a bridge that links or offers prosperity to its 
neighbours and countries in the region .... considering Thailand's 
outstanding potential and its geographical advantage Thailand is naturally 
a leader (NSC 1993, p.2). 
This NSC's policy states that the main strategy adopted to realise this advantage was 'to 
promote regional co-operation focusing on linking transport, shipping, communication, 
and telecommunication networks that will connect and bind economic, social, and 
human resources potentiality in the region together' (NSC 1993, p.2). The NSC outlined 
the administration of this strategy by which it would oversee policy implementation. The 
NESDB was assigned to co-ordinate co-operation among the economic, infrastructure, 
and energy sectors within the country and with foreign counterparts. The MF A was 
responsible for promoting co-operation in political affairs, social issues, human resource 
development and regional security (NSC 1993, p.2). 
With this recommendation, Thailand's centrality in promoting regional development 
was clearly justified and embedded as a significant element in the top policy-making 
body. Again and in line with the policy-making elite, the transport linkage was strongly 
advocated as a crucial factor to realise the regional co-operation. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
The active promotion of sub-regional co-operation by the MFA as a key policy-making 
agency was actually another example of Thailand's attempt to re-position itself as a sub-
regional leader in the post-Cold War period. The decline of the political and military 
confrontation of China and Thailand vis-a-vis Vietnam, especially after the Cambodian 
issue was resolved through the UN processes, actually threatened Thailand's previously 
favourable position as a pivot in regional politics. In other words, Thailand's centrality 
6Declassified in December 2007 upon the author's request 
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needed to be reinstituted within the new regional and international settings where the 
co-existing nature of economic competition and co-operation had prevailed. 
Referring to the aforementioned MFA policy document with regard to Thailand's policy 
towards China (DPA 1992), it was apparent that Thailand was alarmed about the 
possibility that the changing regional environment would reduce Thailand's 'special 
position' based on its practical alliance with Beijing during the Cambodian conflict. Not 
only did this regional transformation remove a condition by which Thailand could 
continue its diplomatic role, but it also altered bilateral relations with Beijing along more 
competitive lines. The document noted that: 
The positive development in Cambodia and normalisation of relations 
between China and Indochinese countries including China's successful 
economic and political transformation resulted in Beijing's increasing 
active policy towards its neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia ... This 
transformation in the long term would possibly develop into competition 
and conflict between Thailand and China. Sino-Thai relations would be 
more distant than they were during the containment of Soviet influence 
and in the Cambodian conflict ... (DPA 1992, pp.2-3) 
However, Thailand did not totally accept this changing environment but tried to adjust it 
to suit its interest. The MF A therefore recommended that 'Thailand should consider 
other ways to maintain close ties with Beijing in this changing environment' (DPA 1992, 
p.4). This included deepening economic co-operation with China in Indochina. The MFA 
viewed that this strategy would enable Thailand to become a significant link between 
China and Southeast Asian countries once again. Since China was successfully expanding 
its relations southward with Indochina this sub-region was therefore a playing field in 
which Thailand needed to engage to shape its development for Thailand's economic 
interests and influence, as well as to protect it from any negative impact through the 
penetration of Chinese power into the region (DPA 1992, p.4). For this reason, it can be 
seen that Thailand's proactive role in building the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
initiative was a way in which the country wanted to transform regional environment to 
buttress its leading position in the region. This can be seen in both reactive and proactive 
foreign policy behaviour. It was reactive if considering Thailand attempting to maintain 
its relevance in this changing regional environment especially with Beijing. However, it 
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was proactive if we look at Thailand's primary objective as not letting this environment 
continue but putting forward a sub-regional scheme as a policy innovation to shape or 
divert the outcome to benefit Thailand's interest. 
To effectively realise greater sub-regional co-operation, the MFA proposed several 
measures: (1) setting up a fact-finding commission to study and collect relevant 
information for further policy formulation; (2) convening an inter-agency meeting to 
seek possible directions, or at least setting up a coordinating committee to oversee this 
issue in particular, in which the MFA would play a major role; (3) promoting people-to-
people contacts based on culture, education, sport, and Buddhism; and ( 4) expanding 
and improving Thailand's transport network to prepare for future linkages with 
neighbouring countries (DPA 1992, p.2). Of these four policy recommendations, the 
transport issue was again seen to be the most important solution by the policy-makers. 
Therefore, the MFA's position on the transport issue in the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation initiative was consistent with these of the political elite and the NSC. The MFA 
planned to engineer the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation by proposing to set up the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation Joint Working Committee (QEC-JWC) to co-ordinate 
cooperative projects amongst the four participating countries. Domestically, the MF A 
proposed to form a team in which major government agencies related to the Quadrangle 
Growth project would work together closely. This mechanism consisted of the MF A, the 
NESDB, and the National Committee for Co-ordinating Sub-regional Economic Co-
operation (NCCSEC). In addition, the MFA also encouraged Thailand's private sector to 
set up a similar co-ordinating body or a business council in the Quadrangle area 
consisting of provincial chambers of commerce in Thailand's northern region (MFA 
1994c). 
The Foreign Ministry, especially under the Chuan administration, seemed to pay greater 
attention to the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative compared to the other 
similar ongoing development programmes in Thailand's north-eastern region which 
were implemented under ADB's auspices (Supalak 2007, p.8). This position was 
different from that of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) 
that seemed to prefer Thailand to co-operate closely with ADB (this divergence is 
discussed in the succeeding sectors). The MFA wanted to develop Thailand's northern 
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region as another centre in the sub-region (MFA 1994d) that would link the sub-region 
from the northern direction with Thailand's overall transport network It would 
ultimately connect to Thailand's eastern seaboard as part of its grand development 
strategy. 
The MFA was concerned more with Thailand's regional influence that might have been 
overshadowed. The Vietnamese factor was also a part of this regional power calculation 
that stimulated the MFA's enthusiasm in the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
initiative. Ongoing GMS projects focusing on developing land-locked Laos and the lower 
Mekong Basin had already attracted active the participation of the Thai private sector in 
the northeast From the MFA's point of view, the project to link Thailand, Laos, and the 
port cities in Vietnam (Vihn, Hon La, and Da Nang) would greatly reduce Thailand's 
economic and political influence over Laos. Allowing Laos to have another alternative to 
Thailand's ports for shipping exports would clearly decrease Thailand's bargaining 
power vis-a-vis Vietnam. This can be seen from a comment made by an MFA senior 
official on a report regarding the development of a road from Thailand to Vietnam that: 
From my discussion with some Lao officials and businessmen on many 
occasions, I have realised that Laos is not happy with shipping its goods 
through Thailand, thus, wants to support the construction of road to 
Vietnam's coast This will greatly reduce its dependence on Thailand (MFA 
1995b,p.4). 
This was a viable reason regarding the ongoing promotion of Thailand's eastern 
seaboard as a regional shipping hub (MFA 1993c, 1993d). A NCCSEC document captured 
this sensitivity: 
With regard to a transport linkage between Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, 
although it is somewhat feasible, [Thailand] needs to consider its negative 
effects on Thailand's Laem Chabang port as well. We need to consider how 
much impact would occur on our broader policy if any co-operative project 
brings Laos and Vietnam especially closer (NCCSEC 1993, p.3). 
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This idea was also reflected in a cabinet meeting in 1996, the Cabinet agreed that 
'Thailand should reassess with caution before deciding to speed up the link of land 
transport from Laos to Vietnam's coast' (The Cabinet 1996, p.31). 
One event in Thai-Vietnamese relations can cast light on the sub-regional dynamics in 
the early 1990s. Around the initiation of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation, 
Thailand and Vietnam were also engaging in a political dispute over the re-establishment 
of the lower Mekong River management regime. The negotiations between 1991 and 
1995 saw different positions from Bangkok and Hanoi over documents and rules 
governing the new entity, and the question of when to re-include Cambodia in the co-
operation. In this political tension, Vietnam was able to form an informal Indochinese 
coalition against the Thai position. This situation forced Bangkok to threaten to abandon 
the whole negotiation process. This resulted in a political stalemate over moving the co-
operation that lasted several years. This deadlock was lifted when the Indochinese bloc 
was broken up after Thailand successfully lobbied Phnom Penh to support its position, 
and Vietnam was admitted into ASEAN (Makim 2002, pp.26-31). Finally, the Agreement 
on the Co-operation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin was 
signed in April 1995 as the legal basis of the establishment of the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC). 
Therefore, promoting the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative to the country's 
north that did not include Vietnam was not merely due to the simple fact that Vietnam 
was not geographically in the upper Mekong Basin. It was a political intention to increase 
Thailand's bargaining power while keeping Vietnam away from this sphere of influence. 
Moreover, the inclusion of China in the initiative can be interpreted as Thailand not fully 
overcoming its mistrust towards Hanoi. Having China on its side could also ward off this 
suspicion on Vietnam's hegemonic intention in Indochina. 
The MF A therefore strongly argued for the Thai government to extend foreign assistance 
to the poorer countries, Laos and Myanmar, to implement the road construction projects 
under the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative. The MF A suggested the Thai 
government should offer aid in the form of technical assistance, low-interest loans, and 
mobilising financial support from external donors to participate in the project (MFA 
1993c). The government followed suit In mid June 1993 it approved THB300 million 
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loans initially with three per cent interest to Myanmar for the R3 Route. Attached to this 
loan were certain conditionalities for Myanmar to: (1) hire and use Thai companies and 
materials; (2) to lower the toll fee for shipment of goods from Thailand to China; (3) to 
eliminate trade and investment barriers to Thai businesses; and (4) to improve its 
immigration procedures. The MFA perceived that Myanmar's increasingly co-operative 
attitude was a positive sign for the development of the project It assessed, 'Myanmar is 
trying to open itself to sub-regional co-operation which is a good sign towards increasing 
commitment in this regional development' (MFA 1994b, p.12). It thus proposed to 
Thailand's Ministry of Finance that the interest rate charged to Myanmar for the R3 
Route be lowered to 1.5 per cent, with now only the first condition included (NESDB 
1996, p.20) .. 
Regarding Laos, the Thai government also backed the Economic Quadrangle Joint 
Development Company, a joint venture of Thai businesses (60 per cent) and the Laos 
government ( 40 per cent) in return for extracting a concession from Vientiane to build 
R3 Route in Laos. Thailand also increased its assistance to Laos considerably, mainly for 
education and technical training. A technical co-operation programme between the two 
countries started in 1993. The project was directed towards strengthening the market 
economy, technology relevant to social and economic development, and upgrading the 
living standard of the Laotians (TICA 2004, p.19). In November 1996 the Thai 
government also set up an economic assistance and development fund to offer low-
interest loans for governments, public enterprises and financial institutions of 
neighbouring countries to invest in their development projects (MFA 1997a). 
Thailand's financial decision to support the projects in the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation reflected how it viewed this venture as highly important to Thai foreign policy. 
When such co-operation began in 1993, Thailand exercised leadership by persuading the 
ADB to fund the feasibility study for the R3 Route project valued US$650,000 (ADB 1999, 
p.15). It also successfully urged the ADB to support most of the projects in the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative as part of GMS strategy. The ADB 
dispatched a team to survey the route in Laos in January 1994. After this feasibility study 
was completed Thailand offered THB35 million assistance to Laos to appoint an 
engineering company to design the road. Coupled with AD B's financial assistance for the 
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road's construction, Thailand also proposed to finance 20 per cent of the total cost 
(DERC1993e). 
Although the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative may be seen as a part of the 
GMS project regarding the AD B's role, in practice, Thailand was the main actor that tried 
to push for the scheme's progress and to build its own identity separately. This included 
the proposal to set up a Quadrangle Economic Co-operation Joint Working Committee 
(QEC-JWC), and other separate activities to promote cultural exchange and tourism. The 
MF A also played an important role in seeking support from external donors especially 
Japan, Australia, Canada, and France. An early report on the progress of the Quadrangle 
Economic Co-operation initiative suggested that Thailand had approached Australia and 
Japan to co-finance some of the projects. Australia expressed its interest in seeking any 
possible channel through ADB, while Japan was initially interested in helping in the 
construction of a bridge between Chiang Khong district in Chiang Rai Province and 
HouayXay in Laos on R3 Route (MFA 1994a). 
The role of the MFA was important to the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative 
by serving as a co-ordinating body between the policy level and technical agencies. 
Without the MFA the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative may not have 
evolved a more systematic and specific manner. Although the pursuit of a separate sub-
regional co-operation from a broader GMS may reflect Thailand's desire to focus on its 
economic interest in its northern region, cognitive factors cannot be discounted. 
Thailand's vision of playing a leading and central role in mainland Southeast Asia clearly 
drove MF A policy-makers' motivation in their efforts to operationalise the Quadrangle 
Economic Co-operation within concerned agencies, at both domestic and regional levels. 
The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) 
As mentioned in section 5.3.2 when discussing the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan, the NESDB was the core agency responsible for drafting and 
monitoring the overall implementation of that Plan. The earlier Plans generally focused 
on Thailand's industrialising strategy, economic restructuring, and increasing economic 
growth while solving the economic crisis (NESDB 1977, 1982, 1987). The Sixth Plan 
(1987-1991) started to clearly mention about increasing the country's competitiveness 
in the world economy. It states that 'the Sixth Plan focuses particularly on increasing 
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efficiency and quality of development so as to elevate the country's economic 
competitiveness as the ultimate goal' (NESDB 1987, p.2). 
However, since the Seventh Plan (1992-1996), the NESDB had conspicuously promoted 
positioning Thailand as the catalyst for the transition of the neighbouring countries into 
a market economy complex. The Seventh Plan started to ground a strategy for Thailand 
to benefit from the opening up of Indochina. The development of Thailand 'to be a 
regional economic and regional centre' was thus an important strategy (NESDB 1992, 
p.7). The same line of strategy in the Eighth Plan (1997-2001) was also expressed as 'to 
develop Thailand as an important regional centre in production, transport, finance, 
tourism, and services' (NESDB 1997, p. khor). All of the strategies recommended by the 
NESDB, both in the Plan itself and in its sub-regional co-operative strategy, indicated that 
NESDB policy-makers viewed Thailand as a centre of regional development. Certainly, 
this outcome would eventually be in Thailand's economic interest. Yet, the preferred 
strategy behind this goal was partly ideational in nature. 
This ideational background is also illustrated by a comment on Thailand's leading role in 
the sub-region made by Arkhom Termpittayapaisith, the Deputy Secretary-General of 
the NESDB, in an interview on 28 December 2007. His remark captured the cognitive 
mindset of the sub-regional planning of NESDB. He observed that 'Thailand implemented 
a development policy similar to that of Japan in the past. It was a development strategy 
that aimed to pull all sub-regional economies up by using Thailand as a locomotive'. He 
elaborated further that the idea of Thailand exercising its leadership in sub-regional co-
operation firstly stemmed from Thailand being the centre of Indochina that linked China 
and India. Secondly, the economies of Thailand and those of its neighbours were 
complementary; co-operation therefore helped lift both Thailand's competitiveness in 
the world economy and its neighbours' level of development. Thailand thus believed it 
was in a position and had a responsibility to assist them to develop. Finally, Thailand 
believed that by cultivating good relations with neighbours through development 
projects and foreign aid it would build interconnectedness in the region and 'gradually 
persuade them to accept Thailand's economic, social and cultural influences' (interview, 28 
December 2007). 
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A NESDB document issued in 1993 confirmed the above aspirations. It indicated that 
'Thailand should play a role as a "gateway" into its neighbouring economies' (NESDB 
1993a, p.2). This "gateway" concept was elaborated by notions that Thailand functioned 
as (1) a provider of convenient transport routes, (2) a catalyst for facilitating foreign 
investment in the sub-region, and (3) a link between international institutions and 
Thailand's neighbours (NESDB 1993, pp.2-3). Again, such an analysis confirmed 
Thailand's self-perception and role as a potential centre of the region; what kind of 
'grand strategy' it should follow to pursue regional leadership; and which areas it saw as 
important to achieve this strategy. 
A NESDB document issued in 1993 also confirmed the above aspirations. It indicated 
that 'Thailand should play a role as a "gateway" into its neighbouring economies' (NESDB 
1993a, p.2). This "gateway" concept was elaborated by notions that Thailand functioned 
as (1) a provider of convenient transport routes, (2) a catalyst for facilitating foreign 
investment in the sub-region, and (3) a link between international institutions and 
Thailand's neighbours (NESDB 1993, pp.2-3). Again, such an analysis confirmed 
Thailand's self-perception and role as a potential centre of the region; what kind of 
'grand strategy' it should follow to pursue regional leading role; and which areas it saw 
as important to achieve this strategy. 
Against this background, the NESDB produced a final report on 'Thailand's strategic plan 
for the Mekong sub-regional economic co-operation' in 1995. Thailand viewed its need 
to employ proactive strategies to promote itself as an epicentre of the region. It laid out 
strategies for Thailand to become a hub of regional activities regarding its readiness in 
terms of domestic infrastructure. These facilities can be developed into a regional hub 
especially in transport, tourism and finance (NESDB 1995, p.1-6). The transport issue 
was deemed by the NESDB to be a particularly important area of activity. Therefore, the 
NESDB was active in planning and implementing transport linkages in sub-regional co-
operations, both within the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative and the GMS 
project According to this strategic plan, the 'strategy for promoting Thailand as a centre 
in the sub-region' drew much of the attention in project proposals. In outlining two main 
strategic approaches, the NESDB stipulated that its 'Proaction Plan' consisted of 209 
projects (of which 82 projects were under 'Promotion of Thailand's Centrality' title) 
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compared with 139 projects under the 'Economic Restructuring Plan' for improving 
competitiveness (NESDB 1995, pp.1-13-1-16). 
Specifically concerning the transport sector, the NESDB argued that the Thai government 
should play a leading role to speed up the development of the land transport network in 
the sub-region. Such an effort was to demonstrate that Thailand was politically 
committed to 'leading other countries in the sub-region ... by completing its projects in 
Thailand shortly' (NESDB 1995, p.6-3). The NESDB urged that the new Bangkok 
International Airport be completed as soon as possible to accelerate the plan for 
Thailand to become a regional aviation and air freight hub. Thailand's Laem Chabang 
seaport was also aimed to become a principal port for shipping accessing the 
Indochinese countries and Southern China. In addition, an international gateway for 
telecommunications in Thailand's northern and north-eastern regions was planned to 
link the sub-region and the world through fibre optics (NESDB 1995, pp.6-3-6-4) 
In terms of enhancing Thailand's financial potential, the NESDB report outlined a 
strategy to encourage Thailand's financial institutions to expand their role in the sub-
region. A significant dimension of this was to allow international transactions with 
clients in Indochina to be made in Thai Baht so that it would become the currency 
benchmark in the region (NESDB 1995, p.6-3). In the tourism sector, the NESDB urged 
Thailand to promote the sub-regional tourism industry by linking that country with 
culturally rich and pristine neighbours (NESDB 1995, pp.6-3-6-4 ). Moreover, by 
exploiting its superior human resource capacity the NESDB also suggested that Thailand 
could increase its foreign assistance to the sub-region through a variety of technical 
assistance, skill training, and technology transfer programmes (NESDB 1995, pp.6-5). 
These recommendations were all designed to strengthen Bangkok's centrality and the 
economic significance of the sub-region. 
The NESDB's planning vision therefore specifically assigned certain functions to the 
major regional cities as sub-centres of Bangkok to carry out the grand strategy outlined 
above. The Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative was part of what was labelled 
the Northern Region Development Strategy. Chiang Mai was assigned to be the centre of 
the northern region emphasising the role of technical training and human resource 
development and the business centre of the Upper Mekong region including a regional 
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aviation hub (NESDB 1995, pp.6-13-6-14). At the same time, Chiang Rai performed the 
function as a gateway to the upper Mekong Basin, focusing on border trade and cross-
border transport. The R3 Route and rail links were therefore critical to this development 
strategy as they linked Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai more closely to the sub-region 
(NESDB 1995, pp.6-16). The initial estimation of the budget allocated for this project was 
approximately $US6 million for the R3 Route project. Thailand also planned to 
contribute US$200-400 million for the rail link projects between Thailand and Burma 
(out of total US$350-550 million for the whole project) and US$0.38 billion out of 
US$1.2-1.8 billion for Thailand and Yunnan link (NESDB 1995, Table kho-1, sub-sectio.n: 
railway network). To further enhance this strategy, the NESDB recommended that 
Thailand should negotiate to eliminate trade and cross-border barriers such as visa 
arrangements, restrictions on the number of vehicles passing through the border, 
customs procedures, etc. 
Although the idea of the NESDB was quite 'Bangkok-centric' in the sense that the 
country's other regional centres' functions were designed to serve Bangkok's growth and 
stability, the planning mechanisms were not totally centralised. In contrast, the central 
government allowed local administrations and Thailand's private sectors to play roles in 
developing trade, investment, and tourism opportunities with local administrations in 
neighbouring countries. Therefore, the alliance between provincial administrations and 
the private sector in the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative was also 
strengthened and the sustainability of the overall co-operation under the initiative's 
general framework was made more secure. 
( c) The local actors: a local public-private alliance 
Although Thailand's private sector had no direct decision-making authority in the 
decisions of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative, it still influenced the 
direction and implementation of the initiative to a great extent As mentioned in the 
background section 5.1, the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative had partly 
sprung from the active role oflocal businessmen in the northern region in expanding and. 
establishing formal trade relations across borders. Exploiting a close alliance with the 
local governments, they expected special attention from Thailand's central government 
to move the initiative forward as a national agenda. 
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It may be difficult to clearly differentiate the business logic based on material interest 
and the ideational factor in this context because the former was easily noticeable and 
more clearly pronounced in the business world. The general impression was that by 
promoting sub-regional economic co-operation Thailand's private sector would certainly 
benefit from cheap labour and natural resources including enormous consumer demand 
in the sub-region. As neighbouring economies were just starting their transformation 
towards viable market economies, infrastructure, regulatory regimes, and standard legal 
practices were still underdeveloped and were potentially major obstacles to proper 
reform (DERC 1995b; Manager 15-21 November 1993). Therefore, the private sector 
believed that a government role was necessary to harmonise various sectoral policies 
and to regulate legal matters especially in issues of transport, customs procedures, 
taxation, and investment policy. Therefore, there appeared to be collaboration between 
local government and the private sector both in provincial and regional levels. 
The perception of Thai local governments combining with private business to support 
sub-regional initiative can also be examined by looking at this alliance's preference for 
promoting its locales regional centres in the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
initiative. It can be argued that this tendency was a product of an overall hegemonic 
perception that Thailand was entitled to and capable of being a regional centre at the 
macro level. Hence Thailand's local public-private interaction also adopted or replicated 
the centre-periphery model at the local level. To be a centre was not only to serve the 
economic interests of the localities but also to complement the perception of the Thai 
nation of its neighbouring countries. The eagerness of the local actors to build sub-
regional ties and to promote their own locations also confirmed this cognitive mindset 
In fact, the role of the private sector was prominent from the beginning of this initiative. 
As mentioned earlier in the background section, this sub-regional scheme partly sprang 
from local business hoping to expand its commercial ties with adjacent localities of 
Thailand's neighbouring countries (Siriphet 1997, p.18). The government later asserted 
more roles and streamlined this scheme into its foreign and economic policy. In this 
connection, a public-private co-ordinating committee was set up at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to monitor and push for the progress of the sub-regional co-operation 
(MFA 1996, p.4 ). There was also a committee of private sector in the northern region 
comprising nine representatives of the chamber of commerce in each province under the 
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support of the central government. It was later developed into the 'Committee for the 
Economic Quadrangle 10 Chambers of Commerce' (CEQC) in 2000 (CEQC 2010). This 
committee was expected to push and co-ordinate needs amongst the business 
community in the northern region am;! to liaise with the government (MFA 1996, p.5). 
This move was strongly supported by the Chuan government as it also wanted to revive 
the private participation in sub-regional initiative. 
There was also competition amongst potential provinces in the region, supported by 
local business associations especially in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai, to become the centre 
of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation activities. Chiang Rai Province seemed to be 
particularly enthusiastic, perhaps due to its disadvantage of smaller size, so that it could 
offer to the project and compete with Chiang Mai. This is evidenced by frequent visits of 
the Governor of Chiang Rai to local administrations in the Quadrangle area from 1994-
2000 (Chiang Rai Province 1997). The Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai provinces supported 
by their provincial chambers of commerce, also nominated themselves to house a 
regional office to co-ordinate activities in the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
initiatives. Chiang Mai argued to the Cabinet that it was already a regional centre for 
economic activities and transport in the north, and it should be viewed as the best 
location to perform this function. Chiang Rai claimed that its proximity to and cordial 
relations with all local administrations in the neighbouring countries should make it a 
natural gateway to this area (Chiang Rai Province 1997). The Cabinet decision finally 
favoured Chiang Mai due to the support of the NESDB as Chiang Mai was already in 
NESDB's strategic plan for the northern region. Chiang Rai was compensated by its other 
proposals being approved, including the construction projects of a railway to Chiang Rai, 
piers in Chiang Khong and Chiang Saen districts, an industrial zone, including the 
establishment of higher educational institutions in the province (Prachachat Thurakit, 3 
July 1997, pp.35-36). Moreover, it was also selected as a special economic zone acting as 
a gateway to southern China and a centre of border trade in the Upper North Strategic 
Plan, instead (Luechai et al. 2000, p.166). 
Therefore, although observing an ideational aspect of the role of private sector is difficult 
as economic and business interest seems to be prevailing. However, to the least extent, it 
might be also to say that the local provinces and private sector in the northern region 
also carried a similar vision of the central government. That is, they sought to position 
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themselves as a centre ofregional economic activities and compete for this bid. They saw 
their economic potential and interest in the area offered by loosening borders as their 
economic position compared to the surrounding neighbouring countries was higher. 
Therefore, they sought to act as a centre of regional activities and mediator between 
local and central authority. 
5.3.3 Thailand's internal constraints on sustaining its regional aspirations 
Although Thailand's regional aspirations can be observed behind the logic of planning 
and implementation of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative, there were 
several constraints that affected the way in which they were fully translated into action. 
These constraints can also be seen in terms of commitments amongst Thai policy-
makers and capacity of other stakeholders to sustain their aspirations relative to this 
initiative. As a result, the unity of the initiative's stakeholders in pursuing the regional 
vision was eroded, leaving it to be incorporated into a bigger Mekong development 
framework by the early 2000s. 
(a) The limit of political commitment and continuity 
During its implementation under the Chuan government, the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation initiative progressed quite slowly. This can be attributed to the working style 
of Chuan himself who relied heavily on the bureaucracy. As an observer on the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative describes: 'Chuan has a reputation of 
working slow. It took him nearly two years to make a systematic approach to deal with 
neighbouring countries' (Supalak 2007, p.8). Coupled with frequent changes in the top 
positions in the cabinet responsible for the initiative, complaints were made, mostly by 
the local business and provincial authorities, that the government had no clear and 
substantive framework to push the project fast enough (DERC 1995a). 
Moreover, the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation suffered from a lack of strong political 
support from the succeeding governments led by Banharn and Chavalit. The Chuan 
government lasted only three years and was dissolved in July 1995. Although the 
initiative still continued, the pace of co-operation was sluggish and increasingly 
integrated into a bigger framework of GMS. The MFA assessed the progress of the 
Quadrangle Growth project in 1996 and commented that it was overshadowed by the 
AD B's projects and needed to be revitalised (MFA 1996b ). 
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However, this policy lethargy can not be considered to show inconsistency in Thailand's 
regional aspirations. Thailand continued to pursue its regional aspirations long after 
Chuan departed but under different fashions. Th~ foreign policy of the Banharn and 
Chavalit administrations also focused on exercising Thailand's regional leading role as 
discussed in the previous chapter but with their own different policy initiatives.· As John 
Funston (1998b) observes, . Chavalit's foreign policy was characterised by his strong 
regionalist tendencies. Chavalit also positioned Indochina as a foreign policy priority and 
declared that his plan was to restore Thailand's influence based on developing cordial 
relationships with its neighbours. He played a leading role in ASEAN's admission of the 
Indochinese countries into that organisation, and in setting up an ASEAN task force 
addressing Cambodia's political problem after the July 1997 coup staged by Hun Sen 
(Funston 1998b, p.5). 
Banharn's and Chavalit's short-lived governments Quly 1995-November 1996, 
November 1996-November 1997, respectively) and their foreign policy agendas did not 
yield a fine balance in maintaining the pace of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
initiative. Even Chatichai sitting as Chavalit's foreign and economic affairs advisor also 
commented that 'the progress in the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation was 
considerably slow due to political ineffectiveness, and now it is time to revive the plan' 
(Prachachat Thurakit, 3 July 1997, pp.35-36). Chavalit's Deputy Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra also tried to reorganise the domestic co-ordinating structure by reinstating 
the role of the government as a central body after the failure of the co-ordinating 
committee centred on business sector in the northern provinces (Week{y Manager, 16 
February 1998, p.6). However, in an action to atone for driving Thailand into the 
Financial Crisis Chavalit later resigned at the end of 1997. 
The Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative was thus handed back to and re-
invigorated by the second Chuan government that had started it initially. Its policy to 
urge the private sector to be the locomotive at the operational level in the initiative was 
also brought back However, the second Chuan government fell into major financial 
difficulties within both the public and private sectors. The 1997 Financial Crisis led 
Thailand to seek an IMF bailout package with certain conditionalities especially through 
tightening government expenditure. The Thai private sector also suffered from higher 
interest rates imposed by commercial banks, up to 18-20 per cent 
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In short, the 'wax and wane' in the continuity of political support for the Quadrangle 
Economic Co-operation, initiative of both the incumbent government and succeeding 
ones, created a policy discontinuity. Therefore, Thailand's regional leadership in this case 
was subjected to oscillations in policy intensity and direction. Most of the project 
implementations were therefore carried on through bureaucratic channels. The lack of 
clear political support and consistent guidelines in this initiative then affected the pace of 
the project and failed to harmonise the differences between key bureaucracies. Although 
the initiative continued, some variations among the key agencies in this initiative 
prevented Thailand from achieving its vision to consolidate its influence in an effective 
manner. 
(b) The divergence between major policy-making agencies 
The positions of key policy-making agencies involved in the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation initiative were similar in that they all wanted to see Thailand take its place as 
the leading actor in the regional scheme. However, the main difference-especially 
between the MFA and NESDB-was basically in how the initiative was managed. That is, 
whether or not the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative and the GMS should be 
separated to any degree at all. The aforementioned strategic plan for the initiative points 
to the fact that the NESDB saw these two frameworks as inseparable. From the NESDB's 
perspective, the Quadrangle Growth project was more likely an extension of the GMS 
project, thus, its plans for the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative needed to be 
incorporated into the GMS blueprint. This can be seen in NESDB's 'Strategic Report for 
the Mekong Sub-region' in 1995 that included projects under the Quadrangle Economic 
Co-operation scheme in the broad GMS picture (NESDB 1995). 
Conversely, while the NESDB wanted to see Thailand play a leading role in a wider forum 
as in the GMS project, the MFA seemed to aim at a smaller circle, at least, in the beginning. 
The MF A saw the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation as a nearly exclusively Thai 
initiative and wanted to see its development as largely independent from the GMS, at 
least in its identity and core management. This divergence in ideas can be captured in a 
MFA document in 1996; it observed that: 
In some respects, the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative has 
been seen as a smaller part of the GMS framework However, considering 
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the leverage Thailand would gain in this co-operation, Thailand needs to 
build special characteristics for the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation 
initiative, and utilise our leading position in this sub-region (MFA 1996b ). 
The same document suggested several measures to develop special mechanisms for the 
Quadrangle Economic Co~operation. These included measures to: (1) elevate meetings 
specifically concerned with this initiative to the ministerial level and build a clearer co-
ordinating body; (2) organise regular seminars between public and private sectors in the 
Quadrangle area to consolidate national strategy for this co-operation; and (3) establish 
a public-private co-ordinating committee especially for the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation presided over by the Foreign Minister. However, this co-ordinating committee 
was very similar to the one that already existed, namely the Co-ordinating Committee for 
Developing Economic Co-operation with Neighbouring Countries. This committee was 
presided over by the Deputy Prime Minister and the NESDB was acting as the secretariat. 
The latter had already co-ordinated several sub-regional co-operations such as IMG-TG, 
GMS, and BIMSTEC. The MFA realised its proposal overlapped with this Committee but 
still rationalised that without a special mechanism, the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation would be overshadowed by the bigger Mekong framework (MFA 1996b ). This 
idea was not fully implemented and was toned down during the Financial Crisis in 1997. 
Most of the Quadrangle Growth projects were quietly integrated into the NESDB's GMS 
strategy of that time (SC 1997). 
However, the idea of reviving the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative emerged 
during the second Chuan government. In 2000, the MFA proposed to re-adjust the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation framework to be more efficient and separate from 
the GMS. The MFA believed that integrating the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation into 
the GMS framework would result in the former being unable to capture sufficient 
attention. The MF A document indicated: 
Projects under the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative should 
have been pushed for progress faster than it is at the present stage. The 
main obstacle is that most of the projects are dictated by ADB and donor 
countries ... Therefore, Thailand should be able to have a separate and 
clearer strategy to promote this framework by itself (MFA 2000). 
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Yet another divergence of strategy can be seen in the issue of whether to establish a 
regional co-ordinating office in Chiang Rai or Chiang Mai. The MFA document of 1997 
suggested Chiang Rai was favoured by MF A (MF A 1997b ), while Chiang Mai was backed 
by the NESDB appeared in a Cabinet Meeting report (SC 1997). NESDB winning the 
Cabinet approval reflected the fact that it was regarded as a major economic planning 
agency. Therefore, its suggestions were justified with reference to overall national 
planning. This intra-agency policy tension certainly underscored the problem of unity of 
the implementation of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation, hence affecting the 
exercise of Thailand's overall regional leadership. 
Therefore, it can be seen that the conflict between these two implementing agencies also 
reveals disunity in policy-making and implementation. Therefore, as reflected by local 
business and local authority's complaint about lacking clear framework (DERC 1995a) 
mentioned in the previous sub-section, this factor also contributed to the failure of 
materialising Thailand's regional aspirations. 
( c) Limited capacity oflocal actors 
As mentioned in section 5.3.2(c), the Chuan government expected the private sector in 
Thailand's northern region to be part of the driving force in the Quadrangle Economic 
Co-operation initiative. It set up a private sector co-ordinating committee to perform this 
function. However, it was reported that this committee did not perform well and was not 
included in the plan to revamp the local mechanism in the Chavalit government in 1997. · 
The president of the co-ordinating committee reasoned that the poor performance of the 
committee was due to the frequent changes in persons responsible for liaising the 
projects, amongst which were provincial industrial councils, provincial chambers of 
commerce, provincial bankers association. He further asserted that without the 
government's clear guidelines, business interests in different sectors could not be easily 
harmonised resulting in the lack of unity (Week(y Manager, 16February1998, p.6). 
Moreover, the most important projects within the initiative were large-scale and 
required enormous financial support such as for infrastructure and hydroelectricity. 
Most of these types of projects were therefore joint ventures between governments 
whereas private subcontractors were limited to the actual physical construction. No real 
local policy initiation was started in relation to the country's overall picture. The Thai 
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government understood this problem and mandated that 'transport infrastructure 
projects should be implemented mainly by the government If these projects were Jeft in 
the hand of private actors there would be problems and negative impacts to the 
progress' (DERCl 993t). 
With regard to investment promotion, the Thai government also realised that the Thai 
private sector tended to conduct business based on short-term profits, especially in 
Myanmar and Laos compared to other foreign investors. Thai investors were usually 
engaged in the extraction of natural resources and service industries related to tourism. 
Therefore, they were viewed by its neighbours as merely seeking advantage from cheap 
labour and resources without contributing much to their economies in return (DERC 
1993t). A Thai scholar, Ukrist Patamand, assessed thi_s problem noting that the Thai 
private sector was more interested in low-return, low-technology business especially 
subcontracting infrastructure projects while its Singaporean and Malaysian counterparts 
paid more attention to investment in big long-term projects (interview, 13 February 
2008). Coupled with inconsistent support from the government, especially after the 
1997 Financial Crisis, the Thai private sector was not strong enough to drive or sustain 
the economic dynamics of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative. 
Therefore, the notoriety of some Thai businesses increased suspicion of this motive 
amongst Indochinese countries. This affected Thailand's regional ambition in that Thai 
businesses became less favourable in their neighbours' eyes and was susceptible· to 
being outcompeted .by businesses from other countries. The wane of Thailand's 
economic clout was felt in the fact that Thailand could no longer maintain its position as 
, . the top investor in these countries. In Laos, although Thailand was the biggest investor, it 
. has recently fallen to the third rank behind China and Vietnam (Laos Information Centre 
2008). Thailand remained between the third and fifth largest investor in Myanmar 
throughout the 1990s, while Singapore climbed from tenth position in 1990 up to the 
first rank in 1999 (The Irrawaddy, 1 January 2003). Therefore, the capacities and bad 
reputation of Thai business can also be partly attributed to Thailand's difficulty in 
realising its regional vision in the sub-region. Evidence of the fragility of Thailand's 
relations with its neighbours, though not particularly related to the Quadrangle 
Economic Co-operation initiative per se, can be seen in the civic riot against Thailand in 
Phnom Penh in 2003. The riot was believed to have been triggered by a Thai movie star's 
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comment about Angkor Wat, claiming it belonged to Thailand. The Thai Embassy and 
some Thai business properties were burnt down in this civil disturbance. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation Economic Co-operation as 
a case to explain Thailand's attempt to express and translate its regional aspirations into 
action. This case is interesting and important due to the fact that it was the first original 
initiative proposed by Thailand in the early post-Cold War period in the form of a 
multilateral approach to regional co-operation particularly in mainland Southeast Asia. 
This case encapsulates how actors involved in the policy formulation and 
implementation of this initiative were driven by the idea of regional aspirations. It has 
shown that actors from the political elite, policy-making agencies, and local 
administrations all shared the aspirations of Thailand to be a leading actor in the region. 
This view was not only expressed in political rhetoric but had deep roots in the way Thai 
foreign policy with regard to mainland Southeast Asia was formulated and implemented 
in the post-Cold War era. Empirical examination of this perception held by policy-making 
agencies clearly differentiates a real action from political rhetoric. In this case, Thailand's 
regional aspirations were not merely grandiloquent speeches generated by Thai political 
leaders but were substantial motivations in policy-making. They were translated into a 
grand strategy to facilitate· Thailand's leadership in re-arranging mainland Southeast 
Asia's development. Co-operation in transport issues was a particularly tangible symbol 
of how Thailand saw itself dominating the geography of the regional web of linkages. It is 
therefore not surprising to see Thailand as the main advocate in this matter. Although 
sub-regional co-operation was meant to strengthen Thailand's economic position, its 
close involvement in the sub-region was also inevitably expected to extend Thailand's 
political influence. 
This chapter has shown that Thailand's intention to maintain its centre of gravity in the 
sub-regional development largely explains the many atypical policy preferences. 
Possible economic benefits may also explain Thailand's active role in maintaining the 
viability of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation but many long-term negative impacts 
cast doubt on this economic and rational choice. The explanation of this policy behaviour 
is more complete with consideration of the influence of this ideational force. 
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This case also helps elucidate why Thailand in many circumstances chose to lead the 
sub-region and bypass other regional actors such as ASEAN and ADB. Also, the way in 
which Thailand wanted the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation to be relevant and not to 
be subsumed by the bigger GMS projects until the end of the second Chuan government 
has an ambiguous economic rationale. Thailand needed to show its political commitment 
to the development and progress of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative by 
offering foreign assistance to smaller and weaker countries in order to facilitate their 
participation even during the economic difficulty time of the Financial Crisis in 1997. 
Although, eventually, the Quadrangle Growth was incorporated into the GMS, the idea of 
a separate sub-regional co-operation in which Thailand played a central role re-emerged 
in the Thaksin government. A very similar sub-regional initiative was established namely 
the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation Strategy (ACMECS) covering 
mainland Southeast Asian countries, exclusive of China. 
This chapter has illustrated that Thai foreign policy behaviour was likely to seek a 
leading position in Southeast Asia as guided by its self-perception of being the epicentre 
of regional dynamics. However, a coercive hegemonic style of leadership-one that 
critics have argued Thailand has adopted-is not possible due to several factors. First, 
the nature of the Thai state shifted towards becoming a 'competition state' in which the 
issue of maintaining and improving economic competitiveness overtook the policy of 
exercising military might (discussed in Chapter Four). Second, mainland Southeast Asia 
became an area in which several regional powers such as the United States, China, Japan 
and recently India were also competing to assert their influence. Some of these, such as 
China and the United States, were in a stronger position in political, military, and 
economic terms than was Thailand. In this initiative, although Thailand continuously 
attempted to push the initiative forward, China's position was also critical to the overall 
progress of the co-operation. In addition, the mistrust of the smaller Indochinese nations 
towards Thailand's intention to dominate their countries economically and culturally 
resulted in Thailand's drawing up a careful strategy to cultivate friendly and co-operative 
relations with these neighbours. Against this backgrouncf, Thai foreign policy behaviour, 
especially in the case of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative, can rather be 
described as having a degree of a 'benevolent hegemony' in mainland Southeast Asia. 
This is specifically characterised by the tendency to exercise leadership in organising 
'reciprocal, consensual, and institutionalised relations' (Ikenberry 2001, p.196). 
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The next chapter draws on another case in Thai foreign policy during the Thaksin 
administration, namely the 'Forward Engagement' strategy to. It examines to what extent 
regional aspirations played a role in Thaksin's foreign policy in a diplomatic context 
Besides Chuan, Thaksin was the other recent Thai post-Cold War leader who stayed in 
power for a substantial period of time. Studying Thaksin's foreign policy can 
demonstrate how regional aspirations in Thai foreign policy and its strategy, was 
developed and changed from the early post-Cold War period as expressed during the 
Chuan government Importantly, this chapter ultimately shows the continuity of the 
relevance of Thailand's regional aspirations in foreign policy making in the post-Cold 
War context. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE FORWARD ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY: 
THAILAND'S REGIONAL ASPIRATIONS ON RISE 
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 seriously affected Thailand's economic 
competitiveness in the international market. Thailand's focus at this time was therefore to 
restore its economy especially through bringing back investors' confidence. Contrary to 
the prevailing . rationalist approaches that anticipated Thailand adopting an inward-
looking foreign policy, however, the Crisis resulted in ambiguity in Thailand's foreign 
policy behaviour. On the one hand, Thai foreign policy shortly returned to its conventional 
posture of relying on external powers to a certain degree as a way to regain its economic 
stability. The aftermath of the Financial Crisis saw Thailand's cordial relations with its 
traditional allies being reconfirmed. Close ties with Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, and 
Brussels were renewed mainly to ensure Thailand's access to foreign assistance and to 
secure its economic recovery during this period. On the other hand, there was a series of 
attempts to resurrect Thailand's regional leading role both within mainland Southeast 
Asia and beyond. An effort to re-establish the separate identity of the Quadrangle 
Economic Co-operation from the GMS project briefly . during the second Chuan 
government (1997-2001) as discussed in the previous Chapter is an example of this trend. 
The effort to restore Thailand's leading position was more obviously pronounced during 
the Thaksin administration (2001-2006) with his 'Forward Engagement Strategy' 
signifying Thailand's proactive posture towards external affairs. 
Arguing for an alternative explanation to the common wisdom characterising Thai foreign 
relations, this chapter aims to explore how the proactive orientation in Thai foreign policy 
during the Thaksin government was elaborated through the 'Forward Engagement 
Strategy'-particularly, in regional co-operation. Based on the cognitive approach 
outlined in Chapter Three, this chapter focuses on the adoption of self-perception as a 
guideline to shape Thailand's policy direction. Similar to the previous chapter, this 
chapter's main focus is on explaining how a key ideational factor-regional aspirations-
influenced the direction of this foreign policy strategy. In other words, the chapter 
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attempts to show how Thailand's regional aspirations during the Thaksin era were 
expressed and translated into foreign policy within the context of Thailand's economic 
recovery after the 1997 Financial Crisis. Its main aim is to trace and identify the influence 
of Thailand's regional aspirations in the general evolution of the Forward Engagement 
Strategy rather than examining in detail at the implementation of each initiative. 
Thaksin's foreign policy was interesting in many respects. First, the economic and 
political circumstances at the time put Thaksin in a special position. As a result of the 
Financial Crisis, the second Chuan government had to manage the economy within the 
IMF panacea package which was accused by many Thais of 'selling out' the country to 
foreigners (Matichon 10 December 1998, p.2). This electoral disillusionment towards the 
end of the Chuan government gave rise to inward-looking nationalist sentiment amongst 
the Thais (Thai Post 22 November 1998, p.3). Meanwhile, Thaksin emerged within a 
rapidly changing political setting framed by the new 1997 constitution whose the main 
purpose was to engineer strong administrative power. Therefore, his general policy was 
certainly influenced by domestic influences. It is therefore important to understand this 
domestic and foreign policy nexus. 
Second, regardless of the ongoing tendency of backlash attitude amongst the Thai public, 
and unlike other countries for which the Financial Crisis created an inward-looking 
foreign policy posture, Thailand during the Thaksin government did not adopt a low-key 
position in its international affairs. Instead, Thaksin's foreign policy style showed the 
opposite direction-attempting to boost Thailand's roles both within Southeast Asia and 
beyond. This was pursued notably .through creating and renewing Thailand's bilateral 
and regional initiatives. These include various free trade agreements, the Asian Co-
operation Dialogue (ACD), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and 
Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC), and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic 
Co-operation Strategy (ACMECS). 
Moreover, Thaksin's foreign policy also demonstrated Thailand's confidence in its 
attempt to project its role beyond Thailand's traditional sphere of influence. On the one 
hand, mainland Southeast Asia was still a core regional focus of Thai foreign policy. On the 
other hand, Thaksin also aimed at positioning Thailand as a leading actor in bridging 
emerging regional powers in Asia, namely China and India. Similar to the case of the 
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Quadrangle Economic Co-operation discussed in Chapter Five, Thaksin's Forward 
Engagement strategy was also to place Thailand in a position that promoted regional co-
operation. During the Thaksin period, this strategy was pursued at different levels, from 
those underscoring Thailand's bilateral relations to linking to the levels of regional 
groupings especially in Asia. 
This observation leads this chapter to explore several key questions. Why did Thaksin 
pursue an outward-looking foreign policy despite the inward-looking attitude emerging 
amongst the Thai elite and public after the 1997 Financial Crisis? To what extent and how 
did regional aspirations play a role in this Forward Engagement Strategy? 
In an attempt to answer these questions, this chapter is structured in three main parts. 
Firstly, it describes Thailand's foreign policy strategy of'Forward Engagement' during the 
Thaksin government as a background for discussion. This strategy aimed to position 
Thailand as a bridge between its strategic partners mainly through promoting several 
initiatives for regional co-operation. This is followed by a discussion about the conditions 
in which this foreign policy strategy-regional approaches to co-operation-was situated. 
It examines the domestic-foreign policy nexus, and shows how foreign policy was used to 
form compromises between domestic and external forces. It suggests that foreign policy 
was utilised as an important tool to satisfy domestic expectations. In this political setting, 
Thailand's regional aspirations are argued to be guide to identify national interest and 
how to achieve it At the same time, regional contexts also helped support Thaksin's 
foreign policy ambition by allowing him to assert his regional leading role amidst 
economic difficulties. 
The third section examines the empirical evidence for the regional aspirations that 
existed in the minds of major Thai decision makers with regard to this Forward 
Engagement Strategy. Similar to the case of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation, by 
tracing this idea mainly through available archival documents and the author's interviews 
with a number of policy-making elites and government officials, this chapter identifies the 
relevance of this ideational factor in connection with Thai foreign policy-making. 
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6.1. Thaksin's foreign policy strategy: Forward Engagement in brief 
After 1997, the Thai government assigned a primary emphasis to its economic recovery 
in an uncertain atmosphere. Thai foreign policy during the Thaksin administration was 
then aiming to support this ultimate goal. Instead of focusing on relations with the West 
as had the preceding Chuan government, Thaksin's foreign policy strategy emphasised 
more the creation of a web of co-operation with Thailand's strategic Asian partners under 
the 'Forward Engagement' strategy. 
The 'Forward Engagement' strategy was part of the Thaksin government's foreign policy 
to promote Thailand's proactive role in international affairs. The essence of the Forward 
Engagement strategy was pronounced in the Parliament on 26 February 2001 as part of 
the government's overall foreign policy statement The government pledged to: 
increase Thailand's proactive role in the international society by initiating 
the expansion of closer international ties and co-operation between ASEAN 
and East Asia, South Asia, and other regions. This also includes upholding 
the responsibility to be a central link to co-ordinate various co-operations in 
the region ... [and] to urgently strengthen relations and co-operation for 
development between Thailand and neighbouring countries and Asia (SHP 
2001). 
Thaksin's Foreign Minister, Surakiart Sathirathai elaborated later that the focus of the 
Forward Engagement strategy was meant to link different sub-regions in Asia by way of 
creating bridging inter-regional fora. He pointed out that although there was increasing 
interaction between ASEAN and East Asia, as well as between ASEAN and South Asia, the 
precise link amongst three of these groups was less clear. He further asserted that many 
transnational issues required co-operation at least amongst three parties. To link 
different sub-regions together was then an efficient way to achieve this purpose (SHP 
2001, pp.151-152). Thaksin and his foreign policy officials therefore believed that 
Thailand could take the lead in bringing the three different groups together. 
To achieve this policy objective, the Thaksin administration emphasised Thailand's role in 
promoting regional co-operation. Thaksin constantly promoted his idea of pan-Asia co-
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operation with China, India, and other Asian countries, called in his scheme the 'Asia Co-
operation Dialogue' (ACD). He also renewed his government's interest in BIMSTEC 
initiated during the Chavalit government as Thailand's 'Look West' policy. At the same 
time, in order to remain an active participant in Southeast Asia he also created ACMECS as 
another sub-regional co-operation aimed at mainland Southeast Asian countries. Unlike 
the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation, ACMECS encompassed all mainland Southeast 
Asian countries, except China. At the same time, Thailand strengthened ties with selected 
strategic partners in each region, such as Bahrain in the Middle East, India in South Asia, 
and China in East Asia (Thaksin 2002d). The Thaksin government enthusiastically 
promoted bilateral relations with them, particularly in the economic sector. These three 
regional initiatives and bilateral economic diplomacy became Thailand's main strategic 
initiatives to build its international leadership during the Thaksin government 
6.1.1 The Asia Co-operation Dialogue (ACD) 
The ACD was Thaksin's primary regional initiative to cultivate co-operation across the 
Asian continent. It was formally launched on 18-19 June 2002 with eighteen founding 
members, which later expanded to thirty-one by 20087• The main objective of the ACD 
according to Thaksin's initial intention was to be an open dialogue forum for Asian 
countries to build mutual confidence, to search for solutions to poverty, and to further co-
operation for regional development based on skills, knowledge, and resources in Asia. 
Thaksin viewed the ACD as a complement to existing dialogues and ventures in Asia, and 
predicted it would 'create synergy among bilateral, multilateral, sub-regional and regional 
strategic partnerships in the areas of common interests' (Thaksin 2002e). Through this 
perspective, increasing interdependence in Asia would be a proper counterbalance 
against regional uncertainty in the economic and strategic realms. Thaksin expanded on 
the ACD rationale by stated that: 
we have in mind a stronger Asia that can compete and contribute more 
effectively to the world economy ... an Asian region that can maintain a self-
supporting system to cushion ourselves from external shocks, be they 
political or economic (Thaksin 2002e ). 
7 Founding members included ten ASEAN countries, Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, 
Pakistan, Qatar, and South Korea. New admission was extended to Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Oman, 
Sri Lanka in 2003; Bhutan, Iran, Mongolia, United Arab Emirates in 2004; Russia, and Saudi 
Arabia in 2005; and Kyrgyzstan in 2008. 
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To make the ACD distinct from other forms of regional co-operation, Thaksin demarcated 
two dimensions in its composition. The first dimension focused on building a 'comfort 
zone' amongst top decision makers by way of informal consultations. ACD's annual 
ministerial meeting was not framed strictly by any formal agenda, but rather a free flow of 
discussion of common concerns and ideas for conflict resolution and strengthening co-
operation. Thaksin believed that this top-down approach was conducive to moving the 
dialogue forward on a regular basis. 
A second dimension of the ACD was the co-operation based on specifically designated 
projects. Each area was voluntarily run by 'prime movers' reflecting their expertise and 
interest8. To evaluate these projects' effectiveness and progress would require a deepen 
assessment than space here allows. However, considering the main concern of this thesis 
is to examine Thailand's regional leadership, suffice it to say that the country's role in ACD 
during Thaksin was prominent in maintaining Thailand's politico-economic influence in 
the region. Apart from volunteering to host two ACD Summits in June 2002 and 2003, 
Thailand actively performed a co-ordinating role. It organised an ACD Breakfast Meeting 
and an ACD High Tea Meeting-informal meetings amongst ACD foreign ministers in 
New York during the 57th and 58th UN General Assemblies in September 2002 and 2003, 
respectively. Moreover, the Thai Foreign Ministry convened ACD ambassadorial meetings 
twice in Thailand, in July and December 2002, to discuss the future implementation of 
ACD projects and to assess the expansion of membership. Thailand's Foreign Minister 
also engaged in series of separate meetings with ACD members, including with the 
Pakistani Finance Minister and Chinese Foreign Minister in August 2002. The MFA also 
dispatched its senior diplomats to discuss ACD with such other states as Japan, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, India, South Korea, China, Indonesia and 
Brunei (MFA 2003a). 
8 At present, there are 19 areas of co-operation with prime mover(s) responsible for co-
ordinating and leading activities in each area, namely: energy (Bahrain, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Qatar, China and the Philippines), poverty alleviation (Bangladesh, Cambodia and Vietnam), 
agriculture (China, Pakistan and Kazakhstan), transport linkages (India, Kazakhstan and 
Myanmar), biotechnology (India), e-commerce (Malaysia), infrastructure fund (Malaysia), e-
education (Malaysia), Asia Institute of Standards (Pakistan), SM Es co-operation (Singapore and 
Sri Lanka), IT development (South Korea), science and technology (the Philippines), tourism 
(Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Pakistan), financial co-operation (Thailand), human 
resource development (Vietnam and Thailand), environmental education (Japan and Qatar), 
strengthening legal infrastructure (Japan), road safety (Oman), natural disaster (Russia) (ACD 
n.d). 
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Thailand's role in promoting a project on financial co-operation as a prime ACD concern 
was significant In parallel to the development of the Asian Bond and Currency Swap of 
the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), Thailand also proposed developing a similar mechanism 
in ACD and co-ordinated key financial discussions held by the Executives' Meeting of East 
Asia Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP), Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), and 
ASEAN+3. This proposal aimed to 'help with the larger issue of diversifying debt-
financing, by encouraging Asian countries to shift from short-term bank loans to long-
term bonds' (Ahmad 2003). Thailand set up a Working Group on Financial Co-operation 
to work out guidelines for developing sound Asian bond markets. Thailand also organised 
a High-level Seminar on 'Enhancing Financial Co-operation through Asian Bond Market 
Development' on 24-25 March 2006 in Bangkok, to discuss ways to further promote the 
Asian Bond market The first ACD Finance Ministers Meeting was also held in Thailand in 
July 2006. 
Although the Asian Bond in the ACD was still in its initial stage, it succeeded in one 
important aspect It became a crucial complement to the existing financial regulation at 
the broader regional level (Lamberte & Yap 2003, pp.10-11). While similar activities in 
EMEAP, ASEAN+3, and APEC collectively worked to implement technical aspects of bond 
regulation, for example, Thailand made use of the ACD to raise awareness of the need for 
Asia to develop such financial arrangements. The ACD thus acted as a political framework 
within wider Asia for constructing a sound regional financial architecture. This was to 
achieve its goal to 'transform the Asian continent into an Asian Community, capable of 
interacting with the rest of the world on a more equal footing and contributing more 
positively towards mutual peace and prosperity' (ACD n.d.). 
6.1.2 The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-
operation (BIMSTEC) 
BIMSTEC was originally initiated by Thailand during the Chavalit government in June 
1997 as part of its 'Look West' policy. It originally encompassed Bangladesh, India, Sri 
Lanka and Thailand, and later included Myanmar and Nepal in 1997, and Bhutan in 2003, 
respectively. BIMSTEC's main objective was to expand co-operation between Southeast 
Asia and South Asia by way of closer economic interactions, mutual assistance in common 
concerns and provision of training and research. Priority areas of co-operation increased 
from six to thirteen in 2005, and included trade and investment, transportation and 
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communication, energy, tourism, technology, fisheries, agriculture, public health, poverty 
alleviation, counter-terrorism and transnational crime, protection of biodiversity/ 
environment and natural disaster management, culture, and people-to-people contact 
Similar to ACD, each sector was led by a 'lead country' to co-ordinate, monitor, and 
facilitate activities in that area. 
BIMSTEC was operated by four main mechanisms-policy-making, operational, co-
ordination, and expert levels. The policy-making component involved an annual summit 
meeting and intermittent ministerial meetings attended by foreign ministers and 
trade/economic ministers. The operational body included senior official meetings (SOM) 
of foreign ministry and trade/economic ministries which adopted and implemented 
specific policies. Co-ordination was carried out by the BIMSTEC Working Group (BWG) 
consisting of director-general level officials, ambassadors, and other representatives in 
Bangkok. It convened a monthly meeting to follow up and push forward progress in each 
co-operative sector, as well as to study prospects and policies of co-operation before 
reporting to the SOM. A BIMSTEC Centre was also set up to support the work of the BWG 
in 2004 before a more permanent secretariat office for the organisation was finalised. 
Each 'lead country' was tasked to host the expert group discussion to identify activities 
and ways to strengthen co-operation. The results of dialogues were reported to BWG and 
SOM (BIMSTEC, n.d; MFA 2002a). 
BIMSTEC's progress was relatively slow until the Thaksin government came into power. 
As part of the Thaksin's strategy to link Southeast Asia and South Asia, interest in 
BIMSTEC was renewed. This can be seen especially from the fact that Thailand 
enthusiastically proposed a free trade agreement resulting in the signing of the 
Framework Agreement for the BIMSTEC Free Trade Area at the Sixth Ministerial Meeting 
in Bangkok in February 2004. In this context, Thailand was designated as the permanent 
chair of the trade negotiation committee (TNC) to facilitate and frame discussion and 
negotiation towards the conclusion of BIMSTEC's FTA The progress of the FTA since then 
has been reflected in the agreement to reduce and eliminate tariff to the agreed rates, 
starting from 2006 and to be completed by 2011, for products listed in the 'Fast Track' 
scheme; and from 2007 to 2015 for the 'Normal Track' products (BIMSTEC n.d.). 
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Apart from its economic achievements, BIMSTEC was also significant in the politico-
strategic aspect. BIMSTEC became a major forum for India to assert its role in East Asian 
affairs, and acted as a gateway for India to cultivate economic benefits with a more 
dynamic Southeast Asia through Thailand under the FT A scheme. At the same time, by 
involving itself in Southeast Asian affairs through BIMSTEC, India hoped to balance 
Chinese influence in the region to a degree, especially with regard to its security and 
economic ties with Myanmar. With a significantly large Indian population, Thailand also. 
hoped to expand its export markets and to acquire technological knowledge from India. 
With an eye on Chinese influence in Myanmar, Thailand could implement a more viable 
hedging strategy vis-a-vis Beijing by connecting India and Southeast Asia through 
developing transport via Myanmar as well. 
6.1.3 Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation Strategy (ACMECS) 
Thailand proposed upgrading economic co-operation with the countries in mainland 
Southeast Asia at the ASEAN Summit on SARS held in Bangkok in April 2003. The leaders 
of Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand then agreed to meet at Bagan, Myanmar to 
push forward this initiative in November of the same year. This resulted in the adoption 
of the Bagan Declaration to lay out the co-operative framework aiming to foster close 
economic ties amongst the members for regional development Vietnam later joined what 
became known as ACMECS in mid 2004 (ACMECS n.d.). 
The objective of ACMECS was to strengthen the competitiveness of its members by 
stimulating economic development along the borders. Based on the comparative 
advantage of each country, ACMECS was intended to promote the movement of 
production to more economically competitive locations. By doing so, its member-states 
hoped it would stimulate employment, generate income, narrow development gaps and 
alleviate poverty amongst member countries. Ultimately, this would support regional 
development and prosperity (ACMECS 2003). 
ACMECS mechanisms rested on a biennial summit meeting, annual ministerial meetings, 
biannual senior official meetings, bimonthly co-ordination working group meetings 
amongst embassies of member-countries in Bangkok, and sectoral working group 
meetings. The areas of co-operation were grouped into six issues including trade and 
investment facilitation, agricultural co-operation, industrial and energy co-operation, 
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transport linkages, tourism co-operation, human resource development, and public 
health (MFA 2007a). 
As was the case with the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative, Thailand hoped 
ACMECS would help it to benefit from abundant natural resources and cheap labour for 
its sunset industries and agricultural production. At the same time, by using Thailand as a 
'locomotive' for this initiative, it was anticipated that ACMECS would help bridge the gap 
between new and old ASEAN members. The focus on supporting projects especially in 
poverty alleviation, capacity building, and technical assistance also became part of 
Thailand's overall development assistance strategy. ACMECS was designated as a channel 
to provide aid and technical assistance to neighbouring countries (MFA 2007b). 
Recent progress in ACMECS's objectives can be seen in Thailand agreeing to reduce tariffs 
on many agricultural items from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, such as 
soybean, corn, potatoes, and eucalyptus wood. A contract farming project was also 
proposed by the Thai government This encouraged Thai investment in the agricultural 
sector in its neighbouring countries by guaranteeing commodity prices and granting 
some import privileges (Kasikorn Research Centre 2005). Thailand also pushed for an 
ACMECS Single Visa to facilitate tourism in the region. A pilot project on implementing a 
Single Visa between Thailand and Cambodia was initiated in 2005 (MFA 2005a). 
In conclusion, Thailand after the 1997 Financial Crisis actively tried to utilise its foreign 
policy to support its economic recovery. Searching for new markets for Thailand's exports 
and strategic partners for economic co-operation was clearly a rationale for that country's 
foreign policy formulation. As Thaksin stressed in his aforementioned foreign policy 
statement, the Thai government would 'emphasise proactive economic diplomacy as a 
major thrust in its foreign policy' (Thaksin 2001f). Similar to Singapore's foreign 
economic policy focus, Thaksin's other key strategy in parallel with his 'regional 
approach' was the promotion of bilateral free trade deals with many countries including 
Australia, Bahrain, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Peru, and the United States. 
· At this point one important question emerges. Why did Thaksin and his foreign policy 
team pursue the multilateral strategy this way? In order words, why did the Thaksin 
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government create new regional fora when it could have utilised the existing regional 
mechanisms such as ASEAN, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+ 1 or APEC? 
Indeed, Thaksin himself on many occasions expressed his disappointment at the 
ineffectiveness of multilateral negotiation and seemed to attach more importance to 
bilateral strategy. He observed that: 
Regarding international political strategy, in the past, we became a member 
of many fora, such as APEC, ASEM, and ASEAN. The fact is that the bigger the 
forum the less we benefit in tangible terms ... this is because consensus is 
hardly attained due to stark differences amongst members. Thus, the 
consensus is reached in superficial issues only. We joined these fora mainly 
because we were just afraid we could not catch the same train as our friends 
did (Thaksin 2002d). 
Considering the difficulties of creating multilateral co-operation and its slow progress, 
even at the regional level, Thaksin's regional multilateral approach may be seen to be 
anomalous in his general overall foreign policy strategy. It is the author's point of view 
that only when considering the context in which this foreign policy strategy was 
formulated can this problem be understood. 
The next section thus discusses this context in further detail. It suggests that the factors 
surrounding Thailand at both the domestic and regional levels influenced Thaksin's 
foreign policy strategy in several ways. That is, they reiterated the existing idea of 
relations between Thailand and outsiders, shaped the public sentiment for policy 
direction, and raised the government's confidence in asserting selected strategies at the 
international level. 
6.2 Contextualising Thaksin's foreign policy 
This section discusses the context in which the Thaksin administration operated both 
internally and externally. The main concern is to point to an unusual development of 
Thaksin's foreign policy posture towards outward orientation and proaction regardless of 
its backlash domestic platform. At the same time, this section also considers regional and 
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international environment that benefited and restrained Thailand's leading role in the 
region. 
The 1997 Financial Crisis produced several consequences in the context of which 
Thaksin's foreign policy strategy was subsequently formed. These consequences had both 
domestic and regional aspects. They included the emergence of a backlash domestic 
coalition in Thailand, generating more anti-American attitudes amongst the Thais, and 
politically consolidating Thaksin to take advantage of an ASEAN leadership vacuum. This 
section contends that despite the development of contending domestic forces that may 
have driven Thailand to pursue a reactive and passive foreign policy Thaksin's foreign 
policy did not totally fall into that expectation. In contrast, Thaksin expressed his clear 
message that he wanted to bring Thailand into a leading position in the region in the time 
of economic difficulty. 
6.2.1 The emergence ofa backlash coalition after the 1997 Financial Crisis 
The Financial Crisis in 1997 had serious affects onThailand in both economic and socio-
political terms. The crisis was viewed as a negative consequence of Thailand engaging 
with the globalised world. At the same time, Bangkok's subsequent bitter experience with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and with the West's unenthusiastic responses to 
the crisis upset many Thais. Consequently, a new phase of nationalism emerged that 
advocated the minimalist view of international engagement and promoted the value of 
'Thai-ness'. 
In regard to economics, Thailand encountered the depletion of foreign reserves, capital 
flight and increasing foreign debt as a result of the devaluation of the Baht, while its 
competitiveness in the world market plummeted commensurately (Chalongphob 1998, 
pp.2-3). A plethora of research elsewhere has detailed the causes and economic effects of 
the Crisis on the Thai economy. What matters in this study is the Thai government's 
responses to the crisis through its foreign policy. 
As the crisis deeply affected the economy, the government's main objective was to restore 
national prosperity and to regain the confidence of foreign investors. A major decision 
under the Chavalit and Chuan governments was thus to seek financial assistance from 
foreign countries and international financial institutions, mainly the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF). In exchange for a $US17.2 billion rescue package the Chuan 
government agreed to bring Thailand under the IMF's Structural Adjustment Programme. 
Consequently, the Thai government adopted a series of reforms in macroeconomic policy, 
domestic market, legal and regulatory issues. For instance, the government's budget 
aimed at surplus. Value added tax was raised from seven to ten per cent Full ownership 
of business and property was also granted to foreigners (Matichon, 24 November 1998, 
p.2; Bello et al. 1998, p.1). In other words, the IMF's emphasis was to force Thailand to 
adopt a conventional monetarist policy and further liberalise the Thai economy following 
the neo-liberal 'Washington Consensus' guidelines. Adopting this policy response not only 
had economic effects but also rendered broad socio-political consequences. 
Essentially, the economic crisis gave rise to the formation of backlash domestic coalition 
and another phase of Thai nationalism. Thailand's entry into the IMF's economic 
programme and subsequent policy reform as part of IMF conditionality were regarded as 
a humiliation to Thailand's national identity and self-confidence. IMF and Western foreign 
lenders were likened to the Western colonial aggressors who had ripped Siam apart from 
its original physical constitution during the mid nineteenth century. Politicians, business 
and civil society groups started to discuss with nationalistic sentiment against IMF's 
imposed privatisation schemes ( FEER 14 May 1998, p.62). 
Another good example of emerging nationalistic emotion during the crisis can be 
observed in popular media. A theme of 'defending national sovereignty' became 
fashionable in Thai motion picture production (Baker & Pasuk 2005, p.257). The stories 
of Thai historic heroes and heroines, such as Queen Suriyothai, King Naresuan, Princess 
Suphankalaya, Bang Rajan villagers who all fought against the Burmese enemy have been 
reproduced since 1998. Bang Rajan was an example of how much films based on 
historical narratives are popular amongst the Thais. This film aims to boost nationalistic 
sentiment by retelling a story of the villagers of Bang Rachan who set up their own 
paramilitary to fight the Burmese invaders for 5 months. This film also hit number one in 
Thailand's box-office in 2000 (Matichon 19 March 2001, p.5). A newspaper commentator 
observed this popularity, 
It is like propaganda that worryingly attracts Thai audiences nowadays. But 
if we look at the current situation in our country which is so bad that 
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everyone feels like the country is sinking, a flush of nationalism that has 
been inculcated from the old time is quite understandable (Matichon 27 
January 2001, p.6). 
Interestingly, some of these films are directed by Mom Chao Chatrichalerm Yukol who is a 
well-known film producer and a member of the royal family. One of his films, for example, 
is the Legend of Suriyothai-a story of a queen during the Ayutthaya period who 
disguised as a man to fight against the Burmese in a battle. It was the most expensive film 
ever produced in Thailand at that time and remains number one in terms of revenue 
(ThaiPR.net 9 August 2001). It was also reported that this film received financial support 
from the palace (MFA 2001b) including royal patronage in production and promotion. 
The Queen herself ordered a drawing a painting of Queen Suriyothai out of her dream and 
allowed it to be a cover of a guidebook for viewing 'The Legend of Suriyothai'. The leading 
actress cast as Queen Suriyothai is also a member of the royal family and mentioned in 
public that she was selected by the Queen (Thai Post 9 August 2001, p.2). 
The observation of Thai motion pictures is a good source of seeing public sentiment 
during the financial crisis. A Thai commentator compares this to the time after the US 
withdrawal from Vietnam with the sense of defeat when 'Rambo' became popular 
(Weekfy Manager 22 January 2001, p.22). Likewise, these historical based films were also 
nationalistic responses to the penetration of foreigners into the Thai economy. It reflects 
the dichotomous feeling of, what Craig Reynolds asserts, 'thai' (free) and 'that' (slave) 
(2002b, p.327). These terms were then re-introduced to illustrate the relationship 
between Thailand and foreign financiers during the time of financial hardship. 
This nationalistic view also emerged within a faction of prominent Thai elites, 
intellectuals, and the general public. This group argued that globalisation no longer served 
the interest of the Thai people. They called for the exercise of caution and suspicion over 
Thailand's further engagement in the globalisation process. This camp was led powerfully 
and influentially by the King of Thailand who has long advocated self-reliance, 
community-based co-operation, and 'local-knowledge solutions' (Reynolds 2002b, p.319). 
The King has emphasised this rationale on many occasions since the Financial Crisis 
erupted in July 1997. His annual birthday speech on 4 December 1997 typifies his 
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position and can be seen as a royal endorsement of an inward-looking and self-reliance 
strategy. He stated: 
It is not important that we become a tiger. What matters is we have enough 
to live and eat, and our economy is self-sufficient Self-sufficiency means we 
can support ourselves on the basis of moderation ... An economy relying on 
trade is called 'Trade Economy' which is not self-sufficient 'Sufficient 
Economy' is an economy that can fulfil itself; we can survive without 
struggles (Matichon, 4December1997, p.12). 
The King's 'sufficiency economy' concept connotes a notion similar to import-substitution 
strategy. That is, a country should rely on its domestic demands and capacity of 
production to reduce its expenses. Trade is viable as a mean to release surpluses or to 
acquire necessary goods that cannot be produced at home. It also conveys a moral 
directive mainly based on Buddhist philosophy focusing on the exercise of self-
moderation b~sed on necessity, self-fulfilment, and individual financial capability 
(Chaichoke 2001). This underlines the suggestion that a country can choose how to 
participate in the international economy instead of being forced to adopt a particular 
stance (Hewison 2005, p.285). The King's suggestion in the wake of the financial crisis 
was 'we have to go backwards, have to be careful and have to return to unsophisticated 
business' (Chanda 1998, p.62). This 'self-sufficiency' concept was therefore repentant of 
improper economic strategy and consumer behaviour that had prevailed during 
Thailand's economic boom. Withdrawing from deeply engaging in the capitalist economy 
was a solution under this idea. 
At the same time, prominent Thai intellectuals and grass-root social movements 
embraced this concept and advocated de-linking rural development from the capitalist 
· economy (Hewison 2000, p.286). For instance, a well-known enthusiast is Prawase Wasi, 
a former royal physician and a prominent intellect who gained respect within both 
government and NGOs (Mccargo 2005, p.511). His ideas were widely welcomed by the 
public as his image carried an affiliation with the palace and a reputation as a moral 
Buddhist devotee. His view was to promote local development based on the strength of 
community including family and religious values (Connor 2003a, pp.156-157). He argued 
that Thailand competed in the world economy in areas where it does not possess any 
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strength, hence becoming merely a cheap labour production site. He suggests that 
Thailand should look back at its roots and cultural heritage. Its strength and future are 
actually predicated on local knowledge, wisdom, and culture. The local community should 
be strengthened and collectively organise their own economic activities based on its 
needs (Prawase 1997). By adopting this view, Prawase believes Thailand can grow 
stronger and avoid future crises. A survey across Thailand in September 1998 also 
showed that 50 per cent of 1,029 respondents favoured restrictions on foreign imports 
(compared to 45 per cent of favour) which showed an inward-looking tendency amongst 
the public (Roper Center 1998b ). 
Supported by the King and well-respected intellectuals, this nationalist-localist view 
gained support from a broad spectrum of societal groups-ranging from government 
agencies, academics, NGOs, to Buddhist leaders and farmers-as the solution to 
Thailand's economic woes. The concept inevitably· entered into the policy-making realm 
as 'many government departments launched community-based schemes to combat the 
crisis' (Baker & Pasuk 2005, p.256). 
The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) embraced the concept 
and incorporated it into the Ninth Economic and Social Development Plan (2002-2006). 
In its introduction, NESDB clearly refers to the King's sufficiency economy concept and 
the way in which local communities are treasured under its auspices: 
The Ninth National Economic and Social Development Plan (2002-2006) is 
guided by the King's sufficiency economy concept as a core element in the 
country's development and administration. By attaching to the principle of 
'middle path' Thailand will survive the financial crisis and become more 
stable. It will bring about balanced, sustainable, and quality development 
under the globalisation and changing environment ... Thai culture and 
character are the country's strength. Our local knowledge and wisdom will 
be a social immunity from the risks emanated from globalisation (NESDB 
2002a). 
The NESDB also set up Sufficiency Economy Working Group to facilitate and monitor the 
translation of this concept into policy implementation (NESDB 1999, p.30). In fact, this 
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concept had been integrated into the government's budget consideration since 1999. The 
budget reports has clearly specified 'sufficiency economy' (and in several instances, 'new 
theory' concept) as a main principle to conduct many policy areas, including poverty 
alleviation, self-reliant rural communities (BB 2007, 2001, 2000, 1999), and economic 
policy (BB 2008, 2007, 2004, 2002). Therefore, this can show that the contending force 
that tried to push Thailand towards inward-looking orientation was powerful and well-
recognised. 
6.2.2 Anti-American sentiment 
Moreover, the nationalistic sentiment was also intensified by the United States' slow and 
seemingly callous responses to the financial crisis in Thailand. Within the $US17.2 billion 
bailout package under the IMF programme, the funding was mainly derived from the IMF, 
ADB, and Asian countries led by Japan (Chalongphob 1998, p.3). The United States was 
criticised not only for not offering any additional help to Thailand, but also for backing the 
IMF's austerity policies (Matichon, 3 October 1998, p.8). In contrast to its slow and 
minimalist responses to Thailand, the United States seemed to be concerned and swift in 
action on the economic situation in South Korea where substantial American troops and 
banks are situated (Pempel 1999, p.9). As Kishore Mahbubani mentions, 'all the Western 
institutions that had made loans to South Korea received phone calls from the US 
Treasury "advising" them not to pull out These phone calls saved South Korea' (2008, 
p.120). That had not happened earlier to Thailand. 
In contrast to the United States' position towards Thailand, other Asian countries seemed 
to be more rigorous and generous in offering assistance, notably Japan and China. 
Although initially Japan refused to offer bilateral financial assistance, it later on 
contributed $US4 billion to the IMF bailout package, equal to the contribution of the IMF. 
The Japanese government also proposed to establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 
aiming at building Asian currency reserves to help the affected Asian economies, in which 
Japan would contribute US$30 billion. This initiative was overwhelmingly supported by 
the Thai authorities (Lipsey 2003, p.95); however, it was strongly rejected by United 
States in the G-7 meeting. The Japanese government therefore amended its scheme, 
which became the 'Miyazawa Plan' instead, designed to be a rescue fund for five affected 
Asian countries. Under this scheme Thailand received US$2.35 billion to restore its 
economy and to stabilise its financial market (Prachachat Thurakit, 21December1998, 
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p.14). The perception of the Thai decision makers towards Japan therefore became more 
favourable. This was reflected in a comment Thanong Bidaya, Thailand's Finance Minister, 
who noted that 'although I was disappointed by the Japanese government's reaction on 
July 18 now I am deeply grateful. This day will be firmly engraved in Thai history' (Lipsey 
2003, p.94). 
China was also seen as another 'true friend' that did not abandon Thailand during the 
financial crisis. China's decision to contribute US$1 billion to the IMF rescue fund and not 
to devalue its Renminbi was applauded with appreciation by Thailand (Chuan 1999). The 
latter measure, particularly, gained public admirations for the Chinese leadership for 
helping affected economies maintain their trade competitiveness. In addition, China 
joined ASEAN memb~r countries and the other 'Plus Three' counterparts to establish the 
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000 for a currency swap mechanism. Because of China's 
role in this situation, the Sino-Thai relationship became closer especially during the 
Thaksin government 
Another source of anti-American sentiment in Thailand materialised at this time during 
the election of the new Director-General of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Thailand expected that the United States would support the Thai candidate, Supachai 
Panitchapakdi. Bangkok thought this was a foregone conclusion, given that Thailand had 
long been a major American politico-security anchor in Asia as well as a spearhead of 
liberal democracy and the free market in Southeast Asia (The Nation, 3 January 1999, 
p.A4). Despite this history, Washington nevertheless favoured the New Zealand candidate, 
Mike Moore. The conflict over selecting the WTO's director stretched out for almost one 
year due to the United States lobbying for Moore. With the majority of developing 
countries supporting Supachai, the election outcome was not decisive, resulting in the 
compromise of having the two candidates sharing a position, each for a period of three 
years (Matichon 31 December 1999, p.9). Thailand was therefore understandably 
inclined to question the value of its past strategic loyalty to the United States under these 
circumstances. 
In short, the Asian Financial Crisis resulted in a changing perception of many Thais 
towards its external environment The main concern focused on how the economic crisis 
had derogated the pride of the nation due to Thailand losing management freedom within 
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its own boundaries. The conditions imposed by international financial institutions were 
seen as a neo-imperialist tool backed by the United States. The picture of companies 
selling their assets at bargain prices, many of which were bought by American companies, 
was interpreted as the country being bought and sold out by the hands of foreigners. This 
created a belief amongst many Thais that the United States actually triggered the 
Financial Crisis in the first place (Murphy 2008, p.268). Considering Thailand as a security 
ally and the first Asian nation to have entered a formal diplomatic relationship with the 
United States, the lack of enthusiasm and support in the crisis not only upset the Thais but 
also cast doubts as to the United States' real policy intentions. A rough idea of how the 
perception towards the US declined can be observed from the change of public opinion in 
favour of the US. In 1993 the Roper Center's survey indicates that 87 per cent of 1,341 
respondents had a favourable attitude towards the US (Roper Center 1993). This figure 
dropped to 69 per cent in 1998 (Roper Center 1993). The revival of nationalism based on 
anti-American sentiment therefore became an important element in Thailand's post-
Crisis politics. It had an impact not only on Thai politics but also on the foreign policy of 
the succeeding government of Thaksin Shinawatra. 
6;2.3 Thaksin's consolidation of domestic platform 
To understand how this domestic sentiment was incorporated into Thaksin's foreign 
policy position, the new context of the political system engineered by the 1997 
constitution must be understood. This new political system was argued to help Thaksin 
consolidate his domestic platform by enabling him to widely co-opt many traditional 
elites and broad societal groups. 
The 1997 constitution was labelled as the most democratic constitution Thailand has ever 
had, and was referred to as the 'People's Constitution'. It aimed at a number of reforms. 
Apart from creating mechanisms to promote transparency and accountability, to advance 
people's rights and freedom and to promote, most importantly, the new constitution was 
intended to create a more stable government and political institutions. For example, it 
required 2/5 of the existing members of the House of Representatives to initiate a no-
confidence vote debate against the Prime Minister, in contrast to 1/5 in the previous 
constitution. It introduced the separation of executive and legislative functions by not 
allowing Members of Parliament to retain their seats when accepting cabinet positions 
(Borwornsak & Burn 1998). It also discouraged the small-party politics that had plagued 
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Thai politics for decades. For example, the Political Party Act 1998 stipulated that any 
political party incapable of finding at least 5,000 members within 180 days after its 
registration must be dissolved. Moreover, it also 'replaced multiseat constituencies with 
400 single-seat constituencies' (Hicken 2006, p.392). This system forced many small 
political parties and factions to merge with the bigger ones and reduced the number of 
parties. 
Thaksin would probably not have been able to build his political power without utilising 
the domestic sentiment at the time. He understood the socio-economic context in which 
the Thais sought a strong leader to bring the country out from the crisis, and tried to tap 
into that attitude. His Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party (the name translated in English as 'Thais 
love Thais') established in July 1998 obviously conveyed that intention to attract public 
support. With his business background, Thaksin presented himself as a new generation 
politician whose working style was decisive, quick, result-oriented, and guided by clear 
policy and strategy (Pasuk & Baker 2009, p.68). This image was opposite to that of Chuan, 
the Democrat Party, and the Thai bureaucracy which were blamed for bringing Thailand 
into deep recession and humiliation under the IMF programme (Pasuk & Baker 2009, 
p.69). 
To attract broad political constituencies, the TRT promised to 'bring about reform in the 
fundamental structure of the country in all respects, so that Thailand became strong, 
modern, and ready to face the challenges of the world in the new era' (Baker & Pasuk 
2005, p.258). The TRT's populist policy paid unprecedented attention to the rural areas 
where Thaksin promised various grass-root schemes claimed to strengthen local 
communities and to alleviate poverty. The major schemes included a three-year debt 
moratorium for farmers, a THB30 (roughly under US$1) universal access to health care, 
the one tambon (district) one product (OTOP) project, and a THB1 million village fund 
(Crampton 2001; Somchai 2005, p.543). These schemes were seen as 'practical steps to 
achieve a measure of internal self-sufficiency' (Ganesan 2004, p.29). With these self-help 
and grass-root initiatives TRT was well received by many former Thai politicians, 
academics and NGOs. 
At the same time, Thaksin was able to co-opt the Thai traditional elite. His domestic focus 
on rural areas seemed to correspond with the King's idea of 'sufficiency economy' 
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(Ganesan 2004, p.29), at least in the beginning of his premiership. Thus, Thaksin's 
nationalist and populist policy was endorsed by many elites affiliated with the palace such 
as Prawase and Chai-anan who also worked for Thaksin in the beginning. While the rural 
Thais felt direct benefits from Thaksin's populist policy, at this time the urban population 
and elite could also relate to it The landslide victory in the first general election under the 
new 1997 constitution in January 2001 supported this general sentiment in Thailand. 
TRT gained 248 out of 500 seats in parliament while the rival Democrat Party received 
only 128 seats. With TRT's political allies added, Thaksin managed to secure 350 seats for 
his new coalition government With such a result, the 1997 constitution succeeded in 
achieving its premier objective of creating a strong and stable executive power. 
Thaksin's confidence was also boosted when he was found 'not guilty' by the 
Constitutional Court of allegations of asset concealment Achieving political stability was 
commensurate with realising policy effectiveness, Thaksin believed, in addressing his 
legal issues: 
Under the new constitution the government will be certainly in power for 
four years. No matter what will happen in the Constitutional Court, there 
will be no change in our policy. TRT is a leading coalition party with more 
than a majority. Without me as a PM, others in TRT members can also 
perform this role (Thaksin 2001a). 
Another step in Thaksin's power consolidation was the reform of Thailand's civil service 
during his tenure of office. Thaksin felt that the Thai bureaucracy needed to restructure 
itself if it was to keep pace with the changing global environment and carry out his policy 
in a more effective manner (Thaksin 2001b). As a successful and experienced 
businessman, he applied a business management style to reforming the Thai bureaucracy. 
His strategy's core was actually to re-centralise decision making at all levels. What he 
claimed as 'decentralised' referred to the way in which senior government officials were 
given greater freedom in decision making and authority to expedite the implementation 
of policies already decided at the centre. He dubbed this approach the 'CEO style'. It was 
applied at the provincial level in which 'CEO Governors' had decisive authority, not only in 
their direct subordinate departments mainly within the Ministry of Interior, but also in 
any provincial government agencies within their provinces. This management style 
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resembled a 'top-down' approach in which CEO officials were responsible for the success 
of policy implementation in their areas. Simultaneously, they were directly responsible to 
the Prime Minister and his team (Thaksin 2001b; Hicken 2006, pp.400-401). 
This management style was also adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-
ambassadors were also called 'CEO Ambassadors'. They would direct and monitor the 
work of Thailand's other representative agencies within the realm of their own 
embassies' jurisdiction. Thaksin called this scheme 'Team Thailand', in which he argued 
ambassadors would need to share a holistic vision, be flexible, and be able to exercise 
leadership across different agencies. Thaksin hoped that by adopting this approach 
Thailand's embassies could be more assertive in protecting, pursuing, and extending 
Thailand's interests abroad (MFA 2002d, 2002c). 
The Thaksin government pursued this strategy not only to implement its domestic policy 
with confidence but also to restore Thailand's position in the international community. 
Thaksin's confidence in his domestic platforms allowed him to steer Thailand through the 
financial crisis within a relatively short timeframe. He resisted the East Asia Economic 
Model that, in his understanding, depended mainly on foreign investment, exports and 
cheap labour and resources. Instead, he proposed to strengthen Thailand's domestic 
economy by eradicating poverty and empowering local entrepreneurship (Thaksin 
2001b ). His government adopted a strategy of building up productivity in Thailand's rural 
regions and re-energising domestic demand as an alternative to a sole reliance on export 
revenue and foreign investment. 
Coupled with his criticism of the IMF's and of foreign lenders since his election, his 
economic policies worried many observers who believed that he might adopt an overly 
inward-looking stance for Thailand (Pasuk & Baker 2005, p.66). However, he resisted that 
tendency and instead asserted that he was only shaping a 'parallel path' to prosperity to 
those traditionally relying on foreign investment. This dual-track policy approach was 
expected to help the Thai economy not only to recover and strengthen but also to become 
a new economic model for other developing countries. He claimed, 'I am confident that 
within two years many developing countries will emulate our strategy' (Daily World 
Today, 29 June 2001, p.6). 
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In general, Thaksin wanted Thailand to be an exemplar of success. Exploiting anti-
Western sentiments in his country, Thaksin tried to create a similar atmosphere at the 
regional level. Throughout his time in office, one of Thaksin's major foreign policy 
preoccupations was to build and link the different layers of co-operation in Asia. With his 
outspoken personality, supreme self-confidence, and robust working style, Thaksin was 
seen by many observers as a new type of leader who was right for the times and 
circumstances in Southeast Asia. Thaksin's attempt to elevate Thailand's international 
role may have been more difficult if there had been many similar contending leaders 
within ASEAN countries. However, many prominent Southeast Asian leaders were 
passing from the scene, opening up opportunities for him to assert regional leadership. 
6.2.4 Leadership vacuum in Southeast Asia 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Southeast Asia was severely disadvantaged for 
several reasons. These were related to problems in major ASEAN countries' economies 
and politics including rising tensions between some of them. These situations prevented 
them from performing a prominent role in international arena, and allowed Thailand to 
play a leading role in the crisis time. 
The first disadvantage lays in the economic crisis which weakened the capacity of some 
countries to actively engage in regional affairs. Although the impact of the Crisis in 1997 
varied in different major ASEAN countries, a common after-effect was similar in terms of 
the exacerbation of inward-looking sentiments similar to that prompted in Thailand. The 
Financial Crisis not only forced these countries to step back and heal their wounds, but 
also triggered many domestic changes especially in Indonesia. 
Regarded by many as the natural leader of ASEAN, Indonesia did not necessarily perform 
as such during this time. Indonesia suffered tremendously during the financial crisis. 
Apart from the slump in its economy, the crisis generated several important changes in 
the country. After three decades in power, Suharto faced a fierce public protest against his 
continuing leadership. He finally resigned in 1998 leaving the transition of leadership in 
Indonesian politics in disarray. Suharto himself faced legal action for his alleged 
involvement in corruption. Violence erupted in many parts of the country, based on both 
separatist agendas (such as in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya) and ethno-religious 
segregation (such as riots in the Maluku Islands, Sulawesi and Kalimantan). The latter 
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included anti-Chinese minority tensions throughout much of Indonesia (Brown & Wilson 
2007, p.2). At the same time, the United States pushed for further democratisation in 
return for supporting Indonesia's economic recovery. Coupled with international 
pressure on Indonesia's heavy-handed approach in East Timar, these external factors 
strongly influenced the Indonesian government to accept a referendum towards the 
independence of East Timar in 1999. Moreover, Aceh was also severely hit by the tsunami 
on Boxing Day 2004 causing approximately 220,000 people to be killed or missing (BBC, 
25 January 2005). Although this natural disaster helped bring about a peace agreement 
between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (MoU 2005), it 
certainly cost Indonesia time and financial resources to restore damaged areas. 
At the same time, the situation in the Philippines did not permit its leader to play a 
regional role. Although its economy was not as seriously affected by the financial crisis as 
other countries, it did not actually perform better than its neighbours. The country had 
been under the IMF' Structural Adjustment Programme from 1983 to 1998 but the 
economy was still volatile and inefficient (Sida 2005, pp. 55, 69). Domestic political strife 
also impeded the capacity of the Philippines to project greater regional leadership. 
President Joseph Estrada was accused of corruption and nepotism resulting in public 
pressure and protests against him. He was finally impeached by the parliament and 
replaced by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Protests against Arroyo by pro-Estrada forces 
muddled the country's political stability while economic stagnation continued (ISEAS 
2000, 2002b ). This situation seriously affected the country's image and its economy as 
many foreign investors felt uncertain about its political future. Moreover, the Philippines 
also faced Muslim separatist problems in its southern provinces led by several groups, 
most notably the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf These groups 
have carried out bombings, kidnapping, assassination, rapes and extortion not only in the 
conflict areas but also in Manila itself, with Westerners also targeted. The separatist 
problem has seriously affected the stability of the government and become a reason for 
the Philippines to seek assistance from the United States especially after September 11 
(Morada 2003). 
Second, the foreign policy assertiveness of some ASEAN countries was also affected by the 
change of political leaders. As Pavin (2008) also concurs, 'Thaksin was once tipped to 
become Asia's next leader at the time when other charismatic leaders in the region 
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had left the scene'. From Mahathir to Badawi in Malaysia, Suharto to Habibie and Wahid 
in Indonesia, Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong in Singapore, it can be seen that different 
personalities do matter in the shaping of national foreign policy postures and 
international image. 
In Indonesia, the absence of Suharto and the ongoing process of democratisation in 
Indonesia had an impact on its foreign policy in that it was no longer guided directly by a 
powerful leader and a small group of political elites (Smith 2000, p.504; Dosch 2006, 
pp.51, 53-54). Scholars opine that Indonesian foreign policy after Suharto witnessed the 
declining influence of Indonesia in world affairs. Jakarta suffered from an unusually low 
profile, accommodating policy to the West and financial institutions, projecting a weak 
leadership (especially during the Habibie and Megawati periods), lacking focus, and 
wasting resources during the Wahid government (Smith 2000; ISEAS 2002b; Anwar 
2003, pp.5-6, He 2008, p.48). At the same time, ASEAN, normally the cornerstone of 
Indonesia's foreign policy, became less central to it. ASEAN's hallowed non-interference 
principle was threatened by Thailand's proposal of 'flexible engagement'. Though not 
officially endorsed, this new approach has gradually been practised by the members, even 
by Indonesia itself (Smith 1999, pp.257-258). 
In Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad continued his nationalist policy in addressing the 
financial crisis via capital controls and his outspoken character in criticising the West 
which he believed was behind the whole thing. Internally, his leadership style created a 
conflict between himself and a potential political rival, Anwar Ibrahim. Mahathir persisted 
in promoting his nationalist policy and lavish government spending while Anwar, as 
Mahathir's Deputy Prime Minister, advocated IMF-style measures to underwrite tight 
budgets. However, in 2002 Mahathir decided to step down and handed over the 
premiership to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in late 2003. Against this backdrop, Malaysia's 
foreign policy continued to attach importance to Islamic identity, promoting a developing 
country posture, and assuming a critical position towards Western countries and 
globalisation (Saravanamuttu 2008, p.337). However, as Chaichoke (2005) argues, the 
personality of the Malaysian leader perhaps affected the image of Malaysia in the 
international forums more than most. In contrast with Mahathir, Badawi's character was 
softer, calmer, less aggressive and diplomatic resulting in more appeasement with foreign 
counterparts (p.255). 
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Singapore also experienced a similar trend to that of other countries in Southeast Asian 
though not as severely affected by the Financial Crisis. Singapore's foreign policy was 
designed to compensate for its disadvantages in geo-strategic location and ethnic 
dimensions. Its policy resulted in a high degree of vigilance and flexibility in balancing 
major powers while maintaining economic relations with most countries (Leifer 2000, 
pp.8-9; Thompson 2006, p.201). With its economic success, Singapore also increasingly 
aimed at exercising its international role. The former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was 
very critical of the West, notably by way of promoting 'Asian Values'. However, his 
successor, Goh Chok Tong, was more reserved and cautious in his foreign policy, 
especially towards the end of his premiership (Ciorciari 2004). 
Moreover, from 1997 onward there was a series of criticisms made by ASEAN leaders 
directed towards each other. The rising tensions amongst ASEAN leaders also revealed 
their disunity, leaving ASEAN in disarray. This tension was mainly between Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. 
Despite its economic achievement, Singapore has had an image problem amongst other 
ASEAN countries. As the late Leifer argued, its posture often received a cold response 
from its neighbours (2000, p.23). It was looked upon with suspicion, especially in 
Malaysia and Indonesia regarding its leaders' blunt criticism of their internal affairs. From 
1997, Malaysia and Singapore engaged in a series of disputes, initiated by Lee's comment 
on Malaysia's Johar State as 'notorious for shootings, muggings and carjackings' 
(Richardson 1997). Bilateral relations between Singapore and Malaysia experienced 
another downturn following Lee's book entitled 'The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee 
Kuan Yew' published in 1998. In his book, Lee harshly criticised post-independence Malay 
leaders for obstructing the creation of multicultural Malaysia in which other races 
especially the Chinese minority would be treated equally. This policy eventually forced 
Singapore, choose its independence rather than merging with Malaysia to which Lee 
regretted (Lee 1998). Malaysia responded by suspending the Singaporean Air Force's 
over-flight rights to Malaysian airspace, and withdrawing from that year's STARDEX 
exercise of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Malaysia also summoned.Singapore's 
ambassador to explain Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's comment that ethnic Malays in 
Singapore do better than those in Malaysia (AFP, 26 January 2001). The bilateral 
relationship resumed greater normalcy when Badawi became Prime Minister. 
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Singapore's relations with Indonesia were also strained by Lee's comment on Habibie's 
qualifications for presidency in 1998. The latter retorted by downgrading economic ties 
with Singapore and by disparaging the island state as just a 'little red dot' on the map 
(Srilal 1999). These negative images and its small size, in general, prevented Singapore 
from exercising the degree of regional leadership to the extent that it perhaps believes it 
deserves. 
Therefore, domestic environments within and regional tensions amongst major ASEAN 
countries revealed ASEAN's lack of unity and strength as a whole and within each 
member-state. These factors, in a way, aggravated the historical divisions between 
archipelago and mainland Southeast Asia states. While ASEAN became mired in 
internecine disputes, the parallel situation in Thailand was working more favourably for 
the government Thailand's greater political stability after the 2001 election and the TRT's 
growing confidence paved the way for Thaksin to step into the regional and international 
scene more forcefully. 
This regional reference is important to Thailand's attempt to play a leading role. While 
most of the major ASEAN countries were still cleaning up their house in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, other smaller countries could not afford resources to take a regional 
role either. Quieter leaders of major ASEAN countries, in a turn, placed a full spotlight on 
Thailand's readiness for regional leadership. Thaksin's policy success at home also 
inspired some countries in the region to study and adopt his strategy-Thaksinomics-to 
recover their economies including Indonesia, the Philippines or even China (Perrin 2003). 
At the same time one of the healthiest economy, Singapore, which may have been able to 
assume the leading role, saw its limits as mentioned earlier, hence supporting Thailand's 
role. As the president of US-ASEAN Business Council opined on Thailand's leading role in 
ASEAN economic integration, 'the city state was a reluctant leader of the regional 
grouping so it had passed on its ambition to Thailand' (Bangkok Post2004, p.1). 
Many regional leaders also explicitly and implicitly expected Thaksin to lead ASEAN. It 
was also reported in the media that during the Ninth ASEAN Summit in October 2003 in 
Bali, Indonesia, the Cambodian leader commended Thailand for its leading role in 
containing the spread of SARS, assisting Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, including 
Thailand's measures in counter-terrorism and the arrest of Hambali (Khao Sod 8 October 
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2003, p.10). It also reported that President Megawati after finishing her farewell remarks 
in tears to Mahathir on his planning to step down from a political career, came to shake 
hands with Thaksin. She expressed her support for Thaksin to continue strengthening 
ASEAN before both held hands and walked out from the meeting room (Thai News Agency 
8 October 2003, p.4). On the following occasion in the same month of APEC Summit in 
Bangkok, Goh Chok Tong and many leaders also honoured Thaksin as the next ASEAN 
leader (Thai Post 12 November 2003, p.4). 
At the same time, Thailand's leading position in the region was also acknowledged by 
external powers. For example, during the same ASEAN Summit, Japan and Thailand also 
signed an MOU on Japan-Thailand Partnership Program QTPP) to strengthen their close 
co-operation and partnership in organising technical training for developing countries. 
This signified Japanese perception of Thailand's ability to lead development programme 
in the developing world especially in Indochina (Manager 13 December 2003, p. 2). 
Moreover, the US soon after the APEC Summit in Bangkok 2003 granted Thailand Major 
Non-NATO Ally status following Thailand's support in Afghanistan and the arrest of 
Southeast Asia's prominent terrorist leader, Hambali. This status helped reaffirm 
Bangkok's special relationship with the US as reflected by a senior military in the Thai 
Army, Lieutenant General Khemarat Kanchanawat, Director of Operation Group in the 
Thai Armed Forced Headquarters. He states: 
the MNNA is merely a diplomatic term to emphasise a special degree of 
close relationship. This is because militarily we have already had a military 
alliance with the US under SEATO treaty. Even though the organisation was 
abolished, in practice the treaty is still binding until now as we can see from 
our joint military operation (Daily News 23 October 2003, p.3). 
Thaksin's personality also contributed to this regional ambition. With his strong 
personality and ability to speak English effectively, Thaksin had no problem presenting 
himself in the international media. He 'travelled abroad more often than any Thai leader 
in recent history ... [and] enjoyed contact with [the] international business 
community ... [with] no lack of initiative' (Ciorciari 2004). He was not also reluctant to 
criticise and comment on the West or international institutions making his approach akin 
to that of the old generation of outspoken ASEAN leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew and 
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Mahathir. In fact, he expressed his admiration for both those leaders' leadership styles 
(Pasuk 2004, p.2). Therefore, many observers concluded that Thaksin was 'in a position 
to allow Thailand to assume a regional leadership role' (Ganesan 2004, p.39), or 'poised to 
become Southeast Asia's senior statesman' (Montesano 2003, p.82). 
It can be said that Thaksin's confidence was directly associated with the political support 
he was enjoying in the domestic domain. Although the regional situation was supportive 
of his projection of Thailand's leading role at the regional level, the concern was how his 
external relations would be managed. Similar to what the 'two-level game' suggests, his 
victory in the election signified that his government needed to satisfy his constituencies 
by restoring not only the economy but also Thailand's national pride. An inward-looking 
foreign policy would be a possible option but may not have been compatible with the 
reality that Thailand was now closely knit into the global economy. Being in the middle 
position to negotiate both domestic and international pressures, Thaksin selected a 
regional approach as a significant mover in his foreign policy. The next section therefore 
examines this policy preference in the Forward Engagement Strategy. 
6.3 Examining Thailand's regional aspirations in the Forward Engagement Strategy 
This section assesses the connection between Thaksin's foreign policy strategy of 
Forward Engagement and the ideational factor-self-perception-extracted from 
domestic and regional environments discussed in this chapter's previous sections. It 
traces the influence of the idea of self-perception mainly amongst Thailand's top policy-
making elite and that on Thailand's foreign policy preferences. Moreover, this foreign 
policy strategy not only shows how Thailand's self-perception and aspirations were 
influential in decision-making, but also reflects the characteristics of Thailand's regional 
aspirations discussed in Chapter Four. To reiterate, they include the policy preferences to 
improve Thailand's economic competitiveness, to position Thailand's centrality in 
international affairs, and to seek multilateral approaches. 
It is important to note here that this chapter focuses more on Thaksin and his Foreign 
Minister's expression of their regional aspirations rather than that of governmental 
agencies as previously discussed in Chapter Five. As Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1961) 
assert, state's decision-making and action is carried out by those who have an authority to 
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'act in the name of the state' (p.189). Therefore, the focuses between this chapter and the 
previous one are different due to the nature of decision-making in a particular time. 
Thai foreign policy during the Thaksin government was somewhat different in nature 
from that during the Chuan government mentioned in the previous chapter. Thaksin and 
his Foreign Minister, Surakiart Sathirathai played a prominent role in foreign policy 
initiative. Decision-making was more centralised as reflected in his bureaucratic reform in 
'CEO management' style. As critics say, 'from 2001-2006, Prime Minister Thaksin 
implemented a myriad grandiose foreign policy idea ... He colonised the Foreign 
Ministry' (Pavin 2010). Unlike Chuan and most of previous Thai governments that 
relied on technocrats to elaborate and implement foreign policy (Thitinan 2004a), 
Thaksin closely monitored and sometimes intervened in policy implementation so that it 
also served his domestic populist agenda. As Thitinan, a prominent Thai scholar observes, 
Thaksin became more attentive to designing a coherent and forward-
looking foreign policy platform. Amidst a crowded international 
landscape full of international and regional organisations tasked with 
all matters of cooperation among states, the Thaksin foreign policy 
team tried to carve out its own space in international affairs with very 
limited input from the MFA (Thitinan 2004a). 
Not only was MFA's role reduced, but 'NESDB was relieved of its old role as a 
planning agency' (Pasuk & Baker 2004, p.114). On the interview of Foreign 
Minister Kasit Piromya, he also criticised this changing role of planning agencies 
and stated that 'MFA and NESDB merely received orders from above to implement' 
(19 December 2007). This is also in agreement with the Director-General of East 
Asian Affairs, Anuson Chinwanno that 'during Thaksin the role of government 
officials changed from policy-making to policy implementation' (interview on 7 
June 2008). Therefore, the role of government officials was subordinated to 
Thaksin's direct command and his foreign policy team. 
At the same time Thaksin's foreign policy style and policy agenda interestingly 
resembled those of Chatichai. Thitinan explains this similarity as due to the fact 
that both 'shared the same coterie of policy advisors, and they both favored elected 
politicians and ministers over unelected bureaucrats and generals' (Thitinan 2009). 
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This can also imply that the idea of positioning Thailand as a leading actor in 
Southeast Asia was sustained and passed on to Thaksin's foreign policy. It is not 
thus unusual to observe the continuity in proactive foreign policy behaviour. 
Thaksin's view on Thailand's situation is broadly captured by his 2001 policy address to 
the Parliament He attempted to link public sentiment of the crisis and his policy stance. 
That is, the financial crisis brought about the loss of Thailand's pride in the international 
community. He stated: 
The government realises that Thailand is the country abundant with 
biodiversity and unique culture. Thai people possess a great skill, 
craftsmanship, perseverance, and diligence. If they are supported and given 
opportunity to fully utilise these qualities to make use of what their · 
motherland offers them, it will bring back Thailand's strength. Thai people 
can stand on their own feet once again with honour, prestige, and pride of 
being Thai (Thaksin 2001f). 
He also conveyed his frustration at Thailand's declining competitiveness in the world 
economy as ranked by the International Management for Development (IMD). He said he 
was 'not proud at all to mention about it' (Thaksin 2001g). By employing such rhetoric, he 
was able to pressure ensconced policy elites and effectively warn them about the growing 
public frustration with their traditional ways of doing business. 
Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai was particularly forceful in asserting that Thai 
foreign policy needed to be part of the country's strategic priority to bring back viability to 
the Thai economy. He asserted that an important element of this strategy was to build up 
recognition of Thailand's role in the international community. He argued that, as a small 
country, Thailand needed to make itself known, interesting and meaningful. By focusing 
on deepening ties with its neighbouring countries and Asian friends comprised of 
regional powers and important commodity producers, Thailand's initiatives for Asian co-
operation would catch the world's attention (Thansettakij, 16 August 2001, pp.8-9). 
To demonstrate the regional aspirations in the Forward Engagement Strategy, it is useful 
to delineate the topic into several aspects. These aspects were considered to be areas 
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where regional aspirations were intended to raise Thailand's leadership profile at the 
international level. Thitinan asserts, 'Its key initiatives exhibited the ambitions of an 
aspiring middle power' (Thitinan 2009). They include policy preferences towards re-
positioning Thailand as a centre of co-operation, promoting Asian regionalism, and the 
management ofregional order. 
6.3.1 Positioning Thailand as a central link in regional co-operation 
The core essence of the Forward Engagement Strategy was designed primarily to place 
Thailand as a more influential actor in the international community. It reflects the 
underlying vision amongst the top policy-making elite of an appropriate role Thailand 
should play and how to materialise it. In other words, it shows that Thai policy-makers 
perceive that becoming a link or bridge between various fora and partners would best 
serve Thailand's policy interests. The adoption of this foreign policy preference was 
explained by Surakiart as 'building Thailand's high profile and put itself on the "radar 
screen" of international community' (interview on 13 February 2008). 
Pasuk and Baker (2004) explain this strategy as one major part of Thaksin's foreign 
economic policies primarily due to the surrounding environment at that time. China's 
growth and its role in the region after the 1997 Financial Crisis was prominent (2004, 
p.123). The Director-General of ASEAN Affairs, Anuson Chinwanno, also agrees with the 
China factor. He further asserts 'Thaksin saw Thailand's special position both in terms of 
its geographical proximity and smooth relations with less historical conflict or negative 
memories compared to other Southeast Asian countries' (interview on 4 January 2008). 
Surakiart also expressed the same view that 'Thailand does not have any enemy while 
regional powers like China and Japan do not trust each other, so we were in an 
appropriate position to push forwards regional co-operation' (interview on 13 February 
2008). Therefore, Thaksin and his foreign policy team hoped that playing a role as an 
important bridge between China and other Asian countries in support for closer 
integration would benefit Thailand's efforts to increase its competitiveness. 
Thaksin's foreign strategy had both bilateral and multilateral dimensions. Thaksin's 
foreign policy on bilateral relations can be understood within this framework. Bilateral 
relations would constitute the foundation upon which Thailand's regional initiatives 
would rest. Not only did Thailand benefit from expanding its market relations with 
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selected partners but would also gain wider access to other markets previously 
unexploited or underdeveloped. 
Therefore, by creating a 'hub-and-spokes' web ofbilateralism (as illustrated in Figure 6.1) 
Thailand could better pursue its regional approach to co-operation. In Thaksin's rationale, 
the net benefit of this approach would be Thailand's successful culmination of FT As with 
bigger economies. Thaksin thought a smaller economy such as Thailand has a limited 
capacity to absorb imports, while it gains from larger markets for its exports. His country 
could gain from greater market access to both individual countries and sub-regional 
complexes. At the same time, Thailand also expected to increase its attractiveness as an 
investment location by becoming the gateway to broader economic groupings (Thaksin 
2002d). As Thaksin characterised this assumption: 
Instead of [foreign investors] relocating all of their productions to China, if 
they produce in Thailand they can sell their products not only in China, but 
also in India, Japan, Australia, the United States, and the Persian Gulf 
countries. If they produce in China, they can only sell to the Chinese, not to 
the Indians (Thaksin 2002f) 
I I\ China India Vietnam 
Bahrain I~ 
Thailand Singapore 
EFTA I/ USA Australia Chile 
Figure 6.1: Thailand's major strategic partners during the Thaksin government 
Furthermore, bilateral and regional approaches to co-operation in Thaksin's foreign 
policy also complimented one another in ways to achieve Thailand's economic recovery 
from the financial crisis. In Thaksin's mind, this strategy of positioning Thailand as a 
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bridge through bilateralism would result in supporting his ambitions for a Thai role in 
regional multilateralism. 
For instance, regarding ties with Singapore, Thailand and Singapore strengthened their 
strategic partnership based on the 1997 Singapore-Thailand Enhanced Partnership 
(STEP) and the 2003 Singapore-Thailand Enhanced Economic Relationship (STEER). 
Under these arrangements, both countries agreed to promote economic co-operation 
based on the 'minimalist' and 'readiness' postures. They proposed to negotiate FT As with 
many individual countries. They claimed that this approach was approved by APEC which 
allows 'small group of APEC economies [to]· start work on a new initiative while others 
decide if they should follow' (MFA 2002b). Along with Singapore, Thaksin believed that 
Thailand could not afford to wait for all ASEAN countries to reach a group consensus to 
speed up AFT A. Bilateral FT As would encourage competitive negotiations towards 
greater free trade. The logic of this bilateral approach was to stimulate multilateralism in 
ASEAN as a building block towards ASEAN Economic Community. This view can be seen 
from Thaksin's conversation with Lee Kwan Yew on this issue: 
We [Thailand and Singapore] must tango together to open the dance floor. If 
nobody is willing to open the floor there will be no dancers. We welcome 
anybody who is ready to join ... Therefore, we must re-invigorate this 
environment in ASEAN (Thaksin 2001c). 
Another example of this strategy is the Thailand-India relationship. Thailand was the first 
country in Southeast Asia to strengthen relations with India in both security and 
economic spheres since the end of the Cold War (Singh 2007, p.20). Thaksin and Surakiart 
also placed India as high priority, key country to foster closer co-operation between South 
Asia and ASEAN (Surakiart 2003). This can be seen from the frequency of bilateral Thai-
Indian discussions at the top level. Thaksin made two official visits to India within four 
months, the first in late November 2001 and again in early February 2002. He paid 
another working visit to India in mid-2005. Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee 
also stopped over in Bangkok after the ASEAN Summit in Cambodia in November 2002, 
and made an official visit to Thailand in early October 2003. His successor, Manmohan 
Singh, also visited in July 2004. In the period of 2001-2005, the Thaksin government 
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signed more than ten bilateral agreements with India including one for the establishment 
of a free trade area in 2003 (Chulacheeb 2007; MFA 2008a). 
Thaksin sought any opportunity to strengthen ·Thai-Indian ties. He understood that 
India's primary security concerns were related to counter-terrorism and maritime 
security (SC 2002, p.24 ). He agreed to India's request for strengthening bilateral security 
co-operation before other issues were negotiated. Therefore, the Joint Working Group 
QWG) on Security Issues was established in November 2002, headed by the NSC for the 
Thai side and the Ministry of External Affairs for the Indian counterpart. It acts as a co-
ordinating body for a broad range of bilateral security concerns including anti-terrorism 
and transnational crime, defence issues, and legal issues related to security including co-
operation in legal mutual assistance in criminal matters (signed in 2004) and an 
extradition treaty (interview with Prakit Prachonpachanuek, former NSC Secretary-
General on 5 January 2008). After the JWG was set up, less than a year passed before the 
FTA negotiations were initiated and a negotiation framework was formed in 2003. 
Through closer Thai-Indian economic ties as a result of the FTA, Bangkok expected that it 
could be a central link for India to Southeast Asia, vice versa. In Surakiart's words: 
Thailand is the natural gateway for economic activities in Southeast Asia. 
Economic integration is being intensified within the region [under 
AFTA] ... Thailand recognizes India as a hub for forging business activities in 
the sub-continent of South Asia. Likewise, India can look at Thailand as a 
gateway to countries in the Greater Mekong region and ASEAN as a whole 
(Surakiart 2003, p.58). 
This strategy of linking various sub-regions through Thailand as a key bridging actor is 
illustrated in Figure 6.2. BIMSTEC can thus be seen as a bridging forum between the two 
regions-Southeast Asia and South Asia-supported by close ties and the active roles of 
Thailand and India as the cornerstone. At the same time, BIMSTEC not only provides a 
way in which economic co-operation between the two regions is cultivated but also offers 
another possibility for Thailand to seek a partner for development in its own backyard-
the Greater Mekong sub-region. Surakiart remarked that India was an important 
counterpart in the Mekong Basin's development and encouraged Indian investors to seek 
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economic opportunities in this locale through supporting co-operative projects in 
BIMSTEC (2003, pp.58-60). Moreover, Thailand also hoped that BIMSTEC would 
ultimately serve as a crucial piece of the jigsaw of the greater Asian co-operation in ACD. 
As Surakiart said, 'strengthening linkages is what BIMSTEC is all about' (2004b, p.206). 
Figure 6.2: Thailand's major regional co-operation web in Asia under Thaksin 
These examples show that at the micro-level Thaksin actively deepened the bilateral 
relations with selected strategic partners. Certainly, these ties served to secure Thailand's 
economic interest but, at the same time, they were important policy tools for cultivating a 
broader regional co-operation. Thaksin's ultimate regional ambition was to construct a 
pan-Asian co-operation by way of ACD. In fact, the idea of positioning Thailand as a 
regional link was not totally new but has been included in Thailand's policy preference 
since the end of the Cold War. The Quadrangle Economic Co-operation and other sub-
regional initiatives in the first half of the 1990s confirm that tendency. The Thaksin 
government also shared this view and elaborated on it in a more active manner. His hope 
was 'to see Thailand as an Asian Geneva where most international summits, negotiations, 
and conflict resolutions may take place' (SC 2002, p.26). He claimed that after his various 
regional initiatives were implemented Thailand was stronger and more influential in 
everyone's eyes compared to when the financial crisis exploded (Thaksin 2002d). In 
order to realise his Asian co-operation scheme, not only did Thaksin promote 
concomitant regional initiatives but he also adopted a strategy to position Thailand's 
Asian identity as a central pinion of his foreign policy agenda. 
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6.3.2 Advocating Asian consciousness for Asian regionalism 
Thaksin's foreign policy in relation to regional co-operation can be again related to 
Thailand's domestic politics in the aftermath of the 1997 Financial Crisis. The Thaksin 
administration became a mediating actor between the country's domestic backlash and 
the internationalist coalitions. The former was supported by the traditional elite and local 
capitalists found in such venues as the palace, intellectual centres (i.e. universities), the 
local banking industry, the middle class, agro-industry, entertainment producers, 
automobile parts producers and the urban poor who suffered most from the crisis. 
Thaksin's business interests in the telecommunication sector also belonged to this group 
as a sector that required state protection from foreign competition in domestic market 
The internationalist approach, on the other hand, was preferred by certain sectors of the 
bureaucracy (especially the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Thailand), export-
intensive industries, and joint venture companies with foreign firms, and multinational 
firms (Pasuk 2004, pp.7-8). 
The compromise structured between the two domestic forces resulted in Thailand's re-
orientation towards a position reflecting neither a totally inward-looking nor totally 
internationalist outward-looking approach. As Etel Solingen suggests, Thaksin's coalition 
promoted a hybrid of policy, an 'alternative to internationalisation and "inward-looking" 
models' (2004, p.205; 2005, p.7). This foreign policy was rather a selective regionalist 
outward-looking orientation. The regionalist approach, while remaining open to the 
international economy, assigned priority . to the expansion of co-operation within a 
selected geographical area, which in Thaksin's view, was Asia. By pursuing this regional 
approach focusing on Asia Thaksin also thought Thailand would be able to assert its role 
and easily helped Thailand's attempt to expand its markets (Pasuk & Baker, p.123). The 
ACD was his brainchild setup to realise this ambition. 
A strategy to promote Asian regionalism was not only meant to promote the ACD as a 
pan-Asian regional institution. It was also intended to advocate a shared Asian identity in 
support of this regional scheme. Throughout his campaign for the ACD, Thaksin 
emphasised how Asian countries could help each other instead ofrelying on 'others'. This 
constituted an indirect attack on the United States, its Western allies and their 
international institutions. However, this foreign policy posture cannot be seen as an anti-
foreigner policy per se. In reality, it was hardly feasible that Thailand would have pursued 
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such an inward-looking direction considering its long history of international engagement 
and its interest in participating in the global economy. The regionalist policy adopted by 
Thaksin was more designed to be a means for mediating global shocks and uncertainties 
caused by the financial crisis and overcome through building a strong network of Asian 
co-operation. 
Paralleling Thaksin's domestic policy to create a strong economy through reinvigorating 
domestic production and consumption was his Asian co-operative scheme. This also 
envisioned the construction of a strong Asia based on its abundant resources and large 
market The Thai Prime Minister expressed this idea during the 2001 Fortune Global 
Forum in Hong Kong on the topic of 'Next Generation Asia'. He argued that Asia was a 
potential region for future growth. Considering Asia's population of more than three 
billion, its possession of one-third of the world's economy, and its currency reserves of 
more than half of the world's total, Thaksin believed that with sufficient co-operation 'Asia 
will regain its leading role in the business and financial world'. (Thaksin 2001d, 2002e). 
He further asserted that Asia had been pressured into a subordinate position by relying 
on external markets. In these circumstances, Asian countries had to compete with each 
other by offering lower costs of production and by cutting the price of their products. This 
resulted in augmenting the benefit of consumers and producers in the West, while Asian 
peoples received only minor shares. Therefore, Thaksin proposed that 
It is necessary for Asia to change from competing with each other to sell 
their products outside the region to deepening the linkage of regional 
trading networks ... to expand intra-Asian trade' (Thaksin 2001d). 
Thaksin and Surakiart started to promote their pan-Asian co-operation idea around the 
Asia continent in 2001, focusing on cultivating Thailand's natural strategic partners in the 
region. Thaksin travelled to China, Japan, Hong Kong, and India, seeking their readiness to 
co-operate with Thailand as a core group (SC 2002; Thaksin 2002b). It can be seen that 
Thaksin's initiative was successful and supported by these major Asian countries due 
partly to Thailand's continued good relations with them. At the same time, by courting 
these major players Thailand realised that other smaller nations would be interested in 
joining the ACD as well. 
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On the inauguration of the ACD in 2002, Thaksin emphasised how Asia had been glorious 
in the past until it was humiliated by colonialism during the nineteenth century. He 
further observed that in the twentieth century Asia revived and attained prosperity and 
wealth until the 1997 Financial Crisis. Coupled with the rise of international terrorism, 
Asia had been weakened and needed to protect itself from further uncertainties. However, 
Asia still lacked a forum that covered the whole region and could instil sufficient 
confidence into Asian countries. Asia could not be strong unless a shared Asian identity 
was generated. He insisted that: 
The emergence of Asian-consciousness, and with it Asian confidence and 
creativity, will be a key factor in the maturing of the region ... The turning 
point will come when Vietnamese soap operas top the TV rating in 
Indonesia, when Indonesian pop stars play to packed stadiums in Thailand, 
when a Thai fashion designer sells clothes like hotcakes in Shanghai and 
when a Chinese feature film breaks box office records across Asia (Thaksin 
2001e). 
Thaksin believed that the ACD would be an effective channel for Asian countries to 
address their mutual interests in co-operation because its interoperability was not 
dependent on a consensus of the whole, but rather on a like-minded group prevailing in 
discussion (Thaksin 2002a). Therefore, the ACD avoided other impasses on voting issues. 
Consistent with his approach to free trade negotiation, his model for regional 
multilateralism also rested upon a '2+x model', that is, any co-operative project can be 
started with at least two countries while others can join later. 
To operationalise this Asian consciousness within the ACD, Thaksin did not hesitate to use 
a language that was intended to stir up the Asian consciousness even in his Asian Bond 
scheme. He stated that the Asian Bond would be a financial instrument to help maximise 
Asia's potential and 'prevent exploitation of [Asian] reserves by others against the interest 
of [Asians]' (Thaksin 2002a). Though realising the similar development of such financial 
mechanisms elsewhere in Asia, especially within the ASEAN+3 framework, Thaksin 
reasoned that such a mechanism was likely to benefit a limited numbers of countries, and 
could only be called 'an "East Asian Bond", not an Asian Bond' (Thaksin 200Sa). He 
further asserted, 'while the EU seems to offer Euro currency and Eurobond to us in Asia, is 
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it an appropriate time for us to offer Asianbond to our European partner?' (Thaksin 
2002a). He hoped that the Asian Bond could be a financial investment alternative for the 
region and outsiders. It would 'attract more capital for development projects' in the 
region. On~e developed and widely accepted it could help Asian financial market 'become 
more mature', and 'contribute to Qverall stability' of the regional 'and world's financial 
system' (Thaksin 2005c). 
Since the proposal of the Asian Bond, Thailand has rigorously pursued the plan. Thaksin 
directed the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Thailand to conduct a technical study while 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for mobilising diplomatic support for the 
scheme. However, gaining internal agreement over the Asia Bond was not as easy as 
initially expected despite Thaksin's direct command. Tej Bunnag9 recalled that Thaksin 
also had to put in an enormous effort to convince both economic agencies to share his 
vision and support him in this financial scheme (interview on 29 February 2008). 
After raising the Asian Bond idea at the inaugural meeting in Thailand, According to the 
MF A's document (2003b ), the MFA invited the governor of Hong Kong's central bank and 
the Pakistani Finance Minister for discussions about details of the plan in mid-August 
2002. The parties agreed on three steps. First, the Working Group on Financial Co-
operation in the ACD would be set up. Hong Kong would be responsible for technical 
studies while Thailand was in charge of marketing the scheme. The Working Croup 
convened for the first time in May 2003 in Bangkok to draft a formal plan for the Asian 
Bond. Second, it was agreed that the Asian Bond Fund would be established by each 
interested party pooling one per cent of its currency reserves into this fund. India and 
Pakistan committed to contributing US$1 billion and US$50 million to the fund, 
respectively. Third, three elements would be put in place: (1) a credit rating agency; (2) 
securitisation; and (3) a credit guarantee facility developed by professionals and 
recognised internationally. Thailand took a proactive role in campaigning for this scheme 
both within Asia and beyond including in APEC, ASEAN+3, NAM, and World Economic 
Forum. This resulted in many major Asian economies supporting the Asian Bond, 
including China, Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the 
9 The former Thai Ambassador to the China, the UN, France, and United States, the MFA 
Permanent Secretary during Thaksin, former senior advisor to the King, and former Foreign 
Minister during the Samak government. 
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ASEAN member states. This support was evident in the Chiang Mai Declaration on Asian 
Bond Market Development at the 2nd ACD Ministerial Meeting in June 2003 (MFA 2003b ). 
Thus, Thailand's role in propelling the ACD process was significant Although the ACD 
initiative was criticised by many extra-regional observers as merely being another 
'talking shop' without any significant substance (Matichon, 19 May 2002, pp.2, 5), Thaksin 
had demonstrated that he could exercise his political leadership successfully to mobilise 
Asian countries' support for his regional initiatives. In fact, as argued by Vitavas Srivihok, 
Director-General of ASEAN Affairs, 'we [Thailand] wanted it to be a 'talkfest' for a while so 
that it could break the ice and build mutual trust and confidence' (interview on 4 January 
2008). Thailand's strategy in the ACD was to emphasise its core value as an element of 
informal discussions. That would promote a sense of regional belonging amongst Asian 
states (MFA 2003c). This was demonstrated by the acceptance of major Asian economies 
including China, Japan, and India including other members' active participation in their 
priority projects. Despite the common interest of the ACD member countries shown in 
various co-operative projects it cannot be denied that Thaksin and his foreign policy 
team's attempt to raise Asian identity or consciousness as a group vis-a-vis other regional 
groupings also contributed to the progress of the ACD. 
Therefore, we can see a nexus between Thailand's domestic politics and its foreign policy 
direction. Anti-Western sentiment and nationalism after the financial crisis not only 
influenced the Thaksin government to adopt a more populist policy as a political 
compromise. It also supported the idea of repositioning Thailand as a linkage between 
Asian sub-regions in a way in which Thailand's profile could be elevated in the 
international community, hence self-perception was sustained. It resulted in Thaksin's 
Forward Engagement Strategy bridging co-operation across Asia. The ACD performed the 
role of a conduit for regional commerce and identity. Thaksin believed that this 
historically changed the geo-politics of Asia in the sense that the ACD was the only forum 
that was able to include countries across the entire Asia continent In his opinion, it was 
an important step for Asia to become a unified actor and to lead the world (Thai Post 16 
June 2002, pp.1, 9; Matichon 19 June 2002, p.2). 
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6.3.3 Managing regional order 
The Forward Engagement Strategy based on the three major regional initiatives-ACD, 
BIMSTEC, and ACMECS-also had significant implications for the regional order in Asia. 
Thailand's foreign policy during Thaksin marked an interesting move of a medium-sized 
state in Southeast Asia that sought to not only to maintain but also to restructure the 
regional order. With regard to the aforementioned domestic and foreign policy direction, 
Thaksin's regionalist approach suggests that Thailand at this time may have attempted to 
reshape the region in a way to which major Asian powers accorded greater status. In 
explaining this strategic calculation, Thaksin hoped to achieve his foreign policy objective 
of: 
[building] a peaceful environment in the region so as to open up 
opportunities for every country in Asia as a whole to help each other to 
develop Asian economies. This is to achieve a goal of building Asia as a 
significant trading partner with the United States and the EU, including each 
country increasing intra-regional trade and decreasing markets outside the 
region (MFA 2001h) 
From the above statement, several essential points can be derived. First, Thailand wanted 
to strengthen Asian co-operation as it had done through focusing on various regional 
initiatives including ACD, BIMSTEC, and ACMECS. Second, it can be concluded that, though 
not explicit, Thai foreign policy-makers preferred to see the emergence of an Asian 
regional bloc to compete with the United States and the Europeans. Ultimately, by 
pursuing this policy direction Thailand would play a central role both in Southeast Asia 
and throughout the wider region (MFA 2002e). 
(a) Consolidating the Asian bloc 
To reiterate, the experience of the 1997 Financial Crisis strongly influenced the Thaksin 
government's view towards the global economy. Thai foreign policy-makers were not 
reluctant to express their frustration with the crisis and perceived that the ongoing 
development in the world trading system in its aftermath worked against Thailand and 
Asia's benefit While Thailand and Asia still needed to trade with the United States and the 
EU, Thaksin was of the view that closer economic partnership within Asia was only the 
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way to gain tangible and enduring benefits. An MFA policy paper clearly articulated this 
view: 
Being too content with the status quo, Asians might lose the chance of 
enjoying the benefits of having the largest market in the world, whereas 
Latin Americas are now scheduled to join NAFTA and East Europeans are to 
join the EU, giving the two economic blocs enormous bargaining power 
(MFA 2002f). 
The NESDB also expressed this view. Its policy recommendations also advocated 
Thailand increasing its bargaining power in the world trading system. It stron~ly 
recommended that Thailand create conditions in which that country and its trading 
partners could collectively direct and write the rules and patterns of the international 
trading and financial system (MFA 2002i). This policy recommendation clearly echoed 
Thaksin's idea and directive to strengthen a unified Asian voice in the international 
community. 
This logic explains why Thailand actively promoted various schemes for regional co-
operation based exclusively on Asia. By consolidating Asian economic ties, Thailand 
hoped that Asia as a whole could act collectively to interact with other regions from a 
position of strength. The MFA asserted that the Forward Engagement Strategy was aimed 
at seeking to 'connect existing regional frameworks to networks and cooperative 
frameworks in other regions ... between Asia and Latin America, between Asia and Eastern 
Europe' (MF A 2002f). This strategy carried 'a sense of region' as a way to respond to 
uncertainties in the world economy emanating from unequal resource distribution that 
traditionally favoured the West The shaping of an Asian regional bloc was therefore 
underlying Thaksin's idea. 
Moreover, the Forward Engagement Strategy also demonstrated Thailand's strategies of 
what Evelyn Goh calls the 'omni-enmeshment' of major power and 'complex balance of 
influence' (Goh 2007p.?). This was through the creation of a complex web of economic co-
operation and layers of dialogues where talks are more frequent and conflicts are 
neutralised, hence contributing to the maintenance of regional order. In the view of 
Thaksin's foreign policy team, the major players in Asia consisted of China, Japan, India, 
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and ASEAN with whom Thailand must play an active role to facilitate interactions 
amongst them. 
The rise of China, though not explicitly expressed amongst Thai policy-makers in a 
negative sense, is still viewed as a challenge in the perception of Thai foreign policy-
makers. Thailand's policy paper for the national strategy towards China during the 
Thaksin government identified the main policy towards China as 'preventing and 
eliminating the Chinese threat to Thailand' (MFA 2001d). By realising its own weaker 
bargaining position, Thailand needs 'to use co-operative and constructive engagement 
policy at both bilateral and multilateral level' (SC 2003) so that China would play a 
constructive role in the international community. Thailand also wanted China to support 
its own aspirations and that of ASEAN vis-a-vis other major developed countries. 
Thailand received China's full support for its ACD initiative (SC 2003). At the same time, 
Thailand tightened the bilateral strategic partnership with China by starting to negotiate 
the Joint Action Plan on Strategic Partnership that outlined various collaborative aspects 
to mark their thirtieth anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2005 (Smith 2005). The 
Action Plan was later concluded and signed in 2007 after Thaksin was ousted by the 
September 2006 coup. 
While cultivating close ties with Beijing, Bangkok tried to find a balance in its position. The 
visit of Surakiart, the Foreign Minister, to Japan in 2001 signified Thailand's desire to 
enmesh and balance the Chinese. An MF A report of his visit states that Surakiart 
discussed the role of China with the Japanese Foreign Minister. He stated: 'China is 
increasingly playing her role in Asia and at the global level. Thailand also wants to see 
Japan to play an active and constructive role equally to that of the Chinese counterpart' 
(MFA 2001c, p.2). He then raised the ACD initiative and proposed that Japan should join 
this forum. In a later meeting, Thaksin reiterated the ACD plan with the Japanese Prime 
Minister in which the latter expressed his interest, and expressed his belief in the 
significance of co-operation between Japan and ASEAN (MFA 2001c, p.4). 
At the same time, Thaksin also noticed that India was increasingly trying to insert its 
presence in Southeast Asia through its 'Look East' policy (MFA 2001e ). He, therefore, was 
not reluctant to pull an India factor into his regional scheme. Thai-Indian relations were 
boosted at both the bilateral and regional levels as evidenced in the FTA agreement, 
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BIMSTEC, and ACD. Thailand also agreed with India and Myanmar to develop a road link 
which enabled India to increase its role in Myanmar and reach mainland Southeast Asia 
more conveniently. By doing so, China's growing economic and geo-political influence 
could also be checked to a certain extent 
To summarise, Thailand sought close ties with major Asian partners by enmeshing these 
actors into a web of bilateral and regional co-operation. While China and Japan were 
members of the ASEAN+3, India was included in the picture through BIMSTEC. Ultimately, 
the effect of Thai diplomacy has not only maintained a co-operative atmosphere in the 
region but also strengthened regional bargaining power with outsiders, especially the 
United States. This concept was confirmed by Thaksin in the Cabinet meeting in 
December 2001. He agreed that Asian co-operation under ACD would be supported by 
three core groups of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and West Asia. He further asserted that 
Thailand needed to strengthen its relations with each core group first and expand to other 
parts of the region especially China, India and Japan. Their participation in these three 
regional powers in the ACD would secure the success of Thailand's regional strategy (SC 
2001,p.1). 
Thaksin saw his country as having a geographical advantage in pursuing regional co-
operation as a link between Asian sub-regions. Once this regional scheme was stabilised 
'Thailand [could] use it as a card to attract more attention especially from the United 
States to attach more significance to Asia and Thailand than its current stage' (SC 2001, 
p.2). However, the reluctance of the United States to fully help Thailand and some either 
Asian economies during the Financial Crisis still haunted Thailand's policy-makers. 
Southeast Asia was also not a priority of US foreign policy when compared with the 
Middle East and East Asia. Therefore, Thailand's regional approach to build Asian 
regionalism was designed, in part, to compensate for Washington's distancing itself from 
the region. 
This sub-section has given a picture of how the Thaksin administration tried to assert 
Thailand's role in regional politics. It can see from the above discussion that in order to 
strengthen the regional order Thaksin chose to. employ a strategy that positioned 
Thailand as a central mover in this enterprise. This strategy dealing with regional powers 
can be seen as 'active' or 'assertive' but may not represent 'proactive' foreign policy 
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behaviour per se as defined by this thesis. It can be argued that it meant to contain conflict 
and possible emerging regional instability, hence maintaining status quo. However, from 
another perspective this Forward Engagement Strategy was also regarded as 'proactive' 
since it also introduced changes in some regional arrangements that Thailand thought it 
could gain benefits especially the regional financial architecture and trading regime. This 
is still debatable but at least affirms Thailand's attempt to play a leading role in regional 
affairs. Notwithstanding this difficulty to fully engage in 'proactive' policy behaviour 
regarding bigger regional players, Thailand's proactive role in sub-regional mainland 
Southeast Asia continued. 
(b) Continuing interest in mainland Southeast Asia 
Whilst Thailand under the Thaksin government asserted itself as a central link in an Asia-
wide co-operation, its interest in mainland Southeast Asia was also strengthened. 
Thailand attempted to project its centrality once again in this sub-region. Its emphasis on 
leading mainland Southeast Asia was emphasised by Surakiart; he states: 
Thailand is a regional hub for this part of the world, a position recognised by 
President Bush and President Prodi in their Joint Statement during the 
Prime Minister's visit to the United States and the European Commission. 
We have revitalized our relations with the neighbouring countries, both 
near and far (Surakiart 2004a, p.23). 
Apart from existing sub-regional co-operation in Mekong sub-region monitored mainly 
by ADB, this time Thailand initiated its own sub-regional scheme, ACMECS, once again. 
That body was not only an apparatus for Thailand to narrow the development gap 
between old and new ASEAN states but also to consolidate its own leadership in this area. 
However, what differed from previous initiatives for the Mekong Basin was that we can 
see the Thaksin government was committed to perform a greater leading role and 
gradually towards more structural leadership. This can be seen from its provision of more 
systemic financial and technical assistance to its neighbouring countries under the 
ACMECS scheme. At the same time, the policy was crafted with consideration of political 
and socio-cultural sensitivities stemming from Thailand's bitter experiences with its 
neighbours throughout the post-Cold War period. 
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Thailand's leadership in ACMECS 
With the realisation that Indochina could be a source of Thailand's further economic 
growth, Thaksin placed a great importance on bridging the development gaps between 
his country and others in Indochina by using Thailand the engine to drive economic 
development in them. This approach was dubbed by Thaksin and Surakiart: 'prosper thy 
neighbours' slogan (MFA 2005b, p.26). 
Thailand's leadership under ACMECS can be observed in a number of ways. At the First 
ACMECS Ministerial Meeting in 2004 Thailand announced that it had approved THBlOO 
million for 42 immediate projects, and was planning to inject THBlO billion into co-
operation and development schemes for neighbouring countries for which THB4 billion 
had already been approved (MFA 2004). In addition, Thailand volunteered to build the 
ACMECS website as an information centre for public relations and co-ordination amongst 
ACMECS members (ACMECS n.d). Thailand also pledged to initiate unilateral tariff 
reductions for new ASEAN member countries under the ASEAN Integration System of 
Preference (AISP) (MFA 2004). At the ACMECS Summit in 2005 Thailand then announced 
the elimination of tariffs on all agricultural products from Indochinese countries under 
the contract farming projects and expressed its readiness to include handicraft items as 
well (SC 2006). By the end of 2006, it was reported that Laos was offered zero per cent 
tariff for its 225 agricultural products, and 5 per cent for additional 82 products (DFT n.d.). 
This tariff reduction programme would also link to the proposal of contract farming. 
Thailand proposed a contract farming arrangement for its neighbours (particularly 
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar) to grow economic crops such as cassava and sugar cane. 
Both parties would benefit. While low income Indochinese countries would receive more 
investment in rural areas and their farmers could earn more stable incomes, Thailand 
would procure raw materials at cheaper prices for consumption and intermediate goods 
production such as bio-fuel (MFA 2004). Under contract farming projects small and 
medium farmers would also establish linkages with regional and global value chains and 
markets through Thailand and higher-income countries such as China and Vietnam (Zola 
2007). According to one ADB report, the contract farming scheme under ACMECS has 
been an exemplar for Asia-Pacific co-operation as 'a promising way of creating or 
promoting market linkages in the Asian region' (Sununtar 2008, p.16). Its effects would 
touch upon core issues of regional development, especially poverty reduction and 
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capacity building in low-income countries, contributing to bridging the development gap 
hence promoting regional stability at the wider level. 
Moreover, Thailand also played a role in mobilising third-party support under the 
Partnership for Development scheme, which included Australia, France, Germany, Japan, 
New Zealand and the ADB. At the 2004 Ministerial Meeting Japan confirmed that it would 
support the improvement project for Savannakhet Airport in Laos. France also pledged its 
financial support for ACMECS projects, while Germany and Thailand were to sign a 
memorandum of understanding for development partnership targeting in third countries 
in Indochina (MFA 2004). In 2006, Thailand also contributed THB100 million for the 
implementation of an anti-avian flu programme. It pledged financial support for the 
construction of a bridge between Thailand and Laos in Nakhon Phanom province, and for 
50 per cent of the construction cost of the Chiang Khong- Houayxay bridge (SC 2006). 
The ACMECS therefore represented another successful attempt by Thailand to crystallise 
its leadership in Southeast Asia. Similar to other Thai sub-regional initiatives, ACMECS 
embodies the grandest vision of Thai policy-makers since Chatichai's first dream of 
turning the region into a prosperous market This vision was also reiterated by Thaksin: 
Southeast Asia as a whole cannot rise as long as its poorer members are still 
mired in poverty. My government is working with our neighbours to close, 
or at least narrow, the gaps within ASEAN. This is being done, amongst 
other things, through the framework of the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-
Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy, or ACMECS. It is a momentous task, 
involving change on a grand scale, in terms of both time and resources. But 
it is a task that must be undertaken ... in accelerating the transformation of 
this former battlefield into a marketplace, as envisioned a decade and a half 
ago (Thaksin 2005c ). 
Increasing structural leadership through aid policy 
Even though Thailand is still a developing country, it started to emerge as an aid donor 
during the Thaksin government This signifies an attempt to continue to play a role as a 
helper and to increase Thailand's leadership and influence by providing assistance to 
developing countries especially in Indochina and through the ACMECS scheme. To 
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support ACMECS schemes especially in the areas of technical assistance and human 
resource development, Thailand revamped its aid policy. Although Thailand's aid to 
foreign countries started as early as the 1980s, it was limited to humanitarian assistance 
to countries affected by natural disasters. Aid programmes were not systematised until 
1992 when the Anand government expanded the programme. However, Thailand's 
overseas development assistance programme did not play an active role due to financial 
resource constraints, and Thailand was still a net recipient of aid. 
Thailand's aid policy started to change under the Thaksin government when it announced 
that Thailand must emerge from a net recipient status to become a donor country 
following the last repayment of IMF Stand-by Arrangement in the end of July 2003, two 
years ahead of schedule (BOT n.d.). Thaksin declared that Thailand would stop receiving 
foreign aid as a recipient, but would solicit aid partnerships on the basis of equality. In this 
connection, he pledged to increase the foreign assistance programme focusing on 
Thailand's neighbours. Thailand started by offering export credit of THB3 billion to 
Myanmar, and THB2 billion to Cambodia and Laos (Thaksin 2003b, 2003c). Following 
this attempt, it can be seen that Thailand provided overseas assistance totally accounting 
for 0.6 per cent of gross national income in 2003, and stabilised at around 0.1-0.13 per 
cent in from 2005 onwards (World Bank 2010). These figures are interesting if compared 
with those of the United States, 0.11 per cent in 2001 (UNDP 2003, p.228) and 0.17 per 
cent in 2004 (UNDP 2006, p.343). 
The Thai Prime Minister also restructured Thailand's aid agency during this time. 
Thailand's aid agency-the Department of Technical and Economic Co-operation (DTEC), 
was transferred from the Office of the Prime Minister to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
2002 under bureaucratic reform. However, DTEC was dissolved and re-established as the 
Thailand International Development Co-operation Agency (TICA) in 2004. This revamp 
aimed at creating a unified role for Thailand's foreign affairs team and equipped with 
financial tools that would promote Thailand's role in international community. The new 
role of TICA was no longer 'to coordinate development cooperation programmes 
extended to Thailand and to liaise with donor governments and international 
organisations', but to 'steer and coordinate Thailand's technical cooperation activities 
under bilateral, regional, and multilateral frameworks' (TICA 2005, pp.6, 8). 
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This meant TICA's role changed to support Thailand's role in international affairs by 
providing assistance to foreign countries. Its objectives focused on promoting Thailand as 
a centre for technical co-operation in Asia. The assistance programmes under TICA were 
constructed to achieve six major tasks. First, the 'bilateral programme' was designed to 
provide direct assistance to a particular country by ways of development and training 
projects, the secondment of Thai experts, and the provision of equipment. Second, the 
'Annual International Training Courses Programme' (AITC) was organised to support 
capacity building of developing countries by transferring Thailand's experience and 
knowledge crucial to development process. Third, the 'Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries Programme' (TCDC) promoted the sharing of knowledge and 
technology amongst public officials from the Southern Hemisphere. Fourth, the 'Third 
Country Training Programme' (TCTP) aimed at promoting Thailand as a training ground 
for various international organisations in the region such as WHO, ESCAP, and UNDP. 
Fifth, the 'Trilateral and Regional Cooperation Programme' reflected Thailand's proactive 
role ·in provision of aid and its commitment as an emerging donor country. It also 
provided an opportunity for Thailand to mobilise and pool financial resources with third-
party donor countries to assist other developing countries. The focus was on human 
resource development and capacity building. Sixth, TICA also supported a volunteer 
programme under the project 'Friends from Thailand'. It dispatched young volunteers to 
developing countries to carry out missions in human resource development and help 
promote cultural and people-to-people exchanges, such as Thai language instructors 
(TICA 2005, pp.11-14). 
The connection between ACMECS and Thailand's overseas assistance programmes has 
been Thailand's active role in ACMECS itself, especially in terms of its strong commitment 
to provide technical assistance to Indochina. Thailand thus uses its various aid 
programmes to support this role. As pledged by Foreign Minister Surakiart, Thailand 
became 'committed to addressing and resolving difficulties encountered by [its] 
neighbours ... major strategic areas have been identified which will be addressed by the 
relevant Thai agencies' (Surakiart 2004c, p.117), one of which is 'technical assistance 
aimed at capacity building'. According to TICA's Deputy Director, Apinan Phatarathiyanon, 
as 'TI CA was now under the MF A it was easier to carry out this mission without delays in 
inter-agency co-ordination' (interview on 15 February 2008). 
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According to TICA's statistics, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam benefited most 
from the TICA assistance programmes, receiving 62.25 and then 60 per cent of total 
assistance in 2003 and 2004, respectively. Overall, from 1999-2004 amongst these four 
countries Laos and Cambodia also ranked top in aid destination from Thailand, 
accounting for 31 and 22 per cent of net value (TICA 2005, pp.52-56). Moreover, under 
the TICA's bilateral programme to the four Indochinese countries, Thailand granted 
technical assistance mostly in the areas of public administration and agriculture 
development valued at THBll.37 and THB 10.16 million in 2003, and THB 7.99 and THB 
7.5 million in 2004 (TICA 2005, pp.67, 81) Thus Thailand's aid policy and ACMECS 
scheme are mutually supportive, enabling Thailand to project its leading role in regional 
development 
According to Apinan in the same interview on 15 February 2008, unlike OECD countries 
in which aid policy is used mainly to support trade facilitation Thailand's policy has 
assumed an 'aid for development' approach. That means Thailand has not focused on 
financial assistance unnecessarily but rather on technical assistance, based on Thai 
expertise and experience in collaboration with other advanced countries. These technical 
assistance programmes are conducted in Thailand and use Thailand's facilities, 
benefitting that country in several ways. As a former aid recipient, Thailand is in a more 
suitable position to share its good and bad experiences in development. Thai experts are 
more understanding of the real conditions of developing countries than many technical 
trainers from the first world. This is more conducive to and effective for knowledge 
transfer and sharing, hence creating partnerships between Thailand and countries from 
the South. Although Thailand may not be involved directly in some programmes, such as 
in TCTP, it still gains from the money spent in the country by training organisers and 
participants, and a favourable impression of Thai hospitality is given. 
Eventually, these technical assistance programmes benefit not only from the 
development of the developing countries, especially as a tool to bridge the ASEAN divide. 
They ultimately consolidate Thailand's leading position and sphere of influence in 
mainland Southeast Asia. In Apinand' s words, 
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Thailand's overseas assistance also builds a pro-Thai perception amongst 
new generation leaders especially in CLMV countries in the long run, similar 
to what the American used to do in East Asia (interview, 15 February 2008). 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the continuity of Thailand's foreign policy preference in 
positioning itself as a leading actor in promoting regional and sub-regional co-operation. 
It discussed how the Thaksin government managed to find a fair ground to pursue 
regionalist foreign policy and to assert Thailand's role in regional political economy 
despite Thailand's domestic inward-looking sentiment and economic difficulties after 
the 1997 Financial Crisis. While acknowledging his electorate's inward-looking attitude, 
Thaksin also needed to satisfy the internationalist forces in Thailand to restore its 
competitiveness after the financial crisis. The outcome was a visible 'dual-track' 
approach applied to Thai foreign affairs. Whilst pursuing a populist policy at home 
Thaksin also extended this approach to strengthen regional co-operation partly through 
promoting a regional consciousness amongst Asian countries. Therefore, a major foreign 
policy characteristic under this government was the 'Forward Engagement Strategy' 
based on three regional schemes-ACD, BIMSTEC, and ACMECS. 
This chapter has also demonstrated further that the Forward Engagement Strategy 
was largely motivated by Thailand's aspirations for regional leading role. It has shown 
throughout the chapter that this ideational factor played an integral part in this foreign 
policy strategy. This case also shows how the ·idea of regionalism in the Thaksin 
government was extended to cover various levels of regions, not only in mainland 
Southeast Asia. This extension of regional construction can also reflect, what Can tori & 
Spiegel (1970) propose, the increasing level of communication amongst nations and 
the motivational element of power in which the Thai decision-making elite was willing 
to seek a leading status in international affairs (pp.408-409). 
The Forward Engagement Strategy confirms several important elements in Thailand's 
post-Cold War foreign policy that were cited and assessed in <:;hapter Four. That is, this 
strategy emphasised using foreign policy as a state instrument for increasing 
Thailand's competitiveness in the world economy by way of creating regional 
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multilateralism. At the same time, it also focused on consolidating Thailand's 
leadership in mainland Southeast Asia as a sphere of influence. This foreign policy 
direction is similar to that of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
However, the Forward Engagement Strategy was unique in at least one respect. 
Instead of totally falling back to its traditionally reactive behaviour as many observers 
may have predicted, Thai foreign policy during this time was even more proactive in its 
nature. This policy proaction was reinvigorated by the perception amongst policy-
makers (led forcefully by Thaksin himself) that Thailand must regain its pride and 
leading role in the international community. The Forward Engagement Strategy thus 
shows that Thai foreign policy-makers were not reluctant to bring back its regional 
aspirations. Without such leadership consciousness the scope and influence of Thai 
foreign policy would have been much more limited. 
This proaction was certainly and greatly inspired by Thailand's self-perception as a 
leading state in, at least, mainland Southeast Asia. Therefore, regardless of the 
remaining economic difficulties it was no surprise to see Thailand's foreign policy" 
makers to push forwards its proactive role in international arena. Thailand's regional 
role was manifested in its promotion of intra-regional co-operation, hence 
sophisticating its entrepreneurial and intellectual skills. This resulted in Thailand's 
ability to bridge various regional arrangements and major actors under the ACD 
scheme. At the same time, its structural leadership was gradually built through the 
capability to use its own resources to influence the development of mainland Southeast 
Asia. This capacity was centred on jts aid policy and the multilateral co-operation of 
ACMECS in which Thailand was undeniably a sole leading actor amongst the members. 
Therefore, it can be seen that Thailand's self-perception and its regional aspirations 
influenced the way in which Thailand set about achieving national interests and 
subsequent policy actions. 
Lastly, the case of Thai foreign policy analysed in this chapter also reflects an 
interesting aspect of the foreign policy of medium-sized powers. It suggests that their 
foreign policy strategy in international relations may not only be dependent on having 
a systemic structure. In some cases,. the strategy can be strongly influenced by their 
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own internal context and ideational factors. Comparing the two cases of the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation and the Forward Engagement Strategy, it can be 
seen that both operated in different systemic contexts. The former was conducted in a 
relatively normal situation whHe the latter evolved as a product of regional financial 
turmoil. However, the policy outcomes of both were likely to be consistent in terms of 
Thailand's policy preference to exercise its leading role. Therefore, the systemic 
structure may not entirely shape policy preference in every aspect although it may be 
important in constraining policy implementation. Instead, it is suggested that an 
ideational factor or regional aspirations in this case, played a certain role in which 
Thailand's policy preference was constructed in response to a particular crisis. 
Attempting to exercise its regional influence seems to be, again, amongst indispensable 
choices in Thailand's foreign policy agenda. 
The next chapter will therefore be a concluding part that draws all the major findings 
to reconfirm the thesis's main argument for the role of self-perception in Thailand's 
post-Cold War foreign policy. It will also discuss the major contributions that this 
thesis offers to the body of knowledge in the related fields and policy practitioners, as 
well as the possible future research agendas. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to enhance the understanding of the changing nature of 
Thai foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The approximate period under 
study is around two decades between the late 1980s and the mid 2000s, 
specifically between the Chatichai Choonhavan government (1988-1991) and the 
Thaksin government (2001-2006). It has been argued that Thai foreign policy 
behaviour during this period increasingly increasingly departed from a 'reactive' 
foreign policy, as traditionally ascribed by most scholars in the field, to a more 
proactive approach. However, unlike previous studies in Thai foreign relations that 
take material factors as the sole determinants of change, this thesis has sought to 
examine the role of ideational factors as another aspect in foreign policy-making. 
The role of self-perception in determining Thailand's foreign policy preferences to 
play a leading role in mainland Southeast Asia and beyond has been specifically 
discussed. 
7.1 The major findings 
The author first assessed three dominant explanations of Thai foreign policy 
behaviour, in Chapter Two. Indeed, the main argument of this thesis is 
fundamentally derived from the shortcomings identified in these explanations of 
Thai foreign policy behaviour. It is shown in Chapter Two that the conventional 
school of thought in the study of Thai foreign policy has established an 
understanding of Thai foreign policy behaviour as reactive foreign policy based on 
the realist approach. It is labelled the 'bending with the wind' diplomacy due to its 
high degree of flexibility. This description is grounded in Thai diplomatic history 
regarding its responses to external great powers in the colonial period and during 
the tensions of the Cold War. Within this conventional view, this reactive and 
accommodating posture towards external forces contributed to Thailand's success 
in maintaining its survival and sovereignty. That is, Thailand is flexible in choosing 
and changing policies to side with any power potentially gaining preponderance in 
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the international system. Despite the fact that the Cold War ended and Thailand's 
traditional post-war security threats largely disappeared, the reactive foreign 
policy thesis focusing on its flexibility is still used to explain Thailand's foreign 
relations, not only with major powers but also with other parties and issues. 
Two other existing explanations apply other factors, apart from security, to explain 
Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy direction. The influence of 'democratic 
norms' and 'personal interest and ambition of political leaders' are particularly 
featured. Yet, these alternatives cannot explain the important, overall trend in Thai 
foreign policy. The former is mostly associated with Thailand's democratisation 
especially after the May 1992 massacre and more specifically under Democrat-led 
governments. At the same time, although such as idiosyncratic explanation makes 
sense in several cases in which political leadership was extraordinary, it does not 
generally explain the political leadership and style of the Democrat Party that was 
the major ruling coalition throughout much of the post-Cold War Thailand. 
Moreover, many foreign policy initiatives formulated during the Democrat 
government also explicitly demonstrate Thailand's clear intention to exert regional 
role at different levels. This policy behaviour does not readily fit within any of the 
existing approaches to Thai foreign policy. 
This thesis has accordingly questioned mainly the applicability of the 'conventional 
wisdom' in analysing Thailand's foreign policy behaviour in the post-Cold War era 
when such monumental structural change has occurred at the international level. 
The diffusion of the Cold War tensions and greater economic interdependence 
since the mid-1980s have lifted many constraints and created greater room for 
small and medium countries to adjust their conduct of external affairs. Thailand 
benefited from these changes and was at the forefront of promoting peace in 
Indochina during the 1990s and beyond. 
Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan's policy of 'turning the battlefields into 
marketplaces' opened up a new phase of Thailand's foreign relations. This policy 
change does not fit with the reactive foreign policy behaviour generally ascribed to 
Thailand. It was mainly through the Government's own initiative and with a 
notable absence of clearly defined external pressures that Thailand elected to 
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exercise this policy option. In fact, this policy was initially opposed by many key 
stakeholders both within Thailand and among its foreign allies. Notwithstanding 
such initial resistance, the 'turning battlefield into marketplaces' approach had a 
great impact on ensuring Thai foreign policy in the post-Cold War period by re-
arranging Thailand's foreign policy priorities. Thailand's foreign policy, thereafter; 
explkitly attached greater importance to economic issues and development, 
especially in mainland Southeast Asia. Thailand's regional role largely stemmed 
from its activities in these policy sectors. 
Thailand's attempt to exercise the leading role and influence in this geographical 
area recalled the traditional concept of 'Suvarnabhumi'(the Golden Peninsula) and 
Pan-Thai-ism. These concepts reflect Thailand's desires to be an epicentre or a 
leader on Southeast Asia. However, these ideas were initially taken lightly in the 
literature of Thai foreign policy analysis, and were viewed merely as the reference 
point of certain ultra-nationalist military elites. Considering Thailand's 
involvement in initiating its own series of regional co-operations since the 
Chatichai government, this thesis takes . the view that ideas associated with 
Suvarnabhumi actually influenced foreign policy in contemporary Thailand much 
more than was previously thought. As Tej Bunnag also mentioned in the interview, 
'in fact, even the name of Thailand's new international airport-Suvarnabhumi-
given by HM the King somehow envisioned the centrality of Thailand in this region' 
(interview on 29 February 2008). Based on such a view this thesis investigated this 
idea and its relevance to Thai foreign policy-making in the post-Cold War period. 
Its findings suggest that conventional wisdom on Thai foreign policy should 
incorporate an ideational approach to foreign policy analysis to broaden 
understanding of Thailand's foreign policy behaviour. 
· 7.1.1 Thailand's self-perception existed as a basis for regional aspirations 
This thesis also concurs with the ideational notion that actors' interests are not 
exogenously determined. As the cognitive approaches discussed in Chapter Three 
argue for the relationship between self-perception and interest. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the way in which 'individuals or states' identities shape or 
are the basis of interests' (Reus-smit 2005, p.197). Therefore, Chapter Three traced 
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the origin of how Thai people and their elite understand and view themselves, 
through the context of 'self-perception'. 
This chapter reaffirmed that Thailand's self-perception is closely associated with 
the 'Suvarnabhumi' concept, and that this was a product of the modern Thai nation-
state building process. In that process, nationalism was used by political elites in 
different periods, with the same purpose in mind, to form national characteristics 
and knowledge shared by different groups of people residing in the newly 
demarcated territories, or to use Benedict Anderson's words (1983), to shape an 
'imagined community'. This 'imagined Thailand' was constructed mainly through 
Bangkok's promotion of so-called 'official nationalism'. This version of nationalism 
underscores the superiority· of Thais and the central Thai culture over other 
nations and ethnic groups. 
To consolidate their country's nation-state building projects, Thai elites since King 
Rama V have employed various strategies to enforce, popularise, and imbue an 
official nationalism into the Thai people. Bangkok has pursued overt national 
consolidation policies, as evidenced in the case of the Siamese court in Bangkok 
forcing other small kingdoms militarily to accept it as the sole sovereign for 
modern Siam/Thailand. This approach was also illustrated by the Phibun 
government's Cultural Mandates to promoting 'proper Thai-ness'. However, it was 
the indirect enforcement of official socialisation processes that embedded the 
'imagined Thailand' amongst the citizens. The most important instrument 
employed to impose official nationalism as a dominant view was popular education. 
Research in Thai nationalism shows that Thai education has continuously 
emphasised Thailand's regional centrality in Southeast Asia, its past victories and 
its expansion into present-day neighbouring countries. This version of history is 
still found being taught in Thai schools, even today. 
Moreover, Thailand's Cold War experiences also deepened the sense of Bangkok's 
regional centrality and its neighbours were often regarded as tangible threats to 
Thailand's security. Thailand's role as an American ally and a frontline state in the 
region against communism during this period mirrored its struggle for influence 
over mainland Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 also 
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sensitised Thailand to a historical enemy who had always challenged Bangkok's 
geographical sphere of influence. Thailand's role was therefore to repeat what it 
had done before-to ward off the Vietnamese. Thai calls for support from great 
powers and from the international community in this episode placed Bangkok in 
the world political spotlight. The conclusion of the Cold War and the resolution of 
the Cambodian issue both elevated confidence and esteem amongst Thai policy-
makers relative to their country's centrality in the region. 
These historical experiences invariably encouraged Thais to cultivate a negative 
image of other nations, particularly their neighbouring countries which are 
portrayed as uncivilised, subordinate, treacherous, or untrustworthy. Thais thus 
tend not to view themselves in close association with the citizens of their 
immediate neighbouring countries despite their sharing of cultural, historical, 
linguistic, religious, and ethnic roots. Chapter Three concluded that this nation-
building and socialisation process has resulted in a formation of a 'self and 'other' 
dichotomy in which the self is superior and the others are inferior. In other words, 
the Thai self-perception was formed around the core idea of Thailand's 'higher' 
status, hence Thailand was deemed by its policy elites to be a leader of the region 
especially in mainland Southeast Asia. This self-perception also interacted with the 
structural environment in the Cold War timeframe resulting in Thailand defining its 
national interest as protection of its security from communist neighbours. Policies 
grounded in distrust therefore dominated Thailand's foreign policy behaviour 
throughout the post-war era. 
However, Thai foreign policy before the end of the Cold War focused mainly on 
preserving the country's security. Its active role in both alliance politics and 
regional co-operation can be still regarded as a reactive foreign policy. It was the 
reaction to changes in regional political environment that may have affected the 
continuity of Thailand's national security pillars-nation, religion, and monarchy. 
Proactive foreign policy, defined by the Two Good Theory as a policy that seeks 
change the external environment in order to elevate a state's position in the 
international order, was less likely to emerge until the Cold War tension declined. 
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7.1.2 Emerging regional aspirations in the globalisation 
In Chapter Four, it was shown how the decline of the Cold War and rise of economic 
globalisation actually involved both material and ideational changes in Thailand. 
The evolving ideational structure prevailing during the end of the post-Cold War 
attached great significance to neo-liberalism. This, in turn, facilitated the 
transformation of modern capitalist economies towards neo-liberal free market 
principles and democracy. This ideational change resulted in many states around 
the world restricting their roles in economic affairs and democratising, especially 
after the collapse of the former Soviet Union (Fukuyama 2004, p.20). Despite 
decreasing their direct roles in the economy, states still remain prominent in 
promoting economic environments conducive to growth and investment. 
Strengthening a state's economic competitiveness through various competitive and 
co-operative strategies has increasingly become a major focus. 
As stipulated by ideational theories, 'agents and structure are mutually constituted' 
(Reus-smit 2005, p.197). These structural changes prompted the transformation of 
the Thai state in terms of its political and economic goals, as well as the adjustment 
of its self-perception. As the accommodating and reactive foreign policy behaviour 
may have been particularly conditioned by Thailand's traditional security dilemma, 
the decline of Cold War tensions and new structural environments certainly 
impacted on Thailand's foreign policy behaviour. 
Chapter Four discussed this process of transition. It demonstrated a connection 
between the internationalisation of the Thai economy, the changing nature of the 
Thai state, and its policy-makers' cognitive aspects. The internationalisation of the 
Thai economy that occurred during the 1980s means that Thailand became deeply 
integrated into the world capitalist economy. In this system, 'international 
competition' was a prevailing concept prescribing states' interest and policy 
directions towards promotion of trade and foreign investment. Not only did the 
internationalisation of Thai economy transform Thailand's production structure 
into export-led led growth but it also facilitated change in the political structure 
itself. A more 'globalised' Thai economy brought about the growth of the capitalists 
and the middle class within Thailand and their direct involvement in politics. This 
eventually resulted in the end of the prev:ious quasi-democratic political system led 
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by the military and the reintroduction of an elected civilian government led by 
Chatichai Choonhavan and supported by businessmen. As Anek Laothamatas (1991) 
argues, the increasing role of capitalists transformed Thai politics from 
'bureaucratic polity' to 'liberal corporatism'. This type of state, in turn, reinforced 
the idea of competition, co-option, and co-operation as concrete policy components 
to sustain and increase Thailand's economic competitiveness. 
Not only did the logic shaping this type of Thai state evolve from selected ideational 
and material structures, it also developed in accordance with existing cognitive 
elements. Chapter Four demonstrated that Thailand's self-perception developed 
into a more co-operative mode whilst its core element relating to its self-appointed 
sense of superiority remained intact. In other words, the Cold War antagonistic 
perception towards neighbouring countries gradually outmoded amongst Thai 
foreign policy-makers in the post-Cold War era. Yet, the view of Thailand as a 
'leading nation' in Southeast Asia remains an important operational idea amongst 
Thai policy-makers. Their self-perception was still centred on the idea of Thailand's 
leading position in the region but it became more tied to co-operation than to 
power competition of the Cold War. This resulted in Thailand seeking to exercise 
its regional leading role-its so-called 'regional aspirations'. This thesis has found 
that this characteristic of Thai foreign policy has been sustained throughout the 
post-Cold War period as an important element in Thailand's foreign policy. 
Chapter Four therefore concluded that Thailand's regional aspirations in its foreign 
policy have developed in line with three major characteristics. First, foreign policy 
has become a part of the Thai state's effort to advance Thailand's competitiveness 
in the international economy. To achieve this goal Thailand needs to secure and 
search for comparative advantage. Mainland Southeast Asia, therefore, has been 
designated as Thailand's pivotal area of influence. Thailand's exercise its leading 
role in this geographical area therefore constitutes the second characteristic. Third, 
however, Thailand's relatively limited structural power requires it to utilise 
multilateral approaches to regional co-operation. Depending on circumstances, 
Thailand thus views its role in regional co-operation primarily as a bridge, 
facilitator or co-ordinator in the broader regional co-operation. These features 
were examined by employing two case studies in key Thai foreign policy during 
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this period, namely, the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiatives (or the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation), and the Forward Engagement strategy. 
7.1.3 Crystallising regional aspirations in the early stage 
Since the Chatichai government, Thailand's foreign policy has been preoccupied 
with identifying new and acceptable regional arrangements. Thailand was not 
reluctant to embrace the idea of promoting sub-regional co-operation as a means to 
strengthen its economic competitiveness and to exercise regional influence. 
Parallel to the ADB's Greater Mekong Sub-region, the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation was one of the first regional initiatives proposed by Thailand in the early 
post.:Cold War period. The thesis has argued in Chapter Five that the persistence of 
the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative since its commencement in 1993 
until the early 2000s was mainly due to Thailand's ambition to maintain its 
regional role in this area. 
The evidence showed that Thailand started to systematically assert its role in 
arranging economic co-operation in the sub-region to serve Thailand's interest. 
However, regarding its size and power especially compared to China, Thailand was 
willing to lead the co-ordination and sometimes equally shared financial 
responsibility in the scheme. Apparently, limited economic benefits, competing 
projects of the same kind (particularly the AD B's Greater Mekong Sub-region), and 
poor co-ordination between the Thai public and the private sector realising the 
economic objectives in this initiative weakened Thailand's ability to sustain the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation. However, most stakeholders in Thailand 
especially in the public sector still shared a similar view of Thailand's leading role 
in this regional project. Ultimately, the life of the initiative could have been 
shortened and not lasted for almost a decade without self-perception and regional 
aspirations interceding to the extent they did in Thai foreign policy calculations. 
Chapter Five also showed that the promotion of transport linkages in this initiative 
became an important instrument for Thailand to persuade other participating 
countries that they shared a common interest in its success. This was a tangible 
symbol of Bangkok's attempt to weave the Mekong sub-region into its sphere of 
influence through pursuing these linkages. The success of this campaign further 
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ensured that Thailand would become the centre of gravity in mainland Southeast 
Asia's overall economic development efforts. 
Thailand's leadership in the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation project signified 
that its foreign policy behaviour no longer conformed to the conventional view of 
reactive policy. This is, to a great extent, owing to Thailand's decisiveness to effect 
change in Southeast Asia's political and economic environments despite various 
external factors-China and other regional actors amongst the most important 
ones. As an emerging regional power, China could certainly make or break the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative. However, Thailand did not allow its 
destiny to be placed in the hands of the Chinese. Although Bangkok was willing to 
share leadership in this initiative to some extent, it was extremely proactive in its 
own right seen in it investing financial resources and co-ordinating efforts to allow 
and encourage its smaller neighbours-Laos and Myanmar-to participate in the 
project. 
Although the ADB and, to a certain extent, ASEAN were also involved in the 
Quadrangle Growth initiative, they viewed it as complementary to the broader GMS 
project. However, Thailand did not allow its role to be overshadowed by these 
regional actors or institutions. Even during the Financial Crisis in 1997, when the 
merging of the initiative into the GMS project seemed to be economically rational, 
Thailand refused to relinquish its primary role in the Quadrangle Economic Co-
operation initiative. Thai policy-makers initially rejected the idea of merging the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation into the GMS and persisted in maintaining this 
stance for quite some time. 
It was concluded in Chapter Five that Thailand's self-perception had crystallised in 
its foreign policy with clear aspirations of regional leading role in the case of the 
Quadrangle Economic Co-operation. Its aspirations to establish a central position 
for itself in mainland Southeast Asia's economic development politics means that 
Thailand needed to gain leadership based on support from its less developed 
neighbours. The Quadrangle Economic Co-operation was a testing ground of such 
an approach. Multilateral co-operation emerged as a Thai policy preference and 
gained consensus within Bangkok's policy-making circles. Through advocating sub-
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regional co-operation in mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand was able to ensure that 
the rearrangement of the regional political economy of the sub-region after the 
Cold War would work -in its own favour. Moreover, Thailand's role as a broker 
between China and ASEAN could be secured by engaging with Beijing in sub-
regional development initiatives that focused on narrowing the gap between new 
and old ASEAN member countries. 
7.1.4 Elaborating regional aspirations in the Forward Engagement Strategy 
The case of 'Forward Engagement Strategy' in the Thaksin government discussed in 
Chapter Six also demonstrated the role of self-perception in Thai foreign policy. 
Unlike the case of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation, when Thailand 
experienced economic growth and growing confidence, the Forward Engagement 
Strategy was implemented in the aftermath of Thailand's worst financial crisis in its 
history. This crisis created a domestic backlash coalition which centred around 
anti-American and anti-globalisation sentiments. A more inward-looking approach 
to economic development came to dominate Thai society, ranging from the 
influential King, well-respected intellectuals, and governmental agencies to grass-
root organisations. This was reflected in Thailand's embracing such concepts as 
'sufficiency economy' and 'local wisdom' as the alternative development strategies. 
Despite this growing inward orientation, however, Thailand's foreign policy did not 
become totally reactive. On the contrary, Thaksin was initially able to convince his 
constituency that under his leadership, the Thai economy would be restored 
through continuing to exercise and strengthen the country's role in regional affairs. 
He clearly articulated Thailand's self-perception and spelled out its regional 
aspirations as a rationale for his strategy. Indeed, he chose to implement an even 
more assertive foreign policy amidst Thailand's economic difficulties. Coupled with 
the political and economic turmoil in other parts of Southeast Asia and the 
retirement of other outspoken Southeast Asian leaders such as Lee Kwan Yew and 
Mahathir Mohamad, Thaksin's strong domestic support and expressive personality 
helped him project his international profile. 
Thaksin implemented his Forward Engagement Strategy through the promotion of 
three major regional initiatives, ACMECS, BIMSTEC and ACD. These three initiatives 
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complemented one another to support Thailand's self-assigned role as an 
important bridging actor in the region. 
The ACMECS served as Thailand's foundation to consolidate its leadership in 
mainland Southeast Asia. Importantly, ACMECS advanced this interest through 
Bangkok's determination to exercise more · structural leadership through 
revamping its aid programmes directly targeting the Indochinese states. If aid 
schemes were meant to strengthen Thailand's political and economic leverage over 
these countries, why was a bilateral approach not sufficient? The answer may rest 
simply on the fact that, as opposed to hegemonic strategy that entails unilateralism 
in military and economic terms, regional leadership requires multilateral channels 
and coalitions (Doran 2009, pp. 95-97). By supporting multilateral fora, Thailand's 
status became increasingly prominent. This leadership image would eventually 
work in favour of enhancing Thailand's position in the region and bringing about a 
further connection between mainland Southeast Asia and the outside world. 
Thailand was also enthusiastic about adopting a bridging role between various 
parts of Asia. Its regional plan for deepening relations with the Indian subcontinent 
was renewed through BIMSTEC. By promoting closer ties with South Asian 
counterparts, Thailand felt it could be a 'natural gateway' to South Asia for ASEAN. 
This meant Thailand would be able to promote its economic competitiveness and 
to seek partnerships from South Asia as part of its grand strategy for shaping 
Indochinese economic development. On the other hand, by instigating close ties 
with India, Thailand hoped to trigger a snowball effect of support from other 
regional powers, especially from China for a wider regional forum-ACD. In short, 
closer ties in BIMSTEC especially with India were deemed as serving as another 
building block for the formation of ACD. 
The ACD was Thaksin's ultimate ambition to forge an exclusively Asian bloc. To 
promote this regional initiative, he invested enormous effort in seeking political 
support from major Asian counterparts through diplomatic campaigns and moral 
persuasion. Thailand utilised its existing ties with major economic partners to re-
structure regional economic architecture focusing on increasing intra-regional 
economic interactions in both trade and investment. The Asian Bond initiative in 
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the ACD was a significant move in this regard. It was timely and became a political 
catalyst for raising concerns for a more independent and more robust financial 
arrangement amongst Asian countries at a wider level. 
Thaksin also believed that successful regional co-operation required a shared 
vision and identity. Based on Thailand's bitter experience with Western countries 
and institutions during the 1997 Financial Crisis, Thaksin advocated an Asian 
consciousness within the ACD through deepening interaction within Asia. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Six, his approach was mainly based on his belief that Asia 
had enormous potential but had long been marginalised by the United States and 
Europe. Therefore, he called for closer co-operation amongst Asian countries by his 
ACD initiative was one a stepping stone towards this goal. 
Thailand's active promotion of regional initiatives under the Thaksin government 
supports this thesis' main argument that Thailand's foreign policy behaviour no 
longer strictly followed its posture of 'bending with the wind' diplomacy. Thailand 
instead exercised its leading role on every possible front. Its structural leadership 
in mainland Southeast Asia was elaborated into a more systematic approach even 
in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Thailand's approach to mainland Southeast 
Asia's economic development was more cautious so as to gain trust amongst its less 
developed neighbours even though Bangkok's core expectation was to increase its 
influence within the region. Beyond mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand also built up 
its international profile through the exercise of 'entrepreneurial' and 'intellectual' 
leadership in Asia. To operationalise this strategy, Thailand's role became 
increasingly significant. Thaksin swiftly re-organised Thailand's public sector 
including the foreign service so that it was capable of taking on a more effective and 
assertive role. Thaksin and his top policy-makers also played a crucial and direct 
role in promoting Thailand's ongoing regional initiatives. This, in fact, had the 
psychological effect of elevating morale amongst both the Thai private sector and 
regional audiences and resulted in stronger confidence in the Thai government's 
regional schemes. This was somewhat different to the case of the Quadrangle 
Economic Co-operation where Prime Minister Chuan predominantly entrusted the 
Thai bureaucracy with the implementation of Thai foreign policy strategy. 
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7.1.5 Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated that Thailand's self-perception of itself as a leading 
actor in Southeast Asia is relevant in the study of Thai foreign policy. Self-
perception was sustained through a socialisation process in Thai society which was, 
in large part, a state-building project. Therefore, it became an institutionalised idea 
in the policy component, accepted by both the country's policy elites and by the 
Thai people at large. Its effects continue today and have resulted in Thailand's 
attempting to establish for itself a leading role in regional politics. Regional 
aspirations have also increasingly become institutionalised and influenced over 
what Thai foreign policy-makers have come to consider what is necessary and 
possible for achieving Thailand's national interests. Therefore, this thesis concludes 
that this general policy preference has played a role in Thailand's. post-Cold War 
foreign policy. 
Although analysing a foreign policy is a complicated task, this thesis has 
demonstrated that ideational factors have an effect on certain aspects of Thailand's 
foreign policy. They have ensured that Thailand's post-Cold War foreign policy can 
no longer be decisively labelled 'reactive' as depicted by the 'bamboo bending with 
the wind' characterisation. The end of the Cold War brought Thailand's desire to 
change its external environment on its own terms into full view and its foreign 
policy behaviour has gradually more developed into ·proactive posture. Thailand 
continues this posture by endeavouring to position itself as a catalyst for change in 
regional affairs-whether this be either as a leading actor in mainland Southeast 
Asia, or as a 'bridge' between various levels of regional co-operation. 
Starting from Prime Minister Chatichai's 'turning the battlefields into marketplaces' 
policy, Thai foreign policy has been consistent with its regional aspiration, to lead 
the region in its own ways. This continuity in Thailand's post-Cold War foreign 
policy behaviour is well captured by the former Prime Minister Anand 
Panyarachun's remarks (1991): 
Our approach and style may be different but, basically, we will 
continue with the main thrust of the policy of turning 'battlefields into 
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marketplaces' as seen in the larger context of bringing peace and 
stability throughout the whole of Southeast Asia. 
The cases of Quadrangle Economic Co-operation and Forward Engagement 
Strategy demonstrated this uninterrupted idea inherited through generation 
of policy-makers at least since Chatichai's time. 
7 .2 Contributions and implications of this study 
The study of Thai foreign policy in this thesis has three major implications. First, it 
contributes to the expansion of knowledge in the field of Thai foreign policy. 
Second, it offers some insights relevant to the broader field of international 
relations. And, third, it renders some policy implications to practitioners of Thai 
foreign policy. 
7.2.1 Contributions 
As noted in Chapter One, Thailand is a major actor in Southeast Asia; however, the 
study of Thai foreign policy studies is at present somewhat dormant. This thesis 
has therefore tried to 'reinvigorate' the debate in this field by challenging the 
essence of conventional wisdom about Thai foreign policy. By questioning the view 
of Thai foreign policy behaviour as a reactive one, this thesis offers several points of 
discussion. 
First, it offers an alternative approach to traditional avenues for studying Thai 
foreign policy-making. It introduces analysis on the ideational factor as a 
component of Thai foreign policy studies, apart from the threat perception concept 
popularised during the Cold War. Although some scholars have attempted to 
identify some universal values and norms factors in Thai foreign policy-mainly 
human rights and democracy-the major pitfall lies in the representation of such 
concepts. 
As argued in Chapter Two, this shortcoming is evident from the Thai government's 
recent heavy-handed approach to the separatist problem in the southern provinces, 
the latest military coup d'etat in September 2006, and the violation of human rights 
in the political tension during 2009-2010. If democracy and human rights were 
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embedded in Thai policy-makers' thinking, such incidents may not have occurred. 
It is the author's view that an ideational factor directly relating to Thailand, if it has 
an impact c;tt all, should cut across different regime types and actors in Thai politics. 
Therefore, this thesis has chosen the examination of Thailand's self-perception in 
the first instance. 
Second, this thesis has focused on a 'black box' in Thailand's foreign policy-making 
process by emphasising the cognitive aspects of foreign policy decision making. 
Scholars have attempted to explain this 'black box' by employing different 
approaches to understand Thai foreign policy, notably, as summarised by Monsak 
(2003) through leaders' personalities, bureaucratic politics, military politics, 
domestic consensus, and systemic approaches (pp.5-17). These different 
dimensions of Thai foreign policy tend to answer a similar question of what makes 
foreign policies different under differing regimes, leaders, or contexts. However, 
none of these directly offer answers to the following question: 'is there any 
commonality despite these variations? If so, what could explain the common or 
shared characteristics of Thai foreign policy?' The constitutive approach in this 
thesis has revealed that Thai foreign policy, at least, in the post-€old War era has 
shown certain aspects of a motivation or aspiration to become a leading actor in 
the region. This aspiration was explained by the policy-makers' common self-
perception that was formed in Thai history, then implanted and reconstituted 
through socialisation processes. 
Third, by highlighting ideational aspect of in the study of Thai foreign policy, the 
limitations of the materialistic and rationalist paradigms dominating current Thai 
foreign policy analysis are pointed out here. Considering that policy-makers are, 
after all, only human, it is understandable that they make decisions based on not 
only their or the country's rational self-interest but are also influenced by their 
own ideas such as beliefs, norms, perceptions, and memories. In many instances, 
these ideational factors play ·a role as guidelines in their decision-making. 
Therefore, any foreign policy analysis without reference to any possible ideational 
factor may only lead to a partial conclusion. This thesis has attempted to fill this 
gap by testing the influence of certain ideas on Thai foreign policy-making. 
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It has revealed that the selected ideas investigated in this study-self-perception 
and regional aspirations-have at least offered Thai foreign policy-makers an 
interesting approach to pursue their foreign policy both at Thailand's own initiative 
and as a response to external factors. In other words, the thesis has asserted that 
ideational factors are relevant in the way in which Thai foreign policy-makers 
chose their preferred strategies to realise their national interest. 
Moreover, foreign policy-making is certainly part of a country's overall political 
process, and its relevance to political development in a specific polity must be 
addressed. This thesis takes such a linkage into consideration and fit Thai foreign 
policy within this context. By associating the origin of Thailand's self-perception to 
the emergence of nationalism as part of the modern Thai nation-state building, this 
study has attached itself with the broad literature of Thai studies, especially in the 
study of Thailand's political development. The findings in this thesis thus help 
illuminate not only a relationship between modern Thai state formation, 
nationalism, and political development, but also help explain these factors' impacts 
on Thailand's overall international relations. 
7.2.2 Implications 
The major findings of this thesis also have theoretical implications that are broadly 
related to the foreign policy analysis subfield of international relations. These 
implications address several important points regarding the current weaknesses of 
foreign policy research with relevance to developing countries. This thesis can 
therefore be viewed as helping to provide a foundation for a better understanding 
of foreign policy behaviour of developing states in general. 
First and foremost, this thesis has added Thailand's case to a broad compilation of 
empirical studies underpinning ideational hypotheses. Pointed out by Judith 
Goldstein and Robert 0. Keohane (1993), the reflectivist criticism of the rationalist 
model is useful in offering an analytical understanding of the role of ideas in foreign 
policy-making. By employing this theoretically novel approach, researchers can 
examine not only 'what strategies are devised to attain interest' but also 'how 
preferences are formed and how identities are shaped ... [and] matter in foreign 
policy-making' (p.6). 
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However, these scholars also suggest. that the weakness of the reflectivist theory is 
in its abstract and limited empirical support. Despite increasing number of studies 
adopting this research agenda, the focus, again, is on developed countries especially 
Germany and Japan such as in the works of Peter Katzenstein. Therefore, this thesis 
offers an understanding of the role of ideas such as those expressed variously as 
self-perception, identity, self-image, or role-not only in general reference but also 
specifically for developing countries. 
Second, this thesis also generally addresses a longstanding debate about should 
international relations be a predictable pattern of state behaviour without 
reference to human actors' involvement or, conversely, a more complicated 
behaviour dependent upon human beings' irrational behaviour. By tackling 
Thailand's international behaviour through the lens of foreign policy analysis, this 
thesis is in line with the latter approach. It underlines the fact that decisions are 
made via an imperfect human rationality that is bound by historical precedents, 
personalities, past experiences, and cultural and social predispositions (Hudson & 
Vore 1995, pp.211). As reflected in the case study chapters in this thesis, the main 
enquiries set out directly to answer some anomalies in each case which are 
unpredictable by exclusively using systemic or rational theories. However, these 
anomalies were explainable if the influence of ideas, which in fact were shaped by a 
complex political socialisation through history, is taken into consideration. 
Third, this thesis has filled the gap in the lack of research into the foreign policy of 
developing countries. As Justin Robertson argues (2005), the current stage of 
foreign policy research still exhibits a major weakness in theorising developed 
countries' experiences and applying them to a broader set of generalisations. The 
most common theme in foreign policy analysis involving developing countries is 
either the study of their policy responses to external pressures (especially from 
great powers) or the investigation of the management of relations of developed 
countries with the third world. Only a small number of cases are directed to an 
independently formulated foreign policy (Robertson 2005, pp.3-5). Although this 
thesis also acknowledges the external pressures affecting various aspects of Thai 
foreign policy decision-making, the focus of how ideational factors played such a 
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prominent role, in fact, addresses foreign policies that were mainly driven from 
within a particular state. 
Fourth, this thesis also provides a broad understanding about a type of foreign 
policy related to new state's capacity to shape relations in a developing world 
setting. Studies by some scholars in foreign policy analysis note that developing 
countries are less likely to exercise international leadership due to resource 
constraints which make their foreign policy mostly reactive (Robertson 2005, 
pp.19-24). The findings of this thesis have drawn an opposite conclusion. In spite of 
its limited resources and economic difficulties, Thailand persisted in its attempts to 
exercise international leadership through brokering its own regional initiatives 
throughout the post-Cold War period. This means, as the thesis claims, that Thai 
foreign policy should more accurately be described as increasingly proactive. The 
case of Thai foreign policy in this thesis can therefore be used as a building block 
towards theorising how developing countries manage to exercise international 
leadership in various ways. 
7.2.3 Policy implications 
The gap between theory and practice is always a concern amongst academics and 
practitioners. Practitioners mainly find theoretical approaches 'such as structural 
realist theory and game theory' too abstract and simplistic to apply in real 
situations, which are more complicated and specific (George 1999, p.9). Therefore, 
an actor-specific theory serves as a compromise to 'bridge the gap'. It helps 'our 
understanding why certain foreign policy decisions are made' by both individuals 
and a group of decision makers, especially 'when there is an idiosyncratic, 
culturally shared conception of what is good foreign policy' (Hudson & Vore 1995, 
pp. 229). It is concluded here that because this thesis has touched upon cultural 
and ideational issues in foreign decision-making, it should be able to deliver useful 
policy-relevant issues to Thai foreign policy-making. 
This contrasts with the conventional wisdom based on the generalisations about 
reactive foreign policy behaviour which normally cast doubt on Thailand's 
proactiveness. This thesis instead offers a perspective that Thailand has attempted 
to undertake a proactive role in the region. It suggests that certain ideational 
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aspects of policy-making underline a broad spectrum of policy-making elites in the 
·post-Cold War period. The style of policy management matters in carrying out a 
successful implementation. Therefore, the author views that analyses are flawed if 
they overlook attempt of decision-makers to lift Thailand's international profile 
and only criticise that such a policy is merely designed for personal advantage. The 
findings in this thesis have revealed that such a policy preference is somehow 
common and broadly shared amongst policy-makers, not specific to any particular 
group. 
Therefore, this thesis, at least indirectly, has endeavoured to raise policy 
practitioners' awareness about Thai aspirations regarding regional l~adership. 
Such a trend contains psychological effects shaping the country's foreign policy. In 
short, a country's self-perception and its perceived role help outsiders to expect its 
possible international responsibilities, hence create more certainties in an 
anarchical world. If Thai policy-makers were more understanding of cognitive 
aspects and of their own efforts in their desire for Thailand to exercise a regional 
role, it would help that country to consolidate its leadership aspirations by 
encouraging and maintaining policy continuity and unity through successive 
regime changes. 
In fact, many regional initiatives proposed by Thai governments were useful for 
strengthening regional benefits. Thailand's role in sub-regional schemes, especially 
in the Mekong River Basis, has undeniably facilitated the integration of new ASEAN 
members into that organisation. This has benefited ASEAN not only in terms of 
bridging economic development gaps but also socialising and harmonising political 
differences. This has gradually created a more peaceful environment in Southeast 
Asia. The Thaksin government's foreign policy and its consciousness of leadership 
would have created the likelihood of achieving further progress, had the September 
2006 coup not interceded. Policy initiatives in that strategy were also highly 
relevant to East Asia's attempt to consolidate East Asian regionalism and its 
prevention of political and economic turmoil. Thai proposals to reform and 
regulate Asian financial architecture su,ch as the Asian Bond in the ACD were 
similar to those recently proposed in the 2009 .G20 London Summit to resolve the 
Global Financial Crisis. If Thailand's leading role was strengthened it could 
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potentially perform a constructive function towards regional political and 
economic stability. 
Finally, this thesis underlines the importance of Thailand's neighbouring countries 
to Thailand's foreign policy and its leadership aspirations. Thai foreign policy needs 
to be crafted in way designed to modify the longstanding distrust of its smaller 
neighbours of Thailand's perceived intention to exploit and dominate their 
economies, politics, and cultures. Many Thai government officials have already 
understood that these ideas need to work their way into the wider Thai public. 
Thailand's foreign policy towards neighbouring countries can no longer be separate 
from other domestic issues. Similar to how education was used to implant 
Thailand's self-perception of its superiority in its own society, as discussed in this 
thesis; cultural sensitivities can be an important tool by which to change Thai 
attitudes towards other countries in the region. Without a serious move by 
Thailand's political elite to raise this concern and change public attitudes towards 
its neighbours, Thailand's regional leadership cannot be easily sustained. 
7 .3 Suggested future research agenda 
This thesis has introduced ideational factors into Thai foreign policy analysis. It has 
shown that ideational factors are important to Thai foreign policy-making in the 
post-Cold War period as they have shaped policy preference and direction. The 
study has also attempted to facilitate debate on ways that future research can 
engage to develop a greater understanding of the influence of ideas in various 
aspects of Thai foreign policy. 
Future research along such lines can explore several objectives. First, it can present 
more case studies that examine how Thailand's self-perception and regional 
aspirations have played a major role in other foreign policies. The structuring of 
such studies would help establish an increasingly systematic analysis of Thai 
foreign policy. Second, researchers can study further, how self-perception and 
regional aspirations are institutionalised in Thai foreign policy-making 
mechanisms. Again, this task requires advanced and detailed studies into policy-
making processes. Third, additional research might extend this type of approach to 
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explore other relevant foreign policy not exclusively included in this thesis, 
particularly Thailand's foreign security policy. With regard to various 
considerations-such as the rise of China, the advocacy for ASEAN's identity, and 
the emerging economies of Indochinese states in the 2000s-an analysis of the role 
of Thailand's self-perception and regional aspirations can suggest linkages between 
Thai foreign policy elites' ideational and material components and the kind of 
regional security arrangements in which Thailand wants to participate and play a 
role. A detailed study of Thailand's aid policy can also be useful in assessing the 
influence of regional aspirations in Thai foreign policy. All of these inquiries would 
enhance meeting the imperative of better understanding of how Thailand as a key 
regional actor in Southeast Asia perceives and behaves within its region and in the 
wider world. 
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